

12 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Project AERODYNAMIC

1. In accordance with a request by SR/COP () I have studied the operational chrono files of project AERODYNAMIC covering approximately the past five years with a view to determining the amount of FI potential in this activity.
2. In order to put this entire matter in context it should be recalled that AERODYNAMIC is aimed at the Ukrainian SSR--an area which should be of very high interest to the United States Intelligence Community. In addition to being "the bread basket of the USSR" (and formerly Europe), the Ukraine is extremely important in the fields of heavy industry and mining, as well as technological and scientific institutions of all sorts. Of the approximate 40 million population it can be estimated that a great percentage of the people are not only ethnically Ukrainian but are conscious politically also. Some 10 years ago, as a result of Russophile Scholarship in the United States, there had been serious question as to the extent of, or even the existence of Ukrainian nationalism except in the western oblasts. On the basis of the experience gained in the last 10 years, it can be almost categorically stated that Ukrainian nationalism does exist in a great majority of the enlightened Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. Besides gleaning this from Soviet writings, we have learned this from a number of our Soviet Ukrainian sources, whose total and overwhelming motivation seems to be Ukrainian nationalism. Since these sources are total products of the Soviet system, it can be assumed that other individuals are also motivated in the same manner. Of course, it is quite difficult for Americans to deal with Soviet Ukrainians because of the pale United States policy vis-a-vis the Ukrainian question. As a result of this, our greatest successes with Ukrainians can be expected only if the contacting individuals are also of Ukrainian background, since United States policy can then be more easily rationalized with a view to subverting the Soviet Ukrainians.
3. The Ukrainian emigres who can best be used to our advantage seem to be those who are members or are associated with the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (ZP/UHVR). It will be recall that in about 1948

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the entire Soviet immigration was surveyed by this agency and the product of this survey was written up in a so-called project TOSM. This was a product of at least two years work and of all the Soviet emigre organizations which were contacted and assessed, the ZP/UHVR got the highest recommendation. We have been in operational contact with this organization since at least 1949, and it can be stated with some assurance that this relationship was honest and aboveboard on the part of the ZP/UHVR despite the fact that we were never able to satisfy their political ends and despite a great number of what these people must have considered as setbacks in the United States position regarding the Ukrainian problem. This organization, which purports to be, as their title implies, only a representation of the underground government formed in the USSR during the war, is not a political party per se; this perhaps is the reason why we have been so successful in dealing with them. Since they do try to represent the basic philosophy which was evolved by the underground government of the Ukraine, they therefore are more liberal in their entire political philosophy than is any other nationalist organization (excluding of course, left socialist and communist groups). An additional factor of significance has been the flexibility which has been displayed by the leaders of this organization. In other words, we have in our hands an instrument that is pliable, morally strong, and operationally seemingly quite secure. In view of all of these factors, the Agency has at its disposal a group of devoted individuals who are willing and capable of working with Soviet Ukrainians; additionally, and probably most important, their political philosophy is sufficiently liberal so that Soviet Ukrainians are quite willing to talk to these people.

4. It can presumably be argued that it would be of greater benefit to the United States to recruit and run unilateral Ukrainian Americans or emigre American individuals to run FI operations for us. Perhaps this would be a good solution. But considering the investment of case officer time as weighed against probable successes, it is questionable whether in the long run the group approach to this problem or an individual/unilateral approach would be more profitable to the United States Government.

5. As a factor in operational planning for AERODYNAMIC it must be borne in mind that FI, CA, and CI aspects of such operations are in this case inseparable. At the inception of Ukrainian operations by this agency, these three aspects of operations were unified in FDS/West, which later became BR/3. Thereafter, the duties were separated so that FI (actually KENDRICK) was handled by DOB; CA was handled by BR/PP staff; and CI was handled by BR/3. During this stage three different officers from CIA were separately meeting with ALCASSOVANR/2 actually unbeknownst to each other since

apparently coordination somehow broke down. Presently all of the three facets are concentrated in BR/OA. At one time there were at least four or five officers at Headquarters concerned individually with AERODYNAMIC, not to mention at least two fairly senior officers in the field. At the present time, however, [] is the only officer directly concerned with these activities. If there was going to be a serious effort to exploit the full potential of AERODYNAMIC and the ARKASOVANIK effort, it is mandatory that more personnel be assigned to these duties; as an initial step, in addition to [] I would recommend the assignment to this activity of at least one senior officer and a secretary.

6. It should be realized that the ARKASOVANIK have sympathizers practically everywhere in the world who could be guided by ARKASOVANIK/2 to do whatever we wanted done--within reason and without blowing our relationship with the ARKASOVANIK. Quite obviously, one person cannot orchestrate an effort of this sort.

7. Of all the ARKASOVANIK assets, the one who has done the most thorough job of writing up his intelligence activities is, of course, ARKASOVANIK/29. The concept which prompted the assignment of ARKASOVANIK/29 to Europe is a valid one and a replacement for him should be found to serve either in Brussels or somewhere else in Europe.

8. In the FI field basically the ARKASOVANIK effort has been:

a. REDBIRD operations. During the height of the REDBIRD operational approach the ARKASOVANIK were able to mount some operations but the total is not particularly impressive because they started in the program fairly late and because of certain other problems which had developed around the assignment of ARKASOVANIK/29 to Frankfurt, Germany.

b. Debriefing of travellers who had gone to the Soviet Union.

c. Debriefing Ukrainian immigrants to the west.

d. Contacting Soviets who come to the west either to cultural or other international conferences or meetings.

9. In addition to the above, the ARKASOVANIK have wanted in the past to establish operational contact with former members of the underground who remained in the Soviet Union. At this point of time, however, this cannot be considered as feasible under the existing operational doctrine of the BR division. Of the general

areas mentioned above, mounted legal operations are of minor importance except in unusual cases; and debriefing of travelers or immigrants can also be considered a fairly marginal activity. The activity which I feel we should continue is the last mentioned above, which is contacting (through the ARCAISOVARI) the Soviets who come to the west.

10. Contact operations under ARHODIMANC could be useful and important. The individual who is concerned with this matter at the present time is ARKASOVARI/E9, who will be operating out of New York City for the foreseeable future because of his personal/family problems which preclude his assignment to a foreign post. In view of the extremely large Ukrainian population in the United States and Canada, it seems to me that the ARKASOVARI through ARKASOVARI/E9 would be able to build up an agent consisting of scientific and technical personnel in various fields, to be utilized against their Soviet counterparts at various congresses and other international gatherings. This same type of agent presumably could be built up also in other parts of the world and particularly western Europe.

11. The ARKASOVARI are already making contact with Soviet students in the United States through the services of ARKASOVARI/E9; this is also the case in Brussels. This activity should be given some impetus and redirection. What apparently happened in the past was that the moment there was some sort of an underarms or possible KIB involvement, the case was turned over to the FBI lock stock and barrel. I feel that unless a given individual, particularly a student, is unquestionably identified as KIB, we should play him with the ultimate view of recruiting him for FI purposes; he be suspected KIB or not. This actually was also the case with one United Nations Soviet Ukrainian employee. Actually, I do not believe that the FBI is particularly interesting in running operations against Soviets, but rather, their interest is of a counter intelligence nature, i.e., to protect United States interests. In this connection please note that although we were ready and willing to recruit the "disaffected" Lithuanian, Laurynas KIPOTIS--who had been a second secretary in the Soviet embassy in Washington and who had also been a KIB officer--we were told by the FBI to keep our hands off him and that they would do what was necessary; it will be recalled that the Bureau did nothing against KIPOTIS, thus missing a golden opportunity for advancing the United States intelligence objectives.

12. At the moment the ARKASOVARI are in contact with a number of Soviet students in the United States, both Ukrainian

and Russian. One of the most interesting contacts they have is with the Soviet Ukrainian Mikhail Petrovich GANDEIUK, who is studying in Philadelphia. This young man is the personal friend of PALAMARCHUK, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, and also knows personally PODORNIY, the Secretary of the Ukrainian Branch of the CP/USSR. (As is known, PALAMARCHUK has a variety of vulnerabilities and thought should be given to mounting an operation against him.) Pretty firm guidance should be given to AREASSOWANY/EG regarding his handling of the student contacts, both in the United States and Canada. This area of activity could prove lucrative from our point of view. Another area of activity in which the AREASSOWANY's should be encouraged is contact with the Ukrainian representatives in the United Nations. As an example of this, an AREASSOWANY sympathizer, a medical doctor, Bullian TITOVYKH, had had, according to a report of 30 June 1960, contact with a "Mike" (lma), a "Soviet Lithuanian", a driver for the United Nations mission in New York, who speaks Lithuanian, Russian, Ukrainian, and English. There is no indication in the chrono file that this was followed up. There are people among the Ukrainians who have contact with various Soviet Ukrainians at the United Nations, and these should be followed up in every case. As was noted above, one such contact was headed over almost at its very inception to the FBI. I feel that just as in student operations, the Agency should retain operations against United Nations officials and contact with such officials for the purpose of recruiting these as internal sources. Obviously, matters of counter intelligence interest should be formally sent to the FBI. As mentioned above, PALAMARCHUK, during his TDY's to the United Nations General Assembly annually, should be sought after by specific AREASSOWANY operatives and possibly recruited. Further, the AREASSOWANY's should be systematically debriefed on their knowledge of all United Nations Ukrainians, both in the delegation and those who attend only the General Assembly.

13. A fact which should not be overlooked is that an AREASSOWANY sympathizer in England, a Constantin ZELENO, Ph.D, had played an important part in the recruitment of [redacted] and he had been invited to visit the Ukraine, both by [redacted] and by the famous Ukrainian writer, KOSHAKCHUK.

14. In summary, the Ukrainian endgame, specifically the AREASSOWANY's, could and should be used for all three facets of intelligence operations, i.e., CA, CI, and FI. At the present writing--and in view of our operational doctrine at this time-- I feel that the most fruitful areas of operations in the FI field would be contact operations, including Soviet students, United Nations representatives in New York, and visiting cultural, scientific and other delegations. Granting the basic ideological /nationalistic motivations of a great majority of the educated

Ukrainians, the human target should, all things being equal, be comparatively soft. To do this effectively, however, I feel that as stated above, in addition to Mrs. Stunder there should be assigned to the Ukrainian section a senior officer who understands Ukrainian operations and a secretary. In addition to the inherent CA and CI advantages of this project, appropriate massaging of contact operations for FI purposes should prove to be fruitful to United States intelligence objectives.

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