

25 Sept 53

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Subject: AERODYNAMIC Ops. Vs. BANDERA-JAVELIN

1. Situation in Homeland

During April 1953, the Underground Headquarters sent word of the diversionary activity currently being conducted in the inside (LVOV district) by MYRON, Chief of the CAVATINA-JAVELIN team, dispatched in 1951.

In July, the Underground Headquarters transmitted its stand on the ZP mandate, its judgement on BANDERA'S departure from the homeland position, and its expectation that BANDERA will cease his schismatic activity and call MYRON to order.

On the basis of the above messages and the instructions to the ZPUHVR and OUN members abroad, KUBARK feels it is the proper time to confer with JAVELIN regarding the stand to be taken by both services vis-a-vis the Homeland Underground.

2. Methods of Approach and Assistance

Both services (KUBARK and JAVELIN) have been dispatching agents into the Ukraine primarily for the procurement of intelligence information and secondarily, to provide morale and technical support to promote the continued existence of the Ukrainian Underground Movement.

However, KUBARK'S initial approach towards exploiting the intelligence procurement potential of the movement, has been to tone down insistence on intelligence output in order to

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establish good faith, create the best possible atmosphere for a serious business discussion with the Underground Headquarters on future procurement of intelligence for us.

JAVELIN, on the other hand, in its conversations with us, has indicated that its only interest in the Underground is to exploit soonest the latter's intelligence procurement potential.

Despite the different emphasis of approach, both services, as manifested by the joint letter of May, 1951, agree that the collection of information in the Western Ukraine (via CAVATINA and CASSOWARY teams) is to be coordinated, directed, and assisted by the Homeland Underground Headquarters. This being the case, contact with the Underground Headquarters is our primary target (KUBARK has this contact) and the Underground Headquarters directives concerning the dual (KUBARK-JAVELIN) links should be regarded as authoritative.

3. Underground Headquarters Stand

A. Regarding ZPUHVR:

During July a message from the Underground Headquarters confirmed the ZP mandate and also stated that the following tasks are the responsibility of the ZP UHVR:

1. To represent abroad the UHVR, the UPA, the Ukrainian Liberation Underground (this is a new term now used in place of narrower "OUN"), and the entire Ukrainian Liberation Movement in the Ukraine.

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2. To carry abroad political, diplomatic, and informational activities in line with the Liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people.
3. To the ZP is given freedom of decision in matters of assistance for the homeland. The ZPUHVR is also the highest authoritative organ for all participants in the UPA and in the underground that find themselves abroad. Attached to the ZPUHVR a UPA missions works along UPA lines.

The above confirmation of the ZP mandate as submitted by the underground leadership indicates that KUBARK thru its association with the CASSOWARIES has received the undergrounds favor.

B. RESULTS ZCh OUN LONDON CONFERENCE (June-July 1953).

During this conference, delegates which included BANDERA, STETSKO, LENKAVSKY, KORDIUK and PIDHAINY agree to the following:

1. To acknowledge Col. ~~KOVAL~~ as the acting head of the entire OUN.
2. To accept all decisions transmitted by homeland leaders to the emigration

C. Regarding ZCh OUN:

August of 1953 the following was received from the Homeland indicating its current stand re: ZCh OUN:

- a. "The OUN provid on Ukrainian territory affirms that BANDERA departed from the decisions of the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN and that he neither

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formally nor in fact is the leader of the OUN. The provid expects that BANDERA in the name of the entirety of the OUN will end his schismatic activities and will call MYRON to order. However unfortunately we must state that among membership in the Homeland the name of BANDERA is popular, and if we inform the public of the departure of BANDERA from the OUN, this would bring about negative results for the Liberation Struggle.

"The OUN Provid on Ukrainian territory authorizes LEV REBET, MATLA and BANDERA temporarily to take over control of the ZCh and to reorganize the ZCh in accordance with the position of the OUN Provid in the Ukraine. The Head of the OUN on Ukrainian territory YU. LEMISH".

The Homeland directives (Stand re: ZPUHVR - ZCh OUN) regardless of impact on the emigration represent a clear cut victory of those elements in the Ukraine who feel their experience under Soviet rule makes them far better equipped to direct and participate in anti-Soviet activity than are members of the BANDERA clique who have at no time lived within the Soviet framework.

4.

CONCLUSIONS:

Despite the clarity of the Homeland's stand re: BANDERA and responsibilities ZPUHVR the possibility of implementing this Mandate by merely showing the documents to BANDERA and thru ZPUHVR-ZCh OUN discussions <sup>and thus</sup> obtain the desired results is not feasible without KUBARK-JAVELIN discussions and JAVELIN

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pressure exerted on BANDERA to abide by the Homelands directives and not continue to jeopardize unity, security and cause.

A cooperative attitude on the part of the British, i.e. acceptance of the Mandate and pressure on BANDERA could and probably will result in the establishment of joint operations. The argument for cooperation should prove effective in convincing the British of the undesirability of running operations independent of the wishes of the homeland headquarters. Such a stand would only create a "TITO - MIKHAILOVICH" situation contrary to our mutual aims and playing into the hands of the Soviets.

Therefore, it is advisable that a strong KUBARK argument be made emphasizing that future uncoordinated operations and the continuance of the schism in the emigration and the homeland are detrimental to the anti-Communist struggle in general and the Ukrainian underground movement, in particular.

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Record of a Meeting with Mr. Mikola LEBED

1. This meeting took place in London on the 25th September. Mr. LEBED was introduced to me by Major Bohdan PIDHAJNYJ of ZCh/OUN who was present throughout the three hour conversation.
2. After expressing my satisfaction at meeting Mr. LEBED, I invited him to state his views which he then proceeded to do at some length. Briefly summarised they are:-
  - a) that a unified command of the Ukrainian underground is an essential condition for its continued existence and survival,
  - b) that an end must be put at all costs to the differences which have arisen between ZCh and ZP representatives in the field and which have led to the isolation of whole regions,
  - c) that ZCh and particularly BANDERA personally must accept the instructions received from the homeland and subordinate himself to the underground leadership.
3. I told Mr. LEBED that I had personally seen the messages sent by BANDERA to the groups in the Ukraine instructing them to recognise Colonel KOVAL as leader and subordinate themselves to him. It was proposed to repeat these instructions through British controlled channels of communication and inform KOVAL of their despatch. But it would also be necessary to advise KOVAL of this action through ZP/UHVR communication links and insure that he would give the ZCh representative MIRON and others the possibility of making contact with him.
4. LEBED accepted this plan and thought that it might provide a basis for agreement in the field. He regretted that BANDERA had not seen fit to tell him of the despatch of these instructions as this would have made the preliminary negotiations easier.
5. I then informed LEBED that I understood BANDERA was prepared to serve on the Committee of Three suggested by the homeland, but that he would do so on terms which would need further discussion. PIDHAJNYJ confirmed that BANDERA had agreed to join MATLA and REBET providing the Committee did not supersede the present ZCh/OUN leadership but merely served as a body striving to find a solution to the present difficulties.
6. LEBED was not inclined to accept BANDERA's offer if it had conditions attached to it, but eventually agreed that it did provide the basis for further discussions. He proposed to resume negotiations with ZCh/OUN in MUNICH early next week.
7. I then expressed the hope that a solution might be found to the present difficulties which were seriously threatening all our interests and reducing the operational value of the groups in the field. Intelligence results were expected from these groups and if they were not obtained soon our support of them would cease.
8. LEBED made a good impression and I think the meeting served a useful purpose, although the only point actually agreed was that of a joint appeal to the field for unity through U.S. and British controlled communication links, which should make it possible for MIRON and other ZCh/OUN groups to link up with the leadership.