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10 September 1952

To: Chief, SR/3

From: SR/3 - W2

Subject: Contact with CASSOWARY 2 on 4 September 1952: Operational

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Present at the conference were CASSOWARIES 2, 4 and 15 and [

1. CIA-U.S. AIR FORCE

a. "Please, pardon me! You may have all the friction with the Air Forces that you like. That is none of my business. However, I cannot permit that this friction be reflected on our operations since after all, it is I who takes the responsibility for the lives of the individuals who are parachuted into the Ukraine". With this preamble, CASSOWARY 2 brought out a list of grievances. He pointed out that under no circumstances should the Air Forces choose a DZ without the knowledge of a responsible CASSOWARY member. He further pointed out that the alternate DZ chosen by the Air Forces was in such a locality that had the agents jumped there they would have unquestionably broken their legs and the entire effort would have been in vain. On this point he is quite adamant, since he says that after all, only five or fewer members of his organization know of the DZ's ahead of time, "but how many of yours know?"

b. The jumpmaster, CASSOWARY 6, was given no instructions about what to do if the plane ran into trouble: Whether he was to stay with the crew or whether he was to go with the agents.

c. After the return of the aircraft, the "Air Force Colonel" took the entire crew for a debriefing and left the jumpmaster, SLAVKO (CASSOWARY 6) and the Case Officer [] to wait in the hanger alone for any number of hours. In the past, says CASSOWARY 2, it has been proven that the pilots claim to have dropped people in the right place and it turned out to be 30 or 40 kilometers out of the way. Why were not CASSOWARY 6 and the Case Officer permitted to sit in on the debriefing of the crew so that CASSOWARY 6 would be able to note the errors of the pilots?

*What friction?
What is it?
We told him
nothing; he did
all the talking.
What was said
in the field
is unknown. H*

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d. CARTHAGE 5 had been instructed to use his radar set (Eureka-Rebecca). The plane, however, was not equipped with the receiver so that CARTHAGE 5 would have used the set merely "for his morale". If the Air Force had not intended to use the radar, why was CARTHAGE 5 instructed to carry 28 pounds around on his shoulders for some 13 nights running, from his area to the DZ, burying, unburying, setting up, etc. Such action, says CASSOWARY 2, is verging on the criminal.

e. After four years of experience, why was the plane permitted to go into the target area to a pre-established DZ without some air-to-ground recognition signal? Had there been such a signal, CARTHAGE 5 would not have made the mistake of signalling a Soviet plane and thus endangering not only himself but all of the partisans in the given area.

2. Training

a. The Case Officer - trainee relationship leaves much to be desired, says CASSOWARY 2. For an example: One of the CARTHAGES became completely disillusioned because of a deep, deep secret with which he was being weighed down. He had become an American agent. The way this came about is that he was made to sign an agreement, before being accepted, that he would be "an agent of American intelligence". When CASSOWARY 2 investigated he found that this was completely baseless and the secret agreement which the agent had signed was merely the agreement that he was taking the CARRIAGE test voluntarily but he had been so excited at the time that he actually did not know what he was signing. This point was made not to highlight the stupidity or excitability of the agent but in order to show that there was no real agent - Case Officer relationship since the agent went around for six months worrying about something which was actually non-existent.

b. When CASSOWARY 2 arrived in Germany, "DYNAMO" (Murphy) told him that he (Murphy) was not at all sure that the CARTHAGE's would be willing to jump. Says CASSOWARY 2: "So you trained them to such a point that you did not even know whether they would jump or not!"

c. It is absolutely essential for partisans to know tradecraft techniques, yet these men had no such training. When the undersigned told CASSOWARY 2 that the CARTHAGES did not want to learn tradecraft, he countered, saying that had they been approached correctly they would have learned, and willingly.

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d. The students did not have enough training in what might broadly be termed "Sovietization". This will have to be rectified.

e. Towards the end of the training the CARTHAGES had very little training outside of comme. Instead of utilizing the last weeks for final briefing and overall review, the CARTHAGES allegedly were doing nothing but copying code.

3. CASSOWARY 2 feels that the remaining three CARTHAGES should be taken out of agent training and put in with a larger group because he feels that if they are cooped up any longer they may go sour and turn out to be disposal cases. Appropos, to the entire training program, CASSOWARY 2 wishes to tell CIA officials that after four years of cooperation and experience the training program should be quite a bit better than it is.

4. In the summer of 1951 there was much talk about organizing Guard Companies. After this move was authorized the Misia UPA, inside of two weeks, recruited over 700 young men who were willing to join this type of an organization. Since last year this entire issue is hanging. If the U. S. is seriously thinking of utilizing the Ukrainian Partisan movement during the coming war, then something certainly should be done about it. Not to recognize the potential of the resistance movement, which during the second World War numbered over 200,000, would certainly seem to him to be a catastrophic error.

5. Proposal

In light of all the above, the undersigned was put in an extremely embarrassing position and it was, therefore, necessary, besides the usual "things will certainly improve", to come out with something fairly concrete, therefore, the following was tentatively proposed:

a. Creation of P/M - G/W schools to be run by CASSOWARY 1 with only limited CIA assistance (Cadre schools).

b. Creation of a unit with the following tasks:

(1) CE/CI information: CASSOWARY 2 is in contact with individual sympathizers of his organization throughout the world, including Europe, Australia, Canada, South America, and the U. S. To utilize this information it might be advisable to have his people process these bits of information and give them to us in report form.

(2) To make thorough analysis of the Soviet Ukrainian press.

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(3) To aid the underground in its Psychological Warfare by preparation of leaflets, brochures, etc.

(4) To prepare materials on the party, government, and institutions of the Ukrainian SSR.

(5) To report on the political status of the emigration.

6. The above proposals are, at the present, being studied by the CASSOWARIES. Point 5-a above has also been discussed in the field where CASSOWARY 3 said such a Cadre school would be possible. Point b above would be desirable since our only CE and political information source is CAPELIN and if something were to happen to him our knowledge of the emigration would be cut off. In passing it might be pointed out that for the nonce, the CASSOWARIES seem to be satisfied but they are extremely anxious to have a constructive program firmed up. They have also pointed out that if we do not want to cooperate with them politically, then they will be just as willing to cooperate operationally only, but they insist on having this cooperation based on a solid foundation and not to have our projects disappear into thin air overnight.

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cc: SR/CP

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