

VIA: AIR
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ATTCH NO. EGMA-10019

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CLASSIFICATION

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TO : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

DATE: 19. März 1954

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt 1

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC/Operational

SPECIFIC— ZPUHVR-ZCHOVN Conflict

ROUTING	
1	3
2	3
3	13/PP/3
4	3 (signature)

- REF: A. EGMA-10198, 10 March 1954
 B. MUNI-6767, 12 March 1954
 C. MUNI-6818, 17 March 1954

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 382B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Transmitted herewith are four AECAPELIN reports on developments during the first half of March 1954, in the ZPUHVR-ZCHOVN conflict.

2. Of operational significance are KASHURA's revelations that the British have ended their operational relationship with BANDERA (AECAPELIN report B, attached). Also of significance is KASHURA's statement that an unknown BANDERA plant, masquerading as an unattached spotter of independent bodies, is currently negotiating with a Mr. Andrew SOBCHUK of the Munich OSI office in an effort to obtain unwitting American aid for BANDERA's liaison plans. (AECAPELIN report C, attached). AECAPELIN report D, attached, confirms AECASSOWARY 3's theory that the document published in Ukrainets-Chas was brought out by MATVIKYKO's courier, who reached Germany in November 1953 (Ref. B, para. 3). It will be noted that KASHURA erroneously stated that the document was given to the UHVR in 1951 (AECAPELIN report D, para. 2, attached), a mistake at first also entertained by the undersigned and AECASSOWARY 3 (Ref. B, para. 1). In reality, the document was taken by AECARTHAGE 12 and 13 in the 1952 personnel drop (Ref C, para. 1).

3. MOB liaison with OSI, after consultation with Lt. Col. (fnu) Newkirk, confirmed AECAPELIN report C as accurate in substance. Newkirk, however, was not sure whether the spotter offered as many as ten bodies. was told by another member of the OSI staff that an "Andrew" (presumably the "Mr. Andrew SOBCHUK" in the AECAPELIN report) met the spotter on 18 March in order to turn down the spotter's proposition. was also told that if the OSI "did go ahead with the plan", it would check all names with MOB. The OSI spokesman further stated that they do not know the name of the spotter, "who is playing it cagey", but promised to supply such and other data as soon as they are forthcoming.

4. It seems, at this writing, that BANDERA's efforts to use OSI facilities to ride his men into the Ukraine will be abortive. MOB efforts will be directed toward dissuading any American intelligence organ from cooperating with BANDERA.

18 March 1954
Attachment: AECAPELIN Reports
Distribution:

- 3 - SR (w/2 atts.) 3 - COM (w/2 atts.)
- 1 - EE (w/0 atts.) 2 - MOB (w/2 atts.)

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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74-124-29/3

Attachment to EGMA-10049
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A. AECAPELIN Report Dated 5 March 1954

1. On 5 March 1954, Ivan MAISTRENKO was fired from the editorial staff of Suchasna Ukraina. The reason for this was the communique of the central committee of the URDP/Left, printed in Vpered, No. 2 (39), dated February 1954. This communique, entitled "Explanation" (Vvyasnennya), stated that the URDP/Left has never been within "the ZPUHVR system" and that the "basic reason for our difference with ZPUHVR was disagreement in questions of foreign policy, orientation of Ukrainian policy on forces foreign and inimical to the Ukraine, participation in certain concrete political actions, etc."

2. Boris LEVITSKY explained to me how the above came about. He spoke approximately as follows: "The triumvirate REBET-MATLA-BANDERA, instead of reorganizing the ZChOUN in accordance with homeland positions, for some reason decided to reorganize ZPUHVR and correct its policy. In an official document dated 28 December, 1953, the triumvirate signed an official declaration in which they condemn Marxism and neo-Communism, holding that the URDP is neo-Communist. This declaration was signed by REBET, who is a member of ZPUHVR. For the URDP this meant that the triumvirate's view coincides with that of ZPUHVR. Therefore, our central committee decided to take a stand. Evhen BOBIKEVICH was instructed to draw up an appropriate declaration. It was written in a sharp tone, strongly anti-American, and spoke of ZPUHVR cooperation with American capitalists. MAISTRENKO was against it and made appropriate changes. I personally, on my own, added the passage which refers to orientation on 'forces inimical to the Ukraine'. In making the final correction MAISTRENKO overlooked my addition. Our paper had already been printed when Dr. HRYNIOCH's articles in Suchasna Ukraina, No. 5, dated 7 March 1954, appeared, wherein Dr. HRYNIOCH himself criticizes REBET for trying to reorganize ZPUHVR's policy instead of reorganizing the ZChOUN. After the Suchasna Ukraina article, MAISTRENKO wanted in some way to delete our 'Explanation' from Vpered, but it was too late. In turn, ZPUHVR fired MAISTRENKO and sent a letter to the central committee of the URDP, demanding evidence that ZPUHVR is oriented on 'forces foreign and inimical to the Ukraine'. Of course, a foolish situation has resulted. I admit that we acted too fast and that our communique is too sharp. Perhaps the matter can somehow be settled."

3. AECAPELIN Comment: As is evident, LEVITSKY is responsible for the URDP action. He instructed BOBIKEVICH to write the resolution in an anti-American manner, and on his own added the phrase about orientation on hostile forces. MAISTRENKO is guilty in that he did not have enough courage to strike out that passage. MAISTRENKO is of that nature that he can never give a firm "no", tending to lean too much upon LEVITSKY, who in turn is highly ambitious, void of any national feeling, without character. His ambition was hurt because LEBED did not talk with him during the latter's visit to Germany last summer. His ambition was hurt because Suchasna Ukraina refuses to print any more of his articles. His anti-ZPUHVR mood is a product of spite. MAISTRENKO does not know of LEVITSKY's manifold intelligence contacts, especially his Yugoslav connections. MAISTRENKO is unable to distinguish between LEVITSKY's personal ambitions and the URDP/Left's "party line".

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B. AECAPELIN Report Dated 11 March 1954

1. On 6 March 1954, I talked with KASHUBA about future liaison with the homeland. KASHUBA spoke approximately as follows: "Until now liaison with the homeland was enjoyed nominally by but two Ukrainian emigre groups, ZChOUN and ZPUHVR. I say nominally, because in fact in case of the ZChOUN liaison was in the hands of the British, and in case of ZPUHVR liaison is in the hands of the Americans. Both the English and Americans control the receiving stations, and all messages fell into the hands of these countries. Of course, the English and Americans were loyal to their partners. Nevertheless, the liaison was not purely Ukrainian. We had to accept such terms because no other possibility existed. For the ZChOUN, PIDHAINY worked with the British. When he joined the opposition, the ZChOUN Provid demanded he turn over liaison to the Provid. We knew that he would not do so, but we had to make that formal gesture in order to deflect a probable charge from other ZChOUN members that we did not make all efforts to take liaison away from PIDHAINY. We, however, did not expect that PIDHAINY would go to London so soon in order to get the British to side with MATLA and REBET. In London PIDHAINY gave a one-sided version of developments, and the British decided to support him."

2. I asked KASHUBA what caused the British to support PIDHAINY. KASHUBA's reply: "The British in general have no interest in supporting any emigre political group, a few Caucasion nations excepted. When they decided to work with the ZChOUN in liaison matters, they did so only because of interest in the Ukraine itself, not in the ZChOUN, an emigre formation. The British wanted to have information on the political, economic, and military situation in the Ukraine. And it must be admitted that with MATVIEY-KO's arrival in the Ukraine they received, via W/T, data very valuable to their intelligence service. Now, when PIDHAINY told the British that the homeland OUN Provid took away BANDERA's right to represent the ZChOUN and had appointed a triumvirate to take over, then of course at first the British did not know what to do. They asked PIDHAINY what he plans to do in the new situation. When PIDHAINY replied that he intends to recognize the board of plenipotentiaries (REBET, MATLA), the British considered this a final argument to do the same. The more so, since PIDHAINY assured the British that contact with the homeland OUN would continue as before, saying that cooperation with the board of plenipoteniaries will bring even greater benefits to the British. The British feared that if they worked with BANDERA they would lose contact with the Ukraine. They concluded that they would support whom the homeland supports."

3. KASHUBA continued: "When BANDERA arrived in London, the matter had already been decided. BANDERA tried to convince the British that his ZChOUN still exists and asked them to work with a BANDERA representative. The British refused, stating their interest concerns liaison with the Ukraine, not an emigre group, and since the homeland ordered that the triumvirate

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take over the ZChOUN, they will cooperate with it. When BANDERA started to tell the British that only a small part of the homeland OUN supports the homeland Provid, that the rank-and-file support BANDERA, that MATVIEYKO represents BANDERA, etc., the British replied that MATVIEYKO is isolated and can do nothing without the approval of the homeland Provid. At the end of their brief talk with BANDERA, the British stated that they would like that all internal Ukrainian fights be ended as soon as possible. But, in order to avoid misunderstanding, they again emphasized to BANDERA that their interests lie in the Ukraine, not in the emigration. 'If you really will have followers and power in the Ukraine, then we will work with you. However, this is not the case at the present time', the British told BANDERA."

4. In view of the British attitude, KASHUBA continued, the ZChOUN has quit all efforts to convince them. This is a painful development, according to KASHUBA, but something must be done. "It is a fact", he said, "that when we sent people in overland over Poland and Czechoslovakia, we had less losses than when the British dropped our people by parachute. In spring we will rebuild contact with the Ukraine, but without foreign aid. If we must have foreign aid, then we will act more wisely than we did with the British. In the future we will not be so careless as to leave all ciphers and receiving stations in the hands of foreigners. Everything will be concentrated in our hands, serviced by our own people. We know that this resolve will cost the lives of tens of persons. Revolution demands sacrifices, and the ZChOUN must suffer them. We now have around 100 men willing to go to the Ukraine. Half may die en route, but half will arrive in the Ukraine. The first thing they will do will be to break the British contact with the Ukraine. Left without liaison, the British themselves will come to us begging for collaboration. We won the first battle against the opposition, and we will win against the British in the matter of liaison."

5. Thus KASHUBA. Taking advantage of Pavlo SHEVCHUK's presence at the UN RADA session, I asked this pro-BANDERA man about ZChOUN liaison problems. SHEVCHUK stated that the British decided to work with PIDHAINY, MATLA, and REBET, but that this cooperation would not endure long because in spring BANDERA plans to send ten or more groups into the Ukraine, who will build new liaison channels and destroy the British channel. Vojodymyr LENYK, the Shlyakh Peremohy reporter covering the UN RADA session, also confirmed that the British had refused to work with BANDERA.

C. AECAPELIN Report Dated 12 March 1954

1. In connection with the refusal of British Intelligence to work with the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN Provid, BANDERA is now hurriedly negotiating with others in an effort to infiltrate his men into the Ukraine in May 1954, at least ten agents with W/T sets to act as liaison between Myron

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MATVIEYKO and the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN.

2. KASHUBA stated that BANDERA has made proposals to the Spanish in Madrid, and the Italians in Rome. In addition, the SB has contact^{ed} a Mr. Andrew SOBCHUK of the Munich OSI base. KASHUBA stated the BANDERA representative in contact with SOBCHUK negotiates as a private person without political attachments. He has offered SOBCHUK ten candidates for dispatch into the Ukraine. All are trained W/T operators. All will hide from the Americans that they have secret instructions from the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN. They will indicate merely that they want to work for American Intelligence. The whole plan, KASHUBA stated, must be realized so discreetly that the OSI will not discover that its bodies in fact work for the ZChOUN. To do so, the agents will, as a matter of course, supply the OSI with intelligence information. On 13 March 1954, according to KASHUBA, details of cooperation are to be worked out by SOBCHUK and the BANDERA representative.

3. I asked KASHUBA what BANDERA wants to achieve in this way. KASHUBA replied that BANDERA wants to inform the homeland OUN Provid about the events in the emigration connected with the reorganization of the ZChOUN, to transmit BANDERA's position in this matter, and to demand a change in the homeland's stand. If the homeland Provid does not accept BANDERA's exposition, KASHUBA continued, then BANDERA will instruct Myron MATVIEYKO to carry action among the rank-and-file against the homeland Provid, to attempt to select a new homeland Provid, to conduct separate liaison with the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN, and to send BANDERA messages from individual OUN members or subordinate homeland Provides affirming their positive stand toward BANDERA and condemning the activities of MATLA and REBET.

4. "In this way", KASHUBA stated, "BANDERA will accomplish his plans with the aid of the Americans themselves." KASHUBA felt confident that the plan will be realized, the more so because for some time the OSI has been looking for agents willing to go to the Ukraine. KASHUBA spoke to me in great confidence, and demanded that I never betray this secret. If action is taken on the basis of this report, I entreat that nothing be done to endanger my security or compromise my position.

D. AECAPELIN Report Dated 15 March 1954

1. In a talk with Ivan KASHUBA on 15 March 1954, I asked him about an article in the Paris Ukrainets-Chas, a pro-BANDERA weekly, which article touches upon the stand of the United States Government toward the Ukrainian underground. Although I as yet had not read that article, I desired to provoke KASHUBA by stating I felt that the article is a falsification.

2. After considerable reflection, KASHUBA replied approximately as

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follows: "The document is no falsification, ^{but} the exact text of a letter ZPUHVR sent to the UHVR in the Ukraine in 1951. ZPUHVR wanted thereby to incline the UHVR and the homeland OUN Provid toward a positive appreciation of the Americans, toward collaboration with American intelligence. The document in turn was brought to the ZChOUN by courier, for the UHVR made copies of it and sent it to all homeland Kray Provids for their information. A copy fell into the hands of the Kray Provid headed by ~~CHERNETS-PRISHLYAK~~, that is, the Kray in which Myron MATVIEYKO is situated. MATVIEYKO immediately realized that the document is intended to make pro-American propaganda and that it comes from an American intelligence service, not from official American Government circles. Accordingly, at his earliest opportunity MATVIEYKO sent us a copy of that document."

3. KASHUBA continued: "At first we of the ZChOUN did not plan to make use of that document. However, when ZPUHVR, with the aid of the Americans, tried to finish off BANDERA, we decided to inform all ZChOUN territorial Provids about ZPUHVR methods and sent copies to all territorial leaders. We wanted only to inform these territorial leaders and did not give any orders that they should make use of the document. The French territorial leader, however, decided to publish it in order to compromise ZPUHVR. He wrote the article in Ukrainetz-Chas. We in Munich feel that this is bad, not for us in the emigration, for the Americans will take no action against us. However, MATVIEYKO in the Ukraine might have much unpleasantness, as well as ~~CHERNETS-PRISHLYAK~~, because he sent us the document. UHVR and the homeland OUN Provid may consider their action a species of espionage and bring the guilty to accountability. Regardless of how the matter will end, we have compromised ZPUNVR utterly. A few more of such compromises and the Americans will cease to work with ZPUHVR, will cease financial support, and the work of ZPUHVR will end."

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