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29 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meetings with AECASSOWARY/2 21-23 March 1960 -
Dupont Plaza Hotel, Washington, D.C.

1. Present at all meetings were A/2, [] and [].
[] was present part of the time. [] met A/2 for three
hours on 22 March.

2. A/2 reported that A/15 and A/29 seem to be profiting from the SRO course and that they consider the instruction very professional. Both, however, have reacted in predictable fashion to the absence in the course of any instruction on the status of national groups in the USSR. They recommend that at least one lecture be devoted to this subject.

3. A/2 had been asked to draft a paper on ~~the above subject~~ ^{nationalism} for presentation to senior officers of SR in connection with his plea to be heard on the subject by the State Department. A/2 presented the paper (see Attachment 1) together with a draft version of his own conditions for further operational cooperation with us. (See Attachment 2) The first paper had obviously been carefully written and translated and was presented in acceptable form. The second, however, had been done in English by A/2 himself and, due to A/2's linguistic limitations, had to be re-written point by point. The final product, however, was A/2's only. No attempt was made to change the subject matter or to resolve any of the points.

4. A/2 reported that an official of KLM, fnu Meis (Meizhinsky), is trying to arrange a new KLM run from New York to Moscow via Amsterdam, Lviv and Kiev. The airline is offering free transportation to and from the Ukraine to an acceptable Ukrainian American journalist in return for an endorsement of the flight to be placed in American-Ukrainian language newspapers. Expenses of the individual while in the USSR will be his own responsibility. The proposition was considered from the point of view of operational potential, but it was judged to be of transportation value only. No special advantages would accrue to the individual.

5. Michael Holowaty has furnished information to A/2 on the Soviet steel plant in Bhilai, India as requested (see previous contact report with A/2). Holowaty obtained his information from an American steel man who visited Bhilai. The latter reported that the nearest city is located 100 miles from the plant. ||

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The Indians are building a residential development near Bhilai for steel workers. There are 500-600 Soviets working in the mill now. They live with their families in a separate area of the residential development and, according to the source, they keep to themselves after working hours. It was the source's opinion that Indians do not visit the Soviets in their homes, nor do the Soviets maintain servants. At work the Soviets have been friendly and eager to talk about their own steel mills at home. Many of the younger men have a good knowledge of Urdu. A majority are from the Zaporozhian area and consider themselves Ukrainians. Source reported that the Soviets will be working in Bhilai at least another two years, although they are periodically rotated. The source suggested that Holowaty would be useful to the Indians as a technical assistant ~~because of his knowledge of German, Russian, Ukrainian and English.~~ because of his knowledge of German, Russian, Ukrainian and English. It was decided that we would determine through State whether there was any possibility of Holowaty being asked by the United States Government to serve in India as a technical assistant under the India Fund Program and further, to find out whether Holowaty's services could be made available on a temporary basis by Inland Steel.

*Plumstead
been changed
here.
will write
to conduct
action for
advice.*

(6.) A/2 provided the following operational lead: Aleksander Gerega, 2503 Searsdale (Scarsdale?) Avenue, Cleveland 9, Ohio, a former UPA man, corresponds with his family in Lviv. His sister Sonia or Sofia was recently married to a Ukrainian who is now a lieutenant in the Soviet Army, name unknown. On 2 November 1959 he was transferred to Zakavkaz in Azerbaydzhan. Recently both the lieutenant and his wife, Gerega's sister, have written letters to him via his parents in Lviv. Sonia is a math teacher but is currently unemployed because there are no Russian schools in the area. She explained in her letter that although her husband is a Soviet officer he is a good loyal Ukrainian - "he is like you and me." Gerega and A/2 infer from this that the husband is a Ukrainian nationalist. The lieutenant himself stated to Gerega that he and his wife will visit the parents' home in Lviv for about a month and a half. In the meantime Gerega was asked by his sister and her husband to write via the parents in Lviv, who will transmit the letters from there. A/2 stated that Gerega furnished the above information on his own and that Gerega would be willing to cooperate if A/2 chose to develop the contact. Given the above set of circumstances, a discussion was held as to the best means for eventual development of contact with Gerega's sister and her husband. At this point too little is known to make an attempt. Since A/2 had arranged to receive information on all further correspondence between G and his family, the matter was left open and the case will be turned over to A/15 for further development. There was some discussion of the proper method to employ when the time for action comes. [] suggested as a possibility the book routine, whereby a REDSKIN traveller delivers a book to G's family in Lviv in which is concealed a message from G. In the message he makes a pitch to his brother-in-law and sister and instructs them on further communications. In this letter G would establish his own bona fides beyond doubt. The tip off on the hidden contents of the book would come via a separate letter from G to his sister and her husband, sent via the parents. The book would be inscribed as a gift from G to his sister so that the parents would realize that it was meant for her.

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7. Constantin Zelenko, who is one of A/1's most active collaborators in England, informed A/2 by letter that he had had a two-hour conversation with Aleksander Korneichuk, a prominent Ukrainian author and public figure, while the latter was attending an East-West round-table conference in London. Zelenko was introduced to Korneichuk by a Laborite M.P. by the name of Jan MIKARDO. K was unable to see Z until the last day of his stay in London. K brought along a Soviet from the local embassy named Nekrasov, not a Ukrainian and obviously K's security watch dog. For this reason the discussion was not free and although K seemed to be doing the best he could to convey the impression that he was a Ukrainian nationalist, his line was predictably cautious given N's presence. He said that the West was much to blame for the fact that there is little cultural exchange with the Ukraine since Westerners seem to believe that real cultural achievements exist only in Moscow and Leningrad and that whatever comes out of the Ukraine must be novel or colorfully provincial before the West is interested in booking it. K stated that the Ukrainians are very eager for real cultural exchanges with the Western world. He also was disappointed at the small number of translations of Ukrainian writers' works available in the West. Z managed to brief K generally on the state of the Ukrainian emigration. In the end K invited Z to visit the Ukraine and to call on him personally.

8. The above is another illustration of the opportunities for profitable contact operations which are passing us by for lack of the proper operational structure in the Field. Furthermore, it should be noted that this particular opportunity was available outside Germany. We may expect subsequent chances in the future but we shall not be equipped to handle them until A/29 is in Europe and functioning as the director of all A/1 European activity under the guidance of a competent KUBARK case officer. We have long known that Korneichuk is one of the white hopes of nationalists in the Ukraine and is strong enough to maintain his position despite this fact. If the A/1 apparatus had been in place and with some advance knowledge of Korneichuk's presence in London (which we had), we might well have been able to stage an uncontrolled meeting.

9. Zelenko also mentioned to A/2 that he would like to take a trip to Poland and the USSR in 1961 after he has taken his PhD. Z is by reputation at least one of the best of the A/1 collaborators in the contact field and played an important role in the [] operation. In view of the latter, whatever its current status, some thought must be given to the advisability of Z's going behind the Iron Curtain. If it were decided that he should go, he would undoubtedly make a good reporting source (see previous A/2 contact report re possibility of hiring him full time as A/1 staffer). It should be mentioned that Z contacts A/2 through A/29, which suggests a good relationship between Z and A/29 and the probability of a smooth working relationship in the future if Zelenko and A/29 were to work together. Further on [] A/2 reminded us that Z was invited by [] to visit him if he should get to the Ukraine.

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10. A/2 received a letter from Professor Bohdan Halajczuk about the International Law Association Biennial in Hamburg in August (see previous A/2 contact reports for ops plans). Halajczuk has been in touch with the Argentine branch of the International Law Association and has learned that a special flight to Germany for the Biennial has been scheduled with a 35 percent reduction in the fare. Individuals may return when they chose. H has placed his name on the list for the scheduled flight. He has also studied the reports of the previous conference held in Yugoslavia in 1956 to acquaint himself with the material which was discussed and the individuals who attended. Our current plans for this conference are tentative and dependent on further information on the Soviet delegation. As yet we have only A/2's assertion that prominent Soviet Ukrainian international law experts will attend. Meanwhile, however, we shall have to go along with the planning so that if at the final moment we decide to invest in the operation, the ground work will have been accomplished and H can actually go. COS Germany is aware of our interest and will forward information when available. H intends to visit West Africa on his way back to Argentina to meet with Sekou Toure, whom he met in Dakar in 1948. Sekou Toure recently wrote an article for Ukrainsky Samostiynyk.

11. Further discussions were held on the Mikhailo Olynyk operational lead (see previous contact reports with A/2). To recapitulate: Olynyk is a former sympathizer or member of the OUN, beginning at least as early as 1933. His wife is A/2's mother's sister. Olynyk lives in Stanislav (a vital target area in the Ukraine) with his daughter. His wife, from whom he is apparently separated, continues to live in his original home outside the city. Olynyk is a bookkeeper. Between the wars, when Stanislav was in Poland, Olynyk headed a small pottery factory and apparently did quite well. A/2 first met Olynyk in 1933, when A/2 was a fugitive from the Polish authorities and the latter arranged for A/2 to meet his mother in his home. Olynyk has two brothers living abroad. There is Roman Olynyk, who lives in Edmonton and through whom A/2 corresponds with Mikhailo Olynyk. In this correspondence A/2 is referred to as Maxim, which is a pseudonym from underground days which Olynyk recognizes. Mikhailo has another brother, Vasyl, living in Acapulco, Mexico, where he runs a restaurant, and a sister, also married to a Mexican. A/2 has heard that between 1939 and 1941 Mikhailo spent some time in Germany while he was associated with OUN/Melnik. In 1944 or 45 he is known to have lost a son in the UPA. This suggests that between 1941 and 1945 Olynyk might have switched his sympathies from the OUN/M, which collaborated with the Germans, to the UPA, which opposed both the Germans and the Soviets. Roman Olynyk is an A/1 sympathizer, but he is a simple man who is not much concerned with politics. He owns a dry cleaning establishment in Edmonton. He has a son, age about 21 or 22, whom A/2 has been considering as a REDSKIN candidate. The undersigned advised A/2 however that if there is another means of setting up clandestine contact with Mikhailo Olynyk, it would probably be a mistake to send his nephew to visit him, thus calling attention to him unnecessarily. A/2 stated that he has three addresses

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for Mikhailo Olynyk: his daughter's, a post office box and his wife's address. There has already been clandestine contact between A/2 and Mikhailo Olynyk, first by letter via Roman Olynyk in Edmonton; then A/2 sent a message hidden in a razor box via Roman and a Canadian-Ukrainian repatriate. The message described the present state of the Ukrainian emigration. Earlier Olynyk sent a message hidden in a picture frame to A/2 via his brother in Edmonton (text available in our files). A/2 is currently waiting for Mikhailo Olynyk to acknowledge receipt of his latest message. He has already acknowledged receipt of the trunk in which the message was hidden. A/2 stated he could not be sure that Olynyk would be a first class inside contact from the point of view of intelligence collection but he stated he was 80 percent sure that Olynyk would agree to provide whatever information he could and would maintain S/W contact. Above all, he could probably provide information on other members of the UPA and their current status. In one of his messages to A/2 Olynyk mentioned that he was in touch with a former UPA man who had recently been released from a Siberian camp. We spent considerable time speculating on the possibility of Olynyk's being controlled, not only because he is a distant relative of A/2's, but because he was involved in the OUN on his own hook. (He was not associated with A/2 directly.) A/2 is of the opinion that if Olynyk were under control, he would have found some way to let A/2 know it in his messages, if for no other reason than his blood relationship. It is the undersigned's opinion that although KGB control is a possibility, we should not automatically assume that such is the case. Not only might Olynyk have escaped the roll-up, but from what we have learned during the past year, former UPA and OUN members, including those who were imprisoned for their activity, have returned to "normal" life and while the KGB might maintain a general interest in preventing repetition of the partisan days, it might not concern itself with the minute details of the current lives of former nationalists. A/2 further added that it was Mikhailo who offered to help him arrange his father's transfer from the Ukraine to Poland. Olynyk claimed that the proper travel documents could be obtained for the right amount of money. A/2, while again realizing the control possibilities, believes this assertion by Olynyk to be plausible. He bases this on what we now know about the frequency with which Soviet Ukrainians go to Poland and vice versa. The undersigned believe that we should consider setting up an S/W system with Olynyk, providing that the latter reacts to A/2's latest message satisfactorily and as long as we remain fully aware of the possibility of RIS control. In any program to re-contact former Ukrainian nationalists, we shall run the risk of RIS control. The same possibility of course exists in running any agent operation into the USSR and the question is only one of the degree of chance. If we do decide to make a pitch to Olynyk, various possibilities for concealing the pitch and S/W instructions exist. There will be more opportunities for sending rigged trunks with repatriates. We might also consider rigging a parcel, ostensibly sent from Olynyk's brother in Edmonton. Thousands of these parcels are now being sent to the Ukraine from the U.S. and Canada.

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12. At the undersigned's request, SR/Requirements provided A/2 a general briefing on our targets in the Ukraine. The necessity for such a briefing became clear when A/2 and the undersigned were discussing the objectives of our joint operations. The presentation given by [] was very good and stimulated A/2's thinking on intelligence collecting. He also hit upon a line for persuading Soviet Ukrainians to work with his organization in the collection of sensitive military information. (The line is that if the Soviet regime gains sufficient military superiority over the U.S., it might be willing to risk a war on the assumption that while it would be damaged badly, the losses could be borne if the U.S. were beaten. A/2 will stress the fact that the Ukraine would suffer tragically because industrial centers are located there and because the Soviets have placed a large percentage of their military strength there.) A/2 was also able to correct an impression which he had earlier received that KUBARK interest is limited to those Soviet Ukrainians in sensitive positions. It was pointed out that this is not always easy to judge. [] demonstrated that almost any Soviet Ukrainian is within range of a desirable target, and it is often the case that he is not aware himself of the value of what he might be able to provide. This is particularly true of missile sites, which are usually located in rural areas, particularly in the woods, and it is the villagers as opposed to the city people who can provide valuable information on these sites.

13. A/2 supplied the following information on another operational possibility. In Toronto there lives a fnu Mota, a Ukrainian nationalist, age 55. He is planning to visit the Ukraine in May or June of this year. A/2 suspects that Mota would agree to accept a briefing and perhaps would perform some operational tasks. This lead was given to A/2 by Anton Evakhniuk, the A/1 representative in Toronto. A/2 expects to obtain more information on Mota from A/4, who is soon to return from Toronto.

14. Further on Ukrainian emigres in Canada: There is a Mikhailo Sopulak, a priest, in Edmonton who is counselor to the Bishop. Sopulak has contact with a travel agency in Edmonton which seems to be handling the bulk of travel arrangements for Ukrainians who are either repatriating to the Ukraine or making visits. Sopulak claims that there will be 125 travellers from Edmonton to the Ukraine in May. Most are "progressives" from the old emigration, who, as a result of Soviet persuasion, are returning to spend their last days in the homeland. However, some of the travellers are genuine Ukrainian nationalists who are taking advantage of the current thaw to see their families. We badly need an assessment by A/15 of both these groups and their operational potentialities.

15. A/2 was asked about his letter operation proposal (see previous contact report) but stated that he was as yet unprepared to submit texts for approval.

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16. There was some discussion on printing of the INFORMATION BULLETIN, which is now handled on a covert basis by Agency facilities. We have been informed by SR/Logistics that as of the end of June AERODYNAMIC Project will be charged for the printing service. SR/LOG advised that this charge will probably be higher than the cost of commercial printing. A/2 was therefore advised to check the cost of printing on the outside (probably in Canada or Germany) in order to make a comparison with Agency costs. When these figures are available, we can give further consideration to the problem.

17. We brought up the subject of a U.S. magazine article on the nationalities question, which A/2 would like to see printed (see previous contact report). We offered to do our best to help A/2 if he would come up with acceptable raw material. We also promised to look for a ghost writer with a reputation in U.S. journalistic circles. A subsequent check with SR/6 revealed that Waldemar Onoszko has direct contact with Frank Gibney, the Time Life writer who worked with Derlabin on his book. Onoszko offered to submit A/2's material to Gibney to obtain indication of the latter's interest or suggestions as to others who might be interested. A/2 was therefore asked to pull his material together and forward it to Headquarters.

18. We told A/2 that we had investigated the possibilities of adapting full size travelling trunks for concealment purposes and that the possibilities were many. The outside limit as far as bulk is concerned is a one-inch deep area completely covering the bottom of the trunk. (The concealment problem in this particular case is not one of opening, closing and re-opening, but one of sealing material in until the concealed section can be broken into and the material taken out once and for all. This greatly simplifies the requirements.) A/2 said that he would look into further possibilities for sending trunks back to the Ukraine with repatriates from Canada and the South America. We also discussed use of the trunk device with Mikhailo Olynyk, mentioned above.

19. On the second day of the meetings, [] and [] joined A/2, [] and [] to discuss with A/2 his views on what we should be doing about the nationalities situation in the USSR and our operational collaboration. As mentioned in paragraph 2. above, A/2 submitted papers on both subjects. Following introduction, [] mentioned that A/2 seemed to get a lot out of the requirements briefing which had just taken place. The conversation therefore turned to operational matters first. The following is a rough word-for-word rendition of some of what was said:

[]: We operate on a strict need-to-know principle. We feel that your interests as an organization and our interests as a service, even though we are working together, might conflict in this need-to-know area and we are trying to work out a sensible arrangement whereby these possibly conflicting interests can be worked out so that they do not conflict. I understand there have been some items during our past cooperation that have given you the feeling that we have been less than frank with you,

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that you should have known more about developments after your cooperation and I would like you to speak on this generally.

A/2: I did sometimes have this feeling, not just me personally but also my close friends. I understand that sometimes it is impossible to clear up all this situation but my opinion is to have some points clear so that I can have a better picture of what we are trying to do and why. That is important. Now today, I am very glad that this man [] was here because two months ago one of your officers, [] gave me absolutely a different picture and I was confused because he gave me the impression that only he is interested in this area but now I have the picture that the entire organization is interested in this area.

[]: One particular officer's experience may lead him to thinking in one area more than another and that is why you got this impression.

[]: That one officer was a specialist in this one particular area and he should not have seen you alone. Paul should have been with him and then you would not have gotten this impression.

[]: Was there anything in our earlier collaboration? Since the time you arrived in the United States in 1951, have there been times when you felt we were not being as frank with you as we should have been?

A/2: No, except in the case of the radio broadcasts.

[] I remember you said let us talk about it first, so that we could decide what to say if there are any plans to cut. Unfortunately, it was too late when we learned of the plans and I decided it was not wise to do something at that time.

A/2: I don't like to be in a position when I agree to work on a project and after 2½ or 3 years I am not told anything - it is just stopped. That is my complaint, because that is dangerous for the future. Not for me personally but for the future of our work together. I am not convinced that is the best way.

[]: Just suppose, as Paul has undoubtedly told you, we hope to work out a program working very closely with Charlie and Carl. They, of course, will know whatever we are doing with them and we expect they will report to you what they know, insofar as you are interested. I don't think you will be interested in day-to-day details. We are concerned about the way in which they report to you because if they report to you by open mail the Germans have the capability of photographing that mail. That is not a secure means of communicating information to you. Would it be agreeable to you if Carl in the field were to communicate with you through us, either directly through us or from us to Charlie to you?

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A/2: In general I agree.

S.G.: You see, we want to avoid talking about the business aspect of our collaboration in the open mails.

A/2: I understand this problem.

S.G.: In other matters, as when he wants to report to you that one of your men got drunk and he would like to get rid of him, this is another matter. But on the clandestine side we don't want anything in the open channels, so would it be agreeable to you to keep that type of information in closed channels?

A/2: My answer is yes, I agree, but after several months if something goes wrong I would like to discuss this matter again.

S.G.: Yes, but what do you envisage could go wrong?

A/2: One, if I receive the information too late, and two, if I am getting information from which something has been cut out. However, if there is information not intended for me, like information about missile sites, etc., then I don't want this, but I want other types of information. I waited nine months to receive through channels other information.

S.G.: You are quite right; our channels are a little bit slower than the international mail, sometimes probably twice as slow. That is fair enough. I think on a six months sample we could discuss it again. (Here there was some conversation and comparisons of Agency mail and International mail service.) As a matter of fact, if your man has a very important message for you and it is cabled by our man in the field you will have the information in a day.

P.E.: I think sometimes the delay cannot be helped - for instance, if our man happens to be away from work the day your man has some information to communicate, or if one of us is not there when the information comes in.

A/2: There is another operational problem. How will Carl receive information for his man in the field? If we want to be strong here on the operational picture, then we must have the entire picture. We could use a code which we have set up for ourselves.

S.G.: Ordinary social type mail Carl could receive directly at his residence. He should communicate with our field officer immediately when he needs to take a trip out of the area.

(A/2 suggested that Carl have more than one post office box for receiving "special mail." He can use codes which they have made up themselves....like "come to London" may mean "come to Munich", etc. [] said yes, something like that could be worked out and is better than SW.)

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C J: As you undoubtedly have guessed, we have some assets on the inside - some persons on the inside whom we are interested in and would like to pursue and these would be interests that we have received independently of your organization. Now it may happen that your people run across a man who would be willing to go inside and who is suitable in every respect to do a job for you or for us, but a job which would involve an interest that we have on the inside that is none of your business, and that is, of course, a very sensitive matter. In such a case, if it is possible, when there is a person who would help you and would also help us, we might on such occasions want to take that over, excluding Carl and excluding you. Would you have any objection about such cases? We would explain to you that this is what we have done and ask you to tell nobody about it.

A/2: In theory I don't think I am opposed to this. However, sometimes it is important to know who is this individual - the man who is going to be used from the outside.

(C J explained that it would be an interest in a particular case rather than in an individual.)

C J: In all cases, any information that you can use you will get from us. We may be getting more information about which you couldn't do anything anyway and that is the kind of case I would like to know if you have any serious objection about.

A/2: If we agree, the agent cannot be used against Ukrainian interests.

C J: This I guarantee you but I can say even more. This type of case wouldn't involve propaganda of any type. Let me say this. We have been cooperating over a number of years. We assure you that we appreciate the kind of cooperation we have had from you to date and we have every intention of playing fair with you, and we also intend to insure security according to our rules and regulations. You should appreciate that there is certain information that Paul can't know and information that I can't know. What we should like to do is whenever we can is to be able to tell you that we don't want to tell you any more about it and let you know why. We would like to have you respect this and not ask any more about it. We might have more latitude to give you such information where necessary if we could have your assurance that you will hold it to yourself or that you will give it to one or two men of your association and bind them not to tell anyone, so that we could be assured that only the following people outside our own organization have such information. I am sure you know better than I that this is no reflection on your organization. It is a natural tendency to want to tell somebody, but it is poison to our type of work.

A/2: I have confidence in my group. Usually they don't ask me any such questions. I would like to be in a position that if there is something that they ask me when something happens, I am in a position to say "Please, I know the situation and, believe me, everything is all right." This is

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very important for me because if there is something they don't understand and there are some rumors, then my conscience is not 100 percent sure and I have no opportunity to explain and I cannot set them at ease.

[]: This would be helpful. For example, how many of your leadership knew in 1954 about the turn-around business?

A/2: Only three - two and Prokop.

[]: Does anyone else know about it?

A/2: Not from me. Ortynsky knows some information, but not from me.

[]: If you can tell your colleagues, "Don't worry about this," would they also accept it if you were satisfied by us that you have no need to know certain information which we don't want to tell you and that we are satisfied that you don't need this information. Do you think that they generally would take your word for that?

A/2: Usually in this kind of work they will say, "We know you and trust you, but we don't know the others." (A/2 gave examples of the case officer taking over a Soviet contact from Carl. This would pinpoint their collaboration with CIA if the Soviet were KGB and if he were not, then he might be scared off.)

[]: Where there is not enough time for us to get together to discuss something, we would like Carl to take his direction from our man in the field.

A/2: I understand....

[]: How fast can we proceed on getting the improved collaboration started? I think we can do that if we get a clearer picture of who your collaborators are. I know you are a very busy man and cannot promise it tomorrow but I wonder if we can get Charlie going on this. About two months ago we wanted this information from you about everybody who would be useful to you in various parts of the world. We thought on your next trip To Europe you can go with one of us and talk to these people so that we can sit down and plan who these people are, how they can be of more use to us.

(A/2 said this information was not given because he doesn't have the information in his files, and these people are not always personally known to him. He said he sent out for some of it by mail and that Paul said this would not be the best way. Paul stated that he was opposed only to having the questionnaire mailed in the form given to A/2. Paul also stated that he wants information on every conceivable individual who might collaborate with A/2.)

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[].: On the propaganda side what we want to do is exploit the existing dissatisfaction in the Ukraine. This is tied more closely to your view. It is important for us to know the attitude of the people when we plan what type of propaganda we want to send into the people. It is important that we have accurate facts on which to base our propaganda. Your seven points are more on what the official U.S. attitude should be. I think your point about the word "Russian" being used instead of USSR is very valid and I will do what I can to bring this to the attention of the State Department. I am not a State Department type but I can see why non-predetermination has to be our official policy.

(There was discussion here as to there being no reason why the clandestine arm of the American Government cannot state that American people don't stand for non-predetermination, but stand for self-determination.)

[].: We have to make a distinction between what we say officially and what we say unofficially.

(Here there was a discussion on cultural exchanges, etc.)

[]: Your seven points are well worth bringing up to a public forum and we will try this week to communicate them to the State Department and let you know if we are successful. If we can find any possibility of further interest by anyone in speaking with you in person, we would be happy to try to arrange that for you. I think Bohlen would be the wrong man because although he would be sympathetic and he is all right, he is not now concerned with this problem.

(Shortly after this the conference was ended.)

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Att. 2 to Memo for Record
Dated 29 March 1960

OPERATIONS

1. For successful operations the following are necessary:
 - a. A political and moral basis (see memo and suggestions);
 - b. Mutual agreement on the operational objectives;
 - c. Adequate preparation of personnel and means.
2. In our operations we should utilize all available means, including the press, radio, publications, direct contact, rumors, etc. None should be neglected. A balanced program must be evolved. While short-range operations can be judged on their immediate results, long-range operations should not be sacrificed because of the lack of such immediate results; i.e., sympathetic target audience reaction or hostile reaction from the Soviet regime.
3. In addition to the Ukraine proper, special attention should be paid:
 - a. To the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and to those resettled in Siberia and Kazakhstan;
 - b. To Ukrainians in the Soviet Army, who constitute a high percentage, particularly of the officer corps;
 - c. To Ukrainians assigned abroad, particularly in Asia and Africa.
4. In preparing for all types of operations, but particularly those of long-term duration, we must create the necessary cadres, train them, prepare them for their assignments and establish them abroad under conditions suitable for their work.

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