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9. Feb. 1954

Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

Chief of Base, Munich

REDSOX/AEQUOR/Operational

ATTN: []

INFO: COM

REF: A. [] Transmittal of Progress Report
885, B. MUNI-6462, C. MUNI-6486, D. MUNI-6467, E. EGQW-12962,
F. EGQW-22856, G. EGMA-9112.

Transmitted herewith is the January 1954 Progress Report for AEQUOR.

[]

8 February 1954

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:

- 3 - SR (w/2 atts.)
- 1 - EE (w/o att.)
- 3 - COM (w/2 atts.)
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AEQUOR Program Report 1954

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Attachment to EGMA-9784

January Progress Report for AEQUOR

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1. Headquarters Action Required:

- A. Decision on future planning for AEQUOR/KUFIRE Operations.
- B. Disposal of AECAMPOSANTOs 10 and 11.
- C. Feasibility of reassessing AECAMPOSANTO 10.
- D. Preparing new arrangement for continuation of KUFIRE Operations.
- E. Authority to transfer and debrief Subject, Ref A.
- F. Utilization of AECAMBISTA 5.

2. Synopsis of Developments: After the arrival of Headquarters case officers, AECAMPOSANTO 11 was assessed and found lacking in the required leadership qualities. Although it was anticipated that an attempt would be made to merge AECAMPOSANTOs 10 and 11 into an independent or support type mission, this was precluded by the non-arrival of AECAMPOSANTO 10 to permit re-assessing and merging before the HBELECTOR flight deadline. In the meantime certain security laxness was uncovered as existing in the Louvain Byelorussian student home which served as an additional reason for postponing the preparation of AEQUOR Team III. A security investigation was undertaken to determine the extent of compromise and to reach some new arrangement which would more adequately serve our purposes for continuation of AEQUOR/REDSOX/KUFIRE operations. Several meetings were held with AECAMBISTA 2 for purposes of determining the extent of the security compromise and to work out a satisfactory disposal plan for AECAMPOSANTOs 10 and 11.

3. Account of Developments:

A. AECAMPOSANTO 11, after conclusion of the assessment [] and [] was found lacking in the desirable leadership qualities necessary to permit launching of an independent two-man team into the Byelorussian SSR. Furthermore, because of his partial knowledgeability of Team II operations and team members, it was deemed that AECAMPOSANTO 11 would be a security risk even if sent in as a team member of an independent type mission at this time because of his strong desire to establish contact with AECAMPOSANTO 6. After receipt of the Headquarters decision that preparation of Team III be postponed, AECAMPOSANTO 11 was informed by AECAMBISTA 2, at our instructions, that certain security issues preclude his utilization at this time and that certain exigencies necessitated the postponement of any mission at this time. Pending receipt of further Headquarters decision, AECAMPOSANTO 11 will not be informed of any final rejection in view of his basic qualifications which would permit his incorporation as a team member with a strong leader type.

B. AECAMPOSANTO 10 had been scheduled to arrive in MOB on approximately 4 January 1954; however, due to the late date on which he was informed to make preparations for departure (by AECAMBISTA 2) and due to the need for procuring special authority to proceed to Germany, his arrival date was postponed until 26 January 1954. In view of the fact that this would, perforce, delay the

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commencement of a training program for approximately 18 and a half months, because of the inability to reassess and carriage AECAMPOSANTO 10 in adequate time to meet the 21 January 1954 HBELECTOR flight, and because of an uncovering of security laxness within AECAMBISTA 1 it was decided that he should postpone his trip and remain in England until further notification. Notwithstanding our request, made on 21 January 1954, to AECAMBISTA 2 that he notify AECAMPOSANTO 10 to desist in his attempts to come to Germany, AECAMBISTA 2 requested that he proceed to the student home in Belgium. According to AECAMBISTA 2, no other course of action could be taken because of the psychological repercussions upon AECAMPOSANTO 10 were he to be instructed to remain in England after having "disposed of all his property, quit his job, and having made his final break with everyone in England." Furthermore, AECAMBISTA 2 stated that because AECAMPOSANTO 10 had been considered twice previously and rejected both times for other than personal reasons, he could not have been left in England after having taken the above steps. According to AECAMBISTA 2 the recruiter of AECAMPOSANTO 10, AECAMBISTA 15, threatened to break with AECAMBISTA 2 and cease his collaboration with KUBARK unless we took AECAMPOSANTO 10 as our ward after all these "dry runs". AECAMBISTA 15 felt personally responsible for AECAMPOSANTO 10's present status and therefore was responsible for his utilization in REDSOX operations or for a proper re-institution into the emigration after appropriate remuneration for losses incurred.

C. Pending receipt of a Headquarters decision which would indicate whether or not any plan is currently envisioned for utilizing AECAMPOSANTOs 10 and 11 in the immediate future, several disposal plans outlined in paragraph 3, reference B, and paragraphs 2 and 3, reference C, are being considered. These, however, are all relatively short-term disposal plans which would ultimately necessitate complete rejection of both candidates or preparation of some plan which would permit their retention for future AEQUOR operations. Because the visas of both candidates expire in less than six months, any disposal plan now followed would be inadequate and would necessitate the candidates returning to their countries of residence for visa prolongation or, on the other hand, would necessitate registration with the German authorities after having obtained some type of employment. In order to permit Field case officers to plan a logical disposal plan it is mandatory that some decision be reached in Headquarters indicating our thinking for future operations.

D. The current status of both candidates is very undesirable. AECAMPOSANTO 11, completely unoccupied and unemployed, has become a ward of AECAMBISTA 5 in Munich. In discussions with case officers, AECAMBISTA 5 has indicated that he is searching for employment for AECAMPOSANTO 11 on the German economy. If AECAMBISTA 5 is successful, this may be a partial and temporary answer until some decision is reached by TPLINGO officials whether or not they would accept AECAMPOSANTO 11 on the service staff in any capacity whatsoever. The Field case officers have met occasionally with AECAMPOSANTO 11 for morale purposes and will continue doing so until a satisfactory plan is evolved.

AECAMPOSANTO 10 arrived in the student home in Belgium during AECAMBISTA 2's presence in Munich. Upon his return to Louvain, AECAMBISTA 2 will attempt to determine the feasibility of having AECAMPOSANTO 10 return to England (if at all possible) or to withdraw him from the student home in order not to expose him unnecessarily to the entire group. Finding temporary employment for AECAMPOSANTO 10 will be more difficult in view of the fact that he possesses only secondary education and would not easily fit in the plan being considered as an understudy on the publication staff.

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E. If a decision is rendered to the effect that it is desired that AECAMPOSANTOS 10 and 11 remain available for future REDSOX operations, it may be desirable to bring AECAMPOSANTO 10 to MOB for re-assessment, re-carriage, and a W/T retest in the immediate future. Transfer of AECAMPOSANTO 10 to MOB for the above purposes would also permit the case officers to probe the extent of knowledgeability of AECAMBISTA 1 members in England.

F. AECAMBISTA 2 was informed that our cessation of Team III preparation at this time was based on the following reasons:

- (1) Non-arrival of AECAMPOSANTO 10 in time to permit assessment and transfer to PBPRIME on the specified time.
- (2) Lack of leadership qualifications of AECAMPOSANTO 11.
- (3) AECAMPOSANTO 11 knowledgeability of Team II Ops.
- (4) Uncovering of security laxness and possible security compromise which necessitates a re-evaluation of our joint efforts.

AECAMBISTA 2's initial reaction indicated his lack of understanding why a delay of "ten days" in AECAMPOSANTO 10's arrival could upset the entire program for Team III. An attempt was made to re-determine the reason for the delay in AECAMPOSANTO 10's arrival. AECAMBISTA 2 informed the case officers that, in spite of the request by [] repeated in October, November and early December to have AECAMPOSANTO 10 make preparations for leaving England, AECAMBISTA 2 took it upon himself not to inform AECAMPOSANTO 10 of this until after 19 December 1953 because "of his inability to determine whether or not we were serious in view of our previous vacillations." It was pointed out to AECAMBISTA 2 that his lack of cooperation and rebellious attitude precipitated our decision and that he had no one to blame but himself. After further pointing out that the delay was not "ten days" but closer to one and a half months, because of the technical preparations necessary for the flight, and that our decision was equally and concurrently precipitated by the discovery of security laxness, AECAMBISTA 2 began to comprehend the matter and began to discuss details in a more rational manner.

G. The security aspects of our collaboration were reviewed with AECAMBISTA 2, the details and findings of which have been transmitted per reference D. Although AECAMBISTA 2 admitted that AECAMBISTAS 11, 13 and 15 were almost completely witting in all aspects of our collaboration, it is also felt that a great deal of loose conversation not consistent with the best security interests, is extant in the student home in Belgium. The use of the student home for routing candidates to MOB in conjunction with the above loose talk was undoubtedly blown the home completely and any action undertaken becomes obvious to the students therein. AECAMBISTA 2's active participation in overt political activities within the emigration, as well as his clinical obligations, prevent him from performing his principal agent functions in the best interests of security and efficiency. Although it is felt that the security laxness should not be minimized, certain responsibility must be assumed by the Field and Headquarters for having sanctioned the present arrangement, for not having suggested a more secure arrangement heretofore, or for not having requested AECAMBISTA 2 to withdraw from active political work within the emigration and possibly drop his clinical duties.

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An attempt was made to determine the extent to which AECAMBISTA 1 leaders in other countries were made witting of the actual activities resultant from the collaboration. AECAMBISTA 2 remained adamant and obdurate in his feeling that the AECAMBISTA 1 leaders were unwitting of AECAMBISTA 1-KUBARK collaboration or the use to which the recruited candidates are put. This appears to be somewhat of an understatement as it is difficult, for instance, to conceive of Alexander LASCHUK, the personal representative of AECAMBISTA 1 in England, helping AECAMPOSANTO 10 dispose of his belongings and assist in the procurement of a visa to travel to Germany under the cover used, i.e. work on the publication staff although AECAMPOSANTO 10 has had no experience along journalistic lines nor has had any scholastic preparation for this work, without having some inkling of the actual reason for his trip to Munich.

H. Unless it is deemed that there will be no further preparation of AECAMBISTA 1 candidates for AEQUOR/REDSOX operations, it is necessary to give some thought to the establishment of a new arrangement which will satisfy our requirements and permit for the acquisition of candidates from the emigration. AECAMBISTA 2 feels, with some justification, that the absence of a program which would stimulate the Byelorussian youth is the main reason for the gradual drying up of recruitable candidates. Although any program short of an overt Cadre School or a military unit of company size would be inadequate in his opinion, it is felt that we will be faced within a year or two, if we are not now facing it, with a dry emigration in Europe recruitment wise. According to AECAMBISTA 2 there are, however, qualified candidates in PBPRIME and Canada who are still available and will be so for some time to come. Faced with the possible need of eliminating the Louvain complex from our operations, it may be an opportune moment to transfer all activities to PBPRIME with special emphasis on Canadian recruitment at this time. Inasmuch as AECAMBISTA 2 is willing to relinquish his position and providing we are desirous of continuing the KUFIRE effort, we may be able to have AECAMBISTA 11 serve as a recruiter (and principal agent if necessary) after transfer of the KUFIRE effort and recruitment to PBPRIME and Canada. A more detailed plan for the proposed arrangement will be forwarded by separate dispatch at a later date for planning purposes. In any case, it is necessary that a decision be reached at this time regarding the desirability of continuing the AEQUOR/KUFIRE effort or of eliminating it in entirety as regards AECAMBISTA 1.

I. The subject of merging the two publications has not been discussed recently with AECAMBISTA 5 as it is felt that the issue will resolve itself within the next few months. Inasmuch as AECAMBISTA 5 is assured of acceptance for TPLINGO, he will not be able to devote any time to the publication once the program is initiated. The feasibility of a merger was discussed by AECAMBISTA 2 with the editor of the newspaper but was rejected by the latter as entirely unwhitiable because of the need for printing half pages or smaller size supplements which would increase the cost of publication to a much greater extent. The editor of the newspaper is not desirous of incorporating any of the satirical magazine contents within the newspaper itself for reasons previously outlined. It is felt, therefore, that the best course of action at this time is to continue the satirical magazine until AECAMBISTA 5 commences his work with TPLINGO at which time the publication of the magazine will be stopped per our instructions.

J. The utilization of AECAMBISTA 5 as a CART source, as proposed in reference E, was discussed between the AEQUOR case officer and [] It was generally agreed that AECAMBISTA 5 has lost his usefulness as a CART source for the purposes envisioned because of the fact that he has been divorced

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from most of the AECAMBISTA 1 members in the student home. Although employed by TPLINGO, it is felt that the AEQUOR case officer should not lose contact with AECAMBISTA 5 who may be able to continue his political reporting as he has done in the past. Limited manpower does not permit for a CART training program to be given AECAMBISTA 5 which would be of dubious value in any case. No commitments have been made to AECAMBISTA 5 CART-wise and the Field case officer is completely at liberty to inform him that previous plans for using him in the CART field have been dropped.

K. Inasmuch as AECAMBISTA 13 will not be available for any type of Plan West assignment until after the conclusion of the school year and in view of the current security check, it was decided that any discussions for implementing the program, suggested in reference F, should be postponed until a new working arrangement is established and until it is determined what activities will be continued utilizing AECAMBISTA 1 personnel.

L. It was learned from AECAMBISTA 2 that the Subject of reference A arrived in the following manner at the Byelorussian Student Home. After arriving in Louvain, he proceeded to the Ukrainian home stating that he was a Russian and asked for directions to the Russian Home. Similarly after arriving at the Russian home, he identified himself as a Byelorussian and inquired for directions thither. During his stay at the Byelorussian home, he has proved to be very cooperative and amenable to any arrangement; he has been assigned to perform various menial tasks at the home to earn his keep all of which he has accepted without any question. In several discussions with AECAMBISTA 2 he has mentioned, intentionally or otherwise, that while with the British he did things thus and so; however, his autobiography and initial debriefing did not indicate any contact with the British. Although he has been under observation by AECAMBISTAS 11, 13 and 15, they have been unable to uncover any suspicious activities but nonetheless are unwilling to accept him because of the vague and story-like background given in reference G. In order to safeguard the remaining assets in Belgium and to determine his suitability as a REDSOX candidate it is necessary that his bona fides be established soonest.

M. In discussions with AECAMBISTA 2 on the acquisition of more qualified candidates for our operations, AECAMBISTA 2 revealed that AECAMBISTA 5 has volunteered for a REDSOX mission. Although AECAMBISTA 5 has not been approached in this regard by the AEQUOR case officers, it is believed that AECAMBISTA 5 would be the high-level type that has been sought for AEQUOR operations. Inasmuch as he is now under consideration for appointment to the Byelorussian desk on TPLINGO, if any serious consideration is to be given to his utilization it should be made before he is accepted by TPLINGO. The primary mitigating influence against his utilization, assuming he is still physically qualified, lies in the fact that he has been quite closely associated with all aspects of the AECAMBISTA 1 KUBARK collaboration. Excluding the above security aspect, AECAMBISTA 5 would provide the high-level leadership qualities which would permit the utilization of AECAMPOSANTOS 10 and 11 for an independent type mission. Should Headquarters deem his utilization desirable as outlined above, AECAMBISTA 5 and AECAMPOSANTOS 10 and 11 can be transferred to PEPRIME almost immediately for training purposes and an early spring 1955 dispatch.

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