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26 March 1954

TO : Chief, SR/3  
FROM : SR/3/W2B  
SUBJECT : Planning for AEQUOR KUFIRE FY 1955

1. The attached paper is submitted as the basic document which should guide AEQUOR KUFIRE planning for the FY 1955 in the fulfillment of its operational responsibilities.

2. Generally, the program as outlined is not overly ambitious and could be implemented with little trouble. The thinking behind this paper envisioned the future AEQUOR operations completely apart from past commitments and amounts to starting anew.

3. Comments and suggestions are requested.

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~~SECRET~~TENTATIVE PLANNING FOR AEQUOR KUFIRE  
FY 1955

1. The obviously innocent and inadvertant disclosure made by AECAMPOSANTO 11 to the assessing CO concerning the insecurity of the LOUVAIN complex has made it necessary for the project to revise its basic operating principles which had governed the course of action during the past three years. We have been able to determine that the rudimentary elements of a professional intelligence operation had been violated by the Principal Agent--AECAMBISTA 2. Although a certain amount of security leaks had been deemed inevitable, the complexity of the disclosures has forced an immediate curtailment of the KUFIRE effort under its present operating procedure. Therefore, before any further commitments can be undertaken, it is necessary to list and re-evaluate the existing, salvagable assets. These assets will become points of departure for future AEQUOR REDSOX operations.

2. Generally these assets are:

- a. The three-man team inside the Byelorussian SSR
- b. Those indigenous elements which have been contacted by the team and are available for anti-communist work
- c. The availability of certain individuals within AECAMBISTA 1 who are not in accord with AECAMBISTA 2 and his devotion to the nationalistic effort. One such individual has indicated that he is more prone to our suggestions and therefore would be more acceptable to our purposes.
- d. The potential untapped source of agent candidates, which according to AECAMBISTA 4 are available to us within the continental limits of the United States, Canada and South America.

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- e. The rapport which has been established with AECAMBISTA 1, accepted as the leading group of the Byelorussian emigration.
- f. The ability to train agent candidate and a new P/A secure surroundings and operational methodology
- g. The experience

3. Discussion of the Assets

A. The three-man team inside the Byelorussian SSR

self-incident, matter

With the dispatch of AEQUOR TEAM II in 1952, the Agency assumed the responsibility of aiding the team, i.e. on a material basis if the team was uncontrolled; on a moral basis if it became apparent that the team was controlled. To date, an analysis of the W/T traffic tends to leave a doubt regarding the team's cleanliness; however, there has been no conclusive evidence to indicate control. It is, therefore, essential that we consider future KUFIRE activities with two approaches: (1) how to exploit the team to insure the flow of positive intelligence and how to utilize the reported dissident elements within the BSSR, if the team is not controlled, or (2) how to provoke the controller into revealing his intelligence interest, method of operation, intelligence data, if the team is controlled.

a. Planning if the team is not controlled. Although the original mission of the team did not include the gathering and transmission of positive intelligence, circumstances since the dispatch have forced us to rely upon the team as an intelligence source, wanting as it may be. In the opinion of the Case Officer, to develop and exploit this source most effectively, it will be necessary to divide the team into two distinct operating areas. One area of the operation would be in BARANOVICHI under the

aegis of AECAMPOSANTO 6, while the other would concern itself with the KAMEN area under the supervision of AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9.

The division as contemplated is not a random, haphazard decision. During the course of the operation, the operation itself emerged as a natural division.

Because AECAMPOSANTO 6 had been able to legalize, he detached himself, per plan, from AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 and established himself as a lumber worker in the BARANOVICHI area. AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 remained within the KAMEN area. To date, the primary drawback to this highly desirable approach has been the lack of independent communication for the BARANOVICHI unit. Whenever AECAMPOSANTO 6 had a message to transmit, he had to make contact with the other two team members and relate the message to them for transmission to the base by W/T. Needless to say, this procedure was insecure. AECAMPOSANTO 6 had to arrange absence from work, travel needlessly and he had no guarantee when he made contact with AECAMPOSANTO 8 and 9 that the latter were not under control. Therefore, to preclude this type of insecurity in the future, the team was asked to activate the S/W link. An address in Berlin was transmitted to AECAMPOSANTO 9 to give to AECAMPOSANTO 6. According to the latest W/T contacts, this had been effected and the base was told that a letter was forthcoming. When this letter is received, the team will be requested to relay to the base an address which AECAMPOSANTO 6 could service. Once the circuit is completed, other addresses, unknown to AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 will be submitted to and from AECAMPOSANTO 6 via the S/W. It is envisioned that this action would then sever any remaining contact between the two areas of operation.

Once some semblance of an organized network has been established by AECAMPOSANTO 6 and it becomes obvious that AECAMPOSANTO 6 can be spared from the

operation, he should be asked to exfiltrate from the BSSR. Although it is impossible to select the course of action now, it is anticipated that in view of his employment and mobility, he may be asked to journey north in the Karelo-Finnish Republic and cross the border into Norway near the Baltic Sea. This seems possible with the limited information available at the present time.

AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 should be made to legalize. The "black-living" approach is not conducive to intelligence gathering and expansion of the operation. However, the problem of outdated documents held by AECAMPOSANTO 8 and the apparent reluctance of AECAMPOSANTO 9 to legalize presents problems which are peculiar to the KAMEN area only and therefore should be discussed at this point.

At first, it was considered that AECAMPOSANTO 8 or 9 arrange with some of their indigenous contacts to service a cache which had been prepared by AENOBLE 27. W/T traffic would have informed the team of its location and its contents, among which were documents and legends for legalization. However, the revelation that AENOBLE 27 was under control discounted this approach. There are three other possibilities, (1) to attempt a resupply by an overland infiltration, (2) an air drop, or (3) buy documents on the black market. Because we have no one in training at the present time and because the KUFIRE segment of the operation has been suspended, the first possibility is not considered feasible in the near future. The second possibility, the air resupply, would not be considered practical for an operation of this size. Therefore, the only remaining possibility would be for AECAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 to purchase documents on the black market. In their W/T message number 36, the team informed us that documents could be purchased. As far as can be determined, the team should have about 120,000 rubles remaining from the original sum taken in on the 1952

dispatch. Therefore, money should pose no problem to this facet of the transaction. The team will be asked to investigate this possibility and may be able to use one of its legal contacts for arranging the purchase.

This analysis of the problem of legalizing should not be considered as conclusive. In the past, the Case Officer was informed that the possibility of getting documents to the team could be arranged in conjunction with other projects operating through that area. However, this analysis attempted to view the project on its own merits and capabilities.

B. Those indigenous elements which have been contacted by the team

The recent encouraging disclosure by the team that dissident elements existed among the population and were being carefully scrutinized by the team members for collaboration, offers AEUJOR KUFIRE a tremendous asset for expanding the KAMEN and BARANOVICHI areas. Although the message did not so state, it can be assumed that the dissention is not peculiar to the area from which the transmission took place. Hence the team should be encouraged to continue its contacts among the indigenous people and evaluate them in reference to the aims of the project. When the evaluations are made available to us, it will then be possible to determine the feasibility of continuing this activity.

If determined feasible, requirements will be relayed to the individual areas based upon information received from SR/6. The initial requests will be verifiable and low level type assignments will be suggested. Obviously the intelligence value of such an effort is practically nil, but it would provide the Case Officer with an opportunity to appraise the modus operandi of the indigenous elements and how well they were trained by the team members responsible for the two area of operations. Should they prove their competency in the tasks, their utilization will be developed along

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intelligence and organizational lines to obtain positive intelligence of a higher level.

Once the report has reached us that these people are available to us, the team should be notified to segregate them into a cell system. Operational guidance will be transmitted to the team members in the KAMEN and BARANOVICHI independently, since at this stage of the operation it is envisioned that the two areas will no longer be in contact with each other.

C. The availability of certain individuals within AECAMBISTA 1 prone to Agency supervision

When the release of AECAMBISTA 2 from AEQUOR ops became inevitable, some BR elements directly connected with the operation became alarmed at this move and considered this severance as detrimental to the collaboration between the Agency and AECAMBISTA 1. One such individual, AECAMBISTA 5, noted that he was dissatisfied with AECAMBISTA 2. Although he did not say why, it can be assumed that AECAMBISTA 5 probably was of the opinion that AECAMBISTA 2 was not devoting enough time to his role of Principal Agent. AECAMBISTA 5 had been in close working contact with AECAMBISTA 2, therefore was in a position to appraise the efficiency of the collaboration. Undoubtedly his association with the project and AECAMBISTA 2 would enable him to offer concrete suggestions for a professional operation.

AECAMBISTA 5 is not new to the KUBARK effort. Several months earlier, a proposal had been advanced to utilize AECAMBISTA 5 as CART source within the Byelorussian emigration. This proposal, stimulated by information received from the field regarding AECAMBISTA 5's potential, however was not honored on the recommendation of CART Munich. It noted that AECAMBISTA 5 had been out of contact with the emigration; also a formal study of CART methods could not be taught him at the present time.

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AECAMBISTA 5 at one stage in our contact stated that he would be willing to associate himself with us without the knowledge of AECAMBISTA 1. It is therefore earnestly advanced that AECAMBISTA 5 received P/A training. At the present time, the project is without a principal Agent and the re-evaluation period would offer an ideal opportunity to transfer AECAMBISTA 5 to PBPRIME for the required work. It would insure us of having a Principal Agent versed in clandestine methodology available for immediate consultation when it again becomes time to initiate AECUOR KUFIRE KUGOWN operations.

The field also requested that AECAMBISTA 11 be given consideration for the Principal Agent position. However, it is the opinion of the Case Officer that, although the individual has demonstrated his competency on other tasks, he is too well known among the emigres in PBPRIME. It may also be undesirable to utilize AECAMBISTA 11 from the political point of view. He has never expressed his opinion concerning the KUBARK-AECAMBISTA 1 relationship or his feeling toward the personalities involved in the collaboration. If an attempt should be made to prepare him in lieu of AECAMBISTA 2 or wean him away from AECAMBISTA 1 we may suffer an embarrassing incident.

D. The potential untapped source of agent candidates

According to a survey undertaken by AECAMBISTA 11 approximately one year ago in PBPRIME and Canada, the influx of young people has been constant. Although not enough is known about recruiting potentialities in Central and South America, the survey which is being undertaken by KUBARK should clarify this doubt somewhat. However, it is an admitted fact, by AECAMBISTA 2 himself, that Europe can no longer be regarded as a source of agent candidates. This depletion can be explained by the emigration which has taken place since the termination of World War 2. Not having any family or material ties in Europe, these young emigres, like their grandfathers

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before them began to leave the European continent in an effort to reclaim some of their lives. However, the emotional fervor against the invaders of their homeland by the Communists left its mark on their thinking. Hence, AECAMBISTA 4 has often noted to the Case Officer that he has been approached by these young emigres, and asked whether or not he could not help them in an active struggle against the Communist in their homeland. Therefore the availability of Byelorussian youth, abetted by its desire to engage in an active struggle against communism offers KUBARK an opportunity to select agent candidates for KUFIRE ops.

Although the Case Officer has been told that Canadian recruitment is out, PBPRIME difficult and South America uncertain, it is firmly believed that this opportunity should not be allowed to wither without first exploiting every possibility. AECAMBISTA 4 has noted that many of the young DP's are now serving in the armed forces. He further stated he saw no reason why they could not use the same cover for agent candidates. For those potential candidates not subject to military service, AECAMBISTA 4 said that often a young emigre may wander from the Byelorussian community where he had been living. After a while, his absence is explained by the fact that PEPRIME is a large country and he could be living anywhere-- eventually he is forgotten. Here again AECAMBISTA 4 reiterated would be an ideal opportunity to remove the agent candidate for training.

It is recommended for FY 1955 that the possibility of Western Hemisphere recruiting be investigated. Although no candidates would be recruited until the legal points are clarified, the early training of AECAMBISTA 5 and approval to proceed with the recruiting would insure a good start to a renewal of AEQUOR KUFIRE ops.

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E. The rapport which has been established with AECAMBISTA 1

During the past four years, the Agency has established a working relationship with AECAMBISTA 1. Although this period included moments of apprehension and personality conflicts, the basic desire to work together has allowed the Agency to dispatch two units into the BSSR. It has enabled us to establish internal listening posts, the potential of developing an intelligence gathering component and through the publication of printed media, has enabled us to express Agency and United States policy in quarters that would ordinarily have been denied us.

It is desirable, therefore, to develop the rapport which has been established to further exploit the intelligence potential of AECAMBISTA 1 by continuing the present relationship, with modifications. The entire situation should be explained to AECAMBISTA 4, within security restrictions, and attempt should be made to enable him to understand the problems of engaging in secure covert operations. We should be amenable to his suggestions and should implement them whenever possible. We should try to utilize any personnel he may submit for our consideration, if deemed satisfactory. If not, AECAMBISTA 4 or his representatives should be informed of our rejection and a plausible explanation given. In the past, unfortunately, AECAMBISTA 2 has conducted the operations on an emotional basis, i.e. he could tell whether the man was good "by looking in his eyes". This all must be explained to AECAMBISTA 4 or the new Principal Agent as unsound practice. Therefore, in a general concept, before any further operations are undertaken there should be a 'meeting of the minds' with each party to the contract knowing his responsibility and aware of the problems which are peculiar to his partner. The AECAMBISTAS should be made to feel that they are consulted on all problems through the Principal Agent. If this

relationship cannot be furthered under the aforementioned working arrangement, it is then suggested that the AECAMBISTA 1 complex be dropped and the possibility of engaging independents for operations be explored.

F. The ability to train agent candidates and a new P/A

It is generally conceded that most of the difficulties experienced in the forerunning operations were caused by the inability or lack of desire expressed by the Principal Agent in recruiting agent candidates. The insecure practices have led to doubt which exists today concerning the status of AEQUOR TEAM II and the feasibility of conducting future operations with AECAMBISTA 1. With the transfer of training facilities and the selection of a new candidate for P/A, most of these fears may be allayed. However, before any consideration be given to new candidates or new operations, the new P/A should be trained for a period of not less than one year. He should be given all the aspects of covert operations similar to the training received by agent candidates. He should further be given specialized training regarding the role of the P/A in covert operations. When he has completed his training, it would then become necessary to determine whether or not it would be desirable to have him begin recruiting immediately. The new concept of the role of the principal agent should be to: (1) implement the recruiting mechanisms.

(2) Escort any agent candidates to PBPRIME for training.

(3) Be present at the training site during the course of instruction.

(4) Participate in the instruction schedule, if necessary expanding the course of instruction to include those eventualities which may be peculiar to BSSR ops.

(5) Maintain liaison with AECAMBISTA 1 and arrange for political and psychological indoctrination of the agent candidate by prominent figures in AECAMBISTA 1, e.g. AECAMBISTA 4 or AECAMBISTA 10.

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- (6) During the course of training, hold discussions with the agent candidates re; Soviet policy, Byelorussian culture, etc.
- (7) Be consulted on particular problems which may arise during the course of instruction.
- (8) Aid in the evaluation of the agent candidates during and upon the completion of the course of instruction, and finally
- (9) Assist in the dispatch of the agents.

It should be stressed at this point, however, that the position of the P/A under the new concept, should not be such as would preclude the influence of the Case Officers on the project over the agent candidates. At best, the P/A should be represented as an limited partner to the agent candidates and under no conditions is he to be <sup>represented</sup> ~~relegated~~ as the primary contact between the agent candidates and the case officers. Although it is realized that this is ? the optimum in covert operations, if we start with these concepts, then any alteration in operational procedure will be from the ideal and not from a concept which would include a "watered-down" version of operations.

G. The experience

Although this asset may be considered an intangible, it can influence the course of future operations. Through it, we have been able to evaluate our shortcomings, those of our colleagues, methodology and personalities. We have been able to alter our operational concept based upon realism as constricted to the idealistic version of a mission. If taken for its face value, this asset can be instrumental in the success or failure of future KUFIRE KUGOWN missions.

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