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13 2816

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, WE
1010 J

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Chief, SR
2052 J

7 SEP 1960

8/Sept. Jm

2. Chief, SR/3

8/sep JB

3. SR/3/CA

8/sep H

4. Ann D.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Stan - do we buy this? Do you want me to call [] will you handle any necessary response? Jm

2-3 - Advised CSR by phone we buy this and no need he call [] [] Jm

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6 SEP 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division

ATTENTION : [] , SR/3

SUBJECT : Use of Canadian Anti-Communist Ethnic Groups

1. On 24 June 1960, [] of your division, [] and [] of WE/6 met with me to discuss the possibility of using the Ukrainian anti-communist groups in Canada as a spotting mechanism for Canadian-Ukrainians returning to the Ukraine either on visits or permanently. [] said that there has been a very close relationship between the various anti-communist Ukrainians in Canada with Ukrainians in the United States. This relationship, for the most part, has been kept strictly within the confines of normal ethnic group interests. However, among the Ukrainians in the United States we do have "controlled agents." [] explained that he was trying to evaluate the usefulness of ethnic groups as spotters and later as participants in the collection of intelligence information.

2. One of these "controlled agents" recently went to Toronto to discuss with a friend there whether the friend would be willing to cooperate in intelligence collection. The friend's reaction came in the form of a question, "What explanation could I give to the Canadian authorities should they query me about such activities?" This discussion was dropped for the time being.

3. I explained that the Canadian authorities were unusually sensitive about clandestine operations, especially the use of Canadians for intelligence collection. The Canadians, I feel sure, would take a very dim view of our operating through any ethnic group in Canada without prior knowledge and approval of the Canadian authorities.

4. After discussing the rather limited capabilities of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB/Ottawa) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) for exploiting both the anti-communist and communist Canadian-Ukrainian groups, it was decided that a dispatch would be sent to []

[], giving him sufficient information concerning our proposed use of ethnic groups in Canada for the collection of "realities" type intelligence. [] could then decide whether it would be appropriate to discuss informally and confidentially our proposal with the Director, JIB and certain officers in the RCMP.

5. OCOW-3274, dated 1 July 1960, "Use of Ethnic Groups" was forwarded to []. Subsequently, while on a visit to Headquarters, [] discussed the contents of this dispatch with []. After careful consideration, [] thought that the climate in Ottawa was such that he could not readily negotiate an arrangement which would be

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approved by the Canadian authorities. Use of Canadian ethnic groups is carefully controlled by the RCMP in conjunction with the JIB and the Department of State for External Affairs. To get all three services to agree to our proposal would be unlikely at this time.

6. [] pointed out that the RCMP was already using members of various ethnic groups as sub-sources on communist-front activities within the ethnic groups and was providing CIA with information from these sub-sources. [] asked that special note also be taken of the fact that in Canada many of the travel bureaus which arrange travel to Sino/Soviet Bloc areas were communist-fronts. Much of the information on travel to the Ukraine could be gotten only from these travel bureaus.

7. COS, Ottawa proposed, as an alternative, that CIA should use the "controlled agent" in the U. S. group to solicit the cooperation of selected Canadian-Ukrainians. Such solicitation must be made in the name of the ethnic group. If the Canadian showed a willingness to cooperate, it should then be proposed to him that he visit the U. S. group. Once the Canadian is on U. S. soil, the "controlled agent" could then attempt to recruit the Canadian and develop the operation as outlined in Paragraph 3 or 4 of OCOW 3274. If the Canadian accepts and later his activities in behalf of the ethnic group should come to the attention of the RCMP or other Canadian authorities and should they query him as to whether he is working for U. S. intelligence, he should be in a position to reply that he is working in behalf of his ethnic group and as far as he knows he is not working for any U. S. intelligence group.

8. [] feels that if the operation is kept well within the confines of the proposal as outlined in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of OCOW 3274 and if the operation is conducted solely in the name of the ethnic group, the Canadian authorities would have no proof of CIA support and/or guidance.

9. Returning to the fact that the Canadian authorities are extremely sensitive about the use of Canadians for intelligence collection by U. S. intelligence services, I feel I cannot give blanket approval to using Canadian-Ukrainians (or any other member of a Canadian ethnic group) in CIA intelligence operations. Instead, it is suggested that when SR Division proposes to use a Canadian, a member of your division discuss each case with the WE/6/Canada desk officer. If approval is granted by WE/6/Canada, all requirements for passage to Canadians must be approved by WE/6/Canada before release by SR Division.

[]
Chief
Western European Division

Distribution:

Original and 1 - Chief, SR
2 - SR/3 - []
1 - Chief, WE
1 - Chief, WE/6

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