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21 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR

SUBJECT: Meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 22 March 1960, between Mr. Mykola LEBED and Chief, SR. Specific time for meeting to be arranged for Chief, SR's convenience. Place: Hotel Dupont Plaza, Room 737.

The following points on Mykola LEBED's background and a list of topics he may bring up for discussion at subject meeting have been prepared for your information. The SR operation in which he is involved is the oldest uninterrupted project SR has. It antedates the SR Division itself. For all practical purposes the project began in mid-August 1948, after two years of exploratory intermittent contact.

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1. Mykola **LEBED**, the General Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, is fifty-one years of age. He was born near Lvov in that part of the Western Ukraine (Galicia), which then belonged to Austro-Hungary. He graduated from a Lvov high school in 1931, after which he became completely involved in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Soon after, in order to escape the Polish authorities, who at that time administered the Western Ukraine, he went to Czechoslovakia, thus beginning a series of international border crossings and clandestine operations which continue down to this day.

2. The name of Mykola **LEBED** first came into prominence in the Western Ukraine in 1934, when he was arrested by the Nazi police in a North Sea port and extradited to the Poles in connection with the assassination of Colonel Bronislaw Pieracki, Minister of the Interior of Poland. After a trial which lasted several weeks, Lebed and Stepan Bandera were convicted of planning the assassination and sentenced to death, later commuted to life imprisonment.

3. **LEBED** escaped from the Poles during German bombings in 1939. He managed to find his wife, whom he had married while both were in prison in 1935. Together they went to Slovakia and from there to Rome in an attempt to reach the United States. In 1941 **LEBED** returned to Slovakia and from there to Poland, where he continued to be active with the OUN, particularly in intelligence activities.

4. On 30 June 1941 when German troops entered the Soviet Union, the Bandera-Lebed faction seized the opportunity and proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine. The German Army was at first favorably disposed, but arrests soon began. While Bandera was soon picked up and spent the entire war in Sachsenhausen, **LEBED** evaded the Gestapo and SD dragnet (see attached circular) and escaped to fight both the Germans and the Soviets with equal zeal and determination. (His family was arrested and spent the war in Ravensbruck.) In 1943 the OUN Bandera-Lebed group consolidated its control over the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and that fall the UHVR, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, was formed as the supreme representative body of the Ukrainian resistance movement. **LEBED** was made Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a post which he holds today.

5. Following a period of negotiations with the Hungarian Army, which had been assigned by the Germans to wipe out the UPA, the Polish

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to him by an existing organization inside the USSR; for this reason the KP/UHVR has indulged less than other groups in jockeying for prestige in the emigration. His mandate has been clear and therefore generally respected.

10. It was already clear in 1948 that LEBED's group was one of the few organizations Russian or non-Russian which could justly claim to represent an active anti-Soviet movement in the USSR able to carry on effective operations.

11. By 1953 it was crystal clear both to LEBED and to SR that REDSOX operations could not produce reliable regular communication channels to the Ukraine. Moreover, by then the Soviets had succeeded in crushing the UPA as an organized fighting force. It was also clear to LEBED by this time that he had little if any chance to get from the United States Government any more favorable statement of policy than that which was sent in 1951 to General Taras GHUPRYNKA and which read approximately as follows:

"The United States actively supports the principle of self-determination. The United States is prepared to take all reasonable steps to insure that the future of the Ukraine will depend upon the will of the majority of the Ukrainian people. It would be only ethical for the United States, as the leading nation of the democratic anti-Bolshevist world, to give moral and other types of support to her democratic and freedom-loving allies. The United States stands on the position of the Atlantic Charter."

Such a policy statement was cleared with the Department of State and has not been revoked.

12. From 1953 to 1958 the group experimented with other means such as radio and mailing for receiving contact with the Ukraine. In the summer of 1958, the group began organizing and mounting contact operations; its first major effort took place at the Brussels World's Fair. SR/3 now is in the process of systematizing and expanding ZPUHVR's operational capabilities on the premise that Ukrainians have been shown to be exceptionally willing to undertake anti-Soviet activities.

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13. For the last thirty years Mykola LEBED has devoted a good part of his thinking to analyzing the Soviets' tactics, both in their attempts to stamp out Ukrainian nationalism and their other domestic and foreign policies. LEBED is convinced that unless President Eisenhower by word or deed shows during his trip to the Soviet Union that he appreciates the fact that the many nationalities of the Soviet Union have separate histories, cultures and, hence, national characteristics, his trip will bitterly disappoint those non-Russians who resent living under Russian hegemony, thus further consolidating the Soviet regime. The Soviet press has for the past year been playing up American ignorance concerning nationality differences inside the USSR. (It is hoped that Eisenhower will not make the type of mistake which MacMillan did in referring to Kiev as "this old historical Russian city".) LEBED will therefore probably have specific recommendations for Eisenhower's trip. For example, if Eisenhower is to visit the Ukraine during his trip, an American interpreter for the Ukrainian language should obviously go with him. The same applies to other nationality republics.

14. It is only natural that LEBED and his group do not approve of peaceful coexistence between the United States and the USSR on Soviet terms. He feels that United States restraint from using the nationalities question to promote evolution inside the Soviet Union shows a serious lack of understanding of Soviet realities by American policy makers, particularly since the Soviets use the issue of nationalism as their prime tool in Africa, Asia and to some extent elsewhere. LEBED, however, does not go along with emigres who think that the inclusion of Cossackia and Idel-Ural in the Captive Nations Week resolution was a good idea. He is a realist - not a romantic. His proposals in recent years for United States official action on the nationalities question have been objective and entirely feasible.

15. LEBED might mention his disappointment that his group's broadcasts from Athens were turned off without warning. It is the lack of warning and consultation rather than the fact that the broadcasts no longer exist which bothers him most. If he brings this up it will be as a matter of principle, i.e., that we do not in the future cancel any of his other activities without prior consultation. (Incidentally, [] assumed the entire onus for not telling LEBED of the broadcasts' terminating. Steve seemed to sense in telling him until a decision re final termination was reached in late January 1960.)

16. LEBED was encouraged by Bohlen's recent attendance at a Lithuanian Independence Day celebration in Washington. Since he considers Bohlen in his present position to be a key man, he has expressed a desire to talk

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with him on topics Ukrainian. Based on his past experiences, LEBEED is of the opinion that any written statement he may make to the Department of State would not reach Bohlen, and therefore he may ask us to arrange for an appointment. If we feel Bohlen is not the proper man for him to speak with, we can suggest some one else in State. There is already a precedent for such a meeting inasmuch as the Vice President of the UHVR conferred with Dick Davis and Freddy Reinhardt at State in 1951.

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