

SECURITY INFORMATION

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DISPATCH NO. MGAA-228

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 26 February 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Operational Plan - Project AERODYNAMIC

Ref: KAUFFG 693

Transmitted herewith is the operational plan for Project AERODYNAMIC for the Spring 1952 operation.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
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Removed from Project *Aerodynamic*
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NGAA- 228

Subject: REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC Operational Plan for Spring 1952

RE: Kauffg 693

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1. Both the undersigned case officers and the CARTHAGES themselves strongly agree that granted the extent of Soviet knowledge of ZACABAL and BROADWAY dispatches of the past several years, any possibility of a May-moon-period air dispatch into the Western Ukraine catching the Soviets napping must be discarded as wishful thinking; the trick has been tried too often. On the other hand, so long as quantities of snow are on the ground, the Soviets do not expect woodland partisan activity of any sort, much less an air drop of partisan couriers, who, as the Soviets well know, would have to wait for local contact until their local colleagues come out of their bunkers in late April. It is therefore strongly recommended by both the agents and the case officers that one of the last ten nights of March or the first five of April be utilized for the dispatch of the next CARTHAGE team. March has never been used for an air mission to the Soviet Union to date and the members of the next CARTHAGE team are frankly scared of waiting until the usual time in May. From their point of view a month of camping in the snow of an isolated mountain forest is far less dangerous than dropping in during the warmer weather when the Soviets are out in force for the now-traditional spring anti-partisan campaign. From our point of view, the plane and crew should by all odds be safer flying in and out in late March than would be the case in mid or late spring. If the operation can be handled securely from this end, the change of schedule to March plus the use of a slightly different air approach should cancel out the effectiveness of Soviet-made plans for intercepting an AERODYNAMIC aircraft or observing CARTHAGE parachutists while they are landing. While the case officers are not air experts, they have given a lot of thought to the ground reactions to the AERODYNAMIC and BROADWAY flights of 1950 and 1951. We know that by January 1950 the Soviets were aware that the U.S. was dropping CAMPORE 3 personnel by air into the Western Ukraine, but the Soviets were apparently unable to do anything to thwart the May 1950 mission. By early July 1950, the Soviets had captured alive one of the four men who had jumped in two months earlier. By Mid-August 1950, the RIS can be assumed to have known all the essential facts concerning the September 1949 and May 1950 drops. Despite this, three separate air flights safely deposited a total of 22 agents in the Western Ukraine in May 1951. The flights themselves were decidedly a success, and even though they repeated the pattern established the previous year, there was nothing except the flares our plane saw at the border to show that the Soviets had devised any methods for coping with the flights. We have no information to indicate that the demise of the two Broadway teams and the breakdown of communications with our team had direct connection with the fact that the teams arrived in the Western Ukraine by air. In brief, as far as the Western Ukraine is concerned, we are not impressed with the Soviets ability to thwart even those air operations that logic would lead them to anticipate.

2. The opinions of the CARTHAGES: Recently while discussing various aspects of their mission into the Ukraine with the CARTHAGES, the subject of mounting an operation during the latter stages of winter rather than in early spring or summer came up. Briefly, the thinking of the agents themselves went something like this:

a.) Since the Soviets now expect air operations during the spring and summer moon phases, why not make the drop in the late winter, preferably the last two weeks in March when no air operations are expected and MVD-MGB ground patrols are lax and knowing that the partisans hibernate as long as there is snow on the ground.

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- b) With a good food supply, a team could survive independently of local assistance until the other partisans emerge from their bunkers;
- c) If supplied with sterno and proper winter clothing a team could live through the last weeks of the winter in a semi-surface snow shelter, well-concealed in an isolated mountain forest;
- d) Since snow makes it easy to distinguish unwooded areas from the air an air dispatch in March would not require bright moon light;
- e) The overall security of the operation, especially on this end, would be greatly enhanced if the operation were run off when it is least expected by the Soviets.

3. Aside from the factor of surprise which enters into a late winter air operation, the place will have the added advantage of a longer night to operate in, which will mean an hour or so more additional cover darkness for the agents -- and they can certainly use it. In May 1950 and 1951, it should be remembered, the first gray light of day came within an hour after the agents got on the ground. Because May is a month of Soviet and anti-Soviet ground activity, both May teams insisted on marching at least ten kilometers away from the DZ immediately after landing. It will be impossible for a March team to wade any distance with their freight through deep snow, now is it desirable that they should. The CARTHAGES now in training have taken this into consideration and are thankful that they will not have to make a long force march immediately after hitting terra firma. In the nearest, thickly-wooded, gully the team will be just as safe as anywhere else. Naturally, if the team is observed by unfriendly persons, it will be extremely hard-pressed to survive the ensuing encirclement actions by enemy troops. If, however, an unobserved drop cannot be made at the DZ we have selected (see KANFTG 693, para 3) then it is hard to say where in the Western Ukraine a team can parachute to earth with impunity: our area is the most isolated mountain fastness on the map.

4. Weather: Ideally, the pilots should not need any moon at all. If a moonless night sufficiently clear for navigation is used and there is ground fog in the inhabited valleys which bound the DZ at an average distance of four kilometers, it is hard to imagine how circumstances any more propitious for an unobserved, safe drop could be found.

5. Composition of the Team:

a. The CARTHAGE team for the coming spring dispatch will consist of four men, e.g., CARTHAGES 12, 13, 15, 16. Of this group two members, namely CARTHAGES 12 and 13, are expert W/T operators, while the other two CARTHAGES have had no W/T training will serve as hand generator for CARTHAGES 12 and 13.

b. The selection of two W/T men and two escort types for a four-man team based on our operational plan which provides for the establishment of two separate radio teams (consisting of one W/T operator and one escort man each), either of which is capable of setting up its own W/T base and of contacting partisans. The concept of two-teams-in-one is calculated to give us two separate chances of getting back in contact with CAMPCORE, if one team is liquidated either while at its own base or on a contact mission, the other team should still remain in tact to carry on.

c. A brief rundown of the qualifications, and specific duties to be assigned the CARTHAGES selected for the team would read as follows:

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i. CARTHAGE 12:

We have tentatively selected CARTHAGE 12 as the most qualified man to be team leader even though he is less familiar with the DZ area and the current situation there than CARTHAGE 13. He was, however, an active partisan in the Western Ukraine and as such is familiar with partisan tactics, etc. He also has some knowledge of the DZ area, having passed through that locale on several occasions during the years 1946-47.

CARTHAGE 12 has been continuously in training at CSOB/K since mid-1950. He has become an accomplished W/T operator, well-versed in the techniques of radio communications. His other training here included S/W, cable writing, observation and reporting, photography, maps and compass, jump training, weapons familiarization, and other subjects.

His motivation is excellent, his morale high, and he shows a mature attitude towards the responsibilities inherent in clandestine work. Although never shouldered with the duties of a leader, he has shown better than average initiative on many occasions which indicated that he possesses qualifications of leadership. As far as W/T is concerned he is a much more accomplished W/T operator than CARTHAGE 13, the other radio man on the team.

Thus on the mission, CARTHAGE 12, will be chief W/T operator and leader of the team in all matters except those pertaining to the establishment contact with local underground forces which is CARTHAGE 13's bailiwick.

ii. CARTHAGE 13:

The man upon which the success of the operation most depends is CARTHAGE 13, who came out of the Ukraine with CARTHAGE 3 in September 1950. This man has an excellent knowledge of the forest complex around the DZ and is also acquainted with several "contact personnel" in the towns on the edge of that forest. He has camped in this forest while with the partisans and knows several ways of establishing liaison with any partisans existing there now.

CARTHAGE 13 has been training since November 1950 almost as long as CARTHAGE 12 and has learned the same subjects as the latter. However, while considered a good radio operator, he is slightly less proficient than CARTHAGE 12.

Judged by his performance during training, CARTHAGE 13 is not a leader nor has he ever aspired to be one. Nevertheless, he is an outstanding follower and has always been depended upon to do the best possible in any given assignment regardless of what obstacles confront him. His motivation is ideal and his morale is high; he is ready and willing for the dispatch whenever called upon for this purpose.

His part in the operation will be that of radio operator, liaison man for contacting partisan headquarters, transmitter of the U.S. and CASSOWARY 1 briefing to CANNPORE headquarters, and lastly guide for the other team members while operating in the DZ area.

iii. CARTHAGE 15:

This man is an eager volunteer for a mission into the Ukraine to fight the Bolsheviks - that is his main qualification, which, considering that he has been exposed to West European culture for twelve years, is a rare one indeed. Although

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he is thirty-three years old, his physical condition and appearance is that of a twenty-six year old. He is a very cooperative and diligent person. The case officers believe that he will be a good escort man and hand generator operator. He is already proficient in the use and maintenance of weapons.

iv. CARTHAGE 16:

Exuding good health and vigor, this twenty-four year old emigre probably will hold up better physically than anyone else on the team. His morale is excellent and he is a willing and eager follower. Although he has aptitude neither for ~~com~~ nor any other intellectual pursuit, his duties as escort and hand generator man should not put very much of a strain on his gray matter.

RE CARTHAGE 10:

Carthage 10, who is by far the most qualified member of the CARTHAGE group now at CSOB/K, has been excluded from the team and the spring dispatch for the following reasons:

a.) most qualified as nucleus for and leader of any future team;

b.) best suited for "black-base type" operation involving semi-legal existence in USSR.

6. Post-Landing Procedures: At this point, our thinking on post-landing procedures runs as follows:

a.) Granted the deep snow that will still be on the ground surrounding the DZ, it will be too difficult for the team to try to hike any distance: they will have considerable freight to dispose of and the more tracks they make, the more they will have to retrace and obliterate.

b.) In the forest surrounding the center of the DZ, they can assemble their equipment in a densely-wooded gully and build their semi-surface snow bunker right there. Note that the apex of the mountain ridge which forms the DZ is about as far from human habitations and roads as can possibly be found in the Western Ukraine.

c.) During the last weeks of snow before the team attempts to contact the underground, it is planned that the team will have W/T contact with our base station somewhat as follows:

i. post-landing report to be radioed from the field as soon as convenient within the first 72 hours.

ii. message from base station with congratulations and fact that plane returned safely.

iii. check-in and situation reports as often as convenient, ideally about every five days.

iv. emergency or danger reports from field to the base if required.

v. pre-established message indicating that according to plan the team is about to split into pairs prior to searching for local contact.

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vi. a message from CARTHAGE 12 and companion (CARTHAGE 15 or 16) either returned successfully or (unsuccessfully) from attempting to establish contact or did not return at all. (A separate and more detailed memorandum on commo follows.)

d.) the team will in any case report by W/T on whatever it does, on the extent of its success, and, on whatever operational data or intelligence it can pick up in the area: this year's team must have complete authority from CASSOWARY 1 to radio about anything and everything until such time as it has proof that CAMPORE headquarters is still functioning well-enough actually to run a W/T net efficiently.

e.) Since CARTHAGE 13 knows both the area and partisan contact procedures best, he and one of the new CARTHAGES will make the first attempt to establish local contact by methods known to CARTHAGE 12 and which will be thoroughly discussed with the case officers and written up before he is dispatched.

f.) for purposes of security, CARTHAGE 12 and the remaining member of the team will move to a new spot unknown to CARTHAGE 13 and companion. A blind letter drop or alternate rendezvous point system will be worked out so that if CARTHAGE 13 and his escort are killed or captured, while trying to get contact, CARTHAGE 12 and his companion become a secure, independent two-man team.

g.) Should the next team discover that CAMPORE headquarters, no longer, exists or has become completely disorganized, CARTHAGE 12 and 15 (the latter speaks excellent German) will try to exfiltrate along with a local partisan or two to Germany so we can get a fuller picture of what is going on and at the same time have enough freshly-arrived personnel to mount teams to start the black base long-range plan, described in CASSOWARY 2's letter (See MGMA-03324). We are planning to equip all members of the present team with Czech and Austrian documents for exfiltration purposes.

7. Documentation: Czech and Austrian documents can be procured here without assistance from Headquarters. The blank forms for USSR documentation have already been requested in KAUFF-704. We will photograph all documents issued and forward copies for your files.

8. Equipment: A separate pouch on equipment is planned. [] is hand carrying to Headquarters a list of those items of equipment which we cannot procure locally. We trust that the highest priority will be given to the procurement and dispatch of this equipment to CSOB. The fact is that within a maximum of two weeks after the arrival of this equipment at this end, the air operation can be ready to roll. We have the personnel and their training is almost completed. Once we have run off the winter camping problem, here in Germany (see para 9 below), the operation should be all set to start. It will be impossible, however, to run this crucial field problem until we get the operational sine qua non, namely the equipment.

9. The Winter Camping Problem: The acid test of our operational plan, procedures and equipment will be a five to seven day field problem which we are prepared to run off here in Southern Germany as soon as we can assemble our equipment. During this problem, the team will live in a mountain woods with all their equipment. This is an isolated uninhabited area which has been used before for this type of problem without any unfavorable security results.

10. Freight Packing: A separate detailed pouch will be written on this subject. Tentatively we plan to equip each man with a parachutist's all purpose kit bag with lowering strap and quick release. No more than fifty pounds will be thus jumped on

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any one man. A freight bundle with food and other equipment and weighing not more than 200 pounds will be lashed to a boboggan and dropped under a separate freight chute. During the field camping problem we expect that the agents will see that the total weight of equipment must be kept to a minimum at that quadruplicate items such as toilet article kits are actually only needed in duplicate, one per pair of men.

11. CASSOWARY 2: We are still waiting for the arrival of CASSOWARY 2 who is now the only person competent to give the political pep-talk, to the agents. The political motivation of the latter has slipped primarily because CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 have been conspicuous by their absence around the training area during the past nine months. Both CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 have been pegged by the agents as disinterested and lazy as far as their team and mission is concerned. Furthermore, we have seen that both the local CASSOWARIES have given almost no thought as to how operations should be run in 1952. This is in direct contrast to CASSOWARY 2 who has invariably come up with sound, imaginative plans and gimmicks in the past. The team needs, right now, the morale support of the only CASSOWARY who is operationally minded.

12. Recent Attitude of the CARTHAGES towards the Americans: Since it has been Americans and only Americans who have kept the show going in the eyes of the team, the bond of loyalty at least on the operational level is now greater between the CARTHAGES and the Americans than between the CARTHAGES and CASSOWARY 1. This means in actual practice that once an operational plan, such as the one outlined above, has been agreed upon, by us and the agents, the CASSOWARIES approval becomes merely a necessary formality. We are not yet able to give that essential political morale boost which AERODYNAMIC agents need, but we are working on it in order to minimize our future dependency on an emigre group. Operationally speaking CASSOWARY 2 remains the only CASSOWARY that we can count on for some occasional operational imagination. Among the CARTHAGES, CARTHAGE 3 has the only very productive mind. He is presently so disaffected with CASSOWARY 1 that we feel that as far as loyalty goes we are making an American agent out of this man without having to say anything derogatory about the CASSOWARIES.

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