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21 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSR

SUBJECT : SR Ukrainian Operations

REFERENCE : SR/3-W2 Paper, "Evaluation of the AERODYNAMIC Project"

1. We concur with the recommendation made in the reference study that SR should continue collaborating with the ZPUHVR, to the extent that this is necessary in carrying out a comprehensive program of FI and PP coverage of the target area. The problem at hand is essentially not one of deciding one thing or another about AERODYNAMIC and the ZPUHVR, but of the shape FI and PP operations directed against the Ukraine should take, and of restoring a balance to them that we forsook in 1948 in the interest of immediate needs of the time. Together with a restoration of balance would also go a restoration of independence of action and of freedom of choice that we do not now have.

2. When the AERODYNAMIC Project was undertaken in 1948 through the more-or-less exclusive channel of ZPUHVR, it was in response to a prospect of early hostilities between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and an urgent need to gain the quickest possible access to operational and resistance assets in the target area. Traditional intelligence concepts of slower but surer objective coverage of the area without the burden of commitments to third parties and of the unavoidable association with their views, were sacrificed in the interest of meeting the urgent need. Of necessity, to an extent we made ourselves prisoner of the ZPUHVR and of other similar groups. This situation could not continue indefinitely, particularly when the early expectations of a "hot war" proved wrong. It was inevitable that sooner or later the approach which was valid under a 1948 evaluation of objectives would lose its momentum, and our broader, long term needs for independent knowledge of Ukraine and an independence as to choice of means of going at the target would assert themselves. This appears to be the case now. It is useless to argue whether or not AERODYNAMIC has been useful unless original operational premises are taken into account, and not merely those prevailing now. When AERODYNAMIC is balanced against the former, it is readily apparent that the project justified itself fully--in fact, it would have been as serious an error not to have undertaken it, as it would be to continue it now on the former, no longer adequate basis.

3. There can be no question that FI and PP coverage of Ukraine will continue. However, one basic change should now be made, namely that the choice of objectives, pace and means should be our own

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independent choice in fact. ZPUHVR should be one of the means only, and nothing more, even though practical experience and our own best judgment will probably dictate that in its own particular category ZPUHVR is the only prudent and effective operational instrument suitable for use. Unless proportion is restored on this score, and the ZPUHVR is made subordinate to a broad and comprehensive plan of approach to Ukraine in the FI and PP fields of work, an imbalance will persist and the question of the usefulness of AERODYNAMIC will keep recurring. There can be little question that the importance and size of Ukraine geographically and of its indigenous population argue urgently for a wider approach than merely that through the framework of ZPUHVR; in fact, it also argues not merely for a separate, but also an enlarged SR Headquarters mechanism to develop and operate all types of coverage against it. Except for what was done through AERODYNAMIC and therefore inevitably carried with it a certain ZPUHVR character, if not bias, the target otherwise has been virtually untouched.

4. To establish independence from a single, therefore a limited, medium of activity such as the ZPUHVR, does not mean any precipitate abandonment of it, or a complete veering onto a contrary course. It should mean, however, a freedom of decision. It is essential to remove ourselves gracefully from any overdependence on any such body as the ZPUHVR, for several reasons other than those involving any operational considerations. Events may make the group shrink into ballast clinging to us for continued life. Secondly, should a cold war situation continue indefinitely, as is likely to be the case, a group possessing primarily "hot war" potentials may come to require simple sterile holding. This problem may arise in connection with the ZPUHVR as it appears to have arisen with some other emigre groups which seemed to have something to offer in a situation of "imminent hot war," but currently are proving to be somewhat inarticulate "cold war" assets when it comes to reaching their particular homelands, except by radio. As the problem of holding such groups becomes a time-consuming one to the detriment of normal branch activities, it may become necessary to transfer their handling to a specifically-designed "group branch" within the SR Division, or to some CIA organization fashioned along the lines of IO, or to IO itself. We, therefore, should be in a position to disengage ourselves from group commitments and handling problems without any damage either to broader U.S. interests or to any potentials of the groups themselves which we may wish to call into play at any point in the normal course of events.

5. For the moment these several considerations are somewhat nebulous possibilities insofar as the ZPUHVR is concerned. This

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applies particularly to its potentialities in the PP field, even in a "cold war" situation, if considerably less so in the FI field. At an early date the ZPUHVR is to become a vehicle for homebound radio broadcasting. There is, as revealed in frequent discussions, a wide range of other directly attributable or notional activities to be taken up over a spread of time in which it could participate either as a sponsor or a medium of implementation. These range from a certain harassing and symbolic usefulness that the organization can have by simply being alive and articulate, to the creation of an illusion, for the benefit of Soviet and international opinion, of a greater hubbub of dissidence in the Ukraine than would in fact be the case. Actual or alleged rumblings of trouble in Ukraine could have an immense effect as a spur to dissidence in other Iron Curtain areas and as a commentary on internal Soviet stability. The ZPUHVR definitely seems to have potentialities for an augmented "cold war" PP program, and, therefore, at least from the PP point of view, it is not an immediate prospect for "cold storage." It should be given a fair trial to prove itself accordingly, and until then remain, as a part of a comprehensive program of Ukrainian FI-PP activity, in the present headquarters mechanism doing the administrative and operational handling.

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