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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

29 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting in Washington with ABCASSOWARY/2 on 16 May 1963  
attended by [ ] and [ ]

1. Subject meeting was held at the request of A/2 who was anxious to discuss the recent intensified Soviet attacks against the ABCASSOWARY/1 group and his own recent meeting with Yuriy KOSBACH which A/2 felt was instigated by the Soviets. A/2 reported the following information and expressed the following ideas:

A. There has been an increase in recent weeks of Soviet attacks against the Ukrainian emigration in general, and the A/1 group in particular, conducted from both Moscow and Kiev. The attacks consist of public declarations and statements by individual Soviet dignitaries, articles in the Soviet Ukrainian and Russian press, supplemented by a publication of the Berlin Committee for Return to the Homeland, special pamphlets published by the Kiev Association for Cultural Exchanges with Foreign Countries, and direct approaches to A/1 individuals.

B. It appears A/1 activities and publications have given the Communist regime cause to worry. The A/1 presentation of its political and socio-economic program has evidently found a strong response among the Soviet Ukrainian youth in particular. The A/1 group has devoted intense attention to the young literary generation in the Ukraine which has in recent years risen to an important factor in Soviet internal politics. Present attacks against this literary element in the Ukraine drew within its range the Ukrainian emigre literary group abroad which has been explicitly named in the same context.

C. A/1 publications, particularly bulletins directed specifically to Soviet Ukrainians, continuously attacked Russification and the centralization drive in the USSR and appealed to Soviet Ukrainian citizens to defend their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR. This is actually the line along which the present struggle of the Ukrainian people is being waged, as demonstrated in the Soviet press. It seems evident the Soviets have been reading and analyzing A/1 publications quite thoroughly.

D. Among the more significant public attacks by the Soviets were the following:

(1) On 8 April 1963, at a conference of Party functionaries with writers, poets and other representatives of art and culture in Kiev,

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(2) An attack by V. BELAYEV in the 26 April 1963 Literaturnaya Rossiya (pp.2-3) on two A/1 publications on young Soviet Ukrainian poets.

(3) Attack on A/1 publications by T. MYHAL in the Kiev -- Literaturna Ukraina for 10 May 1963 (p.4).

(4) In the 4 May 1963 issue of Pravda (p.2) V. MALANCHUK attacked the "remnants of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" now active in the Western Ukraine.

(5) Article of V. BELAYEV in Literaturna Gazeta, 16 April 1963, directed specifically against A/3.

(6) Articles of V. KUK and I. Bisaha in Visti z Ukrainy, No. 20 for (a refresh of old allegations directed against Ukrainian emigres in Munich) March 1962 (p.2-3) and No. 22 for March 1963 (p.2) (author regrets inaccurate and biased commentaries in the works of emigre historians.

E. Simultaneously with the press campaign, direct approaches were made to A/1 personnel obviously to (a) engender an atmosphere of fright and panic by implying that an eventual physical liquidation might be forthcoming; and (b) arrange negotiations - a "dialogue" -- with top A/1 people in the United States through the permanent Ukrainian Delegation at the United Nations in order to ascertain definitely the ~~existing~~ A/1 policy and aims to and to eventually find a "common basis" directed at A/1 toward a position more favorable for Soviet political purposes and finally, in the case of their complete failure, to compromise A/1 in the eyes of the whole Ukrainian emigration by disclosing and misinterpreting deliberately A/1 talks with them.

(1) Along line (a), the Soviets dispatched to West Germany a group of their agents specifically for this purpose. One, Valeri SHEVCHENKO, who claimed official status in the foreign ministry of USSR in Kiev, (and as such had talks with A/1 personnel during the World Youth Festival in Vienna in 1959), approached on 29 April 1963 in Munich, A/30 the chief editor of the A/1 official magazine. SHEVCHENKO, who admitted that he was visiting Munich in the company of two or three of his friends from Kiev, made it clear to A/30 that he wanted to talk with him *tete-a-tete*. In view of his previous correspondence with A/30 and his attempts to induce A/30 to come to see him at the Youth Festival in Helsinki in 1962, it could be inferred that he was planning to "persuade" A/30 to give up his editorial work, either by promises or threats, or a combination of both. He also might have been planning to suggest that A/30 return to the Ukraine where he would be given an attractive position. SHEVCHENKO's attempt failed, however, due to the fact that A/30 refused to meet with the former alone and brought along with him another member of the A/1 editorial staff.

(2) Presumably with the same operational plan in mind, the Soviets sent, on 2 May 1963, an unidentified individual (Mr. X) to the A/1 Munich offices, who speaking in fluent German and indicating employment

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with some intelligence organization, implied he came to warn A/1 personnel of the pending physical liquidation of 250 Ukrainian emigres among which were A/1 personnel. The source of this information concerning the proposed liquidations was said to be a Soviet officer in Prague, CSR, whom Mr. X said he recently met there. To sustain his "warning", Mr. X, mentioned a few names of alleged Soviet operatives.

(3) Along the same lines, the A/1 office in Munich was visited both in the morning and afternoon, on 7 May 1963 by Volodymyr SEMCHYSHYN of Oslo, Norway, who wanted to see A/3. This visit implied, through SEMCHYSHYN's emphatic wish to see A/3, an intensified psychological impact of the Soviets on A/1 personnel. Among other things, SEMCHYSHYN told an A/1 Munich employee that he had just made a trip to the Ukraine and after visiting Kiev and Lvov flew from Prague to Zurich on 1 May 1963. His visit may also have been made for the purpose of casing the A/1 premises and to ascertain the chances strangers have to meet with A/3. (He did not meet with A/3).

(4) As to plan (b), the Soviets initiated a meeting on 1 May 1963 in New York between Yuriy KOSSACH, A/2 and A/4, during which the former suggested that representatives of the Ukrainian Delegation at the United Nations were interested in a "dialogue" with A/1 personnel and proposed that:

- (a) A/1 personnel negotiate with representatives of the USSR
- (b) A/1 support the pro-Soviet publication, Za Sineu Okeanom, of which Yuriy KOSSACH is editor, with articles and supply an editor for the magazine to replace KOSSACH.
- (c) A/1 organize clubs of Friends of the Ukraine in the United States to develop cultural contacts with Soviet Ukrainians and to maintain contact with the Soviet Ukrainian Delegation at the United Nations.

F. Details of the personal approaches made, attacks in the press and the meeting between KOSSACH with A/2 are being reported separately.

2. V. BELAYEV's book, Granitsa y Ognj (Moscow, 1962) is a direct attack on the Ukrainian Catholic Church and accuses the late Metropolitan Sheptytsky of collaboration with the Germans. This book is not being sold in the USSR because of the objections raised by Soviet Ukrainians against the film Ivana about which Belayev also writes in this book.

3. The Soviet objective appears to be to put A/1 out of business. Attacks against Ukrainian emigre publications are almost exclusively against the A/1 journal and its editors. A/2 feels strongly that steps must be taken to protect A/30 and also to make sure he is sufficiently well paid and well treated so that the opposition cannot buy him. A/30 is one of the most valuable personality assets of A/1 whom the Soviets would very much like

to have on their side, and it would be virtually impossible for A/1 to replace him in the literary field.

4. A/2 requested that he be informed if we have any information as to Soviet penetrations of his organization.   promised this would be done.

5. In connection with the recent efforts by the Germans to obtain collaboration of Ukrainian groups and individuals, A/2 mentioned that during Oberlander's visit to New York and Washington recently, he mailed to A/4 about 150 copies of an anti-Soviet pamphlet with a request that A/4 distribute them to Germans in the United States. A/4 disregarded this request.

6. About 40 copies of a photograph of Yuriy Gagarin displayed at the Soviet ~~book~~ exhibit in Brooklyn were picked up by several ABCASSOWARY operatives and after the back of the photograph was hand-stamped with a message to the effect that even the cosmonauts prefer more freedom and butter to sputniks (see Attachment A), the photographs were replaced on the exhibit table for visitors to take. People were seen taking the photographs and reading the hand-stamped message. The following day, the Soviets had removed all sample pamphlets and photos from the display tables and were seen personally handing them (minus the hand-stamped message) to individuals with whom they conversed.

A note expressing regret for the lack of non-Russian books at the exhibit was attached to an inside page of a USSR-Technical Books pamphlet and distributed in a way similar to the Gagarin photographs. The note was attached to 212 copies of the pamphlet (See Attachment B). (See Attachment D for personality information on Soviets at the Technical book exhibit.

7. Seventy-two copies of a letter addressed to "Dear Countrymen" (See Attachment C) were mailed to the home addresses of Soviet citizens employed by official Soviet installations in New York and Washington, D.C. A smaller number of a similar letter will be mailed from Australia to Soviet citizens in Japan. A final report has not yet been compiled to ~~show~~ the results of this campaign.

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