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DIRECT TO MUNICH

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December 1953

AIR

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Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Chief, SR

AITH: **REDSOX/MUNICH**

INFO: **REDSOX/Frankfurt**

REDSOX/AMFOR/Operational

**Transmittal of Report on Operational Conference with
ARGAMBISTA 4**

A copy of the report on the operational conference with ARGAMBISTA
4 is attached herewith for your information.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. On 11 November 1953, the undersigned met with AECAMBISTA 4, at our request, for a conference which lasted five hours. The meeting took place in Washington DC and was conducted entirely in Russian.

2. AECAMBISTA 4 inquired about [] inasmuch as several matters were left in the air between the two during their meeting earlier in the year. It was explained that his duties have now been assumed by the undersigned.

3. The first portion of the conference was devoted to a general discussion of various facets of AECAMBISTA 1 history and organizational matters. AECAMBISTA 4 related about his organization's inability (and lack of desire) to reach a working agreement with IDENTITIES A and B. He reiterated that the present two separate organization arrangement was more desirable than any type of amalgamation. This is preferable according to AECAMBISTA 4, because of the undesirable element within IDENTITY B. The August 1953 meeting between AECAMBISTA 4 and IDENTITY A revealed that the latter was anxious to unite the emigration but only on his terms. According to AECAMBISTA 4, the only potential within IDENTITY B of interest to AECAMBISTA 1 is the youthful element located in South River, New Jersey. This group is entirely inactive politically, lacks the necessary intelligentsia element, and engages only in social activities.

4. AECAMBISTA 4 offered a variety of information about the activities of IDENTITY C. He indicated that AECAMBISTA 1, as well as the rest of the members of IDENTITY C, is amenable to entering IDENTITY D. The prevalent attitude among IDENTITY C is that IDENTITY D has altered it's political orientation sufficiently to warrant entry therein by the minorities. However, to date this has been impossible because of the machinations of the Great Russian groups.

He revealed that IDENTITY D has granted AECAMBISTA 1 an opportunity to utilize the facilities of IDENTITY E for broadcasts in the Byelorussian language. Five individuals (one announcer, one secretary, and/or translator and three researchers) will constitute the staff of the Byelorussian section. It was implied that the five were being subsidized on a full-salary basis by IDENTITY D. IDENTITY F of New York City and AECAMBISTA 8 have been selected for the research positions. The other names were not revealed except to indicate that the announcer would be female. Initially the Byelorussian

section will make only one 15-minute broadcast daily; the material transmitted will be limited to a concerted anti-Bolshevik struggle and will fall within the political purview established by IDENTITY D.

5. The primary purpose of AECAMBISTA 4's visit to the United States is to obtain approval from the AECAMBISTA 1 Rada members for entry into IDENTITY D. A meeting held in New York City in early November 1953 was called to resolve the various differences in this regard. Inclement weather prevented many of the AECAMBISTA 1 leaders from outlying areas in the United States and Canada from attending. Although entry into IDENTITY D was only preliminarily discussed at this meeting, the Cleveland leaders refused to attend. Instead they sent a delegate who vehemently protested taking any action of this nature which would compromise the minority group's ability to speak out against the proponents of the Federated State.

A commission was appointed at the conclusion of the meeting and delegated authority to prepare a program which would be acceptable to all of the AECAMBISTA 1 members and which will be used as the basis for entry into IDENTITY D. AECAMBISTA 4, nonetheless, anticipates some resistance from certain AECAMBISTA 1 members, but does not consider this to be an irreconcilable dispute or one which would split AECAMBISTA 1. He does not feel that entry into IDENTITY D will injure the prestige or compromise AECAMBISTA 1 in any respect.

Another AECAMBISTA 1 convention is scheduled for the latter part of November. All AECAMBISTA 1 delegations, leaders, and members from the United States and Canada have been invited to attend in an effort to resolve the issue conclusively.

6. During his visit to Washington DC, AECAMBISTA 4 plans to keep and appointment with IDENTITIES G and H at their request. AECAMBISTA 4 was also requested to appear before the Baltic Commission after having volunteered to offer certain supporting documentary evidence in behalf of the Baltic States optimistically hoping that the Baltic States would similarly lend support to the creation of a congressional commission for the various other minorities.

AECAMBISTA 4 also stated that he intended to visit IDENTITY I in ODACID. It is his desire to solicit some type of assistance whereby AECAMBISTA 1 would be granted permission and facilities to wage an effective psychological warfare campaign against the Soviets in the Byelorussian SSR. Expressing strong criticism of the United States psychological warfare campaign, AECAMBISTA 4 stated that the United States has not effectively exploited the recent major political changes within the USSR.

7. At the undersigned's request, operational matters were undertaken next. AECAMBISTA 4 repeated all of the complaints expressed to [] during their May 1953 meeting. He reiterated that the policies of our organization were extremely short-sighted and that we were guilty of poor tactical planning.

He re-emphasized the difficulties and problems resulting to AECAMBISTA 1 because of the disintergration of plans for establishing ZRELOPE and PLAN

CADRE: He stated that unless we were completely certain of following through with any of our plans, we should not broach any new ideas because disintergration of plans for new projects caused greater demoralization within AECAMBISTA 1 than the extant apathy resulting from undertaking no activity at all.

The undersigned explained that the commitments were made by MOB in good faith and that it had been our intention to implement these projects. It was indicated that the implementation of these projects was impossible because of circumstances beyond our control and of the need to work within a strieter budget. The matter was dropped at this point.

8. AECAMBISTA 4 inquired as to the possibility of establishing a PLAN WEST program along the lines proposed by AECAMBISTA 2. It was indicated that the plan submitted by AECAMBISTA 2 was grossly unrealistic and that budget limitations did not permit us to hire four full-time professors, to rent office space for each, to purchase automobiles, et cetera as suggested in AECAMBISTA 2's plan. AECAMBISTA 4 was informed that a modified PLAN WEST program was being considered. In view of the relative inactivity of AECAMBISTA's 2 and 5 it was indicated that they, if amenable to the arrangement, might be utilized as PLAN WEST representatives in Belgium and France, respectively, and that another suitable candidate could be selected for England. The undersigned reiterated that current budget problems did not permit anything but a limited PLAN WEST program, also noting that the personnel presently in our employ would have to be utilized more intensively. AECAMBISTA 4 made no further comments in this regard.

9. The major operational issue, i.e. that of utilizing AECAMPOSANTO 3 in the new AEQUOR team, was undertaken next. The undersigned related to AECAMBISTA 4 that we did not deem it advisable, for security reasons, to include AECAMPOSANTO 3 in the team being formed for 1954 operations. It was indicated to AECAMBISTA 4 that AECAMBISTA 2 refused to procure any additional members for Team III unless we consider using AECAMPOSANTO 3 and that AECAMBISTA 2 and the Field Case Officers were at an impasse on the issue. AECAMBISTA 4 was informed that AECAMBISTA 2 had requested him to resolve this issue and that AECAMBISTA 2 would abide accordingly.

Initially AECAMBISTA 4 marvelled why he should have any voice in the matter since AECAMBISTA 2 was the AECAMBISTA 1 operations chief. He felt that there must be a good reason for AECAMBISTA 2's wanting to include AECAMPOSANTO 3 in Team III. AECAMBISTA 4 went on to extoll his nephew's (AECAMPOSANTO 3) virtues and that he himself saw no reason why

AECAMPOSANTO 3 should be excluded because of the latter's strong desire to participate in active nationalist work and because of his strong ideological motivations. The undersigned emphasized the necessity for eliminating any and all risks in such undertakings. He was told that our procedures for assessing candidates have exonerated themselves and have proven extremely accurate. AECAMBISTA 4 then stated that he has little faith "in the machines" and that he does not understand why his nephew should have been "suspected of foreign IS connections". He considered this completely absurd and that he would vouch for his nephew's reliability. The undersigned carefully explained that the alleged IS connections were only one of the many reasons why we considered AECAMPOSANTO 3 unsatisfactory for the type of assignment considered. This apparently placated AECAMBISTA 4 somewhat or gave him an opportunity to retreat diplomatically. Although he continued to praise his nephew to the end and to marvel at our reasons for rejecting AECAMPOSANTO 3, he agreed to prepare a letter, per our request, for transmittal to AECAMBISTA 2 (via our channels) authorizing AECAMBISTA 2 to drop AECAMPOSANTO 3 from the new team.

10. The discussion then revolved about the topic of agent training. AECAMBISTA 4 stated that "on the basis of reports received from the inside" he could not reach any other conclusion but that our training and preparation of agents has been inadequate. He recommended that our training program be more intensive. He stated that it was mandatory to have almost as much political indoctrination as tradecraft instruction in order to exploit effectively the agents inside. According to him, our "intelligence take" from the AEQUOR Team II has been meager and of a very low-level nature primarily because of inadequate training. It was pointed out to AECAMBISTA 4 that other complications inside also prevented the procurement of more intelligence information.

Case Officers Comment: From the above and from other hints dropped subtly by AECAMBISTA 4, it was evident that AECAMBISTA 4 was intimately acquainted with most of the operational details. He inquired whether or not we had received any recent word from the team which implied that he was kept au courant on receipt of all messages. A non-committal answer was given to AECAMBISTA 4 in reply to his query.

11. The undersigned further indicated to AECAMBISTA 4 that we contemplated transferring agent training to PBPRIME if a minimum of three qualified candidates were found, and that training would commence approximately 1 January 1954. AECAMBISTA 4 inquired whether or not we still contemplated using AECAMBISTA 9 of New York City as the operational chief in PBPRIME as has been considered during AECAMBISTA 4's discussion with [redacted]. It was explained that it was undesirable, security-wise, to bring in more people into operations than was absolutely necessary. In view of the fact that the Field Case Officer will continue to have contact with AECAMBISTA 2, as before it was not anticipated that anyone would be required in PBPRIME on a full-time basis for this purpose. It was explained to AECAMBISTA 4 that, if circumstances necessitated, we could employ AECAMBISTA 9 on a consultative

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basis. However, we considered that almost everything could be handled through AECAMBISTA 2 as before. AECAMBISTA 4 did not suggest using AECAMBISTA's 5, 11, or anyone else in any "hand-holding" or advisory capacities and did not pursue the subject further.

Case Officers Comment: It is not known why AECAMBISTA 4 dropped the subject and did not insist on a full-time AECAMBISTA 1 representative with the agents during their training in PEPRIME as had been expected. The subject was raised several times at different instances to offer AECAMBISTA 4 ample opportunity to express his views on this matter but elicited no other response than that indicated above. It is the undersigned's opinion that AECAMBISTA 4 was concerned over AECAMBISTA 2's status and activities as a full time salaried employee and that he did not desire to compromise AECAMBISTA 2's stature as the operational chief. It is felt that this can be used to our advantage and will afford us full control over the agents during their training in PEPRIME without sharing their loyalty with a AECAMBISTA 1 representative. If necessary, however, AECAMBISTA 9 can always be used on a consultative basis should the agents desire to confer with a AECAMBISTA 1 representative. It may be desirable, however, to include AECAMBISTA 11 in the agent training program in order to have a qualified AECAMBISTA 1 assistant for future training.

12. AECAMBISTA 4 re-broached the subject of establishing a program whereby Byelorussian scholars would prepare analyses and studies on the Byelorussian question, on the approaches to the Byelorussian problem, and on general topics of Byelorussian historical background. He stated that there were several qualified scholars in the United States who could prepare such studies, but that they were employed as laborers and in janitorial capacities and had little opportunity to undertake scholarly endeavours. The undersigned expressed interest in this project and noted that we were desirous of further ascertaining the qualifications of these individuals. It was indicated to AECAMBISTA 4 that we would consider employing one qualified Byelorussian scholar who would work under our direction in the preparation of such studies. A brief outline to serve as an example of our requirements was submitted to AECAMBISTA 4. Several PRQ's (translated into Russian) were also furnished AECAMBISTA 4 requesting him to procure the desired information. On the basis of information received we would attempt to implement a study group project if we deemed that the candidate was qualified for this task. It was indicated that this was not a commitment to hire anyone but merely an attempt to investigate the possibilities of finding a suitable candidate who would have access to the desired information and was qualified to prepare studies on facets of Byelorussian history as yet undocumented.

13. Returning to the topic of agent recruitment, AECAMBISTA 4 lodged a complaint against our non-utilization of qualified Byelorussian youth in the United States and Canada. According to him, there have been approximately twenty Byelorussians from the Cleveland area who enlisted in the United States Army because of their desire to engage in anti-Communist

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activities. These youths frequently approach their AECAMBISTA 1 leaders requesting active national liberation assignments but have to be constantly declined. He requested us to investigate possibilities of using these candidates from both the United States and Canada before the source dries up.

14. A meeting was scheduled for the subsequent day, 12 November, 1953, on which the undersigned, accompanied by a KUBARK notary public transmitted to the remainder (\$5024.50) of the \$10,000 AECAMPOSANTO 4 death benefit payment. A quit-claim statement was signed, witnessed and duly notarized.

15. AECAMBISTA 4 indicated that he anticipates returning to Washington DC in approximately one month at which time he will appear again before the Baltic Commission. He indicated his desire to meet again with the undersigned in order to discuss the study group project further and to transmit the PRQ's. AECAMBISTA 4 was given a Post Office box number in the event he decided to communicate with or use it as a means for forwarding the PRQ's should a return trip to Washington, D.C. be impossible.

16. The following aliases were used by the undersigned:

- [] IDENTITY J
- [] IDENTITY K

Identities: A - Astrawsky

B - BCR

C - Paris Bloc

D - QKACTIVE

E - TPLINGO []

F - J. LIMANOVSKI

G - Sen A. Smith, Rep NJ

H - Rep Chas. Kersten, Rep. Wash []

I - Walter Stoenel, Jr

J - []

K - []