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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

AECASSOWARY Project - Suggested Plan for FI Exploitation.

FROM: SR/3 FI

C J/em

NO.

DATE

21 October 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Chief, SR/3

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENTS.

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SR/3 FI

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21 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : AECASSOWARY Project - Suggested Plan for FI Exploitation.

1. An eight hour discussion with AECASSOWARY-2 on 7 and 8 October 1959, during which time the FI exploitation of this project was discussed, various ideas were exchanged on the basis of which the plan presented below appears to be the most reasonable manner in which to attempt a project to produce in the FI field.

2. Types of FI Activities

This project appears to present possibilities in FI exploitation in the following fields:

(a) Contact of Ukrainians visiting in the West. This includes Ukrainian delegations, tourists, members of scientific and cultural groups, and Ukrainians on the Soviet tourist ships anchored at the <sup>West</sup>~~Soviet~~-European harbors.

(b) REDSKIN Operations. Selected Ukrainian emigres in Western Europe visiting their relatives inside the USSR or going there as tourists. In this connection, they are in a position to collect PI data, determine the vulnerability and recruitment possibilities of contacts inside, and possibly perform some operational tasks such as location of DLDs, acquisition of maps, telephone books, and other indigenous material, acquisition of sampling, etc.

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(c) Concentration of FI exploitation of the Ukrainian emigre group in Poland, the representatives of which travel to the West and who are also being visited in Poland and the Ukraine by the AECASSOWARYs.

### 3. AECASSOWARY Representatives and Contacts in Foreign Countries

There appear to be two types of relationships which the AECASSOWARY organization maintains in Western European countries and the North American continent. There are the staff members or employees of the AECASSOWARY organization which consists of about a total of 21 staff employees, of which about 11 are in Munich and the rest in New York. There are also some part-time employees of the AECASSOWARYs in various Western European countries who have, however, full-time employment in some other endeavor. Besides these paid contacts of the AECASSOWARYs, there are what AECASSOWARY-2 refers to as honorary representatives who draw no salary, but who are ideologically motivated to spend their time and effort on behalf of the AECASSOWARY objective. The relationship between the AECASSOWARYs and these honorary contacts are to a large extent of a personal nature and rarely formalized into exact functions. If one can speak of any functions at all which these honorary representatives perform it is mostly in the distribution of AECASSOWARY publications. The following is a breakdown of AECASSOWARY assets and contacts.

ARGENTINA has two representatives there. There are approximately 40,000 to 50,000 Ukrainian immigrants in Argentina of which approximately 400 returned to the Ukraine in 1956 in response to Soviet efforts to get emigres to return to their homeland. There are about 500 Ukrainian emigres who can be considered sympathetic but unorganized members of the

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AECASSOWARY cause.

AUSTRALIA - AECASSOWARY-2 has one representative in Melbourne; there are about 200 semi-organized AECASSOWARY members out of a total of about 35,000 Ukrainian immigrants in Australia.

FRANCE - Five or six AECASSOWARY representatives; about 25 semi-organized members of the AECASSOWARY group. Most of the Ukrainian emigres in France are pre-World War II emigres and very few Ukrainians have come to France since World War II.

ENGLAND - The largest group of Ukrainian emigres in Europe are in England. AECASSOWARY-2 has about 8 representatives there and 300 to 500 semi-organized emigre sympathizers. The contacts are in London, Manchester, and Nottingham.

SPAIN - There are only about 50 Ukrainian emigres in Spain. AECASSOWARY-2 <sup>has</sup> ~~and~~ two representatives there who are mostly concerned with the radio operation conducted from Spain.

SWEDEN - There is a small group of about 100 to 150 Ukrainian emigres in Sweden. AECASSOWARY-2 has about 5 representatives there who also have their own personal contacts with Ukrainians in Finland.

BELGIUM - Most of the Ukrainian emigres in Belgium are students who are not very much interested in emigre politics. Subject has no representative there but maintains contact with three people there. There are about a total of 5,000 Ukrainians in Belgium. Very few of those are post-World War II vintage.

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EGYPT - AECASSOWARY-2 has one representative in Egypt who is presently studying at Harvard University and who will subsequently return to Egypt. AECASSOWARY-2 intends to maintain contact with him. There are no known Ukrainian emigres in Egypt.

GERMANY - There are about 15,000 Ukrainian emigres in Germany. AECASSOWARY-2 has about 15 employees in his office in Munich. There are several hundred semi-organized Ukrainian sympathizers of the AECASSOWARYs in Germany.

CANADA - There are approximately 450 Ukrainian immigrants in Canada and AECASSOWARY-2 has an office in Winnipeg and Toronto with 7 representatives there. Approximately 200 to 300 emigres are semi-organized members of the AECASSOWARYs. AECASSOWARY-2 stated that the Ukrainian emigres in Canada have elected several members into the Canadian Parliament and have developed into a very powerful nationalistic group.

UNITED STATES - AECASSOWARY-2 has his headquarters in New York from where he conducts his world-wide effort. His communication with his representatives overseas is usually through the commercial mail and through personal contacts.

#### 4. Examples of FI Ops Potential

The AECASSOWARY project is primarily a propaganda effort and FI exploitation of this project has, in the past, been primarily handled as a bi-product of the AECASSOWARY's major effort. Discussions with AECASSOWARY-2 indicated the following type of FI potential:

(a) The Swedish contact:- AECASSOWARY-2 stated that one of his personal contacts in Stockholm, who has been a co-worker of AECASSOWARY-2 when the latter was chief of the Ukrainian underground in 1944/45, and who has since

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resettled in Stockholm, received the visit last year of a Ukrainian tourist who was an old acquaintance and former underground colleague of AECASSOWARY-2 and the Swedish contact respectively. This meeting presented obvious FI possibilities which conceivably could have been used to advantage if an appropriate operational structure were in existence designed to handle such targets of opportunity. The major problem to overcome in this case was one of communication and to have a knowledgeable FI officer available to properly brief the Ukrainian emigre in Stockholm. There may still be something to be salvaged by getting a complete rundown of this incident through AECASSOWARY-2's Swedish contact.

(b) Contacts with Ukrainian cultural delegation:- AECASSOWARY-2's representatives in Western Europe have established a social type of contact with one dancer of the Kiev Opera Ballet and a member of the Ukrainian Choir (Petrietsky, Dorichnko). These and similar contacts have been frequently made in the past by AECASSOWARYs which were designed primarily to pass propaganda of the AECASSOWARYs to fellow Ukrainians with a hope to have this propaganda disseminated in the Ukraine. There have as yet been no recruitment pitches made to the above. Since both are presently in Germany, instructions have gone to the field concerning future handling. The AECASSOWARYs can take advantage in making such contacts with Ukrainian tourists and delegations because of a common background and language. Frequently, these contacts are made quite overtly. The emigre representatives approach the Ukrainians as an editor of a Ukrainian emigre magazine or to ask for autographs in the case where the Ukrainian is a well known entertainer.

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(c) A Canadian contact of AECASSOWARY-2 (Juri STEFONIC, DOB ca 1909) has a brother, Simen STEFONIC, DOB ca 1903, who is the chairman of the Lvov Oblast. They correspond with one another and send packages. The Lvov brother visited his Canadian brother in Edmonton in 1945/46. Last year a Soviet Embassy representative visited Juri STEFONIC and tried to persuade him to return to the Ukraine. This was done on behalf of his brother. Also last year, a cousin of Juri STEFONIC and member of the Ukrainian emigres in Canada, visited the Ukraine and contacted ~~Simen~~ STEFONIC in Lvov. He asked for and received permission to visit their home village, although special permission for this visit was necessary. It appears that the father of these two brothers, one Vasyl STEFONIC was a well known Ukrainian author of classical short stories who is very much respected and popular in the Ukraine. ~~Juri~~ STEFONIC defected to the Germans in 1944 in Frankfurt and collaborated with the Germans. He came to Canada in 1949. He is a lawyer. This contact of AECASSOWARY-2 may have some FI potential in case Juri STEFONIC would be willing or could be persuaded to visit the Ukraine. This is likely to produce some interest, politically, information which could be obtained through elicitation.

(d) ~~Steve~~ OLYNIK: ~~The visit to Kiev last year~~ of this AECASSOWARY-2 contact could have produced some more PI data if the facilities for a briefing prior to this trip were given. OLYNIK is a Reserve Lieutenant in the army and works in Washington in the Library of Congress. He could make future trips to the Ukraine along similar lines, and if properly briefed before his departure, is likely to produce both PI and OI.

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(e) ~~X~~Roman KUCHER:- This is the chemistry professor who has been in contact with an AECASSOWARY in Western Germany. The contact was originally made at the Youth Festival in Moscow in 1957 and was followed up with correspondence and additional contacts in East Berlin in 1958. KUCHER was scheduled to attend a scientific symposium in Wiesbaden in October 1959 during which time he planned to visit with the AECASSOWARY contact (HORNBACH). KUCHER's trip was cancelled because of the sudden death of KUCHER's father. This is an example of an AECASSOWARY contact operation which is likely to have strong CE tones.

(f) AECASSOWARY Representative in Poland:- AECASSOWARY-2 stated that there are a great many Ukrainians in Western Poland with whom AECASSOWARY-2 maintains contact by sending them gift parcels, through correspondence, and through personal contacts when these Ukrainians visit in Western Europe or by having CASSOWARYs contact them in Poland. AECASSOWARY-2 stated that there is a Ukrainian Relief Committee in the United States with headquarters in Philadelphia which is headed by a rather pompous lawyer of Ukrainian background by the name of ~~X~~Pnu GHALAN. In late September 1959, AECASSOWARY-2 talked with GHALAN and they discussed the possibility of establishing a permanent representative of the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Poland to aid the Ukrainian residents who live in Poland. There is also a Ukrainian Relief Society in Poland with which Mr. GHALAN has been negotiating in the past, and through which he has been distributing packages to Ukrainians in Poland. Mr. GHALAN stated that there is a possibility of sending such a representative of the Ukrainian Relief Committee to Poland and that he (GHALAN) would let AECASSOWARY-2 fill the slot with a capable man. AECASSOWARY-2 believes that GHALAN wants some official Washington authority's concurrence with

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this plan and would then proceed to Poland for specific negotiations with Polish Government representatives. There are some obvious FI possibilities in such a resident contact in Poland. Under this cover arrangement, contacts with Ukrainians living in Poland who, in turn, frequently travel to the Ukraine could be developed. Among these contacts are a considerable number of Ukrainian students studying now at the Warsaw universities.

5. Target Analysis

While the AECASSOWARYs present certain advantages as an already existing organization in developing activities in the FI field, closer examination of the above conceivable areas of activities led one to conclude that this FI potential is rather limited in scope. The following considerations are appropriate:

(a) In the field of contacting Soviets of Ukrainian background abroad, we have to consider that only a small number of such delegations, tourist groups and individuals appear in the West. Approximately one half dozen or so events per year bring out Ukrainian delegations such as the bi-annual Trade Fair, the Film Festival (the Ukrainians usually have representatives attending) and three or four cultural and sports groups per year. In the tourist trade, the Ukrainians usually travel together with other Soviet nationalists and the tourist tours are usually very closely watched by attending Inturist representatives which assure that there is a tight schedule and a minimum of independent contacts. This does not preclude, of course, a hit-and-run type of contact usually done in a haphazard fashion because of time limitations, the lack of previous knowledge as to the exact identity of the Ukrainian, and the usual security measures implemented by the watch dogs. Since the recruitment of a person usually

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takes a considerable amount of time and continuous contacts, it is questionable whether such an effort against the tourist target from an FI point of view is justifiable based on the above considerations. As far as representatives to scientific-technical international meetings are concerned, there appears to be some advantage to concentrate an AECASSOWARY contact effort at such targets, especially if the Soviet-Ukrainian is known to have strong nationalistic tendencies. Very frequently, CIA has other types of coverage of such international conferences and usually has the facilities of enlisting the help of the American delegation, which is usually present, in contacting and assessing the Soviet, including Ukrainian members of the delegation. I don't know yet to what extent Ukrainian nationals are reported in most Soviet delegations which come to the West, nor do I know, at this time, to what extent the Ukrainian nationalistic ideology plays a major role in the possible recruitment of such representatives.

(b) With regards to REDSKIN operations into the USSR using Ukrainian emigres to visit relatives and friends, the following major consideration strongly affects this FI potential. Many of the Ukrainian emigres now living in the West have not become citizens of these respective Western countries, but have maintained their stateless status and thus have no valid passports with which to travel to the USSR. For example, only three Ukrainians in England have obtained British citizenships; in France none have French citizenship, and in Germany 5 to 10 have acquired German citizenship. In the latter case, the fact that they have obtained their German citizenship actually may get them into difficulties if they were to visit the Soviet Union, because this German citizenship was obtained

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primarily on the grounds of having served in the German army during WW II fighting Soviet forces. The REDSKIN aspects, therefore, is primarily limited to those AECASSOWARY contacts in Canada and the United States.

(c) The exploitation of the Ukrainian group in Poland depends to a large degree on the feasibility of establishing an overt Ukrainian relief office in Warsaw as proposed by Mr. GHALAN (stated above). The extent of contacts between AECASSOWARYs and Ukrainians living in Poland in the past and present needs still to be further investigated to be able to draw any kind of conclusions from this aspect in the FI field.

(d) Case Officer Comment:- The above target analysis of the FI potential in the AECASSOWARY project indicates a rather meager potential to justify the establishment of an elaborate FI exploitation structure. Even a small FI effort involving only one additional principal agent may not be justified on a full time basis unless we can determine more concrete evidence of FI potential in the AECASSOWARY organization. One of the reasons for this meager information on FI aspects is due to the fact that this is a PP project and no concentrated effort has been made in the past to develop or even to uncover its FI potential. Therefore, it may be advisable to consider a further investigation of this FI potential by having an experienced FI Case Officer assigned on a TDY to accompany AECASSOWARY-2 during the latter's forthcoming trip to Europe. Getting a more detailed and specific idea of the extent to which AECASSOWARY contacts can be exploited operationally would preclude our jumping into this field full scale with expensive assets or scraping the idea of developing an FI effort altogether without having given it the fair chance

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to prove its worth. A great many questions still unanswered could be resolved during such a trip during which AECASSOWARY-2 would play the major role in debriefing his representatives and contact overseas along with a briefing previously submitted by the Case Officer so that such an investigation can be handled under cover without blowing the nature of this investigation and still supply the necessary answers. The points to be clarified are along the lines indicated above in the section on types of FI activities. It is necessary to determine the calibre of AECASSOWARY representatives overseas, the exact nature of their many contacts with local emigres, a detailed debriefing to determine the extent of contacts between local emigres and their friends and relatives inside, and the extent to which the overt AECASSOWARY representation can be used in the development of first phase contact operations against potential individual targets among Ukrainian visitors in the West. It is recommended that the results of this proposed investigation be used to determine whether or not an FI effort be implemented in the AECASSOWARY project.

6. FI Ops Structure

(a) Personnel

(i) New York Office - One member of the AECASSOWARY staff should be assigned as the FI officer who would be responsible for coordination of AECASSOWARY FI activities in the field and who would be in liaison with an FI Case Officer of CIA.

(ii) Munich Office - A senior and experienced AECASSOWARY PA should be assigned to handle the total AECASSOWARY developmental FI

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effort in close coordination with a CIA field Case Officer.

(iii) One secretary to be assigned to the Munich PA would be required inasmuch as a considerable amount of reporting, filing, and typing would be necessary.

(b) Finance

(i) Salary for three employees (New York man, Munich PA, and secretary), approximately \$20,000 per annum.

(ii) Travel allowances, \$5,000 per annum.

(iii) Operational expenses, \$5,000 per annum.

TOTAL :- \$30,000 per annum.

(c) CIA Direction

(i) The Munich PA would be in direct contact with a MOB Case Officer who would give directions and guidance to the PA on all operational tasks. In the case of operations involving the Munich area, the MOB Case Officer would receive his directions from the Chief of MOB, the PA would receive his directions from the MOB Case Officer in coordination with CIA Headquarters.

(ii) If the AECASSOWARY PA travels to other countries to contact the AECASSOWARY overt representatives in connection with a specific FI target in that particular area, arrangements should be made for the PA to have directions and commo from a Case Officer of the Station in which the FI activity is envisaged. For example, if a Ukrainian travels to Stockholm, the Munich PA advises his MOB Case Officer of this development and requests instructions to go to Stockholm to develop FI ops against this group. This is cabled by MOB to CIA

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Headquarters who give appropriate instructions to MOB, which is passed to the PA with instructions of whom to contact in Stockholm (a CIA Case Officer) or the Munich Case Officer goes along with the PA to give direction and guidance. This type of close relationship between the Case Officer and the PA assures a full coordination of all efforts including appropriate vetting, clearances, reporting, and offers the opportunity for recruitment by a CIA representative and subsequent briefing and levying of requirements.

(d) Briefing

The AECASSOWARY PA, himself, should be well briefed and should have considerable background and experience in FI operations to be able to meet the requirements of quick operational decisions and good judgment. One of the PA's first functions would be to brief the AECASSOWARY overt representatives in Western Europe of his particular interest. Only a minimum number of such representatives should be aware of the true intelligence interest, and, therefore, appropriate cover would be necessary to obtain operational data pertaining to the geographical areas of the respective AECASSOWARY representatives.

(e) Spotting

The local AECASSOWARY representatives can be used in a spotting function to advise the FI PA of potential opportunities arising in the geographical area. The overt AECASSOWARY contacts can also be used to provide leads among emigres to report the presence of Soviet-Ukrainians in the area, they can check with local tourist offices for detailed arrangements made for Soviet tourists, they can check the

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extent of contact between emigres and relatives inside and they can be used in the initial phases of establishing contact with Soviets for assessment and collection of ops data.

(f) Reporting

The PA submits reports to the Case Officer which describe in detail the leads emanating from each geographical area and their respective overt offices. The PA submits plans for FI exploitation of these leads, requests vetting and coordination with the respective New York and Washington offices (New York, CASSOWARY office - Washington, CIA). The PA should have facilities for the filing of operational reports and it may be advisable for these operational files to be maintained by the Case Officer in MOB safes.

(g) Typical FI Approach Procedure

(i) The local AECASSOWARY overt representative reports to the PA that a Ukrainian delegation is in the area.

(ii) The PA arrives on the scene together with the MOB Case Officer.

(iii) The PA requests the local representative to collect basic ops data such as names of Soviets in the delegation, location, movements and activities of the individual delegation members, security measures implemented by the watch dogs, willingness of the individual delegation members to talk to representatives of the overt emigre group, and possibly pinpoint specific members who are easily accessible for contact.

(iv) The PA passes this information to the Case Officer who has the names traced by cable to Headquarters.

(v) The PA and Case Officer discuss the ops exploitation of

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individual targets and implement the contact with Base and Headquarters coordination.

(vi) The Case Officer contacts the target pinpointed by the AECASSOWARYs as susceptible or vulnerable. The Case Officer makes this contact independently of the AECASSOWARY contact in order to compartment the AECASSOWARYs from intelligence affiliation.

(vii) The agent is then run exclusively as a CIA asset. The exception to this rule would be in the case of an agent who showed susceptibility towards recruitment based on AECASSOWARY ideologies and would thus have to be recruited as an AECASSOWARY contact. In the latter case (which should be avoided whenever possible) the AECASSOWARYs run the agent with close CIA coordination.

7. Basic FI Ops Agreement with AECASSOWARYs

(a) The intelligence interest should be limited to a minimum of AECASSOWARY representatives.

(b) An agreement is necessary that the organization and overt representatives of the AECASSOWARY organization will serve as spotters and assist in the initial contact and assessment phase of potential FI recruitments, and will subsequently separate themselves from this operation after an AIS recruitment has been made.

(c) Agreements to practice appropriate cover are necessary so that the AECASSOWARYs will not be compromised as an AIS espionage organization.

(d) The overt representatives of AECASSOWARY should not be directly involved in intelligence activities which would compromise and invalidate their

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overt function as representatives of the AECASSOWARY organization.

(e) An agreement should be reached that we recruit and run the agents developed from AECASSOWARY leads, and that we maintain exclusive control over these agents unless they are ideologically in sympathy with the AECASSOWARYs, and, therefore, recruited by them rather than by the AIS. In the latter case, the operation would have to be closely coordinated between the PA and CIA Case Officer.

8. Basic Doctrine

It is felt that the development of contacts should be designed toward ultimate recruitment of said contacts for the collection of positive and operational intelligence. Prior to recruiting a susceptible agent candidate we should assess his value as a potential agent in terms of direct access to information, persons, or installations, or to what extent access can be reasonably achieved being given prevailing circumstances. It is not desirable to recruit agents developed through above mentioned contacts merely because they are anti-Soviet and are willing to let themselves be recruited. If it is felt that said agent has no conceivable access to target data. This question is likely to come up frequently in these operations because many of the Soviet-Ukrainians coming to the West are representatives of cultural groups who ordinarily do not offer a sufficient potential to collect positive intelligence by virtue of their age, profession, or personal habits. In addition to the requirement of having access to target data, it is equally necessary to have the facility to communicate this data to us. An agent candidate who presents the possibility of recruitment during a one-shot visit to the West must be given communications facilities with us, and if such communications facilities are not available

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or he is not willing to use them, there is no use in running him as an agent. I believe that we have sufficient experience to be able to judge the future capability of an agent's reporting ability, and if this does not apply to a specific contact, we should not simply recruit him because he is a warm body inside the Soviet Union. Prior to making recruitment approaches to AECASSOWARY contacts we should attempt to elicit sufficient data on the target personalities involved to determine both his vulnerability and access to target data. When making a recruitment pitch and when developing an operation toward recruitment of a Ukrainian national, we should strive to create the most favorable circumstances in the initial stage from the security point of view, to assure that the operation is not blown to the Soviet security types usually surrounding these targets before we make our recruitment pitch. The KUCHER operation is a typical example of an FI development, which, in its initial phase has disregarded basic operational security precautions and must be considered as either blown or run as a CE case. We should, whenever possible, attempt to compartment the AECASSOWARY contacts with target personalities from the ultimate CIA contact so that the AECASSOWARY organization does not suffer under the reputation of being used for intelligence purposes. In those cases where we make a recruitment arising out of a previous initial developmental contact, we should insist on operational control and maintain this exclusive control throughout. Appropriate CE considerations are partly in order in developmental FI operations involving an emigre organization, therefore, an analysis of the initial contact with a target personality and appropriate handling in the initial phase will guard against the opposition's attempts to penetrate the operation. Appropriate steps should be taken for vetting and testing to determine to what extent the operation

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may be controlled by the opposition. It is hoped that the presence of the CIA Case Officer in the early phase of these developmental operations will assure that proper clandestine operational practices are implemented by the PA, and the appropriate attention is paid to the security of communications, meetings, levying of operational tasks, cover, and the personal limitations inherent in each agent.

9. Recommended Action

(a) AECASSOWARY-2 submits names of candidates for the New York and Munich office so that we can begin name tracing.

(b) AECASSOWARY-2 submit a plan of his itinerary and functions during the forthcoming trip to Europe.

(c) We determine the merit of assigning a Case Officer to take a TDY trip together with AECASSOWARY-2 to investigate further the FI ops potential in this project.

(d) Obtain additional AECASSOWARY-2 views as to how best to investigate the FI potential in his organization - specifically in his field organizations.

  
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