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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
VAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

26 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - Contact Report

SUBJECT: Meeting with AECASSOWARY 2 on 11 August 1955

1. On 11 August 1955, the undersigned accompanied [redacted] to the Statler Hotel for a meeting with AECASSOWARY 2. Since [redacted] had never met AECASSOWARY 2, the former was introduced as [redacted]. The purpose of the meeting was twofold: (1) [redacted] wanted to meet AECASSOWARY 2; and (2) to discuss a new approach to the AERODYNAMIC Projects, both FI and PP. It was understood by both parties that in view of the shifting world political situation, the existing operational methods must be altered to meet the change. As a consequence of the meeting which lasted two days, it was decided that:

a. The study group under the AERODYNAMIC/PP, known as the "PROLOGUE", is no longer in effect. Those members who had comprised the defunct study group would now be shifted into a Psychological Warfare panel. Each individual would have his own responsibility; if he failed to satisfy the requirements he would be removed from the panel.

b. The Psychological Warfare Panel will supply one fifteen-minute tape a week for broadcast from the PYREX facilities.

c. A concerted effort will be placed upon the production of original leaflets for dissemination into the Ukraine.

d. The subsidized newspaper "SUCHASNA UKRAINIA" published in Munich will continue.

e. Members of the Psychological Warfare Panel will analyze and submit a monthly summary of important events as reported in the Soviet Press. This study will be based upon the personal experiences of the panel members and will be interpreted by the individual expert concerned.

f. The panel will begin a systematic collection of names of personalities in the Ukraine whom the panel feels have been designated as Soviet "sleepers" in the Ukraine. In the event of a hot war and should the Ukraine be occupied by a Western power, these people will propagate the Soviet cause.

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g. Pamphlets and other informational media will be originated for dissemination in the Ukraine. These media will deal with conducting passive resistance, what to do in the event of war, etc.

h. Financial aid to the ZChOUN will be dependent upon the new relationship with the ZPUHVR.

i. In the field of FI activities, an effort will be made to recruit and train a nucleus for an agent cadre which would be dispatched into the Ukraine in the event of a hot war.

j. AECASSOWARY 2 will begin to spot a high-level individual who would be dispatched into the Ukraine for reporting purposes as soon as practical.

2. In retrospect, the meeting between [] and AECASSOWARY 2 lasted about two hours. [] noted to AECASSOWARY 2 the discussion was of a general nature, based upon the question "Where do we go from here." He stated that the time had come for a reorientation of purpose which of necessity must be based upon present day actualities. continued by voicing the fact that the apparent harmony which now is being enjoyed by the Soviet Union and the United States cannot exist for any extended period of time and must not be interpreted as a change in American policy toward the Soviets. He noted that extreme caution must be maintained. As far as the Ukrainian underground was concerned, [] reflected that a serious situation has become evident and we must first determine a positive approach to the entire situation before the remaining elements can be used. AECASSOWARY 2 agreed with [] and began his point by stating that his ideas at the present time are strictly theory, but he gave a strong indication that possibilities do exist in the "political and technical (operational) fields" which can be exploited. He stated that, in view of the present day Soviet-United States outward harmony, the United States Government must develop two policies, one unofficial and the other official. The official policy would concern itself with the overt actions toward the Soviet Union and the unofficial policy would take into consideration those plans and programs which would be directed against the Soviet Union in the clandestine field. He continued that it was of the utmost importance that we prepare for the future since the Soviets have and are continuing to influence the emigration. He felt that this attempt will be intensified in the future to gain favor within the emigration. Therefore, from a purely tactical point of view, we must have a policy which would envision an agent reserve which could act as a nucleus in the event of a hot war. He said that the Soviets are building such reserves, therefore it is only simple logic that we must meet that threat with our own effort. However, he added, that he cadre must be based and developed from what can be termed a "cultural" base. This cultural

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base would serve as a rallying point and would be used to disseminate information to the emigration. It would provide the reasons for why we fight. At this point [] interjected his agreement and stated that the cadre must be limited to groups of two or three individuals trained on an independent and continuing basis. He felt that it would be impractical for us to venture into a large-scale training program in view of the time factor. Since the exact time of any open hostilities cannot be predetermined, small groups would serve as an aegis for a larger effort. He continued by stating that there will always be people ready to engage in the struggle against communism. He offered as an example World War I emigres who today have declared themselves available for the anti-Soviet struggle. AECASSOWARY 2 stated that this was true, but that these people must be told of their obligations and given the facts concerning the basis for the struggle.

3. AECASSOWARY 2 then touched upon the talks at Geneva, Switzerland. He stated that the Soviets will exploit these summit talks among the peoples of the USSR by showing that because of the obvious accord no help for the Ukrainians and others within the Soviet Union would be forthcoming from the Western powers. In effect, he continued, the Soviets have given the population two alternatives: (a) join with the Soviets in their attempt to communize the countries behind the Iron Curtain, or (b) go to Siberia.

4. [] returned the discussion to the old emigration when he stated that in the post World War I period the old emigres found themselves, basically, in the same predicament that the emigres from the Soviet have found, i.e. limited cultural growth abroad. However, he continued, there will always be that doubtful element which would waiver in the face of any Soviet effort. However, the firm anti-communist would not return to the Soviet Union. Therefore, he stated, the cultural indoctrination would be only as good as the people at whom it was directed. Because of this nebulous goal, our organization has only limited facilities for maintaining the cultural approach. As time goes on, [] continued, the cultural efforts of our organization will wane to a minimum "in the outer world" while emphasis will be placed upon underground activities.

5. Any individual dispatched into the Ukraine at this time must be of extremely high-caliber, according to []. He must be able to live alone, have documents, live and behave like a Soviet citizen. His mission would be to pass information of political, operational and strategic possibilities. In the event his overt living has been compromised, he must be ready to adopt some form of black living. He would be required to:

a. Disseminate a certain amount of propaganda which he has been supplied him or which he has prepared;

b. Legalize and conduct a covert mission;

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c. Work on an emergency plan; spot and evaluate individuals with definite plans in mind for their utilization;

d. Develop operational plans based upon his personal contacts with Soviet life.

6. AECASSOWARY 2 was informed that the Study Group as it exists today is not effective and is not producing anything that is aiding ~~in~~ the immediate anti-Soviet struggle. Therefore, the functions of this group must be modified to meet current demands. It was decided that the Study Group would no longer ponder the numerous academic issues, but would be adjusted into a Psychological Warfare Panel. This panel would devote its effort to writing and preparing material which could be used in the anti-Soviet psychological warfare effort immediately. Each member of the panel would be given certain responsibilities based upon his particular field. The material prepared will be worked over by the entire group for final presentation. This, according to AECASSOWARY 2, is necessary since, contrary to popular opinion, the group is not composed strictly of members of the ZPUHVR, but is a union of several representative political factions in the Ukrainian emigration. Therefore, to preclude any political friction, all of the members will be asked for their opinions on a given work. AECASSOWARY 2, in a discussion with the undersigned on the following day, noted that the panel arrangement was more satisfactory, since it afforded AECASSOWARY 2 a tighter control on the work output. Under these working conditions, he stated, it would be easy for him to separate a member from the group for unsatisfactory work without the danger of alienating the element which he represented.

7. The meeting on the following day between the undersigned case officer and AECASSOWARY 2 was devoted primarily to problems of the ZPUHVR and the emigration. AECASSOWARY 2 was quite perplexed when he told the undersigned that the American Committee in New York City, had sent a letter to Lev Dobriansky, Chairman of the UCCA under the signature of Malcolm Sergeant, that the American Committee recognized the fact that there were two types of Ukrainians, the Nationalists and the Federalists. AECASSOWARY 2 noted that should this letter get into the Ukrainian press, it would deal a severe blow to the morale of any prospective agent candidates. He further stated that the letter contained a paragraph which related that the purpose of the American Committee was to weld the Ukrainians and Russians into a single nation. This, he added, would add fuel to Soviet propaganda and certainly demoralize the Ukrainian emigration. Since the case officer has always maintained the fiction that the American Committee was a private organization and did not reflect United States policy, there was no way in which the statements made by AECASSOWARY 2 could be refuted. He was told the American Committee was at liberty to say anything they wanted. However, for the record, a check was made with IO/5 to determine the exact wording of the letter. Through (), who quoted some

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paragraphs of the letter, it was noted that Sergeant did say that there were two types of Ukrainians as far as the American Committee was concerned; however, the American Committee could not interfere with any union desired between the Russian and the Ukrainian.

8. The breakdown of the Psychological Warfare Panel in New York is as follows:

RADIO -† Prokop	PAMPHLETS -† Shankovsky
‡ Devnich (speaker)	
‡ Barka	ANALYSIS -† Ciaikowsky
‡ Kononenko (also leaflets)	(plus card index)
LEAFLETS -† Holubenko	TRANSLATOR -† Olenecki

9. At the conclusion of the meetings, AECASSOWARY 2 was asked by the undersigned for his ideas and opinions on the future conduct of any PP and FI activities. The paper is attached. 22 August 1955 was set as the deadline for receiving the first fifteen minute broadcast tape.

Attachment:
a/s

SR/3 W2: [unclear]

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