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TO : Chief, EE
(Attn: Chief, SR) *WMM*
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich
SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC

DATE: _____

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Progress Reports and Training Schedules for Period 1-30 April 1953.

Transmitted herewith are the following attachments:

Attachment A - report on the CASSOWARY Project and CAPIN.

Attachment B - report on the CARTHAGES.

Attachment C - CARTHAGE Training Schedules.

Att: (3)

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Attachment A to EGMA 5417

AERODYNAMIC Progress Report
1-30 April 1953

1. Reestablishment of W/T Contact.

With the reestablishment of W/T contact with the homeland in mid-April, the AERODYNAMIC project has received information on the survival of two CARTHAGE agents (one dropped in, in 1951 and the other in 1952), on the continued existence of at least a skeletal underground organization, on internal CAWNPORE political developments with marked operational connotations and on plans of CARTHAGES to contact CASSOWARY 5 in late April or early May. Thus the potential of this project stands at a new high, and with the effectuation of contact with CASSOWARY 5 and CAWNPORE headquarters, it is expected that the flow of positive intelligence, hitherto unsatisfactory, will quicken.

2. Security of the Operation.

The reactivated W/T traffic suggests that the security of the AERODYNAMIC project is threatened from two sides. On the one hand, there is the ever-present danger that enemy security formations will either destroy or penetrate and control the underground and the communications channel. On the other hand, messages received reveal that an internal conflict which threatens to wipe out key pro-American CAWNPORE leaders has been imported into the homeland. This conflict has a long history; in essence it represents an attempt by an unscrupulous emigre group to take over the CAWNPORE complex by force and with the aid of the operational arm of a friendly power which appears to be an unwitting accomplice to a plan to wipe out CAWNPORE 5 along with American operational assets.

Since his infiltration in 1951 CASSOWARY 5 probably has spent considerable energy protecting himself from the leader of the CAVATINA drop team. While the CAWNPORE 5 - CASSOWARY 5 faction appears to have the upper hand in the homeland, prudence suggests that consideration be given to procedures to be followed or avoided here in the CASSOWARY - CAVATINA struggle in the emigration, in order to protect both our clandestine channel and our assets in the Soviet Union.

3. The CASSOWARY - CAVATINA Conflict.

The political differences underlying our operational problems continue to ferment in the emigration. The CASSOWARIES are naturally indignant because of CAVATINA I's plans to take over CAWNPORE and feel they are duty-bound to take some action to clip his wings. To date they have done nothing and are apparently awaiting explicit instructions from the homeland and CASSOWARY 2. The squabble has attained a higher pitch in Europe with the circulation of CAVATINA I's letter attacking both CASSOWARY I and CAWNPORE as Titoists, neo-Communists, American agents, and traitors to traditional nationalism. The letter

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was apparently intended as the main volley in a campaign to rout both the "New Opposition" and CASSOWARY I and to guarantee victory to its composer at the general CAVATINA 6 Conference to be held in May 1953, presumably in England. CASSOWARY 3 is of the opinion that original plans to hold the conference in Munich were changed because the opposition within CAVATINA 6 in Germany is strong enough to take over the organization. The general opinion in the emigration in Germany is that CAVATINA I's letter is a mad act of desperation which has caused him more harm than good.

4. CAPELIN.

CAPELIN's productions, in both political and CE fields, continue to be very productive. Recent acquisitions include CAVATINA I's letter-manifesto, files of CAVATINA 8 cases involving Soviet espionage in Vienna, reports on old Soviet espionage cases prepared by CAVATINA 8 for BROADWAY, and reports on developments in the Ukrainian emigration. Of significance is CAPELIN's oral report, as yet unwritten, that all Ukrainian political groups have decided to reopen, beginning with a press campaign, the LITVIN-GNIP-TSIPERA affair involving the attack on Diomed GULAY. On the administrative side, the Field still awaits the arrival of CAPELIN's new contract. It is also requested that authorization be given to draw 6,000 DM against CAPELIN's dollar account in the United States in order that he might be able to pay the key money needed to move to a new flat from his present pantry-sized one-room apartment rectory-welfare organization-intelligence office.

5. Miscellaneous.

Ivan BESAHA, a native of the Carpatho-Ukraine who exfiltrated from the USSR in summer of 1952, was interrogated by the undersigned in an effort to establish the subject's knowledgeability regarding illegal underground opposition in the Western Ukrainian oblasts. BESAHA was unable to provide any concrete data suggesting that such resistance exists at the present time and advanced the opinion that an underground group would be liquidated by Soviet security forces by a sustained local effort over a three or four month period.

In regard to an oral request by the headquarters AERODYNAMIC office regarding the source of data for Air Intelligence Information Report PIR 49-26-129-0952 (Airbase KORNYCZ near KOLOMEA), and PIR 49-26-291-1052 (Airfield at GAJE WIELKIE), an overture through MOB liaison with KUKNOB has as yet failed to bring the desired information.

The undersigned regrets that a thorough search of MOB AERODYNAMIC files shows that we do not possess a copy of the report on the exfiltration of CARTEL 10.

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Attachment/B to EGMA-5417

CARTHAGE Progress Report
1-30 April 1953

1. CARTHAGES 3 and 7

a. In line with documenting CARTHAGES 3 and 7 for Germany, both were de-registered from the Frankfurt area and have now begun the process of registering in Munich. No difficulties are foreseen in this latter phase of the legalization process, which should be completed by 1 May. Following this, the weddings mentioned in the March progress report will take place. Immigration applications will be filed immediately thereafter.

b. Since prospective immigrants to America must have a sponsor to prove that they will not become a lien on the United States, it will be necessary for CARTHAGES 3 and 7 to obtain, through overt channels, this guarantee of support. At present, two possibilities exist; one the Tolstoi Foundation, the other the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee. The latter foundation will be approached first, via CASSOWARY 3 and, if this organization is unable to handle this type request, then CARTHAGES 3 and 7 will themselves approach the Tolstoi Foundation.

c. PRQ 1's for the prospective wives of CARTHAGES 3 and 7 are in preparation and will be forwarded to Headquarters when completed.

2. CARTHAGE 5

a. W/T contact with CARTHAGE 5 was re-established on the 14th of April. On this date, CARTHAGE 5 announced that he had spent the winter successfully and at the same time transmitted to us part of CASSOWARY 5's messages prepared in the fall of 1952. In subsequent message, sent on the 23rd of April, CARTHAGE 5 completed transmission of CASSOWARY 5's materials. In this message, too, CARTHAGE 5 informed us of his scheduled April 30 meeting with CASSOWARY 5's men. (See report on the political ramifications of the contents of CASSOWARY 5's messages.)

b. CARTHAGE 5 had received all of our messages sent to him during the winter months, i.e., messages from number seventy-five through eighty-six. Messages from seventy-five were not transmitted to CASSOWARY 5 by CARTHAGE 5 due to lack of contact beginning in November. Also, several of our messages were not deciphered by CARTHAGE 5 because he lacked or did not have with him the proper decode pad. This matter has since been clarified (see our Hotee message number 93.) and in the event CARTHAGE 5 cannot find the decode pad necessary for decoding those undecoded messages he holds, then we shall repeat a summary of those messages.

c. It is assumed that since CARTHAGE 5 is to meet with CASSOWARY 5's men on 30 April, he will not be in W/T contact with us until after this meeting has been held.

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Attachment B to EGMA-5417

d. For complete details on the W/T traffic between us and CARTHAGE 5 beginning 14 April, see HOTEET incoming messages numbers fifty-three through fifty-eight and HOTEET outgoing messages numbers ninety-three through ninety-eight.

3. CARTHAGE 7

a. On the 23rd of April W/T contact was also re-established with CARTHAGE 12 who announced on this date that he too had spent a successful, although rather difficult winter. As in the case of CARTHAGE 5, CARTHAGE 12 had received all of our winter traffic to him which was mainly made up of Dulles' speech, with an added greeting or two from the CASSOWARIES here.

b. In his message number four (23 April), CARTHAGE 12 included a blind broadcast schedule for May. In keeping with this schedule we have sent him our messages numbers twenty-two through twenty-four.

4. Training -- Supply Drop Problem.

a. On 3 April, the air supply drop and air-to-ground pick-up training problem, originally scheduled for March, was held at the Grafenwohr training area. On this problem, using live props, the CARTHAGE team was instructed in DZ selection, in lighting and preparing the DZ for a night supply drop, in calculating where each supply pack would drop, in the use of the URC/4 and in laying out and homing a plane in for an air-to-ground pick-up. (In the air-to-ground pick-up problem whereby the plane was to have actually landed, a simulated landing was made whereby the plane made a low approach over the lighted DZ.)

b. Although the overall problem was run successfully, some difficulty involving the URC/4 and the training of the CARTHAGES in its live use was encountered. Because of some mechanical quirk either in the URC/4 used on the problem or in the corresponding apparatus in the plane, homing the plane over the DZ turned out to be a problem in itself. Consequently, most of the homing directions had to be given from ground-to-air in English, resulting in the exclusion of the CARTHAGE's participation in this phase of the problem. It is regretted that the CARTHAGES were unable to put their theoretical knowledge of the URC/4 into practical use at this time, however, in view of the time left before their dispatch, another such problem will be run if at all possible.

c. If air-to-ground pick-up gear become available in the near future, (pouch pick-up gear has already been requested and should be available to us the second week in June.) it is planned to train the present CARTHAGE team in rigging this equipment in the event this equipment is included in a re-supply drop and a pouch pick-up becomes feasible.

5. COMMO.

a. On 22 April CARTHAGES 10, 15 and 16 were given a complete Commo examination by representatives of Chief, EUCA. The examination, which all CARTHAGES passed successfully and which was of a practical nature consisting of actual contacts and setting

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up of W/T apparatus rather than a question and answer quiz, tested the CARTHAGES in the following aspects of Commo:

- (1) Operating proficiency: Q signals, procedure signs, sending - receiving and the use of signal plan,
- (2) Crypto ability: one time pad system, use of message system indicators and confirmation digits.
- (3) Equipment familiarization: transmitter, tuning devices antennas and power sources.

b. Upon completion of the above mention examination, Commo representatives feel certain that all members of the CARTHAGE team are adequately qualified to pass traffic via W/T. This includes CARTHAGE 16, of whom there were originally some doubts as to whether he would ever qualify as an operator. However, through his determination to master Commo and the instructor's patience, he did make the grade so to speak. All have improved in Commo, and with the time remaining before being dispatched, should improve even more.

6. Tradecraft and other Training.

a. During the period covered by this report, three primary tradecraft subjects were given the CARTHAGES, i.e., Black Base survival, Soviet Aircraft Recognition and Soviet Border Controls. These subjects were taught by CASSOWARY 14 on the basis of materials prepared by our Training Staff. To supplement the Black Base survival lectures, it is planned to hold a five-day field problem the second week in May, using a Training Staff specialist as instructor.

b. The Soviet Aircraft Recognition course, which to date consisted primarily of learning to identify the more popular types of Soviet Aircraft, shall be rounded out with instruction in Radar identification and airfield reconnaissance. Here, to supplement any instruction given them on Soviet Radar and Airfields, the CARTHAGES will be given the opportunity of observing local Radar and airfield installations.

c. For a run-down of other subjects in which the CARTHAGES were instructed during this period, see attached training schedules.

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TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR COURSES 10, 15 and 16

PERIOD: April 6-10, 1953

Monday, April 6

Easter Holiday

Tuesday, April 7

Easter Holiday

Wednesday, April 8

0800-1230: Commo

1230-1330: Lunch

1330-1430: Soviet Aircraft Recognition

1430-1530: Black Base Survival

1530-1630: Soviet Documentation

1630-1730: Ukrainian Politics in Emigration

Thursday, April 9

0800-1230: Commo

1230-1330: Lunch

1330-1430: Soviet Border Controls

1430-1530: Soviet Actuality

1530-1630: Soviet Documentation

1630-1730: The UPA

Friday, April 10

0800-0900: The Ukrainian Partisan, Practical aspects

0900-1000: Soviet Aircraft Recognition

1000-1100: Soviet Aircraft Recognition

1100-1200: General discussion and World News

1200-1300: Lunch

1300-1700: Commo

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TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR CAMELIONS 10, 15 and 16

Period: April 20-24, 1953

Monday, April 20

- 0800-0900: Ukrainian Politics in Emigration
- 0900-1200: Commo
- 1200-1300: Lunch
- 1300-1400: Commo
- 1400-1500: Black Base Survival
- 1500-1600: Map and Compass
- 1600-1700: Soviet Aircraft Recognition

Tuesday, April 21

- 0800-0900: The UPA
- 0900-1200: Commo
- 1200-1300: Lunch
- 1300-1400: Commo
- 1400-1500: Soviet Border Controls
- 1500-1600: First Aid
- 1600-1700: Ukrainian Politics in Emigration

Wednesday, April 22

- 0800-0900: The Ukrainian Partisan, Practical Aspects
- 0900-1200: Commo
- 1200-1300: Lunch
- 1300-1400: Commo
- 1400-1500: Soviet Aircraft Recognition
- 1500-1600: Black Base Survival
- 1600-1700: Soviet Border Controls

Thursday, April 23

- 0800-0900: The Ukrainian Partisan, Practical Aspects
- 0900-1200: Commo
- 1200-1300: Lunch
- 1300-1400: Commo
- 1400-1700: Weapons--Firing range

Friday, April 24

- 0800-0900: The UPA
- 0900-1000: Soviet Border Controls
- 1000-1100: Soviet Aircraft Recognition
- 1100-1200: World News and General Discussion
- 1200-1300: Lunch
- 1300-1700: Commo

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TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR CAETH GCS 10, 15 and 16

Period: 13-17 April, 1953

Monday, 13 April

0800-0900: Soviet Aircraft Recognition
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1500: Examination in Soviet Documents
1500-1600: Soviet Actuality
1600-1700: Liberation Movement in the Ukraine

Tuesday, 14 April

0800-0900: Soviet Border Controls
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1500: Black Base Survival
1500-1600: The UPA
1600-1700: Soviet Actuality

Wednesday, 15 April

0800-0900: The Ukrainian Partisan, Practical Aspects
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1500: Black Base Survival
1500-1600: Soviet Border Controls
1600-1700: Soviet Aircraft Recognition

Thursday, 16 April

0800-0900: Ukrainian Liberation Movement in the Ukraine
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1500: Photography
1500-1600: " " "
1600-1700: Soviet Aircraft Recognition

Friday, 17 April

0800-0900: Soviet Border Controls
0900-1000: Black Base Survival
1000-1100: Ukrainian Politics in Emigration
1100-1200: General Discussion and World News
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1700: Commo

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TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR-CARTHAGES 10, 15 and 16

PERIOD: April 27-May 1

Monday, April 27

0800-0900: Soviet Border Controls
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1500: Soviet Aircraft Recognition
1500-1600: Black Base Survival
1600-1700: The Ukrainian Partisan, Practical Aspects

Tuesday, April 28

0800-0900: Soviet Actuality
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1500: Soviet Documentation
1500-1600: Soviet Border Controls
1600-1700: Ukrainian Politics in Emigration

Wednesday, April 29

0800-0900: Soviet Aircraft Recognition
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1500: Photography
1500-1700: Photo Field Work

Thursday, April 30

0800-0900: Black Base Survival
0900-1200: Commo
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1400: Commo
1400-1700: Map Field Problem

Friday, ~~April~~ May 1

0800-0900: Black Base Survival
0900-1000: " " "
10---1200: General Discussion and World News
1200-1300: Lunch
1300-1700: Commo

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