

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION				PROJECT CRYPTONYM		
				AEQUOR		
	TYPE OF ACTION			FI/CI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CA	
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	SR				
	AMENDMENT NO.	Munich Operations Group				
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RENEWAL FY 1961	BRANCH	SR/3	DESK	CA	
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER []				
TERMINATION	ROOM NO.	1501	BUILDING	J	EXTENSION	4387

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED		
				YES	NO	DATE
CSR/3	[]					
CSR/SS	[]	<i>Feb 17/61</i>				
SR/COP/PA	[]	<i>2/20/61</i>				
SR/COP	[]					
DCSR	[]	<i>2/24/61</i>				
ACSR	[]					

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 2828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

	PERIOD		TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
	FROM	TO			
	1 July 1960	30 June 1961		196 1961	\$
APPROVING AUTHORITY	Acting Chief, SR Division			DATE	<i>27 Feb 1961</i>
DDP/PG					

RENEWAL OF PROJECT AEQUOR

- 1. TOTAL FUNDS REQUESTED: []
- 2. AMOUNT IN WHICH PROJECT WAS INCLUDED IN THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM: []
- 3. STATEMENT OF FUNDS APPROVED AND OBLIGATED BY FISCAL YEAR SINCE PROJECT INITIATION:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Obligated</u>	<u>Approved</u>
1953	[]	[unknown]
1954		
1955		
1956		
1957		
1958		
1959		
1960		

4. PROJECT DATA:

A. Current Objectives

By subsidizing the AECAMBISTA/1 newspaper, to deny the Soviets an unchallenged voice in the Belorussian language among Belorussian emigres, particularly in Europe, and to disaffect the Belorussian populace through clandestine distribution of the newspaper within the BSSR.

B. Changes in Operational Mechanism

None.

C. Intelligence Production

None. There was no FI activity.

SECRET

-2-

D. Analysis of Effectiveness

(1) Chronological List

a. Significant Operational Events. There were no significant operational events of a positive nature in FY-1960. FY-1960 plans for development of an AEQUOR FI program in the REDSKIN field were not realized. The new Field case officer explained as follows: "AECAMBISTA/15, who has been billed as the operational chief of AECAMBISTA/1, is presently the main point of contact between the Field case officer and AECAMBISTA/1. Repeated explanations of what is desired in REDSKIN operations and the critical need for such operations, as well as assurances that money is available to defray the costs of travel and other expenses involved, have been given to AECAMBISTA/15, both by the previous Field case officer and by the undersigned. The case officer has also made it clear to AECAMBISTA/15 that he is willing to spend as much time as is needed in providing operational training to AECAMBISTA/15 and in directing any operations AECAMBISTA/15 or his associates can generate. AECAMBISTA/15's contacts with the case officer, however, have been limited by AECAMBISTA/15 to approximately one meeting per month since June 1960. This is hardly enough to conduct worthwhile REDSKIN operations, especially since AECAMBISTA/1's loosely connected personnel assets seem to be scattered all over Western Europe, and the AECAMBISTA/1 goal appears to be to run operations into the BSSR through Poland."

The Field case officer went on to explain that AECAMBISTA/15 is a full-time employee of PBCHORD and that he simply does not have the necessary time for AEQUOR.

The sole operational undertaking by AECAMBISTA/1 in FY-1960 involved a Belorussian collaborator, a Swedish citizen, who was to be sent into Poland to assess operational potential from the Belorussian community there into the BSSR. This operation was a total fiasco; the trip was never made.

b. Target Actions and Reactions. In June 1960, the Soviets announced the establishment of a "Belorussian Section" of the Committee for Return to the Homeland and Development of Cultural Ties with Compatriots based in Minsk. This indicates an increasing Soviet interest in exploiting the Belorussian emigration for their purposes, both propagandistic and operational. The Soviet release read in part: "A major function of the new Belorussian Section will be to unmask the coarse lines of anti-Soviet propaganda disseminated by dirty nationalist publications which want to separate the emigres from their homeland." It is felt that AECAMBISTA/1 on behalf of its newspaper can take some share of the credit for this diatribe.

SECRET

(2) Pertinence to RMD

The AEQUOR tasks listed in paragraph 4A above are compatible with the SR Division Operational Program, paragraph VA2b of which establishes the need for providing Soviet citizens with information not slanted in the direction of Communism. The project is also in a sense a denial operation, for which provision is made in paragraph VA3 of the SR Operational Program, although it is not described as such in that document.

E. Cover, Control, and Security

The AECAMBISTA/1 publication appears as the official organ of the group. Funds granted to AECAMBISTA/1 for publication of the newspaper ostensibly emanate from AECAMBISTA/1 coffers, augmented by contributions from emigres devoted to the realization of Belorussian national freedom. The Field case officer delivers monthly subsidies to a cutout for transmittal to the publications staff. KUBARK can not be involved in disposal problems, as support goes to AECAMBISTA/1 only in the form of a subsidy. KUBARK takes no responsibility for the welfare of group members or collaborators.

We continue to depend upon the patriotic motivation of those witting of the KUBARK-AECAMBISTA/1 arrangement to prevent detrimental disclosures.

KUBARK controls the AECAMBISTA/1 newspaper by supplying approximately 90 per cent of the total operating funds. To date AECAMBISTA/1 has been readily responsive to editorial suggestions from KUBARK.

F. Assessment of Indigenous Agents

The principal agent of AEQUOR is AECAMBISTA/4. He is seen at infrequent intervals by the case officer, who has reported: "AECAMBISTA/4, the head of AECAMBISTA/1, lives in Paris, where he apparently devotes most of his time to emigre politics not directly connected with this project. Whatever control KUBARK has over the AECAMBISTA/1 personnel involved in the project must be exerted through AECAMBISTA/4. The undersigned has met AECAMBISTA/4 one time; this was during a trip AECAMBISTA/4 made to Munich on PBCHORD emigre business in August 1960. During this one meeting with AECAMBISTA/4, which was also attended by AECAMBISTA/15 and lasted about two and one-half hours, in the settled atmosphere of a comfortable safe apartment, the undersigned attempted to get answers to the following questions, which appear to be

as unclear at Headquarters as they are here: What, specifically, is the AECAMBISTA/1 organization? Who are the AECAMBISTA/1 assets in Eastern Poland and the BSSR and precisely where are they located? Unfortunately, the answers received to both questions were as vague as information already contained in the old AEQUOR files. As best could be determined, AECAMBISTA/1 is not an official organization but a rather vague and loose association of individuals with nationalistic aspirations for a common homeland who recognize AECAMBISTA/4 as president of their government in exile. To determine the extent of AECAMBISTA/4's influence in the emigration and the number of his adherents would, unfortunately, necessitate a lengthy investigation and study in itself. It should be recognized, however, that AECAMBISTA/4 is not the sole pretender to leadership of the Belorussian emigration, and even in that segment of the emigration which recognizes him as president, his influence is not unchallenged."

With the realization that development of Project AEQUOR along REDSKIN lines without the expenditure of much time, money, and manpower, is unlikely, the importance of other members of the group diminishes. If the recommendations made in this paper are approved, KUBARK's only continuing interest will be the organization's newspaper. It is therefore sufficient to say that the editors and writers of the newspaper are responsive to the desires of AECAMBISTA/4, who has always been responsive in turn to KUBARK editorial suggestion. We have not recently maintained an operational contact with any of these editors or writers, with the exception of AECAMBISTA/15.

G. American Project Personnel

Project AEQUOR currently requires the part-time services of two staff officers: a Field case officer and a Headquarters case officer.

H. Liaison with Intelligence Services

Not applicable.

I. Interagency Co-ordination

Not applicable.

J. Plans for the Ensuing Year

The following are the Field case officer's recommendations, concurred in by the Headquarters desk: "In summary, concerning the operational phase of the project, it can be said that our experience

during the past year clearly demonstrates that without a major overhauling of the project along the lines recommended by AECAMBISTA/4, very little can be expected in worthwhile intelligence results. To carry out the recommendations of AECAMBISTA/4, on the other hand, would entail the full-time services of a Field case officer, at least during the initial phases of the reorganization, to handle problems involving cover, training, and so forth, for the proposed full-time agents. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the chances of success warrant the increased investment in both money and manpower which would be required."

It is therefore recommended that:

(1) There be continued the [] annual subsidy of the weekly AECAMBISTA/1 newspaper;

(2) A contingency fund of \$1,000 be set aside for administrative costs and for the exploitation of random REDSKIN opportunities if they arise.

AECAMBISTA/4 has made repeated impassioned pleas for support of AECAMBISTA/1 now self-supported broadcasts over Radio Madrid to the extent of \$4,000 per annum. It is felt that the AEQUOR program is not comprehensive enough to justify such a subsidy; nor is the quality of overall Radio Madrid programming sufficiently high to recommend such an undertaking.

As for continuation of the newspaper subsidy, as the Field case officer has pointed out: "The same general considerations behind our subsidization of the paper that pertained a year ago are probably still valid." The newspaper, now in its thirteenth year, is published in two thousand copies weekly. Apart from European and American distribution, one hundred copies are sent to Sweden, of which a third are reforwarded to addressees inside Belorussian Poland. Some of these find their way into the BSSR, it is believed, and additional copies are sent directly to random addresses in the BSSR. The Field states that a certain amount of letter response indicates that the newspaper is well received behind the Iron Curtain. In addition, it is probable that the nationalistic feelings nurtured by the AECAMBISTA/1 newspaper within the Belorussian emigration are bound to be passed on to Soviet Belorussians via travel and correspondence. Total impact of the newspaper within the BSSR defies measurement.

It is clear from the above figures that the overwhelming share of the newspaper's audience is in the emigration and that its primary audience effectiveness is with the emigres. Continued subsidy of the

newspaper would not be defensible if this were the sole consideration. We must also consider the fact that the newspaper represents a dissenting voice in the Belorussian language (even though outside the Iron Curtain) at a time when the Soviets are making strenuous efforts to destroy nationalistic feelings among Soviet minority groups. In a sense, over and above the positive benefit of providing the Belorussian emigration with objective news and a periodic anti-Communist editorial message, the operation is a denial operation, not only in that it denies the Soviets a monopoly voice in the Belorussian language, but because it denies them the satisfaction of witnessing the downfall of another antagonist. Another factor to be considered is that continued limited support militates against the souring of an emigre organization that has been associated with us for ten years and for which we might have specific need, not now foreseeable, in the future.

On the basis of these factors it is felt that the project is worth the relatively small sum of [] needed to continue subsidy of the newspaper, and it is so recommended.

K. Estimated Expenses

Subsidy of the Newspaper:

Two Staff Members	[]
Office	1,000.00
Travel	1,000.00
Supplies	1,000.00
Editing Fees	1,000.00
Printing	7,000.00
Administrative Costs and Contingency Fund	<u>1,000.00</u>

Total []

L. Field Direction

The present Field case officer is [] at the Munich Operations Group.

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIG REF No. na

ALLOTMENT No. 134-4008-8002

[]
AUTHORIZING OFFICER

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-7-

5. D&TO ACTIVITIES:

Not applicable.

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