

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

8 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Plans/PI
SUBJECT: Project ANKUR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	
CLASSIFICATION	Cancelled
	Changed to <u>Secret</u>
BY AUTHORITY OF	
Name	<u>C/SR/SOP</u>
Office	
Date	<u>12 JUN 1961</u>

1. Background

a. The attached project is for the support of ~~SECRET~~ operations into the Byelorussian SSR. It was initially approved on 1 July 1951 through 30 June 1952, and was then renewed for a one year period. It is now being submitted for renewal for an additional year. During the life of this project a singleton drop was made in the fall of 1951, but nothing further has been heard from this individual. A four-man team was airdropped in the fall of 1952 into Byelorussia. Since that time one of the members of the team has been successful in legalizing himself. Two of the members are living a bunker existence and the fourth member was killed in an altercation with security forces. The remnants of this team are in intermittent W/T contact. There are no plans for dispatching an agent-team into Byelorussia during fiscal year 1954. The project renewal as originally submitted under date of 13 July 1953 is for a total of [] Due to revisions in the budget, this has been revised downward to [] The targets and tasks of this project are expensive and little has been attained in fulfillment of these objectives to date.

2. FI Staff Observations

a. There are a number of factors in this project which have given this staff cause for concern. From discussions with the case officer it appears that SR has depended upon Byelorussian National Council (BNC), as the mechanism through which to spot and recruit agents for dispatch into the Byelorussian SSR. The four-agent team described above was catapulted into Byelorussia to contact mythical resistance groups which BNC presumably thought to be in the area. The team was given practically no FI training. Assuming that it is not under control, which is by no means certain, it has yet to identify any resistance groups or potential resistance groups. Yet, planning is progressing along the line that new agents will be recruited through the BNC, trained, and injected illegally into this area. There is no indication that future efforts along this line would be any more successful than those in the past.

b. If this Agency intends to continue intermingling its agent operations with emigre groups, ~~TOP SECRET~~ questionable doctrine under the most

favorable circumstances, the following steps must be complied with before the final recruitment and dispatch of any additional agents:

(1) All information presently available on the Byelorussian National Council, the NADA, another Byelorussian emigre group, and emigre Byelorussian Communist organizations both in the United States and abroad should be completely collated. This will assist the Agency to determine whether the BNR, its officers and members, are guilty of breaches of security, if not actual contact with the KGB. It is understood that there is a wealth of material uncollated in the possession of SR on these subjects, and a vigorous attempt should be made to seek out other sources of information on these groups. The officers of the BNR should be pressed for full disclosure of all pertinent information in their possession which apparently has not been done to date for fear of alienating their "cooperative spirit." Until this material is assembled and carefully analyzed, this staff will not be in a position to determine whether the BNR is the proper mechanism to accomplish this Agency's objectives.

(2) A CE review of all W/T traffic exchanged with the agents presently in Byelorussia must be made precedent to the dispatch of any additional agents under any circumstances.

(3) All possible avenues should be explored to determine the possibility of exfiltrating one or more of the agents presently in Byelorussia, preferably the one who has attained legalization, in order that the unique information in his possession can be spilled in the mounting of additional operations into the area. The objection raised by the case officer to this procedure centered in the fact that the two living bunker existences were dependent upon the legalized agent for material support. This is not a valid reason to reject exfiltration, in spite of humanitarian considerations that might exist if this business was of a different nature. Furthermore, demands upon one or more of these agents to plan for exfiltration may well reveal that they are under control, a fact of great importance to the mounting of additional operations.

3. Action Recommended

a. that this project is being approved in the reduced amount of for the specific purpose of accomplishing the three steps outlined above precedent to the final recruitment and dispatch of any agent into

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Byelorussia who may originate through the existing arrangements with the BNS which, from its description, appears to be a finey reel upon which to base full reliance in carrying forward the vital and delicate activities of this Agency in fulfilling national intelligence requirements.

b. that full coordination with this staff must precede the final recruitment and dispatch of any agents into this area.

15/
[DC/PLANS/FI]

Attachment

FI/PLANS/DAFlinn:jc 8 October 1953

Distribution: Original ~~one~~ - Addressee *Wass*
1 - DC/FI/OPS
1 - Projects/PLANS/FI
1 - TSCO
1 - FI/PLANS/chrono file - 1701 L
1 - SR ✓

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~87545~~ B