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CLASSIFICATION
SECURITY INFORMATION

DATE: 8 February 1952

TO : Chief, WE
FROM : Chief of
SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX
SPECIFIC— ⁰ Ukrainian Operations

Removed from Project Aerodynamic
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JOB # 69-425/83
Box: 20 Fold: 6

The letter quoted below and signed by SMEDDUM has been received from Broadway on this date:

"1. There have been some important developments recently in connection with operations into the Ukraine in which we are mutually interested. We would be grateful if you could acquaint Washington of our views on these developments as set out hereunder.

"2. You will recall that during the ZACABAL/SIS talks in London last December the question of joint ZACABAL/SIS operations into the Ukraine was raised and the decision taken to investigate the possibilities of such operations. Accordingly, the American and British Case Officers in Germany concerned with the exploitation of Ukrainian elements met at the end of December and agreed a coordinated approach to the Ukrainian groups which they have been using for operational purposes. The object being to persuade representatives of these groups to consider combined operations. Both the BANDERA Ukrainians (Z.Ch. OUN), whom we have been using, and the so-called "Opposition" (ZP/UHVR) from which ZACABAL have been drawing operational elements, re-acted positively to this approach and engaged in detailed discussions in Munich, between January 17th and 28th. At these discussions the following took part: 7) SUBJECT took part in discussions with members of the
2 P/CHANS got up from 17-28 JAN 1952
EPI: For Following 2 Names

a) Representatives of Z.Ch.OUN: Professor J. STECKO, political LIT UKRAINE
Leader and Major B. PIDHAJNIIJ, Staff Officer in charge of
operations.

b) Representatives of ZP/UHVR: Dr. Ivan HRYNIOCH, political CIT UKRAINE
Leader and Captain OPATINSKIJ, operational chief.

"3. Whilst these discussions could not immediately resolve the long standing political differences between the two organizations they did lead to the following agreement over a possible joint operation:

a) Z.Ch.OUN is prepared to accept one or two representatives of ZP/UHVR for inclusion in the next team to be sent to the Ukraine, undertaking to bring these representatives into contact with Headquarters of the Chief of the Ukrainian underground.

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- b) A single channel for W/T communications is to be maintained between the underground and the outside world, control of such communications to be a matter for Anglo-American decision.

4. "As all this had taken time and the beginning of the training season for agents was fast approaching, it was deemed advisable to send [] to Munich to examine matters on the spot. His visit enabled him to meet the local ZACABAL representatives who informed him that a new development had occurred on January 16th which took the form of an approach made to ZACABAL by BANDERA, through an intermediary named SULYMA. BANDERA offered ZACABAL his collaboration in return for American assistance over a journey to the U.S.A. for himself and his political advisers. The purpose of this journey was to meet Mikolaj ~~LEBED~~ with whom BANDERA wished to enter into political negotiations to achieve a reconciliation among the Ukrainian emigre groups abroad. BANDERA made his offer conditional on his being recognised as a leader of the militant Ukrainian organisations in exile. According to the ZACABAL representatives in Munich the offer had been communicated to Washington and was under consideration. [] was asked not to reveal his knowledge to BANDERA and since the latter did not admit to it the matter could not be discussed between them.

5. [] discussions with his ZACABAL colleagues in Munich centred around the possibility of launching a British-sponsored operation in which one or two members of the ZP/UHVR could be included on the basis agreed between Z.Ch.OUN and ZP/UHVR (see para 3(a) above). In the course of these discussions it became clear that ZACABAL desired to consider the offer made by BANDERA before finally agreeing to the more restricted plan for a joint Z.Ch.OUN-ZP/UHVR team in the spring. Nevertheless it was [] impression at the end of his visit to Munich that this restricted plan was mutually and immediately acceptable, whilst the BANDERA offer would require further consideration at the []/Washington level, in view of its political implications.

6. "The American and British Case Officers in Germany met again on 1st and 2nd February when the former reported that ZACABAL's views regarding the composition of the joint Ukrainian team had been modified. It was now suggested that the team should have an equal number of representatives from each organisation. Other alterations in the operational details were also suggested which materially changed the original plan and touched on subjects we felt to be beyond the competence of our respective local representatives. Accordingly we instructed our Case Officer by telegram on 6th February to inform his ZACABAL colleague that although in principle we are fully in favour of the moves so far initiated for effecting a political "get together" between ZP/UHVR and Z.Ch.OUN to achieve unity in the preparation and despatch of operations to the field, we cannot accept continual alterations in operational details of the joint mission planned for the spring. We feel that a decision about this operation should be reached immediately without waiting for the settlement of political differences between LEBED and BANDERA and we have had to insist on the following points:

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- i) The main object of the operation is to ensure that the tenuous link to the field is strengthened and a better basis formed for future possible joint operations. This cannot be achieved unless the mission is a genuinely united one.
- ii) That the first operation shall be British-sponsored and should consist of a Z.Ch.OUN team of three to four members plus one or two representatives of ZP/UHVR whom the Z.Ch.OUN have already agreed to accept.
- iii) That we should be responsible for training the whole team.
- iv) That communications should be British controlled.
- v) That the team should be despatched by us but that in the event of our meeting with technical difficulties we would request American assistance over the actual method of despatch.

7. "We trust that it will be possible for our respective representatives on the spot to reach agreement. This need not prejudice the political discussions impending between LEBED and BANDERA, which, if successful, should provide a wider basis for future operational collaboration. We understand that these discussions are imminent, it having been decided to bring LEBED to Germany for the purpose. Meanwhile we have been informed that the circumstances of BANDERA's approach to ZACABAL were not quite those which SULYMA represented them to be. It seems virtually certain that the initiative for this approach did not come from BANDERA but from SULYMA himself. We record this merely to show that SULYMA cannot be taken very seriously. Actually no great damage appears to have resulted from his excess of zeal, since BANDERA remains willing, indeed anxious, to engage in talks with LEBED, which might help to bring about a better understanding between the two organisations and result in the creation of a single directing centre responsible for contact and communications with the homeland.

8. "To sum up: we would like to take first things first and, as agreed at the London talks in December, treat the plan for a joint Z.Ch.OUN - ZP/UHVR team, British trained and launched in the spring of 1952, as a test case, proceeding with it without awaiting the results of the political discussions which our and your Ukrainians are about to hold. If these discussions are successful, the resulting fusion and its effects on Ukrainian activities would require detailed discussions at a higher level to determine the pattern of future operational plans, but until such time we feel we should not delay implementing the strictly limited programme we have mapped out for the spring. If we fail to do so we run the grave risk of losing the contacts with the field, so laboriously built up last year."

Prompt response for passage to Broadway is requested.

Distribution
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Frankfurt
Munich

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