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CLASSIFICATION

EGMA-2820

TO : Chief, EE
(ATTN: Chief, SR)
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

DATE: 5 January 1953

Attn: []

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For info and files	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/ Operational SR/3
SPECIFIC— Summary Review of AEQUOR II Operation:
26 August - 10 December 1952

Transmitted herewith is above report.

[pen]

Approved:

[Signature]

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SUMMARY REVIEW OF AEQUOR II OPERATION:
26 August - 10 December 1952

I. BACKGROUND

Mission

1. To get document intelligence and other operational data and to set up support facilities in that area of the Belorussian SSR bounded by lines drawn through MINSK, BARANOVICHI and OSHMIANA.

Composition of Team

2. The team was made up of:

CAMPOSANTO 4 -- W/T operator and base man;
 CAMPOSANTO 6 -- Outside contact man, spotter, and eventual resident;
 CAMPOSANTO 8 -- Outside contact man, spotter, and eventual resident;
 CAMPOSANTO 9 -- W/T operator and base man.

3. All team members were ethnic Belorussians and members of CAMBISTA 1. CAMPOSANTOS 4, 6, and 9 were former Soviet citizens, while CAMPOSANTO 8 grew up in the operational area, which was formerly under Polish control. With the exception of CAMPOSANTO 9, all had military experience of one kind or another during the recent war.

Operational Plan

4. The team was to be air-dropped as near as possible to the NALIBOKSKAYA PUSHCHA, a large forest (800 km²) 60-odd km west of MINSK.

5. The first two post-drop weeks were to be spent in reconnoitring the forest and selecting a temporary base.

6. CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8 were then to leave the forest and begin reconnoitring nearby towns and villages. In particular, CAMPOSANTO 8 was to concern himself with the discovery of local sources of food for the base men. Both he and CAMPOSANTO 6 were to attempt to legalize themselves.

7. After the departure of CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8, the others were to move to the base. Contact between CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8 and the new base was thereafter to be indirect -- i.e., by dead drop or meetings on neutral ground.

8. During the winter, while CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 9 hibernated at the base, the outside men were to live themselves into their legal cover. They were to engage in no active clandestine work, but were solely to

- a. collect operational data (especially document intelligence), and
- b. develop a wide circle of social acquaintances.

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Reports on a and b. were to be submitted throughout the winter by dead drop to the base. When appropriate, the base would send these reports out by W/T.

9. By spring, CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8 were to be firmly established. They were, by then, to have submitted spotting and evaluation data on several possible recruits. In spotting, emphasis was to be put on persons capable of performing operational support functions -- e.g., accommodation address, courier, safe-housekeeper, etc.

10. In order not to compromise the two residents, actual recruiting was to be done on a flying basis by the base men. The new recruits were also to be run by the base men, independently from CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8.

11. With the air-drop of reinforcements in the spring, two more residents (either CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 9 or two of the new men -- or, possibly, a mixed combination) and the development of the support facilities was to continue. Emphasis was to be placed on developing facilities to support a lines organization stretching towards the Polish border. The possibility of using the established facilities as a springboard for operations into the interior was also not to be excluded. All of these possible developments were, however, to depend on the original team's status at the beginning of the 1953 season.

Communications Arrangements

12. The team's basic means of communication was to have been by W/T. Their W/T equipment consisted of two transmitters-receivers, viz., one RS-1 and one emergency RS-6 (packed for burial). CAMPOSANTO 4 held the basic signal plan, and CAMPOSANTO 9 the back-up plan. In addition, as a secondary means of communication the team had an S/W system. Another S/W system for intra-USSR communication was likewise given to them.

Equipment

13. The team was given some 200 kg of equipment, the principal items of which were W/T, weapons and ammo. The rest of the load was made up of survival and personal items.

II. ACTUAL OPERATION

Despatch

14. The team was air-dropped on the night of 26/27 August 1952 on the southern edge of the NALIBOKSKAYA PUSHCHA. The drop was apparently unobserved, and both the men and equipment landed safely.

W/T Traffic

15. To date, six W/T messages have been received from the team. The first two were sent by CAMPOSANTO 4 on 31 August using the basic signal plan, and the

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other four were sent on 10, 16, 22 November and 7 December by CAMPOSANTO 9 using the back-up plan. Three blind messages have been sent to the team.

Vicissitudes of the Team

16. (Note: The following account is based partially on statements made by CAMPOSANTO 9 in his messages, and partially on inferences and guesses made by the case officer).

17. Within a week or so after the team landed (and in any case before 9 September) CAMPOSANTO 6 left the team to make an extended reconnaissance. During that recce he probably intended to get in touch with a man who lived some 30 km from the forest whose name had been given to him by CAMBISTA 2 as a reliable and patriotic Belorussian. By agreement with the team, this man is known as "Prosy" in W/T traffic.

18. On the evening of 9 September, while reconnoitring, the other three team members ran into a group of "armed persons"; a firefight ensued during the course of which CAMPOSANTO 4 was mortally wounded. Presumably, however, the "armed persons" retreated, as CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 were able to take the wounded CAMPOSANTO 4 with them when they withdrew. CAMPOSANTO 4 died the next day after telling his comrades where he had buried his W/T set and his documents. As a precautionary measure, CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 retreated deep into the forest. It is not clear who the "armed persons" were; possibly they were an army or MGB patrol making a belated survey of the forest after the drop; they may equally have been ~~partisans~~ partisans.

19. After letting things cool down for a while, CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 returned to search for CAMPOSANTO 4's RS- and his documents. They found the W/T set, but not the documents. Among the latter were, apparently, CAMPOSANTO 4's code pads and basic signal plan. Failure to find the basic signal plan is CAMPOSANTO 9's explanation for his use of the back-up plan in his transmissions. Because of CAMPOSANTO 4's death, CAMPOSANTO 8 had to remain in the forest with CAMPOSANTO 9. Two men are needed to operate the W/T set.

20. CAMPOSANTO 6 met CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 by prearrangement on 5 October and apparently remained with them for a while before leaving once more for the outside. In the meantime, CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 built a bunker in the forest. They apparently experienced great difficulty in procuring food.

21. On 7 December CAMPOSANTO 9 reported the coordinates of the team's base. Unless a mistake was made, the coordinates place the base on the outskirts of village on the southeastern edge of the forest. It is possible that he and CAMPOSANTO 8 were driven by hunger to make arrangements for food and shelter with a local peasant. In the same message CAMPOSANTO 9 reported that CAMPOSANTO 6 was "here" but was shortly leaving for MINSK. Presumably "here" means "at the base".

22. CAMPOSANTO 6, in the meantime, had made contact with "Prosy" and given him 10,000 rubles. He was given the names of reliable persons in MINSK and

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NOVOGRUDOK presumably from "Prosyia". On his own, however, he seems to have found a "good man" in BARANOVICHI. On his return from the latter city he gave the recognition phrase for that man to "Prosyia". During his travels, CAMPOSANTO 6 has been in LYUBCH, NOVOGRUDOK, BOGUDENKA ("Prosyia's" village) and BARANOVICHI. He evidently passed through the first two localities on his way to BOGUDENKA.

23. In the last blind message to the field (sent on 10 December) a number of questions was asked about the team's location and CAMPOSANTO 6's travels. The team was also asked to transmit such document intelligence as might have been picked up.

Cleanliness of W/T Traffic

24. Although there have been some disturbing indications in certain of CAMPOSANTO 9's messages, it is felt that we do not, at present, have enough material to make a significant analysis of the traffic in terms of control or non-control. When more messages have been received, such an analysis will be undertaken.

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