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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
		SECRET MICROFILMED	EGFA-31920
TO	Chief, SR	MAY 31 1962	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO	Chief, EE COS, Germany		74-124-29/3
FROM	Chief of Base, Frankfurt	DOC. MICRO. SER.	DATE
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/REDSKIN/AERODYNAMIC/OPERATIONAL		30 September 1960
	International Law Association Conference, Hamburg, 7-13 August 1960		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
ACTION REQUIRED	FYI		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
REFERENCE(S)	A. DIR 43740 B. DIR 43204 C. DIR 42834 D. PROB 7496 E. EGFW-11016, 2 Aug 60		<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
			INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
VAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Introduction.

a. This dispatch and its attachments will cover only the preparation for and the operational activity which took place at the subject Conference in response to references above. This dispatch will not consider the broader question of using AECASSOWARY 29 as a singleton PA and the AECASSOWARY 1 organization as a spotting and support mechanism for AECASSOWARY 29. We realize, of course, that this operation could be described as a trial example of the activities to be expected as a result of our undertaking AECASSOWARY 29 as a PA, but we feel that it should not be cited as a typical example in light of all the circumstances involved. Further, we feel that we should not compare this type of operation of contacting Soviets in the West with the type of REDSKIN traveller operation to contact Soviets in the USSR, in which AECASSOWARY 29 will be engaged. We will present our operational and administrative planning for the use of AECASSOWARY 29 in other dispatches.

b. We are sending under separate cover an operational report of our activities divided into three parts: 1) chronology including AECASSOWARY 2's report, 2) personality data on Soviet delegates, and 3) materials which the subject of DIR 39147 (called Source in this dispatch and its attachments) was able to procure. We cannot include a positive intelligence part inasmuch as source was unable to pursue his conversations with the Soviet delegates to the point of eliciting answers to the requirements.

c. Pursuant to the references, we had set three main tasks for Source at the Conference: 1) to elicit the information required by the requirements, 2) to approach subject of reference C and determine vulnerabilities and possible development and recruitment or defection, and 3) assess the other delegates from the point of view of vulnerabilities and development if possible. AECASSOWARY 2 was briefed on these by the FOB case officer on 6 and 7 August 1960. As summarized in para 2 below, we were not successful in any one of these three tasks. However, we must conclude that we have gained some experience and learned some lessons from using AECASSOWARY 1 organization in contact operations against Soviet Ukrainians at a Conference of this type in the West. We have set these out in paragraph 3 below. We have also drawn some tentative conclusions and recommendations in para 4, and we were able to derive some personality data on certain Soviet Ukrainians and other delegates who may appear in the West again, which are set out in Annex II. We do not intend that paras 2, 3 and 4 be an apology for lack of success, but rather to be an analytical review of the activities undertaken during the Hamburg Conference.

2. Results of Operational Activity at the Hamburg Conference.

a. Fulfillment of the requirements. We believe that the requirements presented for this Conference were well selected and showed considerable imagination and preparation. Our function of fitting these requirements into the framework of the conversations at the Conference between Source and

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the Soviet delegates was not completed because we did not have full information on special fields of the delegates and we did not have an agenda of the Conference so that we would know in general what the frame of reference would be for the specific questions. We were not able therefore to brief the Source as from whom and under what circumstances he should be able to elicit the information. We could only brief Source as to the requirements and leave it to him to carry on. AECASSOWARY 2 had briefed Source in New York and instructed him to review them once more with Source. At Hamburg the operational circumstances were such that we could not assist source further since source himself was unable to develop the operational information early in the Conference in order to capitalize on it. Source was unable, actually at any time, to engage in and develop conversations for a sufficient period of time with the delegates to the point where he could insert the requirements and elicit information. In the conversations with KORETSKIY (see Annex II), KORETSKIY was being so very careful and diplomatic in his relations and conversation that Source was able only to discuss general thoughts and ideas without reverting to specifics. Conversations with the other delegates were either of such a short period or of just an introductory nature that no chance to elicit was presented. In the remaining cases, purposeful conversations were completely impossible.

b. Approach and Assessment of Subject of DIR 42834. Source did not identify Subject until Friday, 12 August 1960, and at that time only from a lapel card which the Subject was wearing. On the 7th, 8th and part of the 9th of August, it was not at all clear whether or not there would be Soviet delegates other than TUNKHIN present at the Conference, or how many there would be. Source had tried to obtain this information from the Secretariat of the Conference, but only TUNKHIN was registered and the Secretariat denied any knowledge as to the identities or whereabouts of the others. Source had some difficulty in identifying Subject since the name was spelled differently as indicated in Annex II. Source had further difficulty in approaching Subject since the Subject did not participate in the general discussions during free time, kept to himself in the company of other Soviet delegates. Thus Source could not talk with Subject for any length of time and could not induce Subject to give anything more than just a short answer to a question. At no time could Source talk with Subject alone. Source could not, therefore, form any opinion as to the validity of the potential vulnerability nor could he even attempt to develop any opinion of the Subject at all. Source reported that he had seen Subject talk with an English delegate for just a few minutes, but this was the extent to which Subject seemed to have contact with anyone except his own delegates as far as Source was aware.

c. Assessment of Vulnerabilities of Soviet Delegates. During the course of the Conference, Source was able to approach and converse with the Soviet delegates only a few times and for very short periods of time. This was primarily due to the fact that the amount of free time allowed to the delegates between official sessions and entertainment provided by the Secretariat of the Conference was very small. Source was unable to delve deep enough into each personality to determine whether or not there was sufficient reason to suspect a vulnerability. Source does report in a very few instances certain statements or attitudes which could be interpreted as a reflection of a sympathetic feeling towards Ukrainian nationalism on the part of the Soviet Ukrainians, but none of these statements or attitudes could be assessed as an indication of real dissatisfaction or vulnerability. Source was not able to exploit further these indications, small as they may be, to determine whether there would be a potential for future development or recruitment. AECASSOWARY 2 feels that there is a potential in the cases of KORETSKIY and LISOVSKIY, but we believe that his opinion is based primarily on the grounds that these individuals ought to be susceptible because they are Ukrainians rather than on firm grounds of practical evidence. Although we cannot share AECASSOWARY 2's optimism at this stage that future contacts could provide the opportunity for further development, we cannot rule out the possibility that either one or the

other might arrive at a state of mind where full cooperation with AECASSOWARY 1 group or even KUBARK would not automatically be rejected if a proper approach were made at the optimum time. We have detailed all the information derived from Source through AECASSOWARY 2 in Annex II under separate cover and will not repeat it here.

3. Experience Gained and Lessons Learned.

a. Selection of International Function in West involving Soviet Delegates.

1) We are of the opinion that a very high degree of selectivity must be exercised in determining which international function should become an operational activity before we expend time, money and effort in the elicitation of information and contact operations. We feel, for instance, that on balance the Hamburg Conference was not an optimum opportunity for operational activity. The subject matter of the conference, and therefore the characteristics of the attending delegates, was very narrow in scope and apolitical and theoretical in nature to the point where rapport between source and the Soviet delegates was much confined and sterile. We acknowledge that the goals that the Soviets intended to obtain might have been political in nature, but the forum in which and the means by which the Soviets attempted to gain these objectives were not conducive to the operational type of thinking and approach which we wished to apply.

2) This type of conference was not one which would draw a great number of Soviet delegates, particularly since international law is not one of the fields in which the Soviet Union is a real contender or prominent. At Hamburg the Soviets had only one delegate registered, even though there may have been eight more uninvited guests, in comparison with the much greater number of delegates from the other major representative countries. We must also note that only one or two of the Soviet delegates had attained any kind of prominence in the field, whereas the remaining delegates were newcomers to the field, or not really engaged in international law at all. We feel that even the fact that there were so few Soviet delegates, apart from their characteristics, was a factor against operational potential since under these circumstances the Soviet delegates must be much more circumspect in their relations with the other delegates and conversations. We must therefore conclude that the fewer the number of Soviets attending a conference the less chance we have for information elicitation, and still less chance for assessment, development or even recruitment of the most vulnerable delegate. The fact that some of the delegates were Ukrainians was not sufficient in itself.

3) The very short duration and full schedule of the Conference made it nearly impossible for the Source to develop any conversation to the point where elicitation could be started or an assessment of the delegate be made. Mornings, afternoons and evenings were fully occupied with lectures, discussion groups and entertainment, which left free time for operational purposes only at lunch, if no lunch was scheduled, or between the last sessions of the day and dinner. At Hamburg two and a half days of seven were lost because the Soviet uninvited delegates did not appear until after this period. Source could not identify the delegates and then pursue the contacts during the remaining period. In some cases, Source was able only to introduce himself and make only the most preliminary conversations.

b. Background Preparation of Operational Information.

We are of the opinion that a great deal more operational information and background preparation is required before a Conference can become operationally

What next?

Source's information expected

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exploitable. At Hamburg because the Soviet delegation was not registered with the Secretariat, the absence of this background and operational information was a great detriment. Unfortunately [] 1070 was not slugged AERODYNAMIC and was not received prior to the Conference. Source spent a great deal of his time trying to identify the delegates, to discover where they were housed, to learn which discussion groups they were attending, on which excursion they were going, gathering biographic material to determine the specialities of the delegates so he would know to whom to put the questions, and to identify the KGB or caretaker personnel so that he could avoid them. Very little time was left for purely operational activity of elicitation and development. We do not know whether all this information could have been available prior to the Conference, either at Headquarters or in the Field, but we believe that whether or not sufficient information is available is a criteria in determining whether this or that Conference is a proper one for operational activity.

c. The Ability and Training of Agent Personnel.

1) We are convinced that the operational ability of the agent, as well as his professional qualifications, will in the majority of the cases make the difference between success and failure in any given operation. We agree, of course, that the agent must be professionally and linguistically qualified to be a delegate in his own right to the Conference and to gain the proper access and rapport with the Soviet target. Nevertheless the agent must be qualified operationally also in order to be able to take immediate advantage of those opportunities which are presented because he is professionally qualified. At Hamburg Source was well qualified from the point of view of professional background, language and ethnic compatability. We realize that he was not completely prepared to accomplish the tasks which were set out for him and were passed through AECASSOWARY 2. We understand that this was his first experience in an operation of this sort. AECASSOWARY 2 confided that he had briefed Source for a total of 4 hours in New York during the middle of the night, in addition to other matters, and agreed that this was not sufficient. AECASSOWARY 2 did not have the time with Source in Hamburg to amplify this briefing or to advise Source on operational matters because of the full Conference schedule. The presence of the FOB case officer in Hamburg in an attempt to monitor the operation closely did not really assist AECASSOWARY 2 since AECASSOWARY 2 still did not have sufficient time with Source to train him and the case officer was not in touch with Source at all. We believe that unless the agent is trained to respond to all the varying circumstances which can be met at these Conferences prior to the Conference, we cannot expect either the principal agent or the case officer to make up the deficiency on the spot. In those cases where the agent is unwitting of KUBARK and is completely controlled by the principal agent, the principal agent must have the proper qualifications in order to assist the agent.

2) We will not attempt to evaluate AECASSOWARY 2's performance here since we realize that he was substituting for AECASSOWARY 29 and had not had the benefit of Headquarters training in this type of operational work. Additionally, we can not as yet evaluate AECASSOWARY 29's operational ability since we have not worked directly with him.

d. Case Officer Attendance at Conferences.

1) Pursuant to DIR 43740, the FOB case officer was present at the Conference in an attempt to monitor the operation once it became apparent on 9 August that there would be more than a single Soviet delegate. Thus at the Hamburg Conference there were three operational persons in different capacities conducting operations against nine Soviets: the source who was involved for seven days, the principal

agent who was involved for six days and the case officer, who was involved for four days. We are of the opinion that this is a waste of manpower and that such depth of strength should not be necessary and can be justified only in the cases where there is an actual known requirement for it. At Hamburg we accepted the commitment of manpower because Source was not really a trained agent and AECASSOWARY 2 was not really a principal agent. Therefore it was felt that the presence of the case officer might be required. At Hamburg, Source was not trained and briefed to stand on his own feet, and he required direct support from the PA. However, the PA was not fully trained and briefed to support the agent without the direct supervision of the case officer. Nevertheless the strength in depth did not resolve the operational problems under the circumstances of the Hamburg Conference.

2) Under ideal circumstances where the agent is fully qualified, trained and briefed, and the principal agent is fully qualified and has full possession of operational information, the case officer cannot really make a contribution on a daily basis and can be useful only in those cases of making a final decision of making a recruitment pitch. This is a matter of two-way clandestine communication between three people who cannot meet together because the Source is unwitting of the case officer. At Hamburg, Source could meet the principal agent only twice a day with effective results; at noon and just before dinner, and then only for an hour or so. This was because the Conference schedule was so full that Source must use all other free time to meet with the Soviet delegates. For the most part, Source would report the activities for the previous period, which left little time for further briefing and instructions by the principal agent. A fully trained principal agent could guide the operation from this type of contact with the Source, but in this case the PA had to consult with the case officer. Meetings between the case officer and the principal agent took place at any time in between the meetings between the principal agent and the Source, and there were no difficulties involved. The case officer was able to receive the principal agent's report in full and then to supervise and direct the next steps, resolving any problems that had arisen. However, by the time the principal agent and Source could meet again, events had transpired which outdated the briefing of the case officer or had made the briefing ineffectual. Moreover, new difficulties were presented by the Source which the PA had to pass on to the case officer for advice. Since the Source provided the operational information himself as well as problems involved and since he was the one to receive the final advice and briefing, the effectiveness of the two-way communication between three people was controlled by the availability of the Source. This in turn depends upon the schedule of the Conference. At Hamburg the communications were very much slowed down because the full schedule prevented frequent meetings between principal agent and Source. We have come to the conclusion, therefore, that an operationally well trained agent who can direct and supervise on the spot are all that are required in most cases and that a case officer on the spot is not required except in the case of an attempted recruitment or defection.

*explain!
Anticipate!*

4. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. As a result of our experience and lessons at Hamburg we have formed certain tentative conclusions which we would like to present here for your information and comment. We feel that our conclusions are particularly valid since we must compare the efficiency and effectiveness of this type of operation against the other types of REDSKIN operations

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which we are conducting and plan to conduct in the future. Our basic conclusion is that we should not try to run operations at an international function unless the following criteria are met:

1) The international function itself should involve a sufficiently broad or flexible subject matter to provide the opportunity for elicitation of positive intelligence which could be considered of high priority. The function should be sufficiently long in duration with sufficient free time available in the schedule to enable the agent to perform his operational tasks.

2) The number of Soviet delegates should be sufficiently large to permit the presumption that the agent will have unopposed access to the various members for more than a few minutes and for more than a few times. The characteristics of the Soviet delegation, which will be determined in part by the nature of the international function, should be known in order to determine with whom and in what manner it would be possible to make contact and establish rapport so that the agent can carry out his elicitation task. Sufficient indication should be available that at least one Soviet delegate is suspected of being vulnerable in one or another direction to make an attempted development or even a recruitment possible.

3) The agent must be professionally and linguistically qualified to attend the function in his own right. In addition he must be operationally qualified, trained and briefed to perform his tasks of elicitation, development and assessment of Soviet delegates. He must be capable of operating on his own so that only a minimum of support must be given by the principal agent and only a few of the more important decisions left to the principal agent. He should be fully witting of the intelligence function of the AXCASSOWARY 1 group and in the optimum should also be witting of KUBARK involvement, permitting the case officer to step in if the necessity arises.

4) The principal agent must be fully qualified to support the agent when required, making it unnecessary for the case officer to be in the background except when there is an actual requirement for his presence. The principal agent must be able to receive the reporting of the agent, to assess the situation, and give it the proper direction or redirection when necessary without referral to the case officer.

5) Operational information should be fully developed concerning the Conference so that a minimum of time is spent by the agent in ascertaining who the Soviet delegates are, where they are housed, what the schedule of their movements will probably be, the background professional specialities and characteristics of the Soviet delegates including any suspected vulnerabilities or weaknesses, presence of KGB or caretaker personnel, etc. Particularly useful, although more difficult to obtain, is the knowledge of the lectures and discussions to be given by the Soviet delegates so that the positive intelligence requirements can be tailored by the PA and the agent to fit into the framework of the lectures and discussions. Conversations are frequently so short that the agent must be able to fit in his question almost immediately without drawing attention to the special character of the question.

6) A safe apartment or room and sterile phones are required for contact between the agent and the PA and between the PA and

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the case officer, who may be in another city. The effectiveness of two-way communication between three levels is particularly important in the very fluid situation of short duration such as a conference or a congress. In some cases the relationship between the agent and the PA must be concealed and in others not necessarily so.

b. We have tentatively formed an opinion that a singleton agent is less than half as effective as two mutually witting and briefed agents, who can operate in support of each other. Admittedly we must balance our effort with anticipated returns and we agree that too many agents will spoil the scoop. Nevertheless a well qualified team, assigned separate but coordinated tasks, can accomplish the following:

- 1) Collecting and assorting operational information;
- 2) One can screen the associates of the target while the other can elicit from the target, especially the caretaker types;
- 3) One can attend the assigned group meetings while the other can float after the targets to which ever meeting he may attend;
- 4) One can be briefed to watch for deliberate provocations while the other performs the intelligence task, thereby providing security as well as a psychological support;
- 5) In the assessment of a possible vulnerable delegate, two opinions are better than one;
- 6) If necessary, one can form the commo link to the PA while the other is still in contact with the targets;
- 7) One can do all the report writing, while the other still operates.

We feel that the qualifications of the two agents do not have to be equal professionally or operationally. The second agent can be considered professionally as the protege of the first and be supported by the first agent in this sense. In reverse, the second agent may be more operationally qualified and can support the first agent. Although we have set out this thought separately from the criteria desired for a successful operation, we feel that the question of whether two agents can be used should be considered in the overall judgment of whether an operation should or should not be designed against a particular conference.

c. We realize that not all of the foregoing criteria will be met on any one conference and that if we insist upon these standards we will in ~~all probability not operate at all~~. However, there is a tendency to go to the other extreme. We see an inclination to decide to run an operation at a conference because there will be Soviets there and because we have an agent that can be sent to the conference. In many of these cases we feel that these two facts are insufficient to warrant the time, money and effort. There is, we feel, a middle ground in which we are justified in operating. Each such situation where we have an agent and there are Soviet delegates expected should be examined carefully in light of the criteria set out above and a determination made on the balance of effort against anticipated chances of success. We believe that a careful balancing of these pros and cons will result in operations at the international functions in the West which can be compared favorably with other types of REDSKIN operations in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.

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d. We would appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have on the foregoing.

APPROVED

for

ATTACHMENTS: Annex I & 3 H/W
Att to Annex I USC (A)
Annex 2 USC (B) *not read R/AN*

12/10/60

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ANNEX I - Chronology

1. Saturday, 6 August 1960

a. Pursuant to PROB 7457, AECASSOWARY 2 called on the sterile telephone at 1400 hours identifying himself with the alias HENRY ROGERS and reported that he was registered in the Hotel Frankfurter. [redacted], using the alias [redacted], arranged to meet AECASSOWARY 2 in the latter's hotel room at 1430 hours. At this meeting introductions and identifications were carried out through examination of documentation and a discussion of several matters was conducted for three hours: general background of AECASSOWARY 1, the arrival and planning for AECASSOWARY 29, the operational planning for the Hamburg operation, the operational planning for the Stockholm operation, the plans for the Rome Olympics and the planned trip of AECASSOWARY 2 and AECASSOWARY 29 for the purpose of introducing AECASSOWARY 29 to various contacts in Europe. Most of the discussion concerned the Hamburg operation. At the end of the discussion, [redacted] arranged with AECASSOWARY 2 to meet him again in the hotel room on Sunday, 7 August, at 1000 hours for further discussion.

b. AECASSOWARY 2 stated that AECASSOWARY 29 would not arrive in Frankfurt in time to go to Hamburg and therefore he, AECASSOWARY 2, would replace him. AECASSOWARY 2 said that he had been briefed for this operation before leaving for Europe and that he had met Subject of DIR 39147 (called Source from now on) in New York for four hours and had briefed him on the operation, especially on the requirements which Headquarters had prepared. AECASSOWARY 2 then described Source for [redacted] stating that Source was a 50 year old international lawyer and fully qualified as a delegate to this Conference. He said that Source was not a trained agent, but that he was very nationalistic and anti-Communistic, toughminded and a real fighter, had a quick mind and could speak and debate well and easily, and that he would perform well in eliciting the answers to the requirements if this were possible. [redacted] then briefed AECASSOWARY 2 on the following matters to ensure that AECASSOWARY 2 understood what [redacted] had in mind and to establish a mutual understanding and good rapport on an operational basis:

- 1) Communications arrangements between [redacted] and AECASSOWARY 2;
- 2) Communication arrangements between AECASSOWARY 2 and Source;
- 3) Requirements established by Headquarters for Elicitation;
- 4) Identification and assessment of Soviet Delegates for potential defection or recruitment;
- 5) Identification and assessment of Subject of DIR 42834 for potential defection or recruitment;
- 6) Requirement for a report from AECASSOWARY 2 based upon information from Source.

During this discussion AECASSOWARY 2 and [redacted] were in complete agreement and the exchange was very free and frank. AECASSOWARY 2 had only the one problem that he did not wish to travel to and register in Hamburg in his true name. AECASSOWARY 2 felt that he was very well known in Europe and could be spotted in Hamburg. This, he felt, would expose Source as being connected with AECASSOWARY 2, which might preclude operational success. AECASSOWARY 2 asked for either German documents with which he could register in a hotel, or a safe apartment which would require no registration. [redacted] said that it would be impossible to obtain German documents over the weekend, but that the late arrival and the time necessary for the documents would preclude AECASSOWARY 29 from participating in the Hamburg operation. AECASSOWARY 2 agreed that AECASSOWARY 29 probably would not be required for this operation. AECASSOWARY 2 then stated that he planned to go to Hamburg on Sunday, 7 August, and to meet Source at a prearranged place and time.

[] informed AECASSOWARY 2 that he would fly to Hamburg on 8 August, Monday, and arranged to call AECASSOWARY 2 at his hotel between 2000 and 2400 hours or to meet AECASSOWARY 2 at a designated place and time on Tuesday, 9 August if [] could not reach AECASSOWARY 2 at his hotel on Monday night. AECASSOWARY 2 was instructed to call [] on the sterile phone in Frankfurt at 0900 hours, 8 August, to give the name and telephone number of his hotel. [] then arranged to meet with AECASSOWARY 2 on Sunday, 7 August, at 1000 hours to provide a safe apartment and to confirm the other details of communications.

c. At 1000 hours Sunday, 7 August, [] told AECASSOWARY 2 there was no safe apartment available for AECASSOWARY 2 and that AECASSOWARY 2 should register in a hotel in Hamburg. The other details for meeting were reviewed and confirmed. AECASSOWARY 2 left for Hamburg at 1430.

2. Monday, 8 August 1960

a. AECASSOWARY 2 called on the sterile phone at 1000 hours and stated that he was registered at the Mundesburger Brücke Hotel, Armgarstr 10, telephone 268556. AECASSOWARY 2 said that he had met Source on schedule at 2000 hours, 7 August in front of the Rathaus and had had a long discussion with him that night. Source reported that there was only one Soviet delegate registered for the Conference, TUNKHIN, which fact had been reported in the morning paper in Frankfurt. Source reported that no one at the Conference felt that there would be any more Soviet delegates. AECASSOWARY 2 and [] therefore agreed that there was no need for [] to go to Hamburg and that it would be better to wait in Frankfurt to meet AECASSOWARY 29. AECASSOWARY 2 reported that he was going to move into another hotel for general security reasons that day. [] instructed AECASSOWARY 2 to call on the sterile phone at 0900 hours, Tuesday, 9 August to inform [] where AECASSOWARY 2 could be reached in his new hotel. [] also instructed AECASSOWARY 2 to warn Source to be careful how he approached the single Soviet delegate in servicing the requirements and trying to assess him to avoid calling special attention to Source. AECASSOWARY 2 agreed, but felt that Source would be able to follow through.

3. Tuesday, 9 August 1960

a. The morning paper stated that there were a group of uninvited Soviet delegates attending the conference. [] prepared therefore to fly to Hamburg to be on the location for closer guidance of AECASSOWARY 2. However, AECASSOWARY 2 failed to call [] on this day and [] could not reach AECASSOWARY 2 since AECASSOWARY 2 had said he was going to change his hotel. [] could not go to Hamburg without knowing where to contact AECASSOWARY 2.

4. Wednesday, 10 August 1960

a. AECASSOWARY 2 called at 1400 hours and confirmed the story in the newspaper that uninvited Soviet delegates had arrived at the Conference, but that these delegates were as yet unidentified. AECASSOWARY 2 also stated that he had not changed his hotel, but gave no reason for not calling the previous day. [] stated that he was flying to Hamburg that night and would call AECASSOWARY 2 at his hotel between 2300 and 2400 hours and would wish to discuss the situation with AECASSOWARY 2 at that time in a safe apartment which had now become available. [] also instructed AECASSOWARY 2 to request Source to identify and locate the hotels of the delegates as quickly as possible in order to get the operation under way. [] arrived in Hamburg at 2230 hours, called AECASSOWARY 2 at his hotel at 2300 hours and met with AECASSOWARY 2 in the safe apartment from 2330 hours until 0300 hours 11 August.

b. AECASSOWARY 2 briefed [] on his day by day contacts with Source, but at this stage had little information on the Soviets. AECASSOWARY 2 had

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first met Source at 1800 hours, 7 August, and had reviewed the briefing with Source that [] had given AECASSOWARY 2 in Frankfurt. On 8 August, Monday, Source had reported to AECASSOWARY 2 that a Yugoslav delegate, MILAN BARTOS, had said that there might be two more Soviet delegates, and that one of these might be KORETSKIY. BARTOS did not indicate how he had received this information, and did not know the identity of the other delegate. On Tuesday, 9 August, Source had reported to AECASSOWARY 2, when they met at lunch, that there were apparently four Soviet delegates in addition to TUNKHIN at the Conference. Source stated that he had met KORETSKIY for a short time that morning, but that Source could not identify the other three delegates. Source then reported some of the information which is in Annex II. AECASSOWARY 2 again asked Source to concentrate on identifying the other delegates, particularly the Subject of DIR 42834. AECASSOWARY 2 met Source again on Wednesday, 10 August at noon for an hour. Source reported that there were eight delegates now at the Conference and that he had identified in addition to TUNKHIN and KORETSKIY, LISOVSKIY, YANOVSKIY and a KHOMENCHUK from the lapel cards that the delegates were wearing. Source had checked with the Secretariat for information concerning the Soviet delegates, but the Secretariat had said that since these delegates were not invited they had not registered their names or the hotels where they were staying. Therefore, the Secretariat had no information concerning them at all. AECASSOWARY 2 again instructed Source to continue to identify the delegates, but at the same time to attempt to elicit the information required and to assess the delegates. Source related the difficulties he was having in that the Soviets tended to hang together, they attended conferences where Source was not present, and did not seem to mix with the other delegates. Therefore Source was not sure that he could engage any of the delegates in a conversation to the point where he could insert the questions from the requirements. AECASSOWARY 2 encouraged Source to continue the best he could.

c. [] asked AECASSOWARY 2 to evaluate Source's performance. AECASSOWARY 2 said he thought Source was doing a fair job, but that he was not really prepared to be an agent. Source is a professor of law and felt that he was being split somewhat between his intellectual honesty and loyalty to his profession on the one side and the desire to accomplish what AECASSOWARY 2 wanted him to do on the other side. AECASSOWARY 2 said that Subject was not shying away from his operational tasks, but that he was first of all a professor of law and that the operational tasks were somewhat foreign to his nature. Nevertheless, AECASSOWARY 2 felt that Source would drive forward in any case, that he had a good approach to the problem of eliciting the information required and that he was able to approach and meet other delegates easily. AECASSOWARY 2 was quite hopeful that the requirements would be fulfilled if it were possible to engage in a conversation long enough to steer the thought around to the proper subject matter.

d. After this discussion of the operational difficulties of Source, [] and AECASSOWARY 2 agreed that there would be no real purpose for AECASSOWARY 29 to come to Hamburg after proper documentation for just the last few days of the Conference. Both agreed that AECASSOWARY 29 probably could not do more under the circumstances than AECASSOWARY 2 was already doing, and that it would be more important to prepare AECASSOWARY 29 for Stockholm. AECASSOWARY 2 then proposed to send Source to Stockholm after the Hamburg operation since Source could not get a plane flight back to the Argentine until 23 August. AECASSOWARY 2 felt that Source could be useful in Stockholm since he would be invited to the Congress as a guest, had a paper which he could read and had had the operational experience at Hamburg. [] agreed to inquire as to the desirability of this participation of Source both from Headquarters and from [] and would then inform AECASSOWARY 2. The remainder of this meeting dealt with

SECRET

 CONTINUED

3

AECASSOWARY 1 affairs and planning for AECASSOWARY 29 as senior operator in Europe. Finally, [] instructed AECASSOWARY 2 to call the safe apartment at 1000 hours, arranged to surveil a meeting between AECASSOWARY 2 and Source for general security purposes, and then to meet with AECASSOWARY 2 at 1830 hours for dinner and further operational discussion at the safe apartment.

5. Thursday, 11 August 1960

a. AECASSOWARY 2 called the safe apartment at 1000 hours and reported that he had not been able to contact Source that morning, but would see him in the evening at 1700 hours. Plans for the surveillance exercise and for the meeting between [] and AECASSOWARY 2 at 1830 hours at the KARL MUCK Platz, were confirmed. At 1500 hours [] informed [] by phone that it would not be necessary for AECASSOWARY 29 to come to Hamburg, but that [] should procure the German document for AECASSOWARY 29 to travel to Sweden in true name. [] also requested [] to obtain Headquarters' and [] permission for Source to attend the Stockholm Congress. At 1645 [] went to the Hauptbahnhof to surveil the meeting between AECASSOWARY 2 and Source at 1700 and roamed the area for a half hour. The anticipated meeting did not take place. At 1830 hours [] met AECASSOWARY 2 for dinner and an operational discussion. AECASSOWARY 2 reported that Source had requested a meeting at 1630 rather than 1700 in order to prepare for the evening reception on a river boat at 1800 and therefore was not at the established meeting site at 1700 hours.

b. During the meeting between AECASSOWARY 2 and [] on Thursday night, AECASSOWARY 2 reported the information gained by Source during Wednesday, 10 August and Thursday, 11 August. Source was now able to identify LISOVSKIY, BLISHCHENKO, JANOVSKIY and SHIMINSKIY, who had changed his lapel card from KHOMENCHUK, in addition to KORETSKIY. Source said there was a woman delegate, but that he could not yet identify her. Source was still unable to determine in which hotels these delegates were staying. Source had passed to LISOVSKIY, on Wednesday morning, a few books which Source had written and then had met LISOVSKIY again on the way to the busses which were to take them on the excursion to the Baltic Sea at 1400 hours Wednesday. LISOVSKIY had agreed to ride with Source, but at the last minute noticed that the Soviet woman delegate was riding alone and then decided to ride with her. LISOVSKIY asked Source to sit in the seat behind them so that they could converse anyway. LISOVSKIY said that the woman delegate could not speak Ukrainian, but LISOVSKIY was quite circumspect in his statements during this discussion. The contents of this discussion are contained in Annex II. Source also reported the incident wherein LISOVSKIY returned the books on Thursday Morning, 11 August, in the company of JANOVSKIY and BLISHCHENKO. This incident in addition to other pieces of information obtained by Source is contained in Annex II. At the end of the meeting [] instructed AECASSOWARY 2 to call the safe apartment at 1200 hours Friday, 12 August, to report any further progress and also arranged a meeting with AECASSOWARY 2 at 1430 at the KARL MUCK Plaza.

6. Friday, 12 August 1960

a. AECASSOWARY 2 called at 1200 hours just after he had met Source, but said that there was nothing special in the way of progress since Source had had no further opportunity to engage in conversation with the Soviet delegates during Friday morning. [] met AECASSOWARY 2 at 1430 hours. AECASSOWARY 2 reported that Source had been able to discuss the Ukrainian nationality problem with KORETSKIY only very briefly on the excursion boat trip the previous night, but that he had not been able to talk to LISOVSKIY.

Source said that LISOVSKIY had said he was very tired and didn't wish to discuss any subjects with Source. LISOVSKIY had remained on the upper deck by himself for most of the trip. Source reported that the few Soviet delegates who had gone on the trip were sitting at a table by themselves and did not seem to wish to engage in conversations with anyone. Source reported that KORETSKIY said during this trip that most of the Soviet delegates were out of the USSR attending a conference for the first time and that the Soviet Government wished to be able to send them later to other conferences. Source speculated that this might be the reason why the Soviet delegates were circumspect in their relations to other delegates.

b. Source reported to AECASSOWARY 2 that he had invited LISOVSKIY to have lunch with him on Friday noon, but that LISOVSKIY refused by saying that all the meals for the Soviet delegates had been prepaid and therefore had to be taken in the hotel. LISOVSKIY also refused to drink wine with Source on the same basis. Source reported that during Friday morning, a pro-Communist Italian delegate approached KORETSKIY and introduced himself, saying that he was very glad to meet a Russian who was a fellow lawyer. KORETSKIY immediately responded that he was a Ukrainian, not a Russian, and then proceeded to ignore the Italian. Later that morning, LISOVSKIY informed Source that he might be in Buenos Aires in 1961 and on this basis accepted Source's home and university addresses. However, LISOVSKIY gave Source only his Academy of Science, Kiev, address. Further information from KORETSKIY is contained in Annex II. AECASSOWARY 2 had arranged to meet Source at 1800 hours for an hour prior to the banquet. [] instructed AECASSOWARY 2 to call the safehouse at 2000 hours if there was further progress and to meet with [] at the safehouse at 1000 hours the next morning, Saturday, 13 August in any case, for a last meeting before [] returned to Frankfurt. AECASSOWARY 2 did not call at 1000 hours because there was nothing further to report.

7. Saturday, 13 August 1960

a. [] met AECASSOWARY 2 at the safe apartment at 1000 hours. AECASSOWARY 2 had talked with Source that morning for an hour. Source has now identified TUZMUKHAMED, ISHAKOV, and the woman delegate, KHALFINA. TUZMUKHAMED gave a lecture in English on colonialism, which was very strong. Afterwards Source tried to engage him in conversation, but TUZMUKHAMED was most reluctant to discuss anything with Source. TUZMUKHAMED said that he would try to obtain a copy of the speech for Source if he could. Source reported that the second Uzbek, Iru ISHAKOV, did not participate in any of the speeches or in the discussion, but remained pretty much to himself. KORETSKIY had said that ISHAKOV was a great scholar, but source was not able to engage him in conversation beyond a few minutes. Source said that the woman KHALFINA had expressed an interest in meeting a couple from Argentine, but she never found the time and Source did not talk with her further. Source was never able to discover where the Soviet delegates were staying and felt that since the Secretariat had no information, TUNKHIN must have arranged all the administrative affairs himself, including the procurement of lapel cards. Source noted that the Soviet delegate cards were typewritten whereas the others were printed.

b. It had become clear to AECASSOWARY 2 and [] that Source was not going to have any success on the requirements or on the assessment of the Soviets during the remainder of Saturday. It was agreed that [] would return to Frankfurt and AECASSOWARY 2 would follow on Sunday after last talks with Source. [] then instructed AECASSOWARY 2 to accomplish the following before returning to Frankfurt:

- 1) Obtain all the materials possible from the Conference;

- 2) Request Source to write up as many notes as he could about the personalities, conversations conducted with Soviet delegates, and Source's opinions on the possible vulnerabilities of each Soviet;
- 3) A report on AECASSOWARY 2's debriefing of Source which would not be contained in Source's notes;
- 4) An accounting of funds expended for operational purposes and travel by AECASSOWARY 2, including any operational expenses of Source, excluding travel.

[] then gave AECASSOWARY 2 contact instructions for AECASSOWARY 2 to reach [] when AECASSOWARY 2 returned to Frankfurt. [] then closed the safe apartment and returned to Frankfurt at 1615.

8. Sunday, 14 August 1960

a. [] met AECASSOWARY 2 at 1630 at the Hauptbahnhof and then met with AECASSOWARY 29 at the safe apartment in Frankfurt. AECASSOWARY 2 reported that he had met Source in Hamburg at 1300 hours and again during the evening of Saturday, 13 August, to obtain the last information about the Conference. Source said that he had sat with the Soviet delegation during the closing hours of the Conference and had watched them voting on the resolutions. Source reported that on important questions TUNKHIN would raise his hand first and then the remaining delegates would follow suit. On less important questions, however, TUNKHIN would vote and then some of the Soviets would vote the opposite way, much to their own amusement. Source believed that this splitting of the vote was done deliberately to create the impression that there was a freedom of voting among the Soviet delegates. Source said that the Soviet delegate did not remain in Hamburg after the last sessions as far as he knew, but that he was not able to engage any of them in conversation during that Saturday morning session. AECASSOWARY 2 then gave [] his typewritten notes of the Conference (attached to Annex I), the materials which Source had procured at the Conference (Annex III), and his accountings. AECASSOWARY 2 reported that Source had not written the notes, but that AECASSOWARY 2's notes contained the important items Source would have written. AECASSOWARY 2 stated that Source had left for Stockholm for the Historians Congress, which was in conformance with DIR 45007.

b. [] arranged to meet AECASSOWARY 2 and AECASSOWARY 29 again at 2000 hours on Sunday, 14 August, for further general discussions about AECASSOWARY 29's assignment to Frankfurt. AECASSOWARY 2 planned to go to Munich on 15 August and AECASSOWARY 29 was scheduled to go to Stockholm on 15 August if the German travel document was ready. In discussing the Hamburg operation in retrospect, [] and AECASSOWARY 2 agreed that it had not been a real success. We felt that there had been no real opportunity for Source to elicit the information required and that Source had just not been able to get close enough to the Soviets to make any headway. [] AECASSOWARY 2 and AECASSOWARY 29 felt that some excellent lessons were learned concerning this type of operation, which are summarized in the covering dispatch.

Annex 2

* VOLODIMIR KORETSKIY

Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147

Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960

KORETSKIY is a 72 year old Ukrainian. He gave his address as the Academy of Science, Kiev, USSR. He stated he was the head of the Scientific Section concerning Law and State in the Academy of Science, Kiev. He is no longer a professor because he is now concerned with research on the whole complex of juristic sciences and is working on these problems with his younger staff. He told Source that he was most interested in knowing about Latin America since he was preparing some work and writings on this theme. At another time KORETSKIY stated to Source that he was working on the same theme as that written about by Dr. VASYL MARKUS, of Paris, in the latter's last book written in April or May of 1960. KORETSKIY stated that the Academy of Science, Kiev, had a copy of this book but that he wanted one for himself. He also stated to Source that he was particularly interested in the short period of Ukrainian independence during World War I when the Ukrainians were fighting the Red troops, the White troops, and the Polish troops on three fronts.

Source stated that KORETSKIY was very careful and diplomatic in all of his conversations but seemed to show some sympathy to the West. He was very interested in the Ukrainians, particularly in Canada and the United States. He wanted to know where the headquarters of the Ukrainian emigration was located and was most receptive to the full explanation that Source gave him. KORETSKIY was interested to find out from Source that the U.S. emigration was more energetic and therefore more important than the Canadian emigration. KORETSKIY stated that he read the Ukrainian Quarterly, printed in the U.S., regularly at the Academy of Sciences, Kiev. He stated that he would welcome newspapers and magazines in the Ukrainian language printed in the West so Source sent some older issues to KORETSKIY's hotel along with the first book that Dr. MARKUS had written. One of these issues contained a critical article about KORETSKIY, however he was happy to get it all the same. KORETSKIY told Source that MARKUS' first book, written in 1958, was strongly criticized in the Soviet Ukrainian press and that the author's last book, published in 1960, had not been mentioned at all.

KORETSKIY discussed Ukrainian nationalism with Source; he was very careful and diplomatic, but also sympathetic. Source asked him whether the emigre group helped or hindered the Ukrainian people. KORETSKIY replied that it was very important not to judge everything in the Soviet Ukraine all together; that one must have an analytical approach and give a special estimate and opinion to each aspect or to each fact. He stated that the Ukrainians do the same thing in relation to Soviet realities of life. Some things the Ukrainians like, however, on other things the Ukrainians have their own critical opinion. The Ukrainians do what they can -- not only in the Ukraine but throughout the entire Soviet Union. KORETSKIY stated that the Ukrainians hold their own weight in the entire Soviet complex.

KORETSKIY also discussed the Virgin lands saying that it was very difficult and that perhaps a mistake had been made. At this point Source asked about the Congress of Kholhozniks but KORETSKIY replied that he never mixed in Government business. At another time KORETSKIY expounded with the normal Communist line to Source giving a beautiful picture of the USSR. Source said that it sounded rehearsed and he felt that KORETSKIY did not really believe what he was saying.

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(continuation of Annex 2, Volodimir KORETSKIY)

X
A Yugoslav delegate, Milan BARTOS, stated to Source that KORETSKIY sometimes pretended to be a Russian and at other times a Ukrainian. The Yugoslav apparently knew that KORETSKIY would attend the conference on Monday, 8 August 1960, prior to the appearance of KORETSKIY. The Yugoslav stated that in his opinion KORETSKIY was strictly a 'middle man' -- neither left or right (the apparent intention of this statement is toward political inclination). At one point a pro-Communist Italian delegate approached KORETSKIY, fawned on him, introduced himself, and said that he was so very happy to meet a Russian international lawyer. KORETSKIY immediately replied that he was not a Russian but a Ukrainian, and then completely ignored the Italian delegate. At another time KORETSKIY stated to Source, in a slightly derogatory manner, that BLISHCHENKO and KHIMINSKIY were Russians and then made a gesture which Source took to mean that the two were indeed Russians -- andn probably something more, such as KGB agents or informants.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ANNEX II TO RGRA-31926
<p style="text-align: center;">Annex 2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">* WADIM LISOVSKIY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147 Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960</p> <p>LISOVSKIY is a 55 year old Ukrainian with grey-white hair, a red face, and a poorly dressed appearance (one suit only). LISOVSKIY stated he was the head of the Law Department in the Economics Faculty at Moscow University. However, Source was not completely sure whether LISOVSKIY is associated with the University itself or with a research institute at the University.</p> <p>Source met LISOVSKIY on Wednesday, 10 August 1960. During the first conversations LISOVSKIY expressed interest in the Ukrainian emigration and the problem of assimilation into the host country. LISOVSKIY stated that the best way to avoid assimilation was to return to the Ukraine. LISOVSKIY suggested that if Source was afraid to return permanently he could return as a visitor and then perhaps decide to stay. Source reported, however, that LISOVSKIY was sympathetic to the emigration. LISOVSKIY was especially interested in Lev DOBRIANSKIY, a professor at Georgetown University, and wanted to know where he was, what he was doing, how well he was doing, etc.</p> <p>LISOVSKIY accepted some books written by Source from the latter on Wednesday, 10 August, one of which was entitled "National State -- But Enslaved" (Natsya Derzhavha Al Ponevshlena). LISOVSKIY kept the books overnight but on Thursday morning, 11 August, returned the books to Source; LISOVSKIY was accompanied at this time by YANOVSKIY and BLISHCHENKO. LISOVSKIY spoke in Russian rather than in Ukrainian while returning the books explaining that as an official representative of the Soviet Union he could not accept books which were critical of the Soviet Union. Source concluded that LISOVSKIY spoke in Russian since it was an official move to return the books. Source stated that LISOVSKIY had published a volume on International law in the Soviet Union and that this volume was severely criticized by official Moscow.</p> <p>Twice after this exchange of books LISOVSKIY refused to have lunch or wine with Source, explaining that all the meals and wine for the Soviet delegates had been prepaid for and that he must not, therefore, accept Source's invitation. LISOVSKIY also refused to enter into a discussion with Source on the boat trip of the evening of Thursday, 11 August '60, stating that he was very tired. By the end of the conference, however, it was apparent that LISOVSKIY was acting as if the 'book incident' had not taken place.</p> <p>KORETSKIY told Source that LISOVSKIY, YANOVSKIY and BLISHCHENKO had been sent to a conference in the West by the USSR for the first time so that they could be used at other conferences in the West later on. Source stated that he believed this is why the three men were usually together and why they seemed to be somewhat frightened to mingle with the other delegates.</p> <p>LISOVSKIY told Source that he might be going to the Argentine in May of 1961 as a member of a tourist group and then accepted Source's home and university addresses.</p>		
FORM 83c 10-57 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS DI-28, 61-28A AND 31-23 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET
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Annex 2

* ~~FNU~~ TUZMUKHAMED

Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147

Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960

TUZMUKHAMED is a 32 - 35 year old Uzbek; he is a slim, brunette Mongol and very close to Japanese in appearance. Source met TUZMUKHAMED on Friday, 12 August 1960, and learned that he is a professor of International Law at Tashkent University.

Source never had a real chance to talk with TUZMUKHAMED — partly because he was always in the company of BLISHCHENKO or another Soviet (although never in the company of ~~ISHAKO~~, another Uzbek from Tashkent) and partly because he would only give very brief, general answers to questions and never entered into a detailed discussion. TUZMUKHAMED delivered a very strong speech in English against colonialism and afterwards told Source that he would get the latter a copy of the speech.

~~X~~ TUZMUKHAMED was at the banquet but sat at a separate table with BISHCHENKO and never engaged in conversation with the others. Source saw him talking with a delegate from England for a very short period, however, does not know the subject of their conversation.

Annex 2

~~* FNU~~ ISHAKOV

Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147

Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960

ISHAKOV is a 60 year old Uzbek. He is a very big man with a big head and a round face; he has a flat nose and a heavy Mongolian fold; his face is marked with smallpox scars and his complexion is very dark.

ISHAKOV was identified by Source on Friday, 12 August 1960 at which time Source learned that the Uzbek was an Instructor of International Law at Tashkent University and may be a former student of KORETSKIY. ISHAKOV stated to Source that he has published a big work on the "Status of the Bukhara State", but that he did not know whether he could still get a copy to send to Source or not. He promised to do so if possible. KORETSKIY told Source that ISHAKOV was a very famous scholar.

ISHAKOV was always isolated from and ignored by the other Soviet delegates although he was almost always with one or more of them. Source stated that ISHAKOV did not engage in the general conversations and that he never talked to anyone, but merely came to the discussion table and just sat. ISHAKOV was able to read English since he told Source that he had read a book in English on international law.

Annex 2

* ~~MIKHAILO~~ YANOVSKIY

Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147

Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960

YANOVSKIY is Ukrainian and a professor at Tashkent University. He was one of the younger members of the Soviet delegation and was very quiet. KORETSKIY stated that YANOVSKIY had been sent out to this conference for his very first trip outside the Soviet Union; during the entire conference he was usually found in the company of BLISHCHENKO and LISOVSKIY.

Source reported that YANOVSKIY seemed sympathetic to the West.

YANOVSKIY was present when LISOVSKIY returned the books to Source; the latter stated that while LISOVSKIY was talking in Russian, explaining why he was returning the books, YANOVSKIY was smiling and winking at Source.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ANNEX II TO EGPA-31920
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Annex 2

* FNU KHIMINSKIY

Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147

POSSIBLY KGB

Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960

OCC: LAWYER(?) CIT: USSR

POB

Source was informed that KHIMINSKIY was born in the Ukraine, but has lived in Moscow since 1926. He spoke very poor Ukrainian, but started a conversation with a Ukrainian phrase or two and then switched to Russian.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION PROVIDED

KHIMINSKIY had a very unintelligent face, a dark complexion, with pale, unsympathetic lips; he was of medium height. When Source first saw KHIMINSKIY the latter wore a lapel badge with the name of 'KHOMENCHUK' (or something very similar to this); later Source observed that the Soviet had apparently noted the error as the name card had been changed to 'KHIMINSKIY'.

Source was informed that KHIMINSKIY had published a book on law. He was a lawyer (but not a professor) and that he was working "someplace in Moscow". Source reported to AECASSOWARY 2 that KHIMINSKIY was a "jurist in Moscow", but that 50 per cent of the lawyers in Moscos were KGB. Source felt that KHIMINSKIY could be KGB, but that he was certainly not an international lawyer.

Source reported that Dietrich LOEBE, a member of the Max Planck Institute, said that KHIMINSKIY was not a lawyer, but was something else. Source also reported that Klaus BASEDOW, a German delegate and Honorary Conference Secretary, said that he did not think that KHIMINSKIY really belonged in the conference — that he was not a specialist on International Law.

KORETSKIY referred to KHIMINSKIY as a 'Russian' in a derogatory manner and made a gesture with his hand, which Source took to mean that KHIMINSKIY was something more than just a Russian, perhaps KGB. The Soviet woman, KHALFINA, told a Dutch delegate that KHIMINSKIY and some of the others were out of the country for the first time.

FORM 53c 10-57 (00)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
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Annex 2

~~*~~ FNU KHALFINA

Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147

Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960

KHALFINA is a Russian female, about 35 years of age, and comes from Moscow. Source was informed that KHALFINA was a specialist in civil law in Moscow.

~~*~~ Source learned that KHALFINA had told a Dutch delegate that except for WINKIN, KORETSKIY and herself, the remaining members of the Soviet delegation were out of the USSR for the first time at a conference.

Source was told that KHALFINA had been in Denmark previously, but did not know in what capacity or when.

Source reported that KHALFINA had expressed interest in meeting an Argentine couple, but did not find time to do so during the conference.

Annex 2

* FNU BLISHCHENKO

Source: AECASSOWARY 2 from Subject of DIR 39147

Date of Information: 7 - 13 August 1960

BLISHCHENKO is a Russian male, about 35 years, with a long, thin face. Source was informed that Subject was a lawyer in the field of international law and constitutional law. BLISHCHENKO has published something in the field of law but Source did not know what it was.

BLISHCHENKO appeared to know some English.

Source reported that Subject was almost always with another of the Soviet delegation, mostly with LISOVSKIY or with YANOVSKIY. Source saw BLISHCHENKO in the presence of TUZMUKHAMED at the banquet and the two Soviets sat by themselves.

Source reported that the Russian woman, Fnu KHALFINA, had told a Dutch delegate that Subject was out of the USSR for the first time and that he was being prepared for participation in other conferences.

Source reported that when LISOVSKIY returned the books which Source had given to him, BLISHCHENKO was present; then when LISOVSKIY was making his 'speech' in Russian — BLISHCHENKO was winking at Source.

Source reported that KORETSKIY told Source that Subject was a Russian, but at the same time made a gesture with the hand as to indicate that Subject was something more than just a Russian.

ENCLOSURE EGFA 31920

74-124-29/3