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OFFICE	<i>C/MAC</i>
DATE	<i>19 JULY '62</i>

~~TOP SECRET.~~

Our Relations with the Ukrainian Nationalists  
and the Crisis over BANDERA.

1. The organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists derives from the UWO (Ukrainian Military organisation) founded in the 1920s and led by a certain Colonel Eugen KONOW-LETZ who, like his predecessor, Simon PHTLIURA, was later assassinated by the Bolsheviks.
2. As their name implies, the Ukrainian nationalists support the idea of an independent Ukraine and are strongly anti-Russian. Since pre-war days they have had contact with partisan groups in the Ukraine and can thus legitimately claim a long continuity in anti-Soviet activity.
3. I was in touch with followers of PHTLIURA and KONOVALETZ in Roumania in the late 1920s and in Czechoslovakia from 1933 to 1939 and was quite well impressed with their possibilities.
4. It was not however until after the end of World War II that it was decided to use them operationally. In 1948 contact was made in Germany with the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Nationalists (ZCh/OUN) through Major Bohdan PIDHAIJNYJ, chief of their operational section, and later with Professor Jaroslav STECKO, a political leader of the ZCh/OUN. At that time ZCh/OUN was the strongest of several Ukrainian Nationalist groups in the emigration. As already stated it had stemmed from the UWO and had been composed at first largely of Galician Ukrainians and had had its Headquarters in LVOV. Before the war it had operated as much against the Poles as against the Soviets. Its methods were ruthless and resulted in the imprisonment in Poland of a number of its members on charges of murder and other crimes of violence. Among those apprehended was Stefan BANDERA, Chairman of the LVOV Executive Committee of the OUN and already then a leading member of the movement which was later to bear his name. The invasion of Poland in 1939 set BANDERA free and he established himself in the LVOV area from where he directed the activities of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) which operated in Western Ukraine against both the Germans and the Russians. In 1941 the Germans decided to recognise an independent Ukraine and set up a Ukrainian Government, but soon had second thoughts about the political expediency of this move. They thereupon declared this Government illegal and imprisoned its members, which included STECKO and BANDERA who spent most of the war years in various concentration camps. In January 1945 BANDERA escaped to VIENNA and from then on until the present time has lived semi-incognito, first in Austria and later in the US Zone of Germany. In January 1946 a Congress of the OUN held in Soviet occupied Ukraine elected him to the PROVID (Council) of the Ukrainian Nationalist organisation, the other members of the PROVID being Professor STECKO and General CUPRINKA - then commanding the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) in the Ukraine. The legality of BANDERA's election was later contested by other Ukrainian nationalist groups, and led to a split in his own organisation which resulted in the withdrawal of Colonel MELNIK and his followers. It also increased the rivalry between ZCh/OUN and

/ ZP/UHVR (Foreign

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ZP/UHVR (foreign representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation) both of which claimed contact with the leadership of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) in the Ukraine. This ZCh/OUN - ZP/UHVR quarrel has constantly bedevilled our relationship with BANDERA and became particularly acute after CIA had commenced the operational exploitation of ZP/UHVR soon after we had started our own collaboration with the BANDERA group.

5. Meanwhile the operational aspect of this collaboration was developing satisfactorily. Suitable recruits were forthcoming and were being handled in a competent and loyal manner by PIDHAJNYJ. Initial land frontier crossings were followed by more ambitious infiltration operations and in spite of losses and set-backs resulted in the establishment of several parties in the Ukraine with W/T and other communication facilities. Gradually a more complete control was obtained over these operations and although the intelligence dividend was low it was considered worth while to persevere with them. Some regard however had to be paid to the politics inseparable from them and it was here that the real difficulties occurred.

6. By 1950 the quarrels in the Ukrainian emigration were beginning to have repercussions on the homeland where the leadership had become aware of the fact that the British and Americans were backing rival groups of the Ukrainian nationalists and supplying them with technical means for maintaining communications with the Ukraine. Couriers arriving overland from the Ukraine that year carried mail addressed both to the ZCh/OUN and the ZP/UHVR which contained an eloquent and statesmanlike appeal from POLTAVA - one of the political leaders of the Ukrainian underground, later killed by the Bolsheviks - to the Ukrainian emigration to make up its quarrels. The receipt of this appeal was deemed a good moment by ourselves and CIA to send a joint message to the Headquarters of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) by hand of the SIS/CIA agents being infiltrated into the Ukraine in the summer of 1951. The message read as follows:

"To the Fighters in the Ukraine from your friends:  
Greetings.

The representatives reaching you from abroad bring you the following identical message.

We are united in our endeavours to assist you in maintaining communication links between the homeland and abroad and are providing the technical help necessary to assure these communications.

The maintenance of communications and the flow of accurate, reliable and up-to-date information on the military and political situation are important and invaluable factors in the fight for freedom.

We request your opinion, at the earliest opportunity, on the method by which co-ordination of communications abroad can best be assured in order to guarantee the continuation of the contact and safeguard its security. We fear that these communications will be hampered by a continuation of the present disagreements which we deplore and earnestly hope may be resolved.

Glory to the Ukraine".

/7. This message was

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7. This message was designed both to encourage the Ukrainian homeland and to emphasise Anglo-American solidarity at a time when certain American circles (not connected with CIA) were making unfounded suggestions to the effect that the British were backing the Ukrainian separatists politically to the detriment of the unity of a future non-Bolshevik Russia, whereas in fact CIA was operationally as much involved with the Ukrainian nationalists as we were.

8. The message was received by the homeland in due course and appears to have had some slight influence on future developments. Indeed it probably brought about the despatch by the UPA leadership of further instructions to the Ukrainian emigration - to which reference will be made later - suggesting ways in which the conflict between them could be resolved.

9. Until this time, i.e. mid-1951, our operational and political contact with the ZCh/OUN had been maintained mainly in Germany and restricted to Major PIDHAJNYJ, the operational chief, and Professor J. STECKO, the political leader. Then, in the summer of 1951, Stefan BANDERA, the real leader of the movement, emerged from his clandestine concealment to have his first meeting with me in LONDON. The following is an account of my impressions then of BANDERA, - impressions which in the main are still valid today:

"Allowing for the fact that he was out to show himself in the best light, much of what he said sounded both convincing and sincere. We have to accept him for what he is; a professional underground worker with a terrorist background and ruthless notions about the rules of the game, acquired by hard experience, along with a thorough knowledge of the Ukrainian people which I would judge to be more instinctive than deeply psychological. A bandit type if you like, with a burning patriotism which provides an ethical background and a justification for his banditry. No better and no worse than others of his kind I have had dealings with in the past. He appears to be genuinely grateful for the help given to him, but at the same time is certainly trying to get all he can out of it".

10. Since that first meeting I have had occasion to see BANDERA repeatedly. The contacts he and his people were to develop with us did have some effect on his character and outlook making him slightly less ruthless and uncompromising than he had been at first. But he nevertheless remains essentially the dictatorial type and as such a difficult customer both to his well-wishers and particularly to his political opponents.

11. Soon after the despatch of the SIS/CIA appeal it became evident that BANDERA's inflexible insistence on his political prerogatives and right to leadership were having further repercussions in the homeland. His own supporters there (among them MIRON, leader of a group infiltrated with our help in 1951) were thereby encouraged to assume an attitude of equal independence and intolerance towards the leadership of the UHVR (Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation) and the command of the UPA. At this time the situation in the homeland was made even worse by the receipt there of mail taken in by the overland party despatched

/in June 1951. This

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in June 1951. This mail - addressed to MIRON with instructions for it to be forwarded to the leadership - bitterly attacked the ZP/UHVR for failing to react to POLTAVA's appeal for emigre unity and for disregarding a proposal of BANDERA's for an amalgamation of the ZCh/OUN and ZP/UHVR on a basis of political parity. It was the first time that the homeland had received detailed news about the serious rift in the Ukrainian Nationalist camp in emigration. It reacted by a short wireless message which was emphatic and crisp; a reminder to the Ukrainian emigration that it had no right to go on quarrelling while members of the UPL were being persecuted and killed in the Ukraine.

12. We had not ceased to preach the same thing and now insisted on BANDERA and Co. sitting down to talks with the ZP/UHVR. This suggestion had the full support of CIA and the two sides met in Germany in January 1952. The real attitude of the ZCh/OUN towards cooperation with ZP/UHVR is clearly shown in the following extracts from a record of the proceedings of the Plenum Meeting of the European members of the ZCh/OUN held in LONDON in March 1952:

"Subject Discussed:

Decisions taken:

...(b) Negotiations with ZP/UHVR:

Professor STECKO informed the meeting in some detail of the inauguration in January last of negotiations with representatives of the ZP/UHVR in Germany, namely Dr. HRYNIOCH and Captain LOPATINSKYJ, for the removal of difficulties and misunderstandings between ZP/UHVR and ZCh/OUN. He explained that whilst receptive to the offer put forward by ZCh/OUN, the "Opposition" had argued that it would be premature to raise the question of OUN political representation in the UHVR. This was a contention which the ZCh/OUN delegates were not prepared to accept and as a result the talks had been suspended.

The meeting welcomed the inauguration of discussions with ZP/UHVR and expressed the hope that they would reach a satisfactory conclusion in the near future. The meeting also unanimously approved the suggested encounter between STECKO and LEBED and empowered STECKO to act as spokesman and plenipotentiary for ZCh/OUN. At the same time the meeting recorded its desire that ZCh/OUN should maintain its political viewpoint and should not forfeit its right to be represented in the UHVR should a joint representation of the Ukrainian National emigration be reached".

13. The ZCh/OUN - ZP/UHVR negotiations thus broke down mainly because ZCh/OUN demanded parity representation as a political basis and a monopoly of communications with the homeland as a technical condition for reconciliation. Both conditions were unacceptable to ZP/UHVR, the second being incompatible with its obligations towards CIA.

/14. The situation

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14. The situation continued to remain strained and uneasy until August 1952 when Stefan BANDERA suddenly resigned the leadership of the ZCh/OUN. But since he was replaced by the equally implacable Professor STECKO no further progress towards reconciliation with ZP/UHVR was made that year.

15. However this did not prevent us from repeating our warnings and advice. At a meeting with BANDERA in Germany in March 1953 I once again stressed the need for political peace in order to achieve the main purpose of our collaboration, namely the collection of worth while intelligence.

16. In May 1953 BANDERA was permitted to send to the Ukraine a lengthy explanation of his position and give the reasons for his resignation. The decision to allow him to do so was taken deliberately, since I felt that the homeland would draw its own correct conclusions from the farrago of bombast contained in this verbose statement of which the following is a typical extract:

"There are no prospects of concluding the negotiations (with ZP/UHVR) which have already gone on interminably. The Opposition is making no attempt to turn away from its errors, but is trying to lead the ZCh/OUN into the same morass of anti-nationalistic ideas".

17. In June 1953 the IV Congress of the ZCh/OUN took place in LONDON, at which Stefan BANDERA was re-elected leader of the organisation abroad. The onus of re-electing him as leader of the homeland was left to the Ukraine and has remained in abeyance ever since, pending the possibility of holding comprehensive elections on Ukrainian territory.

18. In July/August two messages were received from the Ukraine through CIA channels claiming contact with the Headquarters of the Ukrainian Resistance movement. These messages were in the form of instructions to the Ukrainian Nationalists abroad and reflected the homeland's impatience and concern over the continuing quarrels in the Ukrainian emigration. They were as follows:

"Message 1.

'To the General Secretary of Foreign Affairs of UHVR, M. LEBED. We hereby confirm your mandate and that of the entire ZP/UHVR to represent abroad the homeland UHVR, and the entire Ukrainian liberation movement in the homeland. The tasks of the ZP/UHVR are:-

1. To represent abroad the UHVR, the UPA, the Ukrainian liberation underground and the entire liberation movement in the Ukraine.
2. To carry on abroad political, diplomatic, and information activities along the line of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people.
3. To the ZP/UHVR is given freedom of decision in all matters pertaining to direct assistance to the homeland. The ZP/UHVR is also the highest authoritative organ for all those participants in the UPA and in the underground that are abroad. Attached to the ZP/UHVR an UPA mission works along UPA lines. In the name of the Presidium, LISOVIJ, and the head of the General Secretariat of the UHVR, KOVAL'.

/Message 2:

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Message 2.

"The OUN PROVID on Ukrainian territory affirms that BANDERA departed from the decisions of the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN and that he neither formally nor in fact is the leader of the OUN. The PROVID expects that BANDERA, in the name of the entirety of the OUN, will end his schismatic activities and will call MIRON to order. The OUN PROVID on Ukrainian territory authorizes Lev REBET, MATLA and BANDERA temporarily to take over control of the ZCh/OUN, and to reorganize the ZCh/OUN in accordance with the positions of the OUN PROVID in the Ukraine. The Head of the PROVID of the OUN on Ukrainian territory, Yu. LEMISH'."

19. The receipt of these messages was followed by a visit to Europe of Mikola LEBED, the member of the UHVR chosen by the Ukrainian Underground movement as mediator in the ZCh/OUN - ZP/UHVR conflict. BANDERA having meanwhile accepted the homeland's messages as genuine, he and other leaders of the ZCh/OUN met LEBED and members of the ZP/UHVR in MUNICH early in September 1953. The results of this meeting are recorded in the following extracts from our report to CIA, whom we were keeping informed of developments:

"Representatives of the ZCh/OUN duly met M. LEBED and leading members of the ZP/UHVR in MUNICH to discuss the messages received from the Ukraine. At these discussions BANDERA took the line that since the first of the messages contained no reference to the ZCh/OUN as an organisation this made it difficult for him and his followers to accept it as a basis for negotiations with ZP/UHVR.

After both ZCh/OUN and ZP/UHVR had put their views to LEBED the talks were adjourned to permit ZCh/OUN to summon a meeting of their Executive Committee for a discussion among themselves of the instructions from the Ukraine. This meeting is due to take place in MUNICH on 16th September.

Meanwhile BANDERA paid a visit to LONDON and was seen by our officers who endeavoured to persuade him to reach a settlement with ZP/UHVR and to accept to serve on the Committee of Three suggested in the second message received from the Ukraine. BANDERA agreed to do his best subject to the decision reached at the meeting of the ZCh/OUN Executive referred to above".

20. When the ZCh/OUN Executive Committee met its decision concerning the acceptance of the homeland's instructions was far from unanimous. BANDERA and STECKO felt that participation in the suggested Committee of Three would mean completely abandoning ZCh/OUN freedom of action whilst the more moderate members of the Committee (PIDHAIWYJ, KORDIUK, RIPECKYJ, MATLA) urged conciliation and demanded that an earnest attempt should be made to try to collaborate with the ZP/UHVR. The meeting thus brought to the surface differences which had been growing within the ZCh/OUN owing to the displeasure its moderate elements had begun to feel over the high-handed policy of BANDERA and STECKO.

21. I saw BANDERA in LONDON twice in September, the purpose of the meetings being to obtain full details of the negotiations with LEBED. Once again the importance of a rapid settlement of the ZCh/OUN - ZP/UHVR differences was stressed and a warning given to BANDERA that failure to accept the seemingly reasonable suggestions for such a settlement made by the homeland might

/have serious consequences

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have serious consequences for the future of our collaboration. BANDERA was also told to agree with LEBED on the text of messages to MIRON and other groups in the homeland, instructing them to subordinate themselves to the leadership in the homeland and to seek contact with it. It was explained that the Chief of the UPA would be informed of the despatch of these messages and would be instructed, through ZP/UHVR communication channels, to insure that MIRON and the others would be given the possibility of making contact with the leadership.

22. On his return journey to the USA LEBED visited LONDON. With the knowledge and approval of CIA he was seen by me, and expressed the following views:

- (a) that he regarded the instructions received from the homeland as a reasonable basis on which to reach agreement within the Ukrainian emigration and to achieve the unified command of the Ukrainian underground, which is essential for its continued existence and survival;
- (b) that an end must be put at all costs to the differences which have arisen between ZCh/OUN and ZP/UHVR representatives in the field and which have led to the isolation of whole regions;
- (c) that ZCh/OUN and particularly BANDERA personally must accept the instructions received from the homeland and subordinate himself to the underground leadership.

I told LEBED that I had personally seen the messages sent by BANDERA to the groups in the Ukraine instructing them to recognise UPA leadership and subordinate themselves to it. It was proposed to repeat these instructions through British controlled channels of communication. But it would also be necessary to advise UPA leadership of this action through ZP/UHVR communication links and insure that it would give the ZCh/OUN representative MIRON and others the possibility of making contact.

LEBED accepted this plan and thought that it might provide a basis for agreement in the homeland. He regretted that BANDERA had not seen fit to tell him of the despatch of these instructions as this would have made the preliminary negotiations easier.

I then informed LEBED that I understood BANDERA was prepared to serve on the Committee of Three suggested by the homeland, but that he would do so on terms which would need further discussion. PIDHAJNYJ, who was present, confirmed that BANDERA had agreed to join MATLA and REBET providing the Committee did not supersede the present ZCh/OUN leadership but merely served as a body striving to find a solution to the present difficulties.

LEBED was not inclined to accept BANDERA's offer if it had conditions attached to it, but eventually agreed that it did provide a basis for further discussions.

Concluding the interview with LEBED, I expressed the hope that a solution might be found to the present difficulties which were seriously threatening all our interests and reducing the operational value of the groups in the field. Intelligence

/results were

results were expected from these groups and if they were not obtained soon our support of them would cease.

23. The messages to the homeland, referred to above were actually despatched in November, the text being closely coordinated and agreed. The messages as transmitted through SIS channels read as follows:

"The following message is from BANDERA of the ZCh/OUN to KOVAL, head of the OUN leadership in the homeland and is addressed to MIRON and his contacts. The same message will be passed direct to KOVAL through ZP/UHVR channels.

Begins: The following declarations have been received by ZCh/OUN through ZP/UHVR.

- (i) The leadership of the OUN in the homeland declares that BANDERA has departed from the decisions of the 3rd Congress of the OUN and that he is no longer formally the leader of the OUN. The leadership requires BANDERA to cease his disruptive activities and call MIRON to order. The leadership further authorises RYBET, MATLA and BANDERA to take over temporarily the leadership of the ZCh/OUN and to reorganise it in accordance with the principles of the OUN.
- (ii) The leadership of ZCh/OUN regards the accusation of its having departed from the decisions of the 3rd Congress as unfounded.
- (iii) The leadership of the ZCh/OUN is seriously troubled over disagreements in the homeland and appeals to all to remain united.
- (iv) MIRON and all our other members are to submit to the leadership of the OUN.
- (v) The leadership of the LVOVSKIJ Kraj and MIRON must recognise the fact that BANDERA has relinquished his post as leader of the OUN, and that his functions have been taken over by KOVAL, whose appointment is to be respected.
- (vi) ZCh/OUN request KOVAL to recognise MIRON as their representative and to give him necessary facilities.
- (vii) ZCh/OUN appeals to the ZP/UHVR to avoid discrediting the ZCh/OUN because this would only lead to further disorganisation in the homeland.
- (viii) The leadership of the ZCh/OUN declares that it will convene an extraordinary conference to determine its functions abroad.
- (ix) ZCh/OUN will continue to maintain its own communications with the OUN in the homeland and requests that all organisational matters be channelled through this link.
- (x) While recognising the decision of the 3rd Congress and the amendments made in 1950, the leadership of the ZCh/OUN declares that it will continue to defend the ideological-political foundations of the OUN and endeavour to preserve them throughout the Liberation Movement".

/24. MIRON has

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24. MIRON has since acknowledged the receipt of these messages and pledged his loyalty and subordination to the Leadership of the UPA in the homeland.

25. At the end of November 1953 Zinovy MATLA arrived in MUNICH from the USA to take part in discussions concerning the establishment of the Committee of Three demanded by the homeland. At that time BANDERA was still arguing with his followers the pros and cons of his participation in this Committee, eventually obtaining a majority mandate in favour of doing so. On 23rd December the Committee of Three, consisting of Lev REBET, Zinovy MATLA and Stefan BANDERA, signed an agreement setting forth in detail the Committee's functions and prerogatives on what seemed to be a sensible and liberal basis.

26. In January 1954 the Executive Committee of ZCh/OUN met again and unanimously approved this basis for the Committee's work. At last ZCh/OUN and ZP/UHVR appeared to have found the means of settling their long and useless quarrel.

27. But this hope remained a short lived one. Almost as soon as it started functioning the Committee of Three was faced with attempts on the part of BANDERA to secure ZCh/OUN domination over it. In this he was supported by a small group of his more fanatical followers, whilst the reasonable ones continued to advise cooperation and restraint. Matters came to a head early in February when BANDERA announced to the Executive Committee of ZCh/OUN his withdrawal from the Committee of Three on the grounds that its other two members were exceeding their mandates and depriving the ZCh/OUN of its prerogatives. BANDERA's action caused a final split among his followers and cost him the support of the ZCh/OUN journal "Ukrainskij Samostijnik", the whole of the influential editorial staff of which went over to the ZCh/OUN supporters of the Committee of Three. BANDERA attempted to assert himself by depriving PIDHAIJNYJ of his functions of Chief of the Operations section and by attempting to seize by force the editorial offices of the "Ukrainskij Samostijnik" - actions which only made the split in the ZCh/OUN more bitter and profound. The "Ukrainskij Samostijnik" then announced BANDERA's resignation from the Committee of Three and its own determination to support the Committee, even without him.

28. At this stage a final attempt to bring BANDERA to reason was made by me and meetings took place in LONDON on 24th/25th February. At these meetings BANDERA attempted to justify himself by producing instances of what he regarded as an abuse of power by REBET and MATLA of the Committee of Three. He accused them of manoeuvring to subordinate ZCh/OUN and implied that this was being done on instructions and indeed under pressure from the Americans. None of the arguments he used were really valid and in the end he had to agree that the declaration signed by the Committee of Three on 23rd December 1953 would have been sufficient to safeguard ZCh/OUN interests had he only given the other members of the Committee a real chance to prove their good faith. He admitted that his attitude had cost him the support of some of his most loyal followers and that it had not only split the ZCh/OUN organisation in Germany, but likewise the branches in Great Britain, USA and Canada; what is more, that it might well have a further serious effect on the homeland and upon the future of our relations with him.

/29. In view of this

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29. In view of this attitude there appeared to be no alternative but to break with BANDERA in order to safeguard the healthy ZCh/OUN elements remaining and be able to continue using them operationally. But having wasted so much time over dealing with BANDERA I decided to give him one last chance. Knowing that MATLA would be transiting the United Kingdom on his return to the USA I suggested to BANDERA that the three of us should meet together in a last effort to reach a settlement, or at least a compromise. BANDERA refused this suggestion with arrogant finality. The break between us was complete.

30. The new situation produced by BANDERA's attitude caused consternation among the candidates now undergoing training in the UK. The position was explained to them first by PIDHAJNYJ, then by BANDERA himself, it being considered necessary to establish beyond doubt whether their loyalty lay with BANDERA or with the modified ZCh/OUN which is cooperating with the Committee, now composed of REBET and MATLA. As anticipated the majority declared themselves faithful to BANDERA and consequently have to be excluded from our operational plans.

31. Any doubts I may have had regarding the wisdom of breaking so finally with BANDERA were dispelled as a result of subsequent interviews with MATLA, whom I had not met before but who struck me as being a reasonable and honest individual. Himself a member of ZCh/OUN, he arrived from USA to join the Committee of Three fully prepared to support BANDERA. Had the latter taken up a less unyielding position the two of them could have managed the Committee in a manner advantageous both to ZCh/OUN and the cause of Ukrainian national unity. But BANDERA's uncompromising attitude made this impossible.

32. Before leaving MUNICH, MATLA had agreed with REBET, his colleague in the Committee of Three, as well as with KORDIUK, leader of the re-organised ZCh/OUN and Dr. HRYNIOCH, Chairman of the ZP/UNVR, that subject to our concurrence future collaboration with us over operational matters should be governed by the following principles:

- (i) The new Leadership does not want to interfere in any way with operational work, and in fact does not want to know anything of what is being planned, or what is being carried out operationally. It has complete confidence in PIDHAJNYJ, and once more confirms his appointment.
- (ii) The new Leadership, on the other hand, wants to ensure that any political mail which is sent out agrees in every respect with its views, and conforms with any mail which may be sent out via CIA-sponsored channels.
- (iii) The new Leadership thinks it would probably be necessary for the Americans and the British to agree on their attitude towards the political problems, in order to avoid disagreements and misunderstandings.
- (iv) Any co-ordination between British and American sponsored operations to avoid clashes or confusion it considers mainly an Anglo-American co-ordination task.
- (v) The question of security of operations and security in general it leaves entirely to PIDHAJNYJ and the British.

/33. The above appears

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33. The above appears to offer a reasonable basis on which to continue and develop our operational work which requires Ukrainian Nationalist elements for its execution. Details remain to be discussed and settled.

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Appendix "A"  
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Past and Present Leadership of the ZCh/OUN.  
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A. Before BANDERA's withdrawal from the Committee of Three and quarrel with his own followers:

Chairman:  
(of the Foreign Section only)      Stefan BANDERA

Deputy Chairman:                      Professor Jaroslav STECKO

Principal members:                    Bohdan PIDHAJNYJ  
   Bohdan KORDIUK  
   Modest RIPECKYJ  
   Maria MUCHL (Mrs. STECKO)  
   Zinovi MATLA  
   Zenon PELENSKYJ  
   Roman ILNITZKYJ  
   Volodimir LENNIK  
   Petro KIZKO  
   Roman KEROD  
   LENKAVSKY

B. The ZCh/OUN leadership after the break with BANDERA.

Chairman:                                Still to be elected

Deputy Chairman:                      "   "   "   "

Principal Members:                    Bohdan KORDIUK  
   Zinovi MATLA \*  
   Modest RIPECKYJ  
   Roman KEROD  
   Bohdan PIDHAJNYJ  
   Zenon PELENSKYJ  
   Roman ILNITZKYJ  
   Petro KIZKO.

\* Will be withdrawing in accordance with the statute of the "Committee of Three" of which he has now become one of the two members appointed by the Ukrainian underground.

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GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND ABBREVIATIONS.

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Function:</u>
BANDERA, Stefan . . . . .	Until recently leader of the ZCh/OUN.
CUPRINKA, Taras, General . . . . .	Commander of the UPA until killed in 1951.
HRYNIOCH, Ivan, Dr. . . . .	Chairman of the ZP/UHVR
KONOWALETZ, Eugen, Colonel . . . . .	Founder of UWO, precursor of ZCh/OUN. Subsequently murdered by the Bolsheviks.
KORDIUK, Bohdan . . . . .	Member of ZCh/OUN, former editor of the journal "Ukrainskij Samostijnik".
KOVAL, Colonel . . . . .	Commander of the UPA
LEBED, Mikola . . . . .	General Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the UHVR (now in USA)
LEMISH, Yu. . . . .	Cover name of Colonel KOVAL
LENKAWSKYJ . . . . .	Member of ZCh/OUN who has thrown in his lot with BANDERA.
LISOVYJ . . . . .	Member of the Presidium of UHVR in the homeland.
LOPATINSKYJ, Konstantij . . . . .	Chief of Operations of ZP/UHVR (now in USA).
MATLA, Zinovi . . . . .	Member of the ZCh/OUN selected by the homeland to be one of the members of the "Committee of Three".
MIRON . . . . .	Leader of a group of agents infiltrated into the Ukraine in 1951.
PETLIURA, Simon . . . . .	Hetman of the Ukraine; assassinated in Paris in the 1920s by Moscow's orders.
PIDHALJNYJ, Bohdan, Major . . . . .	Chief of ZCh/OUN Operational section.
REBEET, Lev, Dr. . . . .	Member of the Executive Committee of ZP/UHVR, selected by the homeland to be one of the members of the "Committee of Three".
RIPECKYJ, Modest . . . . .	Member of ZCh/OUN, Editor of the "Ukrainskij Samostijnik".
STECKO, Jaroslav, Prof. . . . .	Deputy Chairman of ZCh/OUN.

<u>Abbreviation:</u>	<u>Meaning:</u>
UWO	Ukrainian Military Organisation
ZCh/OUN	Foreign Representation of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
PROVID	Council
OUN	Org. of the Ukrainian Nationalists in the homeland.
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
UHVR	Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (in the homeland).
ZP/UHVR	Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation.