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SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. MGAA- 0735

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief SR
Chief EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *Vbc*

DATE: 16 May 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— ⁰ REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC

SPECIFIC— Some operational and Political Implications involved in the Re-establishment of Contact with CAWNPORE

Transmitted herewith is a report by and regarding Some operational and political implications involved in the Re-establishment of Contact with CAWNPORE.

psf.
ryj

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MGAA- 0735

Subject: REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC - Some Operational and Political Implications
Involved in the Re-establishment of Contact
with CAWNPORE

1. Since there is a good possibility that we will be back in W/T contact with CAWNPORE Headquarters in the near future, it is urged that Headquarters give serious reconsideration to the operational and political requests which we may reasonably expect to receive. In complying with verbal request that the field advise Washington what to anticipate in the way of CAWNPORE requests, the undersigned have conferred at length and submit their comments in Paras 2 and 3, based on:

a. An analysis of CAWNPORE's political and operational stand as reflected in last year's traffic from the field;

b. The aggregate debriefings and spontaneous assertions of three courier teams which arrived over a period of three years;

c. The briefing instructions given to courier team leaders sent out by CAWNPORE;

d. The 1948, 1949 and 1950 pouches from CAWNPORE;

e. The development of the nationalist movement since 1939 and in particular the political declarations of CAWNPORE 1 and "diplomatic" relationships and negotiations between CAWNPORE and the Germans, Hungarians, Rumanians, Poles (1941-45);

f. The equipment sent in on three air dispatches.

2. Operational Implications: Since we believe the operational side is much the more clear-cut, we will discuss that first. The subject falls naturally into three subheadings:

a. Materiel Requests: Judging from four-years experience with the needs of CAWNPORE, it is not felt that there will be any demands for items we cannot or do not want to supply. There will definitely be no requests for Jeeps, mortars, heavy machine guns or other heavy equipment. At most we foresee a demand for commo equipment, small arms, rifles, carbines, ammunition, grenades, explosives, food, medicine, maps, printing materials (paper, mimeograph machines or small presses), all available on short notice if not already in stock at CSOB/K.

b. Personnel Requests: If W/T operators are requested, we have three men more highly trained than any heretofore dispatched. On tap are two other men who have just begun commo training. We also have the prospect of three potential W/T trainees recruitable from England. Concerning the long-term

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54-124-29/3

SECRET

- 2 -

MGAA- 0735

availability of further commo trainees, the successful conclusion of negotiations between CASSOWARY 1 and CAVATINA 6 could place at our disposal a vast pool of recruitable W/T bodies. Since we indicated to CAWNPORE last summer that we had begun the training of military and para-military technical specialists (the Landsberg project), we may reasonably expect some request for a progress report. In this event, as matters now stand, we could sugarcoat the remains of the Landsberg project, de-emphasize the non-existence of the covert training program and emphasize how unexpectedly complex the negotiations with the Bonn government have been.

c. Special Requests: From 1947 on CAWNPORE has consistently moved away from the tactics of open partisan warfare in order to preserve itself as an organization and to concentrate its energies on the dissemination of propadanda, the maintenance of communication lines with its outlying underground groups in the Ukraine and with the West. We feel that CAWNPORE will be very reluctant to lose any more of its personnel on westward, overland courier missions. From 1945 through 1950 over fifty per cent of the men dispatched on westward courier missions have perished. The CARTHAGE 3 team of 1950 was unique from two points of view: the leader of the team was not killed and there were no other casualties. In 1947 all but one member of that year's team perished in Czechoslovakia and the survivor was doubled by the MGB in Bratislava. Invariably up to 1950 the leaders and important members of each year's ^{have perished} team. As result important pouches have fallen into the hands of the Soviets. Since we discussed with the in-going teams of 1950 and 1951 the possibility of eventual pouch and personnel pick-ups by aircraft and asked CAWNPORE to give a realistic estimate of the security risk involved at their end, it follows that CAWNPORE strongly hopes that W/T contact and possible air pick-ups obviate the need for further westward courier missions. Therefore it is quite possible that CAWNPORE will ask us to train CARTHAGE personnel in pick-up techniques.

It is also possible that with several smashed W/T sets still kicking around from 1949 and 1950 and with the unavoidable rough handling that the 1951 sets must receive, CAWNPORE will ask that personnel be thoroughly trained in radio theory and repair. By extension, they may also request personnel trained to teach W/T to other partisans in the homeland.

3. Political Implications: Because of their limited understanding of the workings of U.S. policy and institutions, the CASSOWARIES, as well as most other Slavic emigre leaders, incorrectly evaluate day-to-day operational vicissitudes which have no real political significance in themselves. For example, the recent difficulties experienced by CASSOWARY 2 in clearing his status before the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is interpreted by most members of CASSOWARY 1 as another manifestation of the covertly hostile U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ukrainian nationalism. Therefore many of our actions and statements (or lack thereof) are taken by CASSOWARY 1 and CAWNPORE to be parts of a clearly defined but unvoiced policy. If it is difficult for CASSOWARY 1 to comprehend the literal meaning of our deeds and declarations, it is obviously even more difficult for CAWNPORE, isolated as it is, to understand the non-Slavic mentality and its methods of operation.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

MCAA-0735

It is entirely unlikely that either CASSOWARY 1 or CAWNPORE expect any overt or covert U.S. policy commitment in exclusive support of Ukrainian nationalism. Their grasp is neither so limited nor unrealistic. We must not confuse what they want with what they think is feasible as quid pro quo. // ✓

In our opinion, there are now only two logical ways for CAWNPORE to raise the general underlying issue of their political problem without seeming to diplomatic or insistent. If they do not choose to put a direct or implied query to us as to our stand on the broad non-Russian issue (last year they did not pose questions, they merely said they "hope" we will give them sympathetic support), then they will ask their own representatives in CASSOWARY 1 for a report on what they have been able to accomplish since May 1951 in behalf of CAWNPORE. This would allow them to kill two birds with one stone: in effect, they would thus elicit an indicative answer on our stand without ever having asked us for it, plus a progress report from CASSOWARY 1. If they decide on the other hand to put a direct or indirect question to us, it will probably be an implied petition to the U.S. to desist from fostering the impression that the U.S. supports the concept of a united and indivisible Russia. By keeping their request general they would not have to criticize the VOA, QKACTIVE, etc. separately at the outset.

Since we have consistently desired to establish this operation on a businesslike, quid pro quo basis, and have implied as much to the homeland, CAWNPORE recognized that all material support and the resulting commo link is an asset, but, more important than that, a means to an end. As the Germans noted in the last war, underground or partisan movements in the Soviet Union are only as strong as the faith of their members in ultimate success. We have gathered from our relations with the CASSOWARIES and the CARTHAGES and from CAWNPORE pouches that CAWNPORE considers our attitude on the whole USSR question the key to their future. Even though we in the West are in no position to fathom what will go on in the CAWNPORE mind in the event we withhold all political support, on the non-Russian question, we can safely predict that CAWNPORE would be less efficient and less cooperative and certainly in no position to disseminate pro-US propaganda among the Ukrainian masses. It would in fact become increasingly difficult for them to justify their cooperation with us in the eyes of their own people and they would place themselves in the "despicable" position of being hired agents of a foreign power.

*Why covert?
Self-determination is overt!*

Despite our efforts to persuade CAWNPORE and its foreign representation to accept at face value our covert assurance that the U.S. is unequivocally pro-self-determination, the CASSOWARIES aver that the following official or semi-official American undertakings are not consistent with this unannounced policy. It has become increasingly difficult for us to find reasonable arguments to support the thesis that these manifestations, while confusing, have no bearing on the inalterable U.S. policy of self-determination. Incidentally, the order of importance of these "policy" issues to the Ukrainians seems to correspond directly to the order of difficulty the Americans would have if they sought to influence other branches of the U.S. government which control the most important of these activities.

SECRET ✓

SECRET

- 4 -

MCAA- 0735

- a. The management and contents of the Ukrainian VOA broadcasts; ✓
- b. The refusal of SONR to grant the non-Russian nationalities parity of representation within SONR;
- c. The failure to organize Ukrainian Labor Service Companies; ✓
- d. The disintegration of the covert military and para-military specialist's training program (Landsberg Project); ✓
- e. The non-materialization of a Ukrainian news bulletin printed in English. ✓

4. [] request for this memo was in accordance by our conviction that the really crucial phase of this operation as regards confidence and long-range cooperation is only now approaching. CAWNPORE headquarters has had all winter long to think over the extent to which and conditions under which it can cooperate with us. We suggest that Headquarters consider and determine the extent to which and under what conditions the U.S. can cooperate with CAWNPORE. Early policy decisions on these matters will prevent awkward delays in answering the type of political messages we expect from CAWNPORE and will permit us to guide the CASSOWARIES in the framing of their messages so that we can minimize the crises that can arise from subsequent changes made by Headquarters in CASSOWARY 1 messages to CAWNPORE.

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74-124-29/3