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EXTRACT FROM:

469 CMOUW

9 October 1951

SUBJECT: CSOB Semi-Monthly Report #7, covering the period from
16 September to 30 September.

1. Introduction:

The outstanding event of the period was the apparently entirely successful dispatch of CAMPOSANTO 1 as the first step towards what we hope will be a link with the Byelorussian resistance movement. This dispatch represented an extremely long flight of a technically most difficult nature, and great credit is due the ZACACTUS Air Section, and the air crew members in their employ, for its successful completion.

2. Operational Relations with JAYHAWK

a. During 1951 it has become increasingly evident that operations into the USSR involving both JAYHAWK and ZACABAL should be re-examined carefully by both parties in order to determine whether or not the present degree of coordination is adequate to insure successful operations in certain sectors of the target area. At the last general conference held in April of this year, it was agreed that the present form of extremely loose coordination would be sufficient for the present. The question of joint operations was to be deferred to a later date.

b. It is felt that now there is adequate evidence to show that the present form of coordination, both in the purely operational and in the operational-political fields, is inadequate and will lead, if it has not already, to serious repercussions. Operations which either ZACABAL or JAYHAWK have developed to maturity, cannot help but be subject to unusual stress because one or the other of the two services has entered into the field without adequate coordination. The situation is particularly acute in the Baltic and in the Western Ukraine.

c. ~~JAYHAWK~~ entry on the Ukrainian scene in the manner in which it did may very well have resulted in the disruption of the underground either causing MSB retaliation or else by injecting issues of "emigre politics" into the councils of the resistance. If both the services had not been so intent in getting its own "private line" into the Ukrainian SSR, there appears to be a good possibility that the issue could have been resolved and that an operation could have been undertaken which would have considered both the operational-security and political factors.

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d. ZACABAL's increased activity in the Baltic field is certainly to have an effect on JAYHAWK operations in the area. By attempting to maintain a separate operational entity we have already clashed with JAYHAWK on the political level in Lithuanian operations and this class will probably be carried over into the realities of operations, particularly when we begin boat infiltration next year.

e. There are other fields in which the present type of coordination appears to be working but actually we feel it is somewhat of a calm before the storm. There is little doubt that if we pursue Project AEROSOL vigorously, we shall run head on into established JAYHAWK operations. Already CABOCHE 1 is showing signs of inability to produce the personnel in quality and number necessary to staff and effectively operate an undertaking as ambitious as "Petya 8." If we insist upon performance and evidence of good faith, it is inevitable that CABOCHE 1 will be forced to dip into its staff now involved in JAYHAWK operations. We can imagine what the JAYHAWK reaction to this will be.

f. Although we have ample evidence that JAYHAWK considers the Caucasian and Central nationalities its own operational preserve, we are now beginning to take an active interest in these groups and hope to recruit agent personnel among them. This will surely bring us into operational and political conflict with JAYHAWK.

g. There is also evidence, shortly to be reported on, that JAYHAWK has made overtures to the more radically nationalist wing of the Byelorussian movement. This is not confirmed as yet, but does not sound illogical.

h. Finally, it is perhaps in the political field, as it effects operations, that we find ourselves confronted by the most serious difference of opinion and tactics existing between JAYHAWK and ZACABAL. It is not the purpose of this study to inquire into the extent to which the actions of JAYHAWK and apparently private societies reflect the opinion of the government. However, it is clear that everything possible and within reason is being done by large segments of British official, semi-official and private opinion to support separatism, urge anti-Russian feeling and counteract the efforts of ZACABAL to promote a united front against Stalinism.

i. If this political difference were restricted to the theoretical level, it would not be of such great importance in the operational picture (although by no means should its effect in the propaganda and political fields be minimized). However, since we support emigre groups of various hues, obtain agents from them, and support resistance movements in the interior, we cannot ignore the chasm that exists. Unless both JAYHAWK and ZACABAL are able to find a mutually acceptable approach to this problem, it will confuse and embitter attempts to work out more satisfactory operational relationships.

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j. In view of the gravity of the problems presented above, and in recognition of the adverse effect their continued existence can have on 1952 operations, it is recommended that the following suggestions be placed on the agenda of the REDSOX conference in November. After discussion by all REDSOX personnel concerned, a finished version should be presented to the Deputy Director for Plans as a basis for discussions with JAYHAWK to be held presumably after the outcome of the National Elections on 25 October is known. It is probably a foregone conclusion that if the present government falls, there will be a sharp increase in the scope of JAYHAWK operations. It is hoped that some of these suggestions will have been accepted before this increase in JAYHAWK activity begins.

(1) Another attempt should be made similar to that initiated by Brennan during the April conferences to outline the U.S. attitude and policy on the question of a united front of Soviet emigres against Stalinism. We recognize that it will be a delicate matter, but we should follow this by an inquiry into just to what degree "private" societies like the Scottish League for European Freedom represent British Government opinion. Does the benevolent attitude toward the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) include active support and also reflect official policy? Perhaps we will find that there is considerable resistance to our united front policy and a feeling that by supporting separatists more damage can be done to the Soviet Empire. It is more likely that JAYHAWK will point out, as they have in the past, that separatists provide larger pools of agent personnel. Once these opposing views are clarified, and the damage that they wreak in operations against the common enemy is assessed, then they can be presented for settlement at the highest level. Without this spade work, conducted in an atmosphere of complete frankness, we will never be able to present the matter for decision and unless a decision is made, neither our political and operational programs will prosper.

(2) A REDSOX operational staff should be [] and there should be a JAYHAWK staff available in Washington. Then coordination could be effected while operations were in the planning stage so that when questions are referred to the higher headquarters for decision, it would not be too late to arrange a delay in a given operations. Since we are going to have to accept the fact of continuing JAYHAWK operations, we should not be reluctant to place at least one senior officer thoroughly briefed in REDSOX operations in []

(3) We should review our operational projects and decide which of them would be more profitably run if they were conducted on an entirely joint basis with JAYHAWK. Initially, we should probably find that the Western Ukrainian operation, and also Baltic operations would yield greater results if they were joint.

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(4) After reviewing our projects, we will undoubtedly conclude that many of them should not be run on an entirely joint basis with JAYHAWK, but we may well conclude that some sort of close coordination is necessary in the field. This type of coordination can be effected either by frequent liaison between JAYHAWK and ZACABAL case officers in the field (as is now being done, albeit somewhat infrequently, in the AEROSOL operation) or by actually placing a ZACABAL officer in the JAYHAWK operational unit and vice versa.

k. We strongly urge the home office to consider these suggestions, and other possible alternatives, and be prepared to discuss this matter in all its aspects at the conference.

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469 CMGWU

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PROJECT REVIEW

b. AEROBUS

(1) Since the demise of our operational relationship with this group, we have successfully recruited on an independent basis three CALCANEOUS 1 members for use in Berlin--CALCANEOUS 19, CALCANEOUS 23, and CALCANEOUS 26. We have also contacted CACHINNO 4 and expect to give him a more thorough interrogation with a possible view of using him as a MAT instructor. Melendy was in Munich for a week working on the interrogation and CARRIAGE tests of CALCANEOUS 23 and will return to Berlin after a well-deserved vacation to take over the operation there in what we hope, pending Washington approval, will continue to be a joint operation for the inducement of defection.

(2) Sabarth and Eastlower have conducted some housekeeping details in connection with the liquidation of our contact with CALCANEOUS 1. Primary among these was the return of the Volkswagen and the motorcycle which we purchased for this group and which we find had, in fact, been pawned by them to augment their personal resources. As of this date the Volkswagen has been returned and we anticipate the early return of the motorcycle.

(3) Pirtle has discussed with Thibodeau at some length the possibility of giving support to CALCANEOUS 1 for political reasons either overtly or covertly, and both have reached the conclusion that whatever support is deemed desirable must be given through overt channels from Thibodeau. The latter is contemplating an approach to CALCANEOUS 3 with this in mind.

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