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FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT
INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

74-124-29/3

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

17 Dec 60

DOCUMENT NUMBER

OBBA. 17963

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| INFO. Chief, WE | | NO INDEXING REQUIRED | |
| FROM | | ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING | |
| SUBJECT REDWOOD/AERODYNAMIC Report on AECASSOWARY/29 | | ABSTRACT | |
| | | MICROFILM | |

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: BRUS 6614

Action Required: See enumeration in final paragraph.

1. Summary Comment: During AECASSOWARY/29's nine months in Europe he has been engaged in the following among other activities: he interrogated, debriefed and assessed a Ukrainian defector (DS-960); he directed a contact operations team at ZRPENNY; he arranged and supervised at a distance two REDSKIN piggy-back operations via Sweden; he investigated the Ukrainian and Russian colonies of Belgium under the guise of normal AECASSOWARY business; he located, assessed, and is testing out 9 local Ukrainian subsources; he picked up several incidental intelligence reports and operational leads from the Ukraine via normal AECASSOWARY subsources; he has on their request aided the [] on several occasions and he has laid the groundwork for several types of Soviet operations in or starting from Belgium. In terms of intelligence produced and operational progress to date, this operation, although it has only begun to prove itself, has been the most productive Soviet project run [] over the past year. In local terms, the operation only recently passed the threshold of real local viability, that is to say, A/29 now has a group of singleton subsources in Belgium through which he can run a variety of operations. The presence of A/29 in Belgium has definitely increased [] (ability to cope with its RMD responsibilities. Thus, the reference requested Headquarters approval for an extension of A/29's assignment here until 1 January 1964.

2. Tersely put, [] interest in having A/29 here is posited on the following line of reasoning: since to date [] has found exceedingly few native Belgian businessmen, scientists, or others who have access to Soviet citizens and intelligence targets and who are also qualified and willing intelligence agents, since Ukrainians and Russians resident in Belgium do visit or are visited by their Soviet relatives, since various Soviet industrial, scientific and cultural persons and groups come to Belgium and can be contacted by A/29's subsource network, since with the possible exception of a few persons in Belgian intellectual circles, Ukrainians, Russians and others from the USSR in Belgium are the only significant element of the population keenly interested in the

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| DATE TYPED | DATE DISPATCHED |
| 12 December 1962 | 14 Dec. 62 |
| DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER | |
| OBBA-17963 | |
| HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER | |
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| <p>Cold War and qualified to speak with and assess Soviet Russians and Ukrainians--- since all these things are so [] believes that judicious exploitation by A/29 (or his equivalent) of qualified former Soviet citizens here offers [] the most promising avenue for recruiting Soviet citizens or for collecting intelligence from inside the USSR. (It is cogent to add a footnote here: first, that [] shares not only the conviction that very few of his compatriots are willing, qualified and interested in participating in espionage against the USSR, but also that among residents of Belgium born in the Eastern bloc there can be found better qualified and better motivated agent material; secondly, that it is probably no coincidence that [] only highly qualified and willing traditional asset for dealing with Soviet citizens is [] who grew up in a Russian Jewish family and is well versed in Russian culture. While [] is also suitable from several points of view, he is certainly not well-motivated nor very willing). In a word, [] has a high priority RMD responsibility for Soviet operations and no more promising avenue for fulfilling it is currently foreseen than via AERODYNAMIC. On the other hand, it must be added that it is crystal clear there are sectors of the Belgian population which have yet to be explored or explored thoroughly, e.g. Belgians with Slavic studies field, Belgian scientific institutes and Belgian businessmen working in the USSR, etc. Hard work in these fields is mandatory and will be done. It cannot be repeated too often, however, that virtually all otherwise-qualified Belgians [] has met (outside of Liaison) are not willing to take on active anti-Soviet espionage. [] continues to search for exceptions to this generality.</p> <p>3. <u>Recent Activities of A-29:</u> A/29 wound up his reporting on ZRPENNY in mid-September 1962. Between 13 August, when he returned from ZRPENNY, and mid-September, in addition to voluminous reporting and financial accounting on ZRPENNY, he dealt with the NIGALEs on the KORNIJEVSKI Case and renewed his local Ukrainian contacts in Louvain and Brussels. Starting in September, he began to get lists of names and addresses of Ukrainians and Russians living in Belgium on loan from his subsources. These lists were copied [] and typed on to cards by A/29's wife, who also helped him translate and type various portions of his financial accounting for ZRPENNY. This card file, which already contains several hundred cards, should prove quite useful in both the Ukrainian and Great Russians fields. (Six hundred addresses found among the KORNIJEVSKI material may also be integrated into it, if the [] can borrow and loan it []). Since September, A/29 has been quite busy collecting basic information re who-is-who in Belgium, assessing and testing his 9 collaborators, collection addresses, finding leads on Ukrainian women or men who plan to visit the Ukraine in 1963, following up a lead on a Soviet Ukrainian woman who is to visit her relatives here for two months in 1963, planning how to run contact operations here, and especially against six Soviet students studying in Liege (two are from the Ukraine), planning the circular letter operation (to be described by dispatch in the next pouch), and, on one or two occasions writing or helping the undersigned write KUWOLF materials on the USSR. In addition to these activities, A/29 has kept up with important articles and books in the Soviet Union which have appeared in Germany, England, Belgium and the U.S. This is an important help to the Station's KUWOLF activities and saves the undersigned quite a bit of reading time. A/29 has also worked with or helped out the [] on several occasions as described in paras. 14-17 below.</p> <p>4. <u>Recruitment of Subsources and Operational Support Assets:</u> A/29 has obtained the confidential help and services of 9 persons resident in Belgium. Please see their names in Attachment A which was forwarded under separate cover on 6 December. A/29 has written a separate report on each one outlining biographical data, personality, his method of checking on them or assessing them before he started using them for AECASSOWARY, and, most important of all, how he has and will use them. None are aware that ODYOKE is behind A/29. All names have naturally been checked out with the [] although the latter have not been informed which of a hundred or so identities checked are collaborating with A/29. They have not asked. If and when the NIGALEs have a need to know, [] will be told whatever is necessary. A/29 agrees to this procedure. There is no derogatory information on any of these subsources, [] or [] files, except that subject 9 of attachment A was once connected with the Spanish IS. While it is doubted that his relationship with the Spaniards lasted much beyond the time he lived there, the possibility that it did will naturally be borne in mind in dealings with him.</p> | | | | |
| FORM 10-57 53a (40) | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION SECRET/██████ | PAGE NO. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED | 2 |

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| <p>5. Further PRQ information is being collected and will be forwarded as A/29 receives it. Since the biography of one collaborator was already forwarded under OBBA-17965, the report on him is very short. <u>POA's are requested on all 9.</u></p> <p>6. Since A/29, case officers at Headquarters and the undersigned all felt that there might very well be few suitable Ukrainian sources in Belgium, it has been gratifying to find that 9 producing subagents with good formal education and social standing have been harnessed by A/29. By profession, these nine subagents are as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An engineer with a University degree. 2. The general secretary of a trade union association. 3. A University student. 4. An editor of two publications with a doctor's degree. 5. A widow. 6. A priest studying for his doctor's degree. 7. A graduate student active in student organizations. 8. A university student also active in student organizations. 9. A wealthy business executive with connections throughout the Belgian business world. <p>7. Please also note that virtually all A/29 intelligence reports from the Ukraine are based on information and leads provided by subsources, who are often cutouts to the Soviet Ukrainian or emigre tourist who is the ultimate source. This has been standard AECASSOWARY procedure during the 14 years the project has already existed. It was the system used at ZRPENNY. A/29 now has subsources in Belgium, i.e. the <u>sine qua non</u> of intelligence production from Belgium via this operation.</p> <p>8. Although some former Soviet citizens in Belgium have interesting, exploitable contacts with the USSR, one should hasten to add that it would be foolhardy from the security standpoint for a KUBARK officer under ODACID cover here to sally forth alone among these Russians and Ukrainians looking for likely agents. This ideally is a job for an experienced agent of the same nationality as his targets. Perhaps it is gratuitous to say so, but a Ukrainian is better at assessing other Ukrainians, as an American is better at approaching and assessing other Americans. (Such was also the logic behind contact operations at the Brussels World's Fair, ZRPENNY, etc.) As far as the [] are concerned, they admit that their coverage of former Soviet citizens in Belgium is so light and spotty that they are frequently unable to say who is reliable and who is not. Thus [] is using an agent with good, non-intelligence cover who has the same national background as his targets and can meet and assess prospective local agents with none of the security problems an American case officer would experience.</p> <p>9. <u>Future Plans:</u> The recruitment of suitable internal reporting sources in the USSR is the main <u>operational goal</u> of the AERODYNAMIC Project, as distinct from <u>intelligence collection goals</u>. Contact operations, tourist trips to the USSR, befriending the few Soviet citizens who visit their relatives in Belgium, etc. are all aimed at this objective. Moreover, the primary purpose of the type of "piggy-back" legal travel operation run from Sweden in 1962 was to spot recruitable prospective agents inside the USSR. Some immediate collection of positive intelligence is also desired as a short-range objective, but recruitment of internal reporting sources remains the prime, long-term aim. The operational goal of defection will, of course, also be sought in cases where recruitment is impossible.</p> <p>10. As to the future, [] believes that A/29 can concentrate with profit on the following general types of operations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Contact operations in Belgium with Liaison support and at large international events in Europe such as ZRPENNY, international World Fairs, etc. B. Soviet citizens visiting relatives in Belgium. C. Legal travel by residents of Belgium visiting relatives in the USSR. D. Occasional mounted REDSKIN missions into the USSR to approach persons already assessed as target personalities susceptible to recruitment. E. Occasional K UWOLF operations to facilitate other types of operations. | | | | |
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| <p>11. <u>Contact Operations</u>: As stated elsewhere in this report, A/29 has been working on contact operational planning off and on since mid-September. One lead is to an elderly Soviet Ukrainian lady from the Rostov area who will visit her relatives here sometime in spring 1963. Her original visit, scheduled for fall 1962, was postponed. Another already active lead is to six Soviet students studying in Belgium under the cultural exchange program. The subject of OBBA-17265 already made contact with them under [] instructions on 5 December (see attachment B). These students are all in the Liege area. The subagent is active in student work and, as his biography shows, was born in France of Ukrainian parents. As the report shows, his approach was quite properly bland. He merely looked them up saying that he was the head of the Ukrainian students in Belgium and had heard that several Ukrainians were studying in Liege and wanted to look them up. The two Soviet Russian students he found in the apartment were most cordial and said that there were indeed two Ukrainians among them who would be delighted to meet the subagent. Medals were exchanged and smiling friendliness prevailed. The subagent had been instructed by A/29 not to get on the subject of politics at this first meeting even if the Soviets brought it up. They did not. (Incidentally, [] will be dealing with A/29 and [] under the undersigned's supervision on this matter of the Soviet students.) There are periodically other leads to individual Soviet citizens visiting relatives here for two to three months. Such leads crop up on the travel lists about once every three or four weeks. Without a mechanism such as A/29 provides, [] cannot get at them efficiently or effectively. The largest and most important targets for contact operations are naturally Soviet citizens visiting Belgium on various types of business, cultural groups, etc. Although some of these persons are Ukrainians, neither [] nor A/29 thinks he should limit his efforts to Ukrainians, any more than his team did at ZRPENNY. [] has been studying the movement pattern of these visiting Soviets (who are here from 4 or 5 days up to a month or so) and has noticed that as in other countries they tend to stay in the same hotels and go out for walks or drinks alone or in pairs in the evening when they can be contacted.</p> <p>12. Regarding general methods of approach and the specific methods of steering contacts along lines of operational interest and why emigres are better at this work than foreigners, the undersigned wrote a Book Dispatch on the subject which was sent to several WE Stations in 1959 and 1960. This is a methodology with which the undersigned and A/29 are familiar. [] at Headquarters has quite a good deal of experience in such operations and can describe the mechanics of them in detail.</p> <p>13. To find out earlier which Soviets are arriving and where they are staying, [] has speeded up receipt of the [] travel lists and plans to speed them up still more once the operations start, so that [] will have in its hand every morning at 0900 hours the complete list of Soviets which arrived during the previous day with indications where they are staying. These will be discussed with A/29 and plans worked out for contacting a few of them. Naturally, few will be contacted and the subagent doing the job will, of course, have to have a relatively innocent way of approaching. This is not hard to do for instance in bars and cafes. At any rate, by picking A/43 [] purposely chose a man from outside Belgium (just outside in Aachen) because he has been to the USSR and is more experienced at such direct approaches than the two men from Belgium who were on the A/29 contact operational team at ZRPENNY. When Headquarters approves his use in Belgium, A/43 will work in loose and discreet tandem with the other two men while he and A/29 continue training the new men. A/43 will also scout out further the best methods for contact operations in a city like Brussels. A/43 is free to come to Belgium anytime up to February 1963 when he must start studying for his examinations in Aachen. Since by the time this dispatch has been considered at Headquarters, the undersigned will probably be in Switzerland on a Christmas vacation, it is hoped that approval can come through in time to use A/43 from early to late January. Three weeks ought to be enough. As noted at ZRPENNY, A/43 is quite effective, among other things, when dealing with Soviet women. As noted in this dispatch, A/29 may be leaving for New York for two months in early 1963 to straighten out his son and his former wife. Thus, if approval is delayed beyond early January, it might be impossible to use A/43 until April or May. It would seem desirable to start out with the best man for the job.</p> <p>14. <u>AECASSOWARY/29's Work with the NIGALEs</u>: Before A/29 arrived in Belgium, Headquarters will recall that Liaison was consulted and gave its blessing for him to work in Belgium. After his arrival, his name was given to []. Without meeting A/29, [] helped him legalize, extended his visa and obtained a true name identity card for him backstopped in a small town. Names of Ukrainians of possible</p> | | | |
| FORM 10-57 53a (40) | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION SECRET/████████ | PAGE NO. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED 4 |

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| <p>operational interest (interspersed with other Ukrainians' names of no interest) began to be checked with the [] soon after arrival. Also, several small items collected by A/29 on the Ukrainian and Russian colonies in Belgium were turned over by the writer to the [] with A/29's knowledge. In turn, the [] began occasionally to ask for services from A/29, e.g. for a report on the activities of the Belgian delegation at ZRPENNY, for translations of handwritten Russian or Ukrainian texts which presumably cropped up during the [] CE/CI work. After Father Ivan KORNIEVSKI disappeared in Helsinki, Liaison asked if A/29 could come to their offices to read and do a CE analysis of the voluminous personal papers and letters which KORNIEVSKI left in his room. For this request, A/29 spent about four days in the NIGALE building in a private office after which he gave them orally an analysis of the documents plus written translations of more interesting portions. For this work, the [] expressed considerable gratitude and commented on A/29's competence and mature judgment. They also indicated a desire to use him as a consultant, CE analyst and translator in the future.</p> <p>15. In REDCAP, Liaison plans to approach Vala *KERREMANS-OLIFERENKO (aka Valentina OLIFERENKO, born 16 January 1927 in Kaganovich, member of Belgo-Soviet Friendship Society; per OBBA-5911 dated 17 July 1956). This woman has been described by two of A/29's subsources as a good anti-Soviet Russified Ukrainian woman who deals regularly with members of the Soviet Embassy on behalf of other Ukrainian women in Belgium who have visa problems, etc. She apparently is trusted both by the Soviets and by anti-Soviet elements. The plan is for [] to recruit and use her for a while. If she turns out to be cooperative and worthwhile, she could then be turned over to A/29, if appropriate.</p> <p>16. On their own initiative, the NIGALES suggested that A/29, and not their own Liege office, try to cover closely the six Soviet cultural exchange students in the Liege area. (See OBBA-17981 and BRUS 6647). Liaison agreed to furnish whatever incidental support proved necessary for this task. [] volunteered that their Liege office would not be able to handle coverage of these students closely or well. The [] have assisted [] many times in the past on contact operations against specific Eastern visitors to Belgium. They have recently agreed to help [] get whatever data is needed to locate and keep tabs on Soviet citizens visiting Belgium who, as the [] realize, may be approached by subagents of A/29 who have already had some experience in this work.</p> <p>17. On the KUWOLF side, N/35 has approved of sending a circular letter (see translation thereof in Attachment C, forwarded under separate cover) to several hundred Ukrainian and Russian-Ukrainian women in Belgium. Replies to the letter addressed to a P.O. box are solicited and will be collected by the wife or daughter of one of A/29's subsources. The purpose of this operation is three-fold: first, to put a crimp in free-wheeling Soviet efforts to use, demoralize and neutralize former Soviet citizens in Belgium; secondly, to improve the climate for REDSKIN; and thirdly, to pick up CE data or other data of operational interest to ourselves or to the [] In planning this operation, due consideration is given to the fact that the Soviet Embassy will be very unhappy with this circular letter and will try earnestly to stop future copies from being sent. The [] and the agent who will service the P.O. box have taken this into consideration and are not worried by it.</p> <p>18. <u>Trips outside Belgium:</u> A/29 clearly understands that his main job is in Belgium and that he is expected to be a general [] asset in the Russian as well as the Ukrainian field. A/29 has worked on targets in Belgium for a grand total of about six months out of the nine months he has been in Europe starting in November 1961. Almost immediately after his arrival, he was asked to return to Frankfurt to continue dealing with a Ukrainian defector (DS-960) in CABEZONE. In mid-March he left on a basically personal trip to the United States from which he returned in early June. In late June he made his first trip to Scandinavia re ZRPENNY. He returned on 10 July and left for ZRPENNY on 18 July. He arrived back in Brussels on 13 August and finished his reporting and accounting for ZRPENNY in mid-September. On 31 October he travelled to Germany and returned on 11 November on business directly connected with operations [] A four-day trip to Paris in early 1962 was also on [] business. Otherwise, all his trips in Europe had little to do with Belgium, but had a lot to do with overall KUBARK operational interests. The principle was established in 1962 that when there is operational business which A/29 is best suited to handle he will be made available unless there is local operational</p> | | | | |
| FORM 10-57 53a (40) | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION SECRET/ TOP SECRET | PAGE NO. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED | 5 |

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| <p>work for him of a higher priority, in which case [] will insist he stay here. The P/A of Project [] and the P/A in the Bulgarian field, [] conduct their operations according to the same rule of thumb and have frequently been out of the country. It is expected, however, that with no ZRPENNY planned for 1963, and with several leads to follow in Belgium, A/29 will and properly should be on duty here the greater part of 1963. As Headquarters knows, A/29 has subsources in most major Western European countries. Thus, in the past year, operational leads and intelligence from the Ukraine have cropped up outside Belgium in Finland, Germany, France, Austria, England, Sweden and Holland. The phenomenon is expected to continue.</p> | | |
| <p>19. <u>The Use of KUWOLF Methods as a CI Device:</u> After working on the CALLIKAK translations, A/29 suggested that KUWOLF methods be used to disrupt the RIS' use of former Soviet citizens in Belgium. For example, there is one Soviet agent here who has been having a running argument with his case officer in East Berlin regarding the equivalent of \$80 he spent entertaining and assessing a Russian, identified only as Boris, who normally lives in the U.S. The case officer, judging from the agent's letter, thought this was exorbitant and that the agent had no right to disburse so much without prior permission. An anonymous letter in Russian to the Soviet Embassy here accusing this guy of boasting while drunk that he had fooled his case officer in East Berlin and had falsified his expense accounts would probably cause this agent to be terminated and would thus get rid of one low-level CE case at almost no expense to KUBARK. Neither [] nor the [] can follow up all low level CE leads, nor would this be a worthwhile expenditure of time. Thus very occasionally, on a highly secure and selective basis, [] plans to disrupt and harrass RIS efforts. Unless Headquarters specifically disapproves, [] will start this program slowly in early January 1963. One such operation is outlined briefly in para. 17 above.</p> | | |
| <p>20. <u>Security:</u> A/29 has observed the same high standards of security and caution as other AECASSOWARY P/As in the past. For example, he does not correspond about operational matters with A/2 in New York except through the KUBARK pouch. Moreover, his address and/or phone number in Brussels are known only to two or three of his collaborators. The others, including all virtually outside Belgium, write him care of the American Express, where it is usually collected by A/29's wife. He always visits his sources and has never had any of them to his apartment. He changes apartments at least once every six months and has not yet been asked by any apartment owner to register with the police or fill out any forms. By Belgian law, he need not register in Brussels, because his identity card for foreigners and registration is backstopped by the [] in a small Belgian town where he has to all intents and purposes his main domicile. One cannot be registered in more than one place, thus Liaison advised him to claim residence in the town, if every questioned by the Brussels Police. A/29's wife has not met or been introduced yet to any of A/29's collaborators or friends. (In fact, the only persons she knows socially in Belgium are the writer and his wife.) His current apartment is rented by his wife in her name. The owner has never asked for or been given his first name. The phone is also in the wife's name and is an unlisted number. When the phone rings, she almost always answers it.</p> | | |
| <p>21. A/29's subsources who are fully recruited participants in his clandestine operations, e.g. A/34 in Sweden, are trained to send him material in split transmission. For example, A/29 wrote A/34 in Sweden the name Ivan TKACZENKO in one letter, he sent another later explaining why he was interested in the man; A/34 phoned back saying he knew the man, would visit him (no name mentioned) and would mail his address "as soon as he found it". Such letters and calls if intercepted would not compromise classified information. [] and A/29 feel such security precautions are mandatory and will pay off when delicate operational opportunities come along or a flap threatens to arise. A/29 has an ease, naturalness and sure-footedness in clandestine work which only mature persons with long experience in unilateral operations can develop. Nothing he does would appear to a casual observer as spooky or suspicious. Moreover, his cover as AECASSOWARY representative makes all of his activities and interests seem normal and non-AIS. He can and does justify all the information he collects by saying it is needed by his outfit for research purposes.</p> | | |
| <p>22. <u>Meetings with A/29:</u> Meetings with A/29 are usually held at his apartment during, or more frequently after, working hours. Meetings average two hours in length and are held about six times a week. [] and [] have also been working with A/29 occasionally on specific aspects of his activities. He writes his own reports and does his own financial accountings in relatively final KUBARK form, which facilitates his handling.</p> | | |
| <p>FORM 10-57 53a (40)</p> | <p>USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.</p> | <p>CLASSIFICATION SECRET/TOP SECRET</p> <p>PAGE NO. 6</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED</p> |

23. Finance: The estimated expenses outlined below are all chargeable to Project AERODYNAMIC. These estimates cover the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963.

| | <u>Paid by Brussels</u> | <u>Paid by N.Y. Office</u> |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| Gross salary of A/29 (estimate)* | | \$ 7200.00 |
| One-half ticket cost Brussels-NY and return** | | 250.00 |
| Rent, utilities, phone at \$160 monthly*** | \$ 1600.00 | |
| Ops and travel expenses, etc. for A/29**** | 1500.00 | |
| Ops or trip expenses for subagents | 1000.00 | |
| Cost of living differential | 900.00 | |
| Salary for A/29's wife***** | 2025.00 | |
| Miscellaneous | 525.00 | |
| | | |
| Totals..... | \$ 7550.00 | \$ 7450.00 |
| GRAND TOTAL: \$ 15,000.00 | | |

* A/29 has never been informed exactly to what his gross new salary amounts. This estimate is based on what he received after tax and other deductions by A/2's office in New York. A/29 would like to know the exact figure for his salary.

** It is recommended in para. 36 that the New York office agree to pay half the round-trip travel costs for A/29 between Brussels and New York.

*** This and other figures below it are based on only 10 months in Brussels and two months in New York.

**** These are computed on the basis of 10 months at \$150 per month. Any unforeseen elaborate operations, such as ZRPENNY, would require augmenting this figure or charging to another project.

***** This expense is computed on an hourly salary of \$2.25, 20 hours a week for 45 weeks. (See paras 30-32 below).

24. [] pays for A/29's rent, utilities and, since he otherwise would not have or need one, his telephone. His take home pay per month is about \$325, after taxes, retirement, alimony, etc. have been deducted. [] recommends that a cost of living allowance of 15% of his gross salary be authorized for those periods when he is not traveling on per diem. This would partly compensate for what ODACID estimates to be a 30% higher cost of living in Belgium (than in the U.S.) for persons without Commissary and PX privileges. As matters now stand the A/29 family is having difficulty making ends meet and apparently have not been able to afford buying even clothing locally. This request for a cost of living allowance is made without A/29's knowledge. Perhaps Headquarters may find some alternate method of equalizing prices for normal consumer goods which are considerably higher than the same items in New York. [] agents, such as [] have received cost of living allowances.

25. In order that all possible financial outlays during the coming year are included here and no additional project amendments will be required, it is appropriate to point out that success in divers operations may well so increase the workload both on A/29 and on [] that there will be a pressing need for the services of A/29's wife as secretary and support agent. If and when this comes to pass, it is proposed that she be paid at an hourly rate of \$2.25 per hour, which, if she worked 20 hours a week would total \$2025 for a 45 week year.

26. [] currently has an allotment of \$6000 for FY 1963. Of this \$3082.39 has been disbursed and accounted for at the end of October 1962. (The majority of this went for ZRPENNY). This leaves \$2917.61 for the remainder of FY 1963. For the remainder of the 2nd Quarter of FY 1963, i.e. November and December 1962, [] estimates that a maximum of \$700 will be spent. This would leave \$2217.61 for the rest of FY 1963. According to the figures in para. 23

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| <p>above, the estimated total [] expenses in AERODYNAMIC will not exceed \$2885. This is only \$668.39 above what is currently allotted and available. Since the operation is not likely to expend money as heavily in the second half of FY 1963 as in the first half of FY 1964, <u>no change or increase in the present FY 1963 allotment is requested or required.</u> All that is needed is Headquarters approval to disburse funds for the new purposes enumerated in para. 23. <u>For the first half of FY 1964, an allotment of \$4650 is requested.</u> (This represents \$4665 rounded off.)</p> <p>27. <u>Press articles:</u> A/29 helped the undersigned compose the Stashynski article edited and printed by [] in the "Libre Belgique" of 13-14 October 1962. A/29 also helped out on another article by the writer on Georgia and Georgian nationalism which was to have been printed by the "Libre Belgique" and distributed to the Georgian dancers while the Georgian National Ballet was in town. The Cuban and Indian crises erupted just a few days before this was to go to press and monopolized so much space that [] decided he could not use it.</p> <p>28. A/29 also gave the undersigned several valuable factual and editorial suggestions on a background article on the significance of the Novochoerkassk and other uprisings of 1961 and 1962. This article is now in the possession of [] who claims that he intends to use it. A copy of this article if forwarded as Attachment D.</p> <p>29. <u>Cover:</u> When A/29 first arrived in Belgium he arranged for the printing in Belgium of Attachment E (which is forwarded under separate cover). He has gone through the motions of writing several articles for the Belgian press to be passed through subject 9 of Attachment A. The normal AECASSOWARY interest in information on the Ukraine and on the emigration has stood him in good stead and has not been questioned. Thus A/29 is able to serve as [] eyes and ears in the Ukrainian and Russian fields without attributability to the AIS. There have been no security problems.</p> <p>30. <u>A/29's wife:</u> This young woman naturally does not participate in any way in operational discussions held with her husband and he claims to have used the need-to-know principle scrupulously with her. She did translate and type parts of the ZRPENNY accounting from Ukrainian at the undersigned's request when A/29 was too busy on other matters. She has also typed up many of the address cards on Ukrainians and Russians living in Belgium collected by her husband.</p> <p>31. Since she has not found it possible to find even a part-time job in Belgium, she will probably be returning to New York soon to resume her job at the Addox company. This will be unfortunate from [] point of view since she picked up mail for her husband, did errands for him, used her name instead of his, typed cards, etc. Moreover, she would undoubtedly have been of use in getting the confidence of Ukrainian women who not only travel far more frequently than the men to see relatives in the homeland, but also come from the USSR on visits here more frequently. A/29 will naturally try to find a local source to help him out on these tasks if his wife is in New York.</p> <p>32. Nevertheless, as stated in para. 25 above, if his operations should expand and genuinely require the services of his wife, [] will propose that she be used and will propose that she receive \$2.25 per hour salary. Such a proposal can be considered on its merits at that time.</p> <p>33. A biographical statement on <u>A/29's wife</u> follows under separate cover as Attachment F. Since operational need for her services on clandestine activities may crop up at any time, a POA is requested.</p> <p>34. <u>A/29's personal problems:</u> When A/29 left New York he was told by A/29 that he would be in Belgium on 6 months TDY after which PCS for him or for some one else would be considered, if warranted. Since that time A/29's tenure in Brussels has been vague which has hampered somewhat operational planning. There are two principle reasons for this, one of which involves his family and financial problems. The other reason involves the large number of elements which must agree to or put up with his assignment here, i.e. himself, his former wife (who is trying vigorously to pull him back to New York), A/2, [] and Headquarters. It is his family and financial problems which will be discussed here.</p> | | | | |
| FORM 10-57 53a (40) | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION SECRET/████████ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED | PAGE NO. 8 |

35. A/29 is a rather dry, self-effacing intellectual who has been in intelligence for 20 years. He has a rather high order of aptitude and experience in clandestine operations. Nevertheless, he has managed to complicate his personal life by a divorce followed by a marriage to his first wife's younger sister. Were his first wife not a neurotic with a Slavic gift for intrigue and had he not had a son whom he adores by his first marriage, his family life now would be much more serene. Knowing his attachment to his son, his first wife has been pestering him with letters claiming that the boy is having great difficulty adjusting to his first year in school and needs his father. The younger sister predicts that the first wife will storm the AECASSOWARY office in New York and in general raise cane, as she has often done in the past to get her own way.

36. Under these circumstances, A/29 is torn between his strong desire to continue his work in Belgium and his strong feeling of responsibility for his son. He seems genuinely disgusted and irritated that his personal problems have to influence his professional career. The writer believes he is sincere in this. If Headquarters doubts the man's sincerity, however, his Wechsler-Bellevue test results might be checked again and A/2 could be asked what his first wife has been doing in New York. A/29 has come up with a proposal that he be allowed to return to New York for two months in early 1963 to straighten out his son and his first wife. He has also asked that, if he is to remain in Europe, A/2 pay the cost of his round-trip travel (about \$450) because he is unable to pay for it himself out of his salary because of the high cost of living in Belgium. Briefly put, if [redacted] confronted by the choice of having him away for two months or not having him at all, [redacted] would prefer to recommend approval of at least a compromise arrangement, i.e. he is allowed to go to New York for two months (not three as last year) and that his cover organization agree to pay for at least half the trip. [redacted] has gone over with A/29 the other AECASSOWARYs who might be used to replace him permanently, but none with the proper intelligence background appear to be available. An exchange of correspondence between A/29 and A/2 on his personal problem is included at Attachment G. While A/29 is in New York, he can remain in letter contact with his subsources here on the collection of new leads, but obviously contact and other operations cannot be run without him. Perhaps Headquarters and A/2 can devise some other alternate arrangement whereby [redacted] will not be deprived permanently of A/29 or his equivalent.

37. List of Attachments:

- A. Reports on 9 subsources (Forwarded under separate cover on 6 December).
- B. Initial Contact Report re Six Soviet Students.
- C. Circular Letter to Ukrainian Women (U/S/C).
- D. KUWOLF Press Article.
- E. Cover Publication (U/S/C).
- F. PRQ Data on A/29's Wife (U/S/C).
- G. Correspondence with A/2.

38. The following Headquarters action is requested:

- A. Comment on intelligence produced to date.
- B. POA's on 9 subagents.
- C. Approval to extend A/29's tour in Brussels until 1 January 1964.
- D. Approval of a modest cost of living allowance.
- E. Approval of one trip to New York in 1963.
- F. POA for A/29's wife.
- G. Inform A/29 of his total gross salary.

Attachments:
As stated in para 37.

Distribution:
2 - SR w/atts, 1 cy.
2 - WE w/atts, 1 cy.

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SUBJECT: Visit of G. on 5 Dec 1962 to KUCZENKO, Boris
and KUPAREV, Georgi,
Soviet students living in LIEGE, 69, Rue de Parc.

SOURCE: G.

DATE: 6 Dec 1962

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per CSN 43-43

1. On 5 Dec 1962, at 10.59 hrs G. arrived by train in LIEGE and went directly to the Centre Sociale de L'Universite Liege, Rue de L'Universite, 1st (European) floor, third door on the left, TEL. 23-50-25, in order to get the address of KUCZENKO and his friends. G. was directed to the Centre Sociale by the receptionist at the Hotel des Terrasses, Liege on his previous trip there on 22 Nov 1962. In the meantime he also telephoned the Centre Sociale from Louvain and found out that in charge of this Center was M-le MOTARTT, fnu.

G. was given the addresses of KUCZENKO and KAZANTSEV as 69 Rue de Parc and that of WASSILIEV as the Home of Foreign students, by a Center employee without any difficulties. The employee did not ask him who he was and why he wanted the addresses.

From the Center G. went to 69 Rue de Parc. On the resident lists G. found the names: KUCZENKO and KUPAREV. The building itself is quite an impressive one and is located in one of the best residential areas of Liege. KUCZENKO and KUPAREV occupy one apartment on the ground floor.

G. rang the bell for KUCZENKO and then KUPAREV but nobody answered. He tried it in the late afternoon again but nobody was home. Finally G. succeeded in meeting KUCZENKO at 18 hrs. G. introduced himself in French and was asked by KUCZENKO to enter. ~~xxxxxxx~~ G. explained that he was member of the Centre International des Etudiants Etrangers and after having come across his name thought KUCZENKO was a Ukrainian and decided therefore to visit him. G. said that he was a Frenchman of Ukrainian origin and being just now in Liege used this opportunity to introduce himself. KUCZENKO was very amiable, asked G. to feel "like at home" and was at ease. He explained to G. that he was Russian from Leningrad and ~~xxxxxxx~~ politely when G. told him that he thought all names with "enko" were Ukrainian.

2. G. was talking with KUCZENKO in his dining room which also serves as his studio. The room and the whole apartment in general is well furnished and looks "bourgeois".

3. After G. told KUCZENKO that he was of Ukrainian origin K. asked whether he spoke Russian, and he switched at once to it. G. explained that he knew very little Russian but was much better in Ukrainian. K. interrupted him that he understood Ukrainian too but hoped G. would not mind when he himself continued to talk in Russian. After that they spoke mostly Russian and Ukrainian, and

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4. K. asked G. where from he had his address and who told him his name. G. explained again that he had from the Students Committee in Lovain which keeps trace of all the foreign students and that he paid his visit accidentally taking advantage of being in Liege. K. was interested in the Centre International des Etudiants Etrangeres and seemed not to know what meant Louvain. G. explained and took out of his pocket the Programme of the Evening of this Centre which took place just last Saturday. K. excused himself that he misunderstood the word Lovain and read with quite an interest the program. In the meantime G. also explained that the Centre was a purely professional students organization, they were organizing social evenings, dances, also lectures aso.

When reading about the performance of Ukrainian group in the program K. asked what kind of Ukrainians they were. G. replied that they were young students born abroad. His own parents, for instance, came to France still in 1933 or 1934.

Then K. asked about the Yugoslav group - who they were? G. said that probably like Ukrainian students. K. did not comment and only smiled. Again he asked the same question about the Chinese group and whether they were from Red China. G. replied that they came from Formosa. K. did not comment only smiled. The same reaction came when the Hungarian group consisted of the students who took part in Revolution of 1956.

Prior to that, before G. showed K. the programme, K. asked him to write down the name of the Centre International des Etudiants Etrangeres. G. did it and also told K. that he always could meet him there.

5. G. told K. that he was a student of International Relations, that just now he was working on a paper about Common Market and Comecon, that his mother died a few years ago and he had only father at home in France.

6. In his turn K. told G. that he graduated from Technical Institute in LENINGRAD, that he was specializing "in electricity", his parents live in Leningrad, also his grandfather was still alive. He also has brothers and sisters. While at the Institute he learned English and is more fluent in it than in French. Recently before coming to Belgium he worked very hard on French in particular on technical terms. K. is single. Now he continues to learn French (his French was ~~fixix~~ rather fluent though "too grammatical"), mostly at home on his own, from time to time he also listens to lectures at the University. So far he did very little on his research because first of all he wants to improve his French.

K. came to Liege on a Students-Exchange scheme. There were six of them. All are doing research in various fields. They were scheduled to stay here for one year. On the same scheme six Belgian students went to the Soviet Union.

When G. remarked that he wondered whether K. could learn very much on his subject in Belgium since probably the Soviets were much better in this field, K. replied that this might be true

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but "it never hurts to know what the others are doing".

7. When ~~xxxxxxx~~ talking about French, the difficulty or rather the ease of learning it for Slavic people, K. showed G. a long sheet of paper spread over two tables with French verbs. They laughed about "methodical planning" even in learning French by engineers. K. also remarked that all his friends were now very busy with French and practically did nothing on their research. "But we still got one year ahead".

8. K. liked Belgium and life in Liege. He and his friends were eating mostly in restaurants, ~~xxx~~ but sometimes they prepared their own meals at home.

9. When the telephone rang, K. went to the bedroom, and G. was joined by KUFAREV. The latter introduced himself, pointed to his hand still with dough, that he was cooking something, and asked G. who he was and what he was studying. He himself was an engineer, stemmed from Tomsk, it took him 6 years to finish his studies, actually most studies in the Soviet Union last that long, and that in recent years a particular emphasis was put on practice and work in laboratories. When G. told him that medical studies in Belgium take 7 years, KUFAREV remarked that in the Soviet Union practically only five and he thought this was sufficient. KUFAREV repeated that there were 6 of them in Liege, some of them still without exact assignment as to their research, but they did not mind because it gave them the chance to learn French. They didn't have still many friends but as they were six, it was sufficient a number to keep company each other. Mostly they go out all six together. Just now they were planning to go out and the telephone was from their Soviet friends.


10. When KUCZENKO returned from the telephone, G. excused himself for taking their time and since they want to go out, he was going to leave them. KUCZENKO assured him politely that "not at all" but KUFAREV went at once to put "proper suit on". KUCZENKO gladly agreed to show G. his way to the Station and told him also that there were two Ukrainians in their group - one from KIEV and one from DNEPROPETROVSK. When G. asked for their names and whether ~~xxx~~ K. could put him in contact with them, he assured him that he would do it gladly and wrote him down KAZANTSEV's name and telephone. K. thought the best way to contact KAZANTSEV would be to telephone him and fix an appointment. The name and telephone of KAZANTSEV G. was given in the corridor on the way out. KUCZENKO thanked G. for his visit and told him that he was always welcome at their house. G. on his part assured him that they will probably meet again and perhaps one day they will go to Louvain where G. would introduce them gladly to other foreign students.

11. When G. entered room of K. a young man of about 25 years old, in grey sport suit, was leaving KUCZENKO's studio. He looked like a Belgian. He did not turn up when G. was leaving.

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12. Before G. left, KUCZENKO, excusing himself that he did not remember G's name, asked for it again. G. told him again his name stating his address as that of the Centre Internationales where he could always reach him. K. wrote down his name in his notebook.

H.C.] POB 1937, USSR, Ukraine, occ electrical

13. KUCZENKO, Boris - aged 25, 5'7, somewhat heavy set, broad shoulders, round face, black curly hair combed back, black eyes, slightly upturned nose, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ clean shaven, no glasses, very sympathetic, mostly smiling, seems to be good natured, social type. Correct and polite. Typical Slav. Speaks Russian, English and French.

H.C.] engineer, Belgium, Liege

14. KUFAREV, Georgiy - aged 30-35, 5'8, slim, slim oval almost longish face, pointed features, straight pointed nose, black high-~~xxxx~~ croocut, small moustache, no glasses. Intelligent face, rather inquisitive, somewhat suspicious, talks very fast, puts pointed questions, likes to get to the bottom of everything.

was studying at the University of Liege

15. Telephone number of KAZANTSEV, Evgeni : 23 32 55.

15. G. left K's house at about 19.10 hrs.

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cit USSR


Belgium, Liege

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


Sketch of the K's apartment



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C
Dear Contrywomen,

You are herewith addressed by a group of your friends, by Ukrainian women such as yourself, who during or as a consequence of the last war, were finally resettled on Belgian and Dutch soil, where we found shelter, family and a new life. We address you on a very important matter for all of us, which concerns ourselves, our relatives here and in the Motherland, and our future.

Thinking about our position here, about the situation in the Motherland, and in the world, we came to ^{certain} conclusions and thoughts, which we consider our duty to share with you. We appeal to you to help in our undertaking.

What is the problem?

You all know very well how and when we landed in the Union of Soviet Citizens under tutelage of the Soviet Embassy. You know, how they exploited our attachment to our Native Land, our love for our people, for our songs, for our loved ones and relatives in order to transform us into obedient apparatus of Soviet propaganda, and compel us, against our own will, to demonstrate our loyalty to the regime which to date has been the most ruthless and inhuman in the world.

Persuasion, threats, bribes, blackmail, false flattery and last, but not least, deceit - these are the measures which the staunch Embassy officials and their secret agents have not shunned using to entangle us in their nets and surround us with infiltration agents, denunciators, and all types of activists.

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They have not even hesitated to use our relatives in the Motherland so via visas and indirect blackmail - they could force us to serve the Soviet interests and perform their vile tasks. You know pretty well what we have in mind and there is no need to write about it. Many of us were compelled to contribute to their "Golosa Rodiny", "Visti" and other "Patriots" and to glorify those who oppress our countrymen at home and do not leave us in peace here. Many of us until this day have to keep our Soviet passports.

That's on the one hand, and now on the other: could we have remained in Belgium without attracting the attention of the local authorities and of the community in which we live? Can we even hope that the authorities would understand what really is in our souls when we are herded to various meetings and evenings at different Antwerps and Brussels, and forced for hundredth time to listen to one and the same, repugnant (from our early youth), idle-talk and propaganda of the KGB managers from the Embassy? Hardly!

Dear Countrywomen! Against our will, we landed between the hammer and the anvil. Between the hammer of the Soviet KGBists who constantly exert pressure on us in the well known manner, and our position here, in the Belgian and Dutch communities, these communities' attitude toward us - now and in the future.

Particularly in the future! Did you ever think what is awaiting us, what is our fate, if and when, God forbid, the international situation would get extremely exacerbated? Are you aware of what is the meaning of our often double passports and contacts with the Soviet Embassy? You know what is the problem! And thus what do our communities think of us to-day and what will they think of us in the future?!

You know pretty well [REDACTED] going on at the top of "our"

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Soyuz during the Cuban crisis ! But, when - in panic and confusion - they were going to transfer their files to the Soviet Embassy, was it to be of any help to us? Whose skin they were going to save?

Another Cuba and all the diplomatic staff and perhaps some of their main helpers from the Soyuz might retire safely - with their files - into their diplomatic premises. But what about us?


Our fate, our future - is in our hands and only we ourselves are able to help. Nobody will help us if we don't want to help ourselves. And the first thing we have to do, is to demonstrate that we are not a blind instrument of the Soviet Embassy and the Berlin Committee and their work here, that we are not Soviet, but only Ukrainian (and Russian) people who love their Motherlands, their nations, but have nothing to do with the regime which oppresses our Relatives at home. We have to prove that we are not agents of foreign authority but loyal citizens of our present countries. We have to manifest that we did not give in to threats and the vile game of the Embassy, but remained sincere truthful and genuine Ukrainians (and Russians), conscious of the value of freedom and honor, people who have not lost their conscience.

For that purpose, a few of us, decided to appeal to you and start a new course in order to cleanse all of us of the black taint the Soviet Embassy casts upon us. Now we are only a few and we cannot yet give our names and addresses, and you know only too well why. But with your help , with your response to our appeal, with our growth, time will come when we openly tell the Embassy KGBists "ENOUGH" and start afresh our own ,Ukrainian (and Russian) lives .

Write us to our address - with signatures and without. We shall also in the future maintain our contact with you and inform you

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


about matters concerning us all.

We must get rid of the shackles of all "Unions", Embassies,
and "Committees" !


Your Friends

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FURTHER INTERNAL VIOLENCE IN THE USSR!

The Working Class Begins to Rise against the "Workers' State"

In 1962 for the first time in Soviet history since the mid-1920's, there have been uprisings and bloody anti-regime strikes in key industrial areas by the little people of the USSR. Since there will undoubtedly be more unrest and bloodshed during the coming winter and spring, it is important to understand what conditions have generated the outbreaks of 1962 by a populace noted in history and literature for its long-suffering patience.

This past summer Soviet workers illegally demonstrated against the skyrocketing rise of food prices and protection quotas in industries near Moscow, a heavily industrialized area of southwestern Ukraine, and in Kemerovo, an important industrial region in Siberia. Soviet government efforts to stop these peaceful demonstrations led in both cases to violence, shootings and loss of life when troops were called in and fired into the protesting ranks of demonstrators.

In the case of the Kemerovo troubles, the Soviet government immediately reacted to them directly by admitting at least part of the blame, noting that 47,000 construction workers had quit their jobs because of food shortages, rises in prices and low wages.

One is also reminded that in 1961

...at the part of Moscow, Kemerovo, workers leading food riots when they learned that what they were leading was bound for Cuba. Strikes of some thousands of workers have never been permitted in the USSR and by law must be regarded as "counter-revolutionary" acts.

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
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In the Caucasian oil city of Gruzny, in the coal fields of the Eastern Ukraine, in a rubber factory in Jaroslavl (Jaroslavl) and in an automobile factory in Moscow there have also been illegal strikes and demonstrations. 1962.

News of these events has spread throughout the USSR and to several Western capitals.

What has caused Soviet citizens to risk death or severe punishment at a time when the USSR had almost succeeded in persuading Western opinion that all its major internal problems, except possibly agriculture, had been solved and that the Soviet worker was currently living better than ever before? Was the fact that the 1962 anti-pagine suburbs occurred almost simultaneously in widely separated areas accidental?

In the first years after Stalin's death in 1953, promises of better living standards and more personal liberty raised the hopes of the Soviet population for the first time since the end of the Second World War. The serious shortages of food, clothing, housing as well as the reign of terror and lack of basic human liberties in Stalin's time have been amply pointed by Khrushchev and by other Soviet leaders who in the mid-1950's finally promised immediate improvements. When the power of the political police was somewhat curtailed, when food appeared in city stores in somewhat greater quantity and variety, when the wages of the new of the labor to foreign tourists, when new laws were revised and new political prisoners were granted an amnesty to erect a new "socialist leadership", when the ~~republics~~ republics were granted a slightly larger voice in government, when these and other "reforms" were proclaimed, the hope of the population soared at the prospect of still further steady improvements in their otherwise dark lives.

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
one responsible for agriculture and the other for industry, the Soviet government ^{no longer} has set the stage for intense bureaucratic conflicts and rivalry not only between the two competing party branches, but also between individual party officials and the factory and farm managers with whom they will have to deal. In fact, by substituting normal state economic organs with the party, Khrushchev has done something which Lenin warned against in the early 1920's. Lenin realized that direct, unambiguous administrative responsibility for the party would only deepen the gulf between the people and the party. It can be safely ~~not~~ predicted that the economy will become even more chaotic under this new arrangement and the common people will, as always, feel ^{the not round of inflation} its first and most deeply.

During 1962, the anti-regime demonstrations cited above gave the people new courage, martyrs and a new way of ^{calling attention to its dissatisfaction} expressing itself. Since the situation can only worsen as short food supplies dwindle during the coming winter and spring, ^{and will} eruptions of violence must occur. Without genuine unions and parliamentary representation, there is no other way for popular dissatisfaction to express itself. There is no safety valve. This state of affairs would pose a grave danger to any regime - Communist or not.

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DESENSITIZED

per GSN 43-43

Excerpt from letter to Uncle from Carl dated November 23rd 1962

"My general attitude towards staying here you know. I believe something can be done here and thus a compromise solution must be found. Because of my son, I must be in New York at least for some period since he needs all kinds of help from me. Sorry to mention my private problem, but it seems unavoidable. The best solution would be if I could be replaced by one of you for the period I am in N.Y."

Excerpt from letter from Uncle to Carl dated November 26th 1962:

"I would like to have a clear attitude and opinion from you as to the usefulness of your further stay in Europe. Concretely, whether it is useful for you to stay at least for another year there. You write that you could be substituted by some one. Who could it be? Your family obligations I understand and take into consideration."

What Carl plans to write Uncle on November 28th:


"Whether it be me or some one else here, I think the potential warrants some one staying here for at least another year. There are some things budding and there is some potential. Perhaps George could replace me while I'm in N.Y. Regarding my personal situation:

- a. I have to see my son and help him in the nearest future and help him for at least 2 or 3 months;

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even if my wife should find employment here, in the long run I shan't be able to finance my trip to N.Y.

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solution which might be as follows:

- i. you would call me back to New York for duty and would pay my round-trip back here;
- ii. I would leave here say in early January and come back in early ~~May~~ or late April. This is a slack period for travel operations. For this period in N.Y., either I could try to cover the European terrain from N.Y. or have some one like George here temporarily.
- iii. if something of high importance should crop up in Europe while I am away, naturally I would be ready to come back immediately.

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