

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING	
		PRO-POSED	ACCOM-PLISHED
TO			MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
			ABSTRACT
			MICROFILM

TO: []

INFO: []

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WE

SUBJECT: **REWOOD HENRIK AERODYNAMIC Recruitment of Third Nationals**

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: NONE, FYI

ORBA-16668, 2 Jan 62

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007

1. We found the Field's description in reference of **ARCASSONARY-29's** activities to date gratifying. It is indicated that he has gone to work with energy and imagination. We feel a comment is in order on one point in **ARCASSONARY-29's** contact report forwarded with the reference of his meeting with a subsource he has recruited on behalf of **ARMENIVE**. The subsource said, and **ARCASSONARY-29** did not seem to disagree, that he has a negative opinion of the Ukrainian women married to Belgians who go back to the Ukraine on visits, presumably because they are likely to be working for the Soviets or the Belgians. We think that **ARCASSONARY-29** should be made aware that there is a considerable body of experience which stems from the activities of other emigre groups and which points up the fact that these women as well as their foreign husbands may be fruitful targets for exactly the type of information which **ARMENIVE** is supposed to be gathering. While it is true that most of the women who are permitted to return and visit their relatives are at least on the fringes of the Soviet Patriot groups, there is good reason to believe that many of them are there only because they know that this is the way to obtain a visa. Those who are inclined to accept the new Soviet line at face value or are, more properly, neutral in the political sense are more often than not so appalled at the conditions under which their relatives live that their eyes are opened to the falsity of the current Soviet propaganda line. The point which we wish to make is that these people who visit their relatives and old friends in the Ukraine return to their homes with valuable information on conditions there. If they can be located and debriefed by a person who can get their confidence and assure them that what they say will not get back to the Soviet Embassy, they should be able to provide leads to other women who have made the trip and returned disillusioned. In cases where it seems desirable and the women are able to stay on the good side of the Soviet Embassy and make another trip in a year or two, the stage might be set for a real recruitment aimed at FI or at least operational leads to disaffected persons on the inside. At first, it

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74-124-29/3

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CROSS REFERENCE TO		DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
CS COPY		14 Feb 1962	23 FEB 1962
CLASSIFICATION SECRET		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
			74-124-29/3
OFFICE	EXT.		
SR/3/CA	ad	4387	
COORDINATING			
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
CSR/3	15/2		
SR/2			
WE/2			
WE-6			
RELEASING			
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
C/WE/2			

1-RI	
1-SR/2	INITIAL
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RI/TY	
SR/3/CA	
RI/FI	

DISPATCH

will be difficult for AECASSOWARY-29's subresources to learn who is planning such trips or has just returned. Is it possible that [] ay have access through liaison to the visa applications from such women and that the names could be supplied to AECASSOWARY-29? In this case, his subresources need merely find some pretext to be in the neighborhood of the traveler and stop in to talk with someone who has just returned from the homeland. It certainly need not be a secret that AERKIVE wants as much information as possible from inside the Ukraine and the use of the AERKIVE name should help to allay the natural fear the women have that the Soviet Embassy is trying to find out whether they are talking openly about the real conditions under which their relatives live. We should appreciate your comments as well as those of AECASSOWARY-29 on the feasibility of this operational approach. FYI only, we are generalizing here for Belgium on the basis of what we know that [] does in Holland. Their representative contacts almost 100 women a year and a surprising number of them are disillusioned as described above; they do not hesitate to talk once they are sure of the visitor's bona fides.

2. With regard to paragraph 2 of reference: There is no KUBARK policy restriction on the recruitment of third nationals similar to that which applies to citizens and residents of the UK. However, in the case of the AECASSOWARIES, the UK prohibition has been extended in somewhat diluted form to Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, which could be expected to maintain close relations in the intelligence field with the UK. At one time SMOFH was briefed on our working relationship with the AECASSOWARIES. Therefore, if a Canadian, for example, was involved in an AECASSOWARY-1 operational flap, we should be hard put to deny our own collusion in the light of our earlier disclosure to SMOFH. Canada is also a special case in its own right because of its geographic proximity to the U. S. and the feelings against U.S. involvement in Canadian affairs which this proximity has engendered among many Canadians.

3. Ukrainian residents of the other countries mentioned in paragraph 2 of reference can be considered fair game for AECASSOWARY-29, all other things being equal. It is possible that for any number of reasons policy on a particular nation might change, or policy on REKSEKIN of the "in" variety might change, but at the present moment there is no absolute restriction other than that relating to the UK. In any case, Headquarters would like to take a look at each individual lead as it comes up prior to a full-scale recruitment pitch by AECASSOWARY-29.

4. It is felt at Headquarters that in line with AECASSOWARY-29's original assignment, he should direct the major part of his efforts initially at exploitation of the Ukrainian colony in Belgium. This is not meant to suggest that a good lead from another area should be ignored, and Headquarters does appreciate the usefulness of the Field's scheme to bring prospective agents to Belgium for training and briefing.

5. The defector [] is controlled by the [] although Walter BOSNYK of the UCC made a special effort to reach [] during a recent trip to Europe, he was completely unsuccessful. KUBARK has been unable to get access to [] and is unable to help anyone else in that regard. If this situation should change, you will be notified.

6. Regarding paragraph 7 of reference, three copies of AECASSOWARY-29's raw reports are requested.

7. Following are the results of Headquarters name traces requested in the reference.

- a. PANCIK, Hryhorij - No traces
- b. LOSZCZENKO, Iru - No identifiable traces
- c. REPEYLO, Ola - No traces

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8. It is not possible to perform meaningful traces on MIKTERKO, fma without at least an approximate date of birth and/or other identifiable information.

9. Traces on KOHUF were forwarded in DIR-31125 (December 1961) and DIR-32807 (December 1961).

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