

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

| PROPOSED | ACTION | ACTION PLANNED |
|----------|---|----------------|
| | MARKED FOR INDEXING | |
| | NO INDEXING REQUIRED | |
| | ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING | |
| | ABSTRACT | |
| | MICROFILM | |

TO Chief of Station, Germany

INFO. COB, Hamburg COB, Munich Operations Group
COB, Bonn Chief WE COB, Berlin COB, Frankfurt

FROM

SUBJECT

RENDON/PICCH/BERGHEIMIC/GADNEY**Article on STASINSKI Trial**

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FRAN 3744 of 11 Oct 62

1. For reference, please find attached a very brief background article prepared with the Belgian press in mind. For further background, the Brussels Station would like to refer the German Station to AEGASSONARY/3 who lives in Munich and has provided factual, objective data on SANDERA and HENRI in the past. He knew them both. He was in former years the Ukrainian nationalist least prone to take exaggerated claims or hard history to support his own account. He was, incidentally, educated as a Jesuit priest in Austria.

2. The [redacted] agrees with FRAN 3744 and has already laid the groundwork for articles on dissident groups (national and non-national) in the USSR to be placed by [redacted]. These articles will be calculated to disprove the theory prevalent in Belgium that the USSR is a homogeneous society with no major or even minor insoluble internal problems of a political or economic nature.

Attachments:

Article as above

Distributions:

- 2 - SDI Germany w/att
- 2 - WE w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att
- 1 - [redacted] w/att

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

CS COPY

| | |
|---------------|-----------------|
| DATE TYPED | DATE DISPATCHED |
| 12 October 62 | 12 October 62 |

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OSMA 17796

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

77 518

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION POISON TWO UKRAINIAN POLITICAL

LEADERS?

In Karlsruhe, Germany a fascinating trial has just begun against a Soviet citizen who freely admits having killed two well-known anti-Soviet Ukrainian leaders in Munich. The killings were disguised as natural deaths because a special weapon recently designed by the Soviet police was used. This pistol noiselessly fires a poisonous vapor which paralyzes the victim's respiratory system, but leaves no trace by the time an autopsy can be performed.

The assassin, Bogdan Stashynski succeeded in escaping through Berlin in September 1961 with his German wife when he discovered that his employers were about to liquidate him because he knew too much and his wife was outspokenly critical about living in the Soviet Union. Stashynski's confession has been gone over in great detail by the German police and checks out completely.

Stashynski first used his poison pistol in 1957 in Munich to kill Ley Kshch, a 47 year old Ukrainian political leader and thinker whose writings had caused the Soviet Government a good deal of trouble during and after the Second World War. The second victim was Stefan Bandera, another Ukrainian anti-Soviet leader whose name is widely known throughout the Soviet Union.

Most press reports have omitted the key factor behind these political assassinations, namely that these men would not have

merited first class assassination had not their ideals for Ukrainian independence been widely held in the USSR and had they not been symbols of the most recent manifestation of this century-old movement. The Soviet Government is well aware that the Ukrainians took advantage of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union to re-establish their independence both from Moscow and from Hitler by force of arms. The Soviet Government knows too that armed, organized fighting against the Soviet regime continued in the Ukraine until 1952. Both victims of Stachynski had helped organize the military and political elements of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

Thus by putting them out of the way, the Soviet Government hoped primarily to demoralize the population inside the Ukraine who still hope for liberation from the tutelage of Moscow. Moscow has traditionally tried to suppress their language, culture, claim to sovereignty and right to secede which is guaranteed them, on paper at least, by the Soviet constitution. To believe that this poses a profound internal problem for the Soviet Union one has only to read the daily Soviet press of the Soviet Ukrainian "republic" which constantly attacks all aspects of Ukrainian nationalism. Even Ukrainian Communists who put the interests of the Soviet Ukraine before those of the central government in Moscow are still frequently punished for "nationalism". National Communism actually made its debut in the Ukraine in the early 1920's.

The Soviet Government is very concerned with the fact that Ukrainians abroad have several active anti-Soviet political organizations and are in fact more numerous than any other national group from the Soviet Union. It was to demoralize these millions of Ukrainians living abroad that Moscow

launched the complicated and expensive assassinations of these two political leaders. By doing so, the USSR reverted to a method of solving political problems which was quite familiar during the Stalin regime.

This same assassination tactic against Ukrainian leaders has been used twice previously in this century in cities closer to Belgium than Munich, but the result was to strengthen rather than to weaken the desire of Ukrainians to get rid of what the Ukrainians consider to be a Russian occupation of their territory. One of these assassinations occurred in Paris in 1925 and the second in Rotterdam in 1938. Simon Petliura, who led the Ukraine to three years of chaotic independence after World War I went into exile in Paris, but even there he was considered so dangerous that he had to be shot down at the corner of Rue Racine and Rue St. Michel by a Soviet assassin. Evhen Konovalets led the Ukrainian nationalist underground movement from 1921 until he was handed a time-bomb in Rotterdam by a certain Valukh who rose eventually to the rank of general in the Soviet secret police, thanks to his success as an assassin. Since, however, these earlier crude political murders merely increased the determination of Ukrainians to have revenge, it was natural that the Soviet secret police did not consider obvious murder a proper way to liquidate Ukrainian leaders of World War II vintage.

Now that the facts about these murders are public knowledge, the Soviet Government has again made an obvious miscalculation which will certainly further increase Ukrainian resentment of Moscow's domination and will to overcome it.