

SECURITY INFORMATION

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5 March 1952

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

To: Chief, SR -

From: SR/W 2

Subject: Comments on Joint BROADWAY-ZACABAL Ukrainian Operations

1. British Stand Based on CAVATINA 6-CASSOWARY 1 conversations of 17, 23 and 25 January 1952:
 - a. CAVATINA 6 is prepared to accept one or two CASSOWARY 1 representatives for inclusion in the next team to be sent into the Ukraine.
 - b. A single channel for W/T commo is to be maintained and control of such commo to be matter for Anglo-American decision. (It should be noted that the above British proposals are identical with CAVATINA proposals).
2. CAVATINA 6 Note to CASSOWARY 3 of 2 February 1952:
 - a. CASSOWARY 1 to co-opt CAVATINA 6 personnel. (CASSOWARY 3 maintains that the CAVATINA's will not be co-opted until such a time that CAVATINA 6 shows tangible evidence in its propoganda that they have changed their methods and attitudes).
 - b. CAVATINA 6 accepts the 1950 CAWNPORE mandate.
 - c. CAVATINA retains right to recall and replace any of its members who had been sent to CASSOWARY 1 as representatives of CAWNPORE 2.
 - d. There will be no cooperation between the two groups unless CAVATINA members of CASSOWARY 1 are in full accord with the proposals presented. All activity of CASSOWARY 1 must be coordinated and passed upon by CAVATINA members.
3. CAVATINA solution to problem of contact with the homeland (note of 2 February):
 - a. There exists, at present, one line of communication with the homeland. This line is at present controlled, and will in the future be controlled, by the Contacts Section of CAVATINA 6.
 - b. Contacts Section of CAVATINA 6 willing to transmit to and from the homeland by its own means and methods any pouches which CASSOWARY 1 may wish to send. This service would also include the movement of individual representatives of CASSOWARY 1 to the homeland.

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c. CASSOWARY 1 must cede to the CAVATINA Contacts Section all matters relative to communications with the homeland. (See 2b).

d. CAVATINA Contacts Section will transmit messages or send CASSOWARY pouches or personal representatives to the homeland provided that the CASSOWARY's make no further attempts to establish contact with the homeland on their own.

4. Comments:

Although the CASSOWARY-CAVATINA discussions of 17, 23 and 25 January appear to have been at least partially successful, the CAVATINA note of 2 February seems to indicate that the CAVATINA's would like to take over all responsibility in regard not only to the politics in the emigration but also relative to contacts with the homeland. There can be no political or operational rapprochement if CAVATINA 6 insist on their demands.

5. All these negotiations further underscore the basic political opportunism of CAVATINA 6 and should serve as a warning if U.S.-CAVATINA collaboration is contemplated.

6. The British are under the impression that CAVATINA 3, on 16 January, approached ZACABAL and offered us the services of CAVATINA 6. They are not aware that on 14 December CAVATINA 3 passed to us a written proposal for U.S.-CAVATINA collaboration which had been worked out by nine CAVATINA's, including CAVATINA 2. There seems to be no reason why they should be informed of this development since they were apparently told that the initial U.S.-CAVATINA collaboration had been suggested by CAVATINA 3 and according to them "... CAVATINA 3 cannot be taken very seriously".

7. It should be noted that on 4 January a British case officer reported to us that the CAVATINA reaction to the joint ops proposal was negative (Ref: MUNI 6314 IN 10914). The CASSOWARY's also were not anxious for joint ops prior to a political understanding being reached. On 26 January CASSOWARY 3 informed our case officer in Germany (Ref: MUNI 6882 IN 17205) that during his conversations with CAVATINA 2 about joint teams the latter stated that CAVATINA 6 had never considered joint teams. That is perhaps why on the 1st and 2nd of February, when American and British case officers met in Germany, it was suggested that the joint team should have an equal number of representatives from each organization. Due to the lack of interest in joint teams on the part of both CAVATINA's and CASSOWARY's it has been deemed necessary to drop the idea of joint operations until such a time that there is a political rapprochement between the two organizations.

8. In the light of the above ZACABAL proceeded on the basis of individual teams to be sent in by ZACABAL and BROADWAY. It goes without saying that, as in the past, the dispatches should be very closely coordinated and all information from the homeland should be mutually shared.

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