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DISPATCH NO. EGMA-7052

DIRECT POUCH

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

13 AUG 1953

TO : Chief, SR
ATTN: []
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE: _____

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/Operational
SPECIFIC— AEQUOR/Current Problems

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DATE 2007

REF: Encl. 4 to EGMW-11

1. Agent Training. The matter of a CAMBISTA representative at the U.S. training site was discussed recently with CAMBISTA 2. CAMBISTA 2 himself does not want to go to the United States for personal reasons. These "personal" reasons are basically political since he does not want to jeopardize his role in Belorussian affairs by embracing the haven of U.S. residence while others remain in Europe. CAMBISTA 5 could, of course, be utilized as a training representative. In this capacity, however, he would be out of place since he is by nature a journalist. CAMBISTA 2 has recommended two individuals as highly qualified instructor-types, either of whom could be useful in the training of an AEQUOR team. One of these persons resides in Canada and the other in the United States. If Headquarters is interested in utilizing a native instructor in this Project as is done in the CACCOLA School the names and addresses of the above can be provided. CAMBISTA 2 also recommended Michas/TULEJKA as the CAMBISTA 1 operations officer in the United States.

2. Agent Recruitment. While the results of the Belorussian census should indicate the potential of the Belorussian emigration, it does not necessarily follow that this potential can be immediately exploited for agent recruitment. The potential presently exists only as bodies each with varying degrees of psychological preparation. The latter, i.e. the necessity of proper preparation before a recruitment approach, has been the theme upon which CAMBISTA 2 has harped for almost a year. Without such preparation CAMBISTA 2 is dubious about the success of any recruitment attempt.

Further comments on our estimate of recruitment possibilities from Europe for 1954 operations are included in SMUNI-4538 and EGMA-6948.

3. W/T Control.

A. Estimated time of transfer of control of AEQUOR W/T traffic is 15 September. This is based upon [] approximate date of arrival at Headquarters. The only person familiar with the traffic who will be returning to the United States is [] However, [] has not been handling the traffic since April of this year due to his full-time utilization on CACCOLA matters.

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B. Coordination with CAMBISTA 2 will still be necessary and information copies of all messages should be sent to Munich. Because of the personal relationship existing between CAMBISTA 2 and the AEQUOR II team it would not be feasible to have his present functions re W/T communication taken over by another person, particularly in the United States. If a new team is dispatched in 1954 it might be well to have the CAMBISTA 1 operations officer in the U.S. take over the coordination. However, a clear-cut line of authority should be drawn establishing the functions and responsibilities of CAMBISTA 2 and the U.S. representative in their relationship with KUBARK.

4. Publications. A brief biographical sketch on each member of the publication staff has been prepared by CAMBISTA 5 and will be forwarded in a separate dispatch. This data does not, however, follow the format of the PRQ. It is ridiculous to hold up FY 1954 AEQUOR approval because of lack of clearances on the publications staff personnel. The only person on the staff knowledgeable of U.S. interest and support is CAMBISTA 5. The others (4 persons only) are unwitting as to U.S. subsidy. The publisher gets the money through CAMBISTA 2 and, while never asking from where the support comes, has hinted that he thinks it comes from the Vatican. He has never been encouraged or discouraged regarding this assumption. To approach any of the unwitting staff with a request to fill out a PRQ would be a dead give-away of the true source of the subsidy.

5. Cadre School. Comments on the proposed AEQUOR Cadre School are inseparably corrected with the agent recruitment problems discussed in para. 2 above. Additional comments are included in the recent dispatch concerning the Area Representative program (EGMA-6948).

6. Study Group. The field has received no data on the study group other than the brief reference to it in para. 7 Ref. In order to keep us au courant of developments in the U.S., it is requested that a brief outline of the plan for and functions of the proposed study group be sent to the field. The receipt of such a plan would enable us to talk more intelligently about it with CAMBISTA 1 personnel should the matter arise.

30 July 1953

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