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9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference with Cassowary 2 at the Commodore Hotel,
New York City, 2 July 1952.

Present: Cassowaries 2 and 15 and [] (known
as []).

1. [] reminded Cassowaries 2 and 15 that during the last meeting, on June 11, Cassowary 2 agreed to give up his job in the steel mill. However, before any definite arrangements could be made, Cassowary 2 felt that it would be necessary for him to go to Germany to discuss with Cassowary 3 the details concerning future financial arrangements. In view of this decision, [] pointed out that Cassowary 2 should go to Germany as soon as practicable. Cassowary 2 was also told that, in addition to discussing future financial arrangements, he should take the opportunity of going more deeply into the various political issues confronting the Ukrainian emigration today, with particular emphasis on making an exploratory survey of the major areas of disagreement which presently seem to impede the Ukrainian unification effort. [] pointed out that fragmentation of the USSR emigration only serves to aid the Soviets and, therefore, every effort must be made to establish a united emigre anti-Communistic front.

2. Cassowary 2 expressed complete agreement with the desirability of uniting the major Ukrainian emigre groups. He felt that the major differences which separate the Ukrainian emigres are not insurmountable; that there are positive indications that both the UNRADA and the ZCHOUN would be willing to reach an agreement with the ZPUHVR. Cassowary 2 stated that the two obstacles for establishing unity among the principal Ukrainian groups are:

a. The activities and attitudes of Messrs. Margolin and Vietkevsky. Both of these individuals have been trying to sabotage the previous discussions between the ZPUHVR and the UNRADA-ZCHOUN. Cassowary 2 felt that Mr. Margolin, because of his influence in the State Department, is particularly dangerous and every effort should be made to influence him in order to neutralize his adverse attitude and activities towards ZPUHVR.

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- b. The differences between the British and the U.S. policies. Cassowary 2 pointed out that there are major differences between the two governments' policies on the question of not only the Ukrainian nationalist aspirations, but also on the general issues concerning the future status of all the national minorities presently included within the USSR complex. Cassowary 2 felt that the British policy is more realistically disposed towards the national aspirations of the minority groups and, therefore, might be more favorably received by the Ukrainians inside the USSR.
3. Cassowary 2 stated that in the latter part of June he was in Canada where he had several interesting discussions with Mr. Stetsko. On being asked what his reaction was to Mr. Stetsko and the subject of their discussion, Cassowary 2 gave an evasive reply. However, he implied that the general subject of the conversation concerned the possibility of uniting the two organizations. Cassowary 2 felt that Stetsko is in favor of such unity; however, knowing Stetsko as well as he does, Cassowary 2 was inclined not to take him too seriously.
4. Cassowary 2 mentioned that on 1 July 1952 the Canadian Broadcasting Company initiated special broadcasts to the Ukraine. These broadcasts were opened by Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. DeCour, a member of the Canadian Parliament. Both of these individuals stressed the necessity of conducting a determined struggle against Russian imperialism. This was a clear indication that the Canadian Ukrainian broadcasts will be strongly nationalistic and would be more favorably accepted inside the Ukraine than the VOA broadcasts. Cassowary 2 informed [] that he was told by a reliable Canadian source that the opening of the Canadian broadcasts will be followed by a revamping of the BBC Ukrainian Broadcasts in order to make them more strongly Ukrainian in character.
5. Cassowary 2 believes that, although this may be only a tactical maneuver on the part of the British to win the confidence of the Ukrainians, he felt that such a policy is a realistic one and may serve to gain considerably more support for the British inside the Ukraine. Moreover, Cassowary 2 believes that the British are studying the mistakes made by the Americans in the field of Russian emigre activities, particularly as far as the national minority issue is concerned, and on this basis are forging ahead in making a better policy of their own. Cassowary 2 believes that there should be a stronger effort on the part of the U. S. to adopt a more realistic policy towards the national minorities and to create a more uniform U.S.-British approach to this important problem.

6. Cassowary 2 believes that unless the VOA pursues a more favorable line in its Ukrainian broadcasts, there may be a strong tendency on the part of the leaders in the Ukraine to favor the British rather than the U. S. As long as there are basic differences between the U. S. and the British policies concerning the national minority issue, it may be difficult to form a united front of the major Ukrainian emigre groups. However, despite these reservations, Cassowary 2 feels that every effort should be made to establish such a unity, and that in order to finalize this effort, he is anxious to go to Germany to explore the grounds on which such an agreement could be reached. He pointed out that he does not believe that any emigre organization should exist "illegally." He feels that some of the functions usurped by the ZCHOUN are "illegal," and that an effort should be made to iron out these misconceptions. Cassowary 2 strongly believes that a rapprochement can be reached on the basis of the proposal which he gave to Mr. Stetsko.

CASSOWARY 2

7. Although Cassowary 2 believes that the major Ukrainian emigre groups can be united, he would like to see a more positive indication on the part of the U. S. that such a unity is desirable. One of the factors which should be considered at this time, he feels, is the future status of the rank and file associated with the ZCHOUN. Cassowary 2 believes that some of these people may feel insecure inasmuch as they may assume that closer cooperation with the U. S. might result in "punishment" of the so-called undemocratic elements. Cassowary 2 feels this would be a grave mistake inasmuch as the rank and file support of ZCHOUN represents an extremely important ideological cadre which would be of considerable value to us operationally as well as politically. He believes that the change in the leadership, which would inevitably result if a rapprochement is attained between ZCHOUN and the ZPUHVR, would in turn have considerable effect on the rank and file and would also change their attitude towards some of the controversial issues which at present are not clearly defined.

ALSO STATED

8. Cassowary 2 informed [] that approximately a week ago there was a Ukrainian emigre meeting in Germany in which all the major Ukrainian organizations participated. Despite the internal differences which exist between the various organizations, most of the groups present agreed on a single external platform which in a way can be considered to be unfavorable towards the activities of SONR. Cassowary 2 believes that this meeting was held as a result of the newest effort on the part of the American Committee to establish SONR on the basis of the Fuessen protocol. Cassowary 2 stated that the fact that no Ukrainian organization participated in the new alliance should in itself indicate that the present policy

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of the American Committee is not acceptable to the Ukrainian emigres. Moreover, insistence on the part of the American Committee to go ahead with the formation of SONR without considering the desires of the major national groups has so far served only to splinter the emigration and intensify their pro-nationalist aspirations. For example, the UNRADA, which considers itself as a legal government-in-exile, is not favorably disposed towards the principle of self-determination. On the contrary, as a government-in-exile, it expects full recognition of this fact. Cassowary 2 stated that most of the other Ukrainian emigre leaders and groups ask for recognition of the historic fact, i.e., that from 1918 to 1920 Ukraine existed as an independent state. UNRADA goes somewhat beyond this principle in demanding the recognition of UNRADA as a legal government-in-exile. This difference, however, is not a major one and with proper handling could be overcome, according to Cassowary 2.

9. Cassowary 2 made the following interesting observation which could probably play an important role in determining the extent to which the Ukrainian emigration would participate in a political center with Great Russians or other emigre organizations: Cassowary 2 stated that the recognition by the American Committee of the historic fact that from 1918 to 1920 the Ukraine existed as an independent state expressing the will of the Ukrainian people could serve as a basis for an agreement between the American Committee and the Ukrainian groups. Therefore, if ~~Admiral Kirk~~ would make such a statement and supplement it by the reiteration of the present U. S. policy based on the principle of self-determination, Cassowary 2 feels that greater cooperation could be obtained from the Ukrainian emigration in support of the American Committee.

10. Cassowary 2 also pointed out that ^{the American Committee's} ~~Admiral Kirk's~~ recent statement was not well formulated. He referred to the statement made by ~~Admiral Kirk~~ in which ^{he} said: "We are against dismemberment of Russia, and at the same time we are against propaganda for one and indivisible Russia." Cassowary pointed out that this implies that whereas the American Committee stands against dismemberment of Russia, it is only against the propaganda for one and indivisible Russia. Although this may be a question of nuances, he pointed out that the word "propaganda" should have been used in both cases so that neither the national minorities nor the Great Russians would have an opportunity to misinterpret such a statement. On being asked whether Cassowary 2 would be willing to participate in SONR, he replied that he is willing to work with any emigre group which represents the people inside. Moreover, he said that any emigre group which is making a sincere effort

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to re-establish contact with its people inside the USSR would be acceptable to him. However, he does not feel that the present representatives in SONR possess this important qualification. Most of them, he continued, have joined SONR for personal or financial reasons and, perhaps with the exception of the Byelorussians, have no contact with their own people inside the USSR. If this is a real effort to combat Bolshevism, then only the top emigre leaders with sincere ideological motivation and the right to represent their own peoples both inside and outside the USSR should be included in such an effort.

11. Conclusions

a. The primary objectives of this meeting were to persuade Cassowary 2 to depart for Germany as soon as practicable and to have him explore the possibility of bringing about unification among the various Ukrainian elements.

b. Cassowary 2 agreed to proceed to Germany on the 9th of July, or any day after that, if transportation can be obtained. He also agreed that a major effort should be made to unify the principal Ukrainian emigre groups. While in Germany he will explore the possibility of bringing about such a unification and report to us the major differences which have to be overcome before this can be brought about. He will also submit to us his plans and recommendations for action to be taken in this field.

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c. No operational problems were discussed with Cassowary 2. [] casually mentioned that in addition to the political reasons for Cassowary 2's trip there are certain operational considerations which also would have to be discussed by Cassowary 2 with Cassowary 3. Cassowary 2 appears to be aware of these operational reasons inasmuch as he said that he just received a letter from Cassowary 3.

d. Cassowary 2 wanted to know if there will be individuals in Germany with whom he could discuss operational as well as political matters. He was informed that the American personnel in Germany will give him every assistance and that any unsettled problems could also be referred to Washington. (Cassowary 2 expressed the wish that [] be present during the discussion, inasmuch as the operational problems are closely allied with political issues.) *leave out*

MM
[]
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