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Chief, Foreign Division M
 Chief, Foreign Division S
 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

9 January 1952

REDSOX/Operational/AERODYNAMIC

Transmittal of Contact Reports

Transmitted herewith are the following contact reports relative to the proposed plans for joint JAYHAWK-U.S. operations:

- Attachment A: Report of the conference held 19 December 1951 between the U.S. and JAYHAWK field case officers to work out the details of joint operations in the AERODYNAMIC field.
- Attachment B: Report based on the meeting held 27 December 1951 between CASSOWARIES 3, 4 and [] , outlining CASSOWARY views towards the plans for joint operations.

Copies are being sent through ZACACTUS channels.

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3. Composition of Teams B and C:

a) Team B

Guide	}	CAVATINA
Special Intelligence organizer		
W/T man		
Party man	}	CASSOWARY
W/T man		
Escort (may be Party man)		

b) Team C

W/T man	}	CASSOWARY	}	CAVATINA
W/T man				
W/T man				
Escort				

4. Training:

a) Since we have decided to run joint operations this spring and the possibility exists that the British Foreign Office may at the last minute forbid JAYHAWK to dispatch by aircraft, the CAVATINA members of Team B as well as those of Team C must be trained in American dispatch methods. The JAYHAWK training schedule is rather rigid, beginning between 10 and 15 of February, therefore JAYHAWK would like to have the CAVATINA members of both Teams B and C trained in U.S. parachute methods prior to 10 February 1952. JAYHAWK does not think it would be sufficient to send a US parachute trainer to their training area since it would require his taking all his paraphernalia and even a plane. Therefore, they suggest that the six men, accompanied by a JAYHAWK conducting officer, be trained between 1 and 10 February at the US training site.

b) The CASSOWARY members of Team B will undergo the complete JAYHAWK training, including special intelligence, s/w, parachute and caravan courses but excluding w/t training. The CASSOWARY members of Team B will be accompanied by a CASSOWARY conducting officer.

c) The JAYHAWK case officer believes that JAYHAWK Security will insist on conducting security checks on any CASSOWARY personnel sent to his country. Should the JAYHAWKS insist on this, the U.S. will require similar checks on CAVATINA personnel whom it trains. After the six CAVATINA men finish the US parachute training course, all will go to JAYHAWK territory for refresher courses and two members of Team C will return to the U.S. school sometime in April.

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5. Dispatch:

a) Team B - If the Foreign Office does not disapprove, Team B will go directly from England to Malta for dispatch, and only a CAVATINA man will see the team off from the airport. In the event the Foreign Office disapproves air dispatches, Team B will fly in an U.S. plane from Germany. In this case, both a CAVATINA and a CASSOWARY man will be on hand at the take-off.

b) Team C - will be dispatched from Germany with a CASSOWARY man on hand at the airfield.

6. Equipment:

The U.S. and JAYHAWK will equip those members whom they are sponsoring. This will apply to all equipment except parachutes, Team B will wear BAYHAWK parachutes and Team C will have U.S. parachutes. Both CAVATINA and CASSOWARY personnel should be provided with as much of their equipment as is possible before they are exchanged between the US and JAYHAWK. Should CAVATINA personnel prefer certain US items, of CASSOWARY personnel certain JAYHAWK items, their preferences will be honored. This applies to any item except w/t sets and codes.

7. Drop Zones

These will be determined after guides have been consulted, should Team A fail to transmit new contact points. JAYHAWK will not send Team B into the reception point but only into the general area where the contact points provided by Team A are located. Team C will be sent to a reception party or on the blind, depending upon what success Teams A and B have.

8. W/T Contact Responsibility

Until Team B reaches Headquarters, the CAVATINA members will be responsible for w/t contact unless an emergency arises and they are unable to function. The same policy applies to Team C for which CASSOWARY personnel will bear the responsibility of w/t contact until headquarters is reached.

9. Final Briefing

Both CAVATINA and CASSOWARY officers will have access to Teams B and C for final Briefing.

10. In the event the CASSOWARY May 1951 team resumes contact prior to the first Spring 1952 dispatch, the above agreement for joint operations will be subject to review. Should Team A succeed in contacting headquarters before the first dispatch, headquarters instructions will be the touchstone of 1952 operations.

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C O N T A C T R E P O R T

1. On 27 December 1951, [] presented to CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 the general principles of joint operations as formulated at the London conference and the details of these operations as worked out by the JAYHAWK and US field case officers on 19 December. The following paragraphs contain CASSOWARY 3's statement of the CASSOWARY 1 views in regard to operations in general and to the proposed joint JAYHAWK - US - CASSOWARY - CAVATINA operations into CAMPORE.

2. CASSOWARY 1 Approach to Operations

The sole CASSOWARY concern is the continued existence and support of the underground, as represented by CAMPORE 1, 2 and 3. The CASSOWARIES have a moral approach and will do nothing that can in any way bring harm to the underground or any of the couriers that are dispatched to make contact with it. This applies also to any attempts made by the CAVATINA group to contact the underground, in other words, the CASSOWARIES make no effort to determine or blow the "opposition" dispatches as does the CAVATINA group.

3. CASSOWARY 1 Aims in its operations into CAMPORE

a) Contact with the supreme leaders. CASSOWARIES do not accept contact with peripheral leaders an end in itself. (This was in reference to the contact made by the JAYHAWK May 1951 team with some regional leader).

b) Maintenance of a regular continuing contact with the underground.

c) Transmittal of assistance to the underground, but only of the type that helps strengthen the underground.

d) Utilization of information and intelligence forwarded from the homeland on the condition that this information has been cleared with higher authorities in the homeland.

4. CASSOWARY Opinion of operations to date

a) US-CASSOWARY operations

1. CASSOWARY 1 has the moral satisfaction that neither it nor the U.S. has reneged on any of the points listed in paragraph 2 above.

2. Since the first US-CASSOWARY operation in 1949, all of the dispatches have been based on the wishes and requests of the underground.

3. ~~Not~~ one of the teams dispatched by us has been sent in on the blind (it was expected, even though the DZ may not have been known by the homeland) and each one reached supreme headquarters.

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b) JAYHAWK-CAVATINA Operations

1. The initiative for all their dispatches has originated in Germany and these have been carried out en masse with no regard to the situation in the homeland.

2. CAVATINA has made no attempt to determine whether its operations were in any way interfering or crossing CASSOWARY operations.

3. The planning for 1952 CAVATINA operations is based on word from Team A, which has established only peripheral contact with partisan headquarters. Contact with Team A is not a responsible one since it is based on a team acting without authorization from CANNPORE headquarters. The team has been seven months without contact with headquarters and is now operating on its own.

5. CASSOWARY views on aims of coordination

In view of the needs of the homeland, there must be coordination abroad in any operation directed at establishing contact with it. However, coordination also means coordination between the homeland and the various parties abroad. There must be no more mass actions and, for security purposes, there must be no more attempts by the opposition to blow the operations of the other side. Careful planning is essential.

6. Methods of Realizing Coordination

a) The JAYHAWK-US London Plan

This plan requires a joint staff, joint training and joint dispatch. The implementation of this plan raises numerous problems:

1. There can be only one w/t line, yet CANNPORE 6 did not seem inclined to eliminate ours.

2. The plan will give CAVATINA control over contact with the homeland and over the CASSOWARY 1.

3. Four partners means that operations will become a game with CAVATINA coming out on top.

4. By dropping Team B on Team A's instructions, CASSOWARY 1 will be departing from its long standing policy of acting only with authorization of CANNPORE headquarters.

5. The plan will create serious complications in the homeland.

b) Compromise to the JAYHAWK-US London Plan

The personnel in Teams B and C will be equal in number and some system be worked out so that each group of three will have its own leader.

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This would give more security to CASSOWARY members and improve their morale.

c) Alternative to the above plans

1. Regardless of whether Team A maintains further contact, Team B, consisting solely of CAVATINA personnel, will be dispatched by JAYHAWK, and will carry a CASSOWARY pouch for transmittal to headquarters. Likewise, Team C, consisting solely of CASSOWARY personnel, will be dispatched by the US and carry a CAVATINA pouch for transmittal to headquarters.

2. CAVATINA will forbid the SB from meddling in the work of CASSOWARY 1. All operational matters must be kept from the SB. Both sides must make known a list of those persons charged with operational responsibility and guarantee that no other persons are informed of operational plans or details. There must be no more security breaches.

3. Until Team A or B reaches headquarters (CAWNPORE 6 or higher), CAVATINA will refrain from uncoordinated mass dispatches. Both CAVATINA and CASSOWARY must promise to have their teams deliver the other's pouch to headquarters.