

VIA: Air  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. MGM-A 08324

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M  
Chief, Foreign Division S  
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 28 January 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/Operational/AERODYNAMIC

SPECIFIC— CASSOWARY 2's Letter to CASSOWARY 3

Transmitted herewith are extractions from two letters written by CASSOWARY 2 to CASSOWARY 3 which were given to  on 10 January 1952.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

*RSP/WWP.*

*P6-94*

Removed from Project *Aerodynamic*  
CS Classification: *74-124-29/3*  
JOB # *63-705/83*  
Box: *25* Fold: *1*

CS COPY

RESTRICTED TO SR/ca/E

Distribution:

- ~~1-FDM~~ w/att
- 1-COS w/att
- 1-CSOB/K w/att
- 2-MOB w/att

FORM NO. 51-28 A  
MAR. 1949

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

IR COPY

*74-124-29/3*

~~*24.69 / 617*~~

**SECRET**Letter From CASSOWARY 2 to CASSOWARY 3

1. On 10 January 1952, in New York City, CASSOWARY 2 requested that [ ] handcarry two personal letters on political and operational matters to CASSOWARY 3. Since CASSOWARY 2 did not seal these letters, [ ] had two copies reproduced in the NY office of ZACAGE for forwarding to Headquarters. Had it not been for the crucial political and operational discussions presently in progress here, [ ] would have refused to carry these classified documents (which, incidently, prevented him from swimming on the boat). In obedience of the arrival of a full translation of the material from Headquarters, we have extracted and freely translated what we believe to be the essential points in the two letters. Since CASSOWARY 2 read almost the entire contents of the letters to [ ] in New York as well as handing them over unsealed, he undoubtedly expected us to read them.

2. The following salient statements appear in the first letter:

a) "I do not have a complete picture of the technical-communications collaboration (Translator's Note: presumably between CASSOWARY 1 and ZACABAL). Thus do not count on me to make decisions. I give you complete authority to make decisions on my behalf."

b) "I have the impression that you are planning to start some sort of cooperation" (Translator's Note: Probably in reference to the negotiations between CAVATINA 6 and CASSOWARY 1, to which CASSOWARY 3 had made vague reference in a letter received by CASSOWARY 2 in late December 1951.)

c) "I have been informed that I am expected to recruit certain people here, some as trainers and some for current operations. To do this, I must have i) your authorization and ii) a more complete picture of what is going on at your end; otherwise I intend to continue to stay completely out of things."

d) "Up until now, everything that we have planned and agreed on (Translator's Note: The inference is "with the Americans") has worked out quite differently than originally agreed. For example, I was asked to submit the names of CAWNPORE 3 men already or about to be drafted into the American army and it was agreed that these men would be used in a military program. Nothing happened. I am all for telling the Americans here that we will not do anything concerning the activation of any new, vague plans until we know exactly what the Americans want and how they intend to do it. It is absolutely clear to me that all the CAWNPORE 3 boys should not only not be sent to fight at the front in Korea, but should be earmarked and reserved for much more important tasks. If the Americans do not understand this, then I am in favor of telling them that we cannot recruit anyone."

RESTRICTED TO SR/CA/E**SECRET**

Removed from Project *Aerodynamic*  
 CS Classification:  
 JOB # 63-705783-124-29/3  
 Box: 25 Fold: 1

-2-

e) "Concerning your plan for the activization of informational activities abroad, I feel your plan is unrealistic for the following reasons:

- i. To carry our such information (publicity) work abroad, at least three persons would be required full-time.
- ii. Preliminary talks with the newspaper world here and our American friends are also prerequisite.
- iii. A constant, modest flow of funds is also a prerequisite.
- iv. We have none of the above prerequisites.
- v. Your proposal that we use our reserve funds cannot be accept ed for practical reasons.
- vi. Our expenses would be at least \$1,200 per month.
- vii. Our present reserve of funds could only last a few months at this rate.

f) "In the U.S. today, publicity for our Liberation movement is being blocked. Most articles published are pre-Great Russian in orientation and our movement is sloughed off as 'separatist'. As an example of what I mean, Burnham gave an article to the Reader's Digest last March and, even though the editors accepted it for publication at that time, it has not yet appeared. As another example, VITVITSKY (Translator's Note: The Foreign Minister of the UNR) who was recently in N.Y.) composed a New Year's Day article to be broadcast over VOA, however HRIHORIEV deleted VITVITSKY's greeting to the Liberation movement and revolutionary underground and changed it to read 'the liberation movements', explaining to VITVITSKY that U.S. Government officials would not permit such a greeting to be aired. Still a third example is the fact that the most important news from the Ukraine (Translator's Note presumably the CARTHAGE 3 pouch) was frozen, although much of it could have been published. (Translator's Note: Actually, CASSOWARY 2 was merely told that, if he desired to publish any materials brought out in that pouch, they should be desensitized and coordinated with us before publication; he was not told that CASSOWARY 1 could not publish these materials. Request Headquarters clear up this point with CASSOWARY 2.) Finally, there is the example of KRAICHEVICH (Translator's Note: Leader of the Slovak Committee in Washington) who is constantly publishing information on their underground with no apparent difficulties. I really believe that if we should publish that CAWNPORE 3 was fighting against the Stalinist regime but for a future Russian federation, we would have not only no trouble acquiring publicity, but also the amount of publicity we would get would be nothing short of sensational."

SECRET

-3-

g) "Concerning VISHINSKY's blast about the \$1,000,000 appropriation, I must tell you that the fund has been appropriated but they don't know what to do with it. It is important to note that VISHINSKY's did not react to QKACTIVE but he did react to the Mutual Security Act because he realized that the latter actually threatens internal security."

h) "For the nence, we have decided to use a printing shop in the belief that this is more expediant for us at the moment. We will not thus have the worry of maintaining an office, ~~Consequently~~ ~~merely~~ merely the printing costs. Even if we get into deficit publishing, it is still better than having the additional expenses of an office. Concerning the question of personnel and work, no one here wants to start any publication based on whispering and rumors, for that type of publication merely means playing games with ourselves and others."

i) "We are still living here as DP's and we do not propose to do anything which is contrary to the regulations regarding DP's. You are already familiar with the matter concerning the formal registration of foreign agents; a registered agent cannot even do physical labor. (Translator's Note: an official of the Justice Department stated to [ ] that registered foreign agents are no more regulated or limited in what they can or cannot do than any normal citizen. It is suggested that Headquarters resolve this obvious conflict of statements between CASSOWARY 2 and the Justice Department; they cannot both be correct.) What I particularly have in mind here are the cells of CAWNPORE 3 here. I feel I must truthfully inform these people about the eventual consequences."

j) "I realize that some of the things I say may sound illogical, but I am not well-informed about what is going on. Actually, I am not as pessimistic as this letter sounds but I prefer to take a serious view of things."

3. The following interesting operational and political commentary appear in the second letter, dated 24 December 1951:

a) "We can only run agent dispatches to the Ukraine in two ways: i) to pre-established reception points or ii) to drop zones which we select without co-ordination with CAWNPORE, i.e. reception drops or blind drops. As long as there are leaders and a centralized headquarters of the liberation movement in the homeland, we will maintain communications with them according to their instructions, requests and needs. The only prerequisite must be the realization that the leaders of the movement in the homeland have the supreme responsibility for the policy and the tactics of the liberation movement, and that at least one or more of the leaders of the movement inside must be known to some one of us personally. The authentication of personnel in any instance of unclearness must be handled there (Translator's Note: the author's meaning here is itself unclear).

b) In the present situation, we must wait until spring to get (via w/t) pre-arranged reception points and instructions from there.

SECRET

-4-

It w/t contact is not restored by spring, then we will be forced to make blind drops."

c) "The first dispatch of agents should not be a completely blind one. (Translator's Note: Here again it is questionable whether CASSOWARY 2 is merely passing on a platitude or whether he is actually driving at something). On arrival there, the task of the team will be:

i. to secure itself for independent action

ii. to determine as exactly as possible through personally-trusted friends the covert situation of the resistance movement, its forces and methods of work, etc."

d) "If the team should succeed in learning of the existence of a functioning central headquarters, its task will be the restoration of contact with that headquarters. Having once established contact, the erstwhile independent team subordinates itself to the central headquarters. Should, on the other hand, the team determine that no functioning headquarters exists, that only isolated or independent lower or medium level units have survived, then the team must not join or subordinate itself to any group until and unless the scattered groups are able to centralize themselves into an organization. Failing the existence of a centrally organized headquarters, the team must lone-wolf it.

e) "The second team to be dispatched must above all stay independent of the underground and advise us of the situation. They must try to locate the individual surviving members of the organization, but when at all possible, the team should co-ordinate its work with and get authorization from us abroad. Each group which acquires low-level contacts (as opposed to one with headquarters) should not reveal whence it arrived and what its tasks are, but should collect information on the geographic area on the possibilities of various types of anti-Soviet activities, on the status of the organization and its security. If it should turn out that underground casualties are much greater than budgeted for, the members of the underground remaining should try to exfiltrate (to the West) in small groups. Such a plan can only be realized if it is carried out without the burden of central direction, as unobtrusively as possible and with a maximum variance of techniques."

f) "Whether we are forced to make a blind drop or whether we have a re-establishment of w/t contacts before any dispatches are made, the ability to continue underground activity requires a decentralized organization. If the movement has lost its headquarters and we are forced to make blind drops, the initiative for co-ordination of the underground activities in the Ukraine must originate abroad and each underground unit will function independently. If the headquarters has survived, co-ordination will take place partly abroad and partly there. Briefly, I have in mind that the leaders will split up and join small individual groups which will operate independently of one another after having laid on an emergency contact plan. All the underground groups

**SECRET**

-5-

should break off their direct personal contacts with the local population. The only logistical or other types of support which the underground will get from the local civilian population will be channeled through pre-established dead drop sites, instead of through personal direct contacts. All technical supplies and other equipment will be sent in from abroad. Each group will be as self-sufficient as possible and devise its own principles of operation. The geographical distribution of groups must be flexible even though each group will be assigned a specific operational territory. This plan must be based on flexibility ~~and~~ in tactics and strategy. As to the system of communications, (Translator's Note: it is not clear whether the author means contact with the local population or lateral contact between units or both. At any rate, this sentence contradicts the preceding sentences in this paragraph) it must not be based on networks but on individuals who have contact with persons living legally. The chain-link system of communications should be revised by various means so that contact can be interrupted but, at the same time, a key (Translator's Note: presumably the author means a method for re-establishing contact once it has been interrupted) will be retained. I would also like to suggest another possibility which I shall call the long-range system of retaining ~~contact~~ contact. This system provides for the selection of several people in each area who can maintain themselves for long periods of time. Each man would have specific jobs assigned to him for each of the following eventualities:

- i. for the immediate present
- ii. in the event of war
- iii. in the event of an internal revolution
- iv. in the event of the weakening of the regime.

For example, one man would be assigned the job of organizing at a given time all the CAWNPORE 3 men in his own terrain. A second man would know the burial site of leaflets intended for distribution at a given time. A third would be charged with organizing administrative support.

g) Underground groups should have funds at their disposal to pay for information. Each of the groups should have a pre-established basic task to perform. It should stick strictly to this basic task, maintain itself as long as possible according to a set plan and not swerve in its work in reaction to individual acts of the enemy. I exclude completely the possibility of even the most modest resistance activities so long as there is more than one center abroad trying to co-ordinate things. The existence of more than one foreign center would lead to confusion inside and would aid the enemy.

h) Concerning the training of teams, if we expect that each team will function independently, then each team must be trained to do so. Such training would involve paramilitary training, partisan tactics, specialized subjects, escort training, security and propaganda training, plus instruction in the operation of printing equipment. In addition, the

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

members of the team should know how to drive, to perform first aid and to use the fundamentals of the Russian language. They must familiarize themselves with living conditions, customs, conditions of life, etc."

i) "Concerning what should be done if there is no longer any functioning headquarters and we must dispatch teams on the blind, I should like to say I am not a believer in a continued struggle just for struggling sake and I do not believe starting up a new organization merely at the West's behest unless the West gives us political concessions. As the situation exists today, I tend to favor the actual liquidation of active opposition, rather than its expansion, let alone its revival. I do not think we should continue to sacrifice human lives and give publicity to our activities for the sake of an indivisible Russia. The promoters of the concept of an indivisible Russia will attempt to force us to ~~xxxx~~ support that concept and, if we become let us say non-active, they certainly will not "punish" us by separating us (politically and geographically) from our Big Brothers, the Great Russian people. For that reason, I would actually prefer it if our Big Brothers, the Great Russian emigres, came out clearly with their program which, though it will be against the present regime, will also guarantee an undivided Russia.

j) "In the present situation, I do not think that any of us in the emigration has the moral right to initiate any activity which is against the interests of the Ukrainian people. We can only conform to their feelings and desires. Therefore, I ask you, consider the whole question of communications with this in view".

4. In resume, we would like Headquarters to take the following action:

a) Clarify with CASSOWARY 2 the misunderstanding concerning our views on publicizing reports from the Ukraine.

b) Find out exactly what restrictions the Department of Justice places on the activities of registered agents.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

ATTACHMENT B

AERODYNAMIC/Meeting with CASSOWARY 2, 26 January 1952

1.  met CASSOWARY 2 at the Pennsylvania Hotel and during a four hour conference discussed the points on the prearranged memorandum. Following is a summary of the discussions:
- a. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he is willing to meet CAVATINA 1 either alone or with others anywhere and at any time.
  - b. At such a meeting he will try to reach an overall agreement with CAVATINA 1, but failing that he will try to reach an agreement on one operational staff, which he considers essential to future operations. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he would be willing to assume a position on the operational staff if need be.
  - c. CASSOWARY 2 has no objections to working with CAVATINA 5 if CAVATINA 1 should select him as his representative.
  - d. If the meeting takes place, CASSOWARY 2 would want to know in advance who will attend the conference. If CAVATINA 2 accompanies CAVATINA 1 then CASSOWARY 2 will request that CASSOWARY 3 also be present. CASSOWARY 2 desires to have the same representation as CAVATINA 1, excluding purely bodyguards if any.
  - e. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he is open-minded on questions of joint or single team dispatches and feels that with good will on both sides this would not be a major problem. He would be willing to accept a CAVATINA 1 man as team group leader if he were best qualified man for the job.
  - f. CASSOWARY 2 requested that CASSOWARY 3 be notified of the above points as his personal views.
2. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he has been having a bit of difficulty with DYMACAGO representatives. Apparently at an earlier date he reported that DYMACAGO requested him to register as a foreign agent. This he did not do on   advice. He does not know the reason for   advice. Consequently for the past four or five months a DYMACAGO representative has been calling on him and wanting to know why he refused to register. The latest DYMACAGO visit was last week. The undersigned said he saw no reason why CASSOWARY 2 should not register and advised him to register as promptly as possible. CASSOWARY 2 further stated that the same DYMACAGO agent is apparently a DYMACAGO recruiter and would like to recruit him as a DYMACAGO informer to report regularly on Ukrainian activities in New York City. He stated that he obviously did not wish to play the role of a DYMACAGO informant. (Note: We are preparing a memorandum to DYMACAGO suggesting that they do not proceed with their efforts of recruiting CASSOWARY 2 as an agent).

RESTRICTED TO

SR/BA/E

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

Removed from Project *Aerodynamic*  
 CS Classification: 74-124-29/3  
 JOB # 63-705/83  
 Box: 25 Fold: 1

## SECURITY INFORMATION

**SECRET**

3. Subject is now employed as a laborer with the Crucible Steel Company in the vicinity of Newark, N. J. He apparently has a very difficult time making ends meet and is working very hard. He appears to have lost contact with general Ukrainian activities in the U. S. and certainly has no information of value on such activities in Europe and none at all on the Ukraine itself. He is very mild and agreeable, accepting practically all suggestions made by   No political problems of any type were discussed and CASSOWARY 2 only generally referred to his other interests but immediately stated that they were well know to us and that   obviously did not wish to discuss them.

4. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he would prefer to have CAVATINA 1 come to the States "because it would be easier for me to see him over the week-end without losing any pay at my job".   stated that it was not desirable to have CAVATINA 1 come to the States but more preferable to have the meeting held in Germany. If, however, CAVATINA 1 objected to such arrangements we would consider holding the meeting in London. CASSOWARY 2 agreed and expressed the wish that   accompany him to such a conference. He stated that he has not seen CAVATINA 1 since approximately 1948 and would be interested in meeting him again as they were good friends at one time. If, however, CAVATINA 1 brought others with him, CASSOWARY 2 would request that CASSOWARY 3 and possibly others be present at such a conference too. He agreed that it would be desirable to limit the conference to himself, CASSOWARY 3, CAVATINA 1 and CAVATINA 2. He appeared to be entirely open-minded about the meeting and stated that if CAVATINA 1 is approaching him on grounds of good will and sincere intentions, he saw no reason why a joint operational staff could not be agreed on. He emphasized his personal conviction that such a joint staff is absolutely necessary under present conditions and for the planning of future operations into the Ukraine. He felt sure that CAVATINA 1 was of the same point of view. Accepting CAVATINA 1's good intentions, CASSOWARY 2 stated that the matter of team leaders or mixed teams would have to be determined by the personalities involved, choosing the most compatible people and the best leaders, irrespective of whether they happened to be CASSOWARY 1 or CAVATINA 6 members.

- 2 -

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

28 Jan 52

74-124-29/3