

The following action is authorized:

Signed: *[Signature]*

R.O. #129 - Unit

2/13/53 *74/124/29/3*
Notes for London Conference

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

1. CIA-ZPUHVR Operational Agreement

a. Air dispatch in 1952 of several 2-to-3 man W/T teams documented and trained for semi-legal as opposed to partisan existence in Eastern Galicia; expect the teams to send messages independent of permission from underground headquarters and to ensure that a pouch-carrying team exfiltrates before winter.

b. Training of partisan specialists recruited through the ZPUHVR as a war-time reserve scheduled to begin shortly. (N.B. Do not believe this should be told the British because this could easily hasten creation of rival UNR-Bandera military center which the British appear to be plugging for now).

2. Spring 1952 CIA Operations:

- a. May is still felt to be the best month for air dispatch.
- b. Do the British anticipate air operations to Eastern Galicia in Spring 1952?
- c. Tentatively, we do not plan to drop more than one team on any flight. What do the British plan?
- d. It is impossible to say anything about the relative timing of British and American air operations until we see whether either W/T contact is still alive in April.

3. Political Relationship with ZPUHVR

a. Aside from subsidizing the newspaper Suchasna Ukraina and performing an occasional favor there is little that CIA can do politically for the ZPUHVR unless it becomes definite that no major Ukrainian emigre group will join the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

b. The ZPUHVR is aware that self-determination is the official U.S. policy on the non-Russian nationality question.

4. Emigre Political Relations

a. The ZPUHVR-Bandera political split will obviously continue and affect operations.

b. The ZPUHVR-UNR split will continue unless each side makes unlikely concessions. (Up to now the UNR has demanded that ZPUHVR and UHVR subordinate themselves to Gen. ~~KAPUSTIANSKY'S~~ War Ministry and the ZPUHVR had demanded that the UNR recognize the UHVR as the highest governing organ of the Liberation Movement).

5. Coordination of Recruitment: Impossible because:

a. Any effective coordination of ZPUHVR and Bandera current operations recruitment is impossible either on the Anglo-American or Ukrainian level without far-reaching and relatively painful concessions by all four parties; no such concessions can be expected.

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b. Any coordination of recruitment from other emigre groups requires the initiation by CIA of another group operation which we have not decided is desirable. (Even if declared desirable we do not have enough case officer personnel to handle any more than our present operational load).

c. In mid-December 1951 we are only in a position to agree de facto to continued uncoordinated recruitment: theoretically anybody can recruit from any group he wants to.

6. Brief Description of Five British Teams

a. 14 May 1951: 6 men with 2 sets and mail air dispatched to Ukraine. Last heard from 1 December by W/T. No casualties reported.

b. 14 May 1951: 5 men with 2 sets and mail air dispatched to Ukraine. Wiped out completely by Soviets. Never heard from by W/T or S/W.

c. 14 May 1951: 4 men with 2 sets and mail air dispatched to Se Poland. 3 men killed or caught by Soviets. Survivor arrived overland in Germany prior to 11 July. Debriefing made available to us.

d. June 1951: 3 men dispatched overland through Czechoslovakia to Poland with documents. Contacted Ukrainian underground leader in Poland in mid-summer. Sent 3 S/W letters. Two of trio left Poland for Germany on 24 October.

e. October 1951: 3 men dispatched overland through Czechoslovakia to Poland. Sent out 3 S/W letters but had not claimed contact with Ukrainian commander in Poland up to last letter. One member of team was scheduled to leave Poland for Germany overland on 5 November,

(N.B. All S/W msgs made available to us. Last two W/T msgs of 1 December not received yet. British have not said whether the expected couriers have returned to Poland yet or not).

7. Important Facts about British Traffic

- a. Last W/T contact 1 December (we have not received these msgs).
- b. 50% more W/T messages from Ukraine than we.
- c. 5 W/T contacts since our last message on 9 September.
- d. 8 S/W messages from Poland; none from Ukraine; our score: 0.
- e. Their traffic confirms heavy MGB activity hampering underground in Ukraine.
- f. No courier contact between Poland and Ukraine reported.
- g. No reaction from leaders to joint letter yet.
- h. Complete destruction of 2nd Ukrainian team confirmed by W/T on 28 Sept.
- i. Otherwise messages contain fragmentary bits of intelligence, operational reports and planning proposals.

8. Summary of CIA Traffic from Ukraine

20 May: Safe landing msg indicating contact.

19 June: (Our politico already in contact with Foltava) Msg from Poltava mainly amenities.

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- 21 June: Requested food. Reported 5000 man oblava between Stryj and Mizunka rivers. Four new members added to the UHVR.
- 30 June: Powerful enemy operations clearly an attempt to finish underground off. Requested August supply drop of food and supplies. Signed Poltava.
- 7 August: Contact delayed because of oblavas. Signed W/T operator.
- 9 Sept.: Contact with hqs cut off by oblavas. I expect contact with hq before end Sept. "Do not make any blind drops this year because it is a waste of people and you will cause us difficulties. If you do not hear from us by November on either of two signal plans, then something bad has happened to us. -- Do not send on the blind until I inform you. I am with raionovii providnik." Signed W/T operator. (This was last msg from Ukraine).

9. What presumably happened to CIA Team of May 1951

- a. The member of the UHVR and OUN Provid on our team was led by a reception party to Major Poltava of the UHVR.
- b. Occasional courier contact between the W/T station and Poltava's headquarters worked up until early August.
- c. As of 9 Sept. our courier was still waiting for couriers from Poltava.
- d. Whether or not couriers came from Poltava to our W/T operator in Sept. or Oct. or not is not known, but something happened either to our main W/T operator, or to his set between 9 Sept. and 1 Nov. If our politico had a set and signal plan, as hinted on 9 Sept. msg, then something has happened to him too.
- e. We, therefore, believe that owing to the normal winter immobility of the underground it will be early spring before there is an opportunity for any surviving W/T operators to start operating again; we presume that they saved at least one spare set separately.

10. Estimate of the Situation inside Eastern Galicia

- a. General: Since the Soviets are now sufficiently aware of the rough outlines and purposes of American and British operations into and Ukrainian underground operations out of the Ukraine:
- i. they have decided to try to destroy the Ukrainian underground in Eastern Galicia as rapidly as possible rather than experiment with containment and penetration any longer;
- ii. for this reason, the sweeps have been larger and longer and the deportations are probably beginning to be as thorough as those from southeastern Poland in 1947, i.e. complete depopulation of rural areas. There is even the possibility that the four Ukrainian Greek Catholic provinces are being segregated from the rest of the Ukraine by an internal USSR border control system along the old Polish border.
- iii. this campaign is coupled by an unprecedented overt attack on Ukrainian nationalism in the Soviet press.

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b. Operational

i. in the opinion of the ZPUHVR, as soon as there ceases to be a central hqs for the underground through the death or the capture of the leaders, there ceases to be a trustworthy functioning organization;

ii. (for CIA information only) if the hqs is wiped out, the ZPUHVR would start from scratch by sending in teams to build cells completely separate from whatever remains of the present underground.

11. Questions and Miscellany

1. We would very much like to see the British use the Polygraph, at least when debriefing returning couriers.

2. We find it hard to believe that neither the ZChOUN nor the UNR have handed the British unfavorable CE data on the ZPUHVR. We would like an exchange of CE information on the operations of our respective groups, including all security breaches. [we have passed all reports on alleged security breaches by ZChOUN).

3. What were the two W/T messages received 1 December?

4. Have any of the three men scheduled to return overland from Poland arrived?

5. Was ~~ZENON~~ the Ukrainian underground leader contacted in Poland?

6. The British stated that the news of "Hornovey's death was received through channels controlled by Pidhainyj on our behalf." Cable received on 22 August from London states news of death contained in W/T msg from Ukraine. Does this mean that Pidhainyj and friends control the W/T channel? ZChOUN operators?

7. Any news that the mail arrived by the successful W/T team has been delivered to hq?

8. Murphy should read WELA-7180; -7181; -7182, and -7183 before the conference. These memos give a summary of the eight S/W messages from Poland and the five W/T messages from the Ukraine received since 28 September.

9. Did British send two overland teams in fall - one in late September and one in October? That is not clear from the London-Washington correspondence.

10. No S/W traffic from the Ukraine?

11. Suggest we exchange of operational data on Eastern Galicia so we can teach respective teams how to exist legally without attracting police attention.

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