

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [ ]
TO INFO	Chief, SR Chief, EE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. <del>74-124-21/39</del> 74-124-21/39
FROM	Chief [ ]	DATE 1959	
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/PSYCH/AEHANGOVER/AERODYNAMIC		
	Monitoring of AEHANGOVER and AERODYNAMIC Broadcasts		
	RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) <input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
ACTION REQUIRED	None; for information and files. <b>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY</b> [ ] INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY		
REFERENCE(S)	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302B VAZIR WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007		
[ ], 9 July 1959			
<p><b>SYNOPSIS:</b> Feeling that it will be worthwhile monitoring of AEHANGOVER and AERODYNAMIC broadcasts as near as possible to the target areas, we suggest in this dispatch several methods of implementing such monitoring projects.</p> <p>1. The purpose of this paper is to acquaint Headquarters, prior to [ ]'s home leave trip, with our ideas and plans concerning monitoring of AEHANGOVER and AERODYNAMIC broadcasts in the areas immediately adjacent to the South-Western territories of the USSR, so that the subject may be discussed with him upon his arrival in Washington.</p> <p>2. We have always felt that we are on the right track as far as the contents of our broadcasts are concerned. The assumption of ours is based on a number of facts: information obtained through continuous study of all available materials concerning political attitudes and behaviour of the Soviet people; the opinions of those Soviet defectors and refugees who have had the opportunity, to hear or read our broadcasts; comments by a number of Soviet people inside the USSR who heard the broadcasts and then had a chance to comment on them to Americans traveling in the Soviet Union (all the comments known to us were highly favorable) who later reported them to KUBARK; and last but not least, the reaction of a) the Soviet press and b) Soviet officials. We wish to cite as an example of the latter certain passages of Mme. FURTSEVA's speech delivered at the 21st Congress of CPSU in Moscow last January. In her speech devoted to the question of strengthening of Marxist-Leninist ideology and communist consciousness among the people of the USSR, FURTSEVA said: "Questions of ideological work ..... assume in present-day conditions great importance because we are forced at present and shall have to continue in the future to wage a struggle against ideological diversions of imperialism and the survivals of bourgeois morality in the conscience of the people" .... and further: "At the service of the organizers of the Cold War are all sorts of private committees, funds, and unions, and numerous radio stations with provocative names like BAYKAL, <u>KAVKAZ</u>, <u>NOVAYA UKRAINA</u>, <u>NASHA ROSSIYA*</u>, OSVOBOZHDENIE (Liberation), SVOBODNAYA EVROPA (Free Europe), and so forth." Now, anyone versed in Soviet reality and the fundamentals of the Communist Party rule in the USSR and the rest of the communist block knows very well that a speech made by a member of the Central Committee of CPSU at the Party Congress in Moscow for the entire communist world to hear is of great significance for this world, and that every word has been carefully weighed before being written into the speech by its author. The fact that Mme. FURTSEVA found it necessary to mention the "diversionary" work of our black radios, thus publicising them before the great masses of listeners and readers of her speech is proof of the significance the ruling clique of the USSR-CPSU attaches to the role of these radios in the overall Psychological War effort of the Free World against Communism.</p> <p>3. The big question has always been, however: are our broadcasts heard by a large enough number of people in the target areas to make the effort worthwhile? Or has the Soviet jamming system succeeded in preventing most of what we say in these broadcasts from reaching the ears of our potential listeners?</p> <p><b>*NOTE:</b> Underlined are names of broadcasts made from PYREX installation in Athens.</p>			
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FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PAGE NO. 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

This question for a long time has been burning the minds of those of us who have been directly connected with our black radio activities and who have always believed in radio propaganda as one of the most powerful weapons against communism, while others simply wanted to know, is the whole thing worth the money it costs? Yet, strangely enough no real effort has every been made by KUBARK to organize monitoring of these broadcasts within the USSR despite the extensive travel in that country of a considerable number of people connected one way or another with KUBARK, and even some KUBARK personnel, not to mention the U.S. Government personnel stationed in Moscow.

4. While working on development of new broadcasting methods (see Ref dispatch) which we hope will help us to penetrate or sufficiently avoid Soviet jammers, we at the same time have been looking into various possibilities of organizing our own monitoring operations, if not inside the USSR, then at least in areas immediately adjacent to its territories, using our own facilities. After considering several different areas and methods we decided that the following were our best bets: a) monitoring of AEHANGOVER and AERODYNAMIC broadcasts by our men sailing on board Greek cargo vessels or tourist cruise ships visiting Soviet Black Sea ports (Odessa, Yalta, Novorossiysk, Poti, etc.) and b) monitoring of AEHANGOVER broadcasts in certain points near the Turkish-Soviet and Iranian-Soviet borders.

5. We feel that following are the prime prerequisites for such monitoring operations: Native-like command of the languages in which the broadcasts are made; security; proper type of equipment; availability of pre-arranged broadcasting schedules. Organizing a monitoring operation around a person who simply "knows a certain language very well," but is not a native of the country where the language is spoken is a waste of time and effort, and may produce totally misleading results. We could cite examples where KUBARK employees of non-Russian origin but with seemingly excellent command of Russian language had a hard time listening to a tape-recording of a Soviet jammed Russian language broadcast while other people in the same room with native Russian easily understood it. Even worse than that would be to use a person without the language expecting him to just recognize the call sign as has been tried once or twice. The sad case of having Mr. Adlai STEVENSON's son monitor AECROAK broadcasts while traveling in the USSR with his father, is perfect example of the latter.

6. By "security" we mean using an agent who will not suspect that the broadcasts he is monitoring are made by Americans and originate in Greece, or else one that can be fully trusted and, if necessary, made witting of the whole thing. While the task of finding a former type agent would be easier as we do have agents among the crews of some Greek merchant ships, we find that none of these people know Russian. On the other hand, to find our own man and then place him aboard one of the Greek cargo ships sailing for a Soviet port as a member of the crew would require a joint operation with HBHADDOCK which, in turn, would mean revealing to the Greeks or at least reminding them of the existence of our black broadcasting activities in Greece.

7. Consequently, we have been thinking primarily of another possibility, namely of having an agent go on one of the Greek cruises along the Soviet Black Sea coast packing a radio receiver set. As a passenger in his own cabin, such a man would have more privacy for monitoring than would a crew member. And, furthermore, his possession of an expensive portable radio would excite little curiosity. In view of lack of agent material in Greece suitable for this type of operation we have been thinking of getting a man from another area, for example, Germany, where it would be easier to find among the mass of Soviet emigres a person with appropriate financial background and perhaps even a German citizen who could pass as a genuine tourist and blend in with the multi-national group of tourists sailing with him. As this latter idea has come to us only recently we decided not to take any further steps in going through with it until   is able to discuss it with the appropriate people in Headquarters.

8. Monitoring of AEHANGOVER radio broadcasts along with the Turkish and Iranian-Soviet borders is an outgrowth of an earlier idea of sending

a man with a radio receiver set on a regular Turkish passenger boat sailing along the Turkish Black Sea coast as far East as the boat goes (we understand it sails East of RIZE which is approximately 120 km from Batumi) and have him monitor the broadcasts at that one point. However, we have learned from upon his arrival here that he is thoroughly familiar with the entire Soviet border area in Iran and is also quite familiar with the Soviet border area of Turkey. In addition, [ ] speaks fluent Persian and good Turkish in addition to the languages (Georgian, Armenian and Russian) in which the broadcasts are made. All this together has convinced us that instead of having the broadcasts monitored in one spot on the Black Sea coast, considerably removed from some of the areas to which our broadcasts are beamed we should run a series of monitoring activities along the entire border of the Caucasus in different spots across from Soviet Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaydhan. This would obviously produce much more conclusive evidence one way or another.

9. Most of the larger cities of the three aforementioned Soviet republics are within a 200 km radius from the border. As a matter of fact, YEREVAN, capital of Armenia, is about 25 km from the Turkish border, and NAKHICHEVAN is only a few kilometers from the Iranian border and can easily be seen from Iran. [ ] has suggested several points in Iran and in Turkey near the Soviet border which can be reached either by train or car. The areas tentatively suggested by [ ] in which monitoring activities could be conducted are as follows:

TURKISH - Sov. Georgian border area --- ARTVIN and ARDAGAN;

TURKISH - Sov. Armenian border --- ARPACHAI and CHALDYR.

All of these points are within 30 - 40 km from the border. We fully realize, of course, that the Soviet border area of Turkey is extremely tight security-wise and that we may run into difficulties in trying to get permission to go to the above-mentioned points (or beyond them --- the closer to the border, the better). We understand, however, that Turkish authorities so far have given their full co-operation to our people in running various operations in that area and that our mutual relations with them are very good. We hope that these good relations will make it possible for our people in Turkey, on whose assistance we shall rely, to help us make the necessary arrangements.

10. The points on the Iran border, across the ARAKS River, suggested by [ ] are: the area across from SHAKHTAKHTY on the Soviet side several kilometers from NAKHICHEVAN; a certain large village across from NAKHICHEVAN ([ ] does not recall its exact name); DJUL'FA-PERSIAN (on the Iranian side across the ARAKS River from DJUL'FA-USSR); ARDEBIL and ASTARA-PERSIAN. These and several other points mentioned by [ ] can be reached by truck or jeep. According to [ ] who was raised in this particular part of Iran where he lived altogether 15 years, and which he professes to know like the palm of his hand or as he said in Russian "KAK SVOI PYAT' PAL'TSEV," is certain that we'll have no trouble in obtaining permission from the Iranian authorities to go to these points escorted by their border police.

11. So far we have not been in touch with either our [ ] or [ ] concerning this matter. We prefer to have [ ], who will be in Washington between 12 and 22 August, discuss the whole plan with SR/PP and with the appropriate desks in Headquarters first. According to [ ], the only suitable time of the year for going to the border areas involved is either early summer or early fall. They are unbearably hot in the summer, while roads become practically impassable during the rest of the year due to mud or snow. [ ] who plans to accompany [ ] on this monitoring expedition will be back in Athens end of September. This will give him ample time to organize things provided the basic plan is approved by Headquarters and the two KUBARK Stations involved and that necessary preparations in place are started immediately.

12. As regards our plan of having AEHANGOVER and AERODYNAMIC broadcasts monitored by a "tourist" along the Soviet Black Sea coast, it will be more realistic not to count on its implementation this summer, especially

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in view of [ ]'s home leave which will keep him away from Athens during August - September. It will take time and effort to find a suitable man, considering the fact that we will most likely have to look for one in areas other than Greece.

13. We consider ZENITH transisterized, calibrated transoceanic portable receivers the most suitable for this type of monitoring operation. They are not available at [ ] and will have to be supplied by Headquarters. We will need two of these for the Turkish-Iranian operation. We will also take along with us one or two small portable battery powered tape recorders in order to produce material evidence in case we find our boradcasts reasonably audible. The broadcasts schedules and frequencies can easily be pre-arranged by WEMCA.

HM 21 July 1959  
HMP/KCP:fds

Distribution:

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1 - EE

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