

AIR

Security Information

MOMA 10868

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Chief, SR
Chief, EE

11 August 1952

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

REDSOX/AEQUOR

Monthly Progress Report, July 1 - 31, 1952

REFS: MOMA-10293
 " 10483
 " 10495
 " 10593
 " 10661
 " 10688
 " 10708
 " 10753
 " 10754
 MUNI- 9358
 " 9429
 " 9438

Transmitted herewith is AEQUOR monthly progress report for month of July 1952.



Approved:

POG/ayh

Distribution:

- 2 - SR w/2 att. (direct)
- 1 - EE w/1 " " "
- 2 - COM [] w/2 att.
- 2 - MOB w/1 att.

1 Enclosure herewith:
Progress Report.

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SUBJECT: Monthly Progress Report, July 1 - 31, 1952

1. PROJECT: AEQUOR
2. AUTHORIZED DURATION: Indefinite
3. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA:

A. Personnel

- (1) [] returned to duty as training officer with Project AEQUOR in the beginning of July and will remain until despatch time.
- (2) Mrs. Stankevich, wife of the editor of "The Fatherland", was hired as translator of "The Fatherland" and "The Hornet" from Byelo-Russian into Russian. Salary RM 150 per month, plus RM 25 for each issue of "The Hornet", assignments and control handled through Cambista 5. (See MGMA 10661 and MGMA 10754).
- (3) Camposanto 2 was despatched to WH on July 13, and is no longer a responsibility of Project AEQUOR. Camposanto 5 has relocated himself in England, found a job, and is apparently well settled; he is no longer a responsibility of Project AEQUOR.

B. Financial

- (1) Contrary to information contained in the June Progress Report, "The Fatherland" is still and will remain a subsidized sub-project of Project AEQUOR. (See MGMA 10688).
- (2) During July Project AEQUOR assumed financial responsibility for the new Cambista 1 satirical magazine "The Hornet" for a three month trial period, plus payment for the first issue which appeared late in June. Expenses will be RM 600 per issue. (See MGMA 10495 and MGMA 10753).

4. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITYA. Spotting and Assessing

- (1) Requirements. The requirements for Project AEQUOR in the matter of personnel are presently as follows:

4 - 6 agents capable of becoming radio operators for the Spring team(s) to enter training by mid-September 1952.

4 - 6 additional agents (non-W/T types) to complete the Spring team(s) to enter training by 31 January 1953.

Housekeeping couple to replace Cambistas 6 and 7.

1 Cambista 1 representative/instructor to enter duty 15 September and remain thru subsequent training cycles.

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(2) Assessments performed July 1952

- (a) Two agent candidates, Pusevski and Alfer, both negatively assessed. Full assessment reports will be forwarded by MGB Assessment Section.
- (b) One instructor candidate, partially assessed, assessment will be completed upon his recovery from automobile accident injuries.
- (c) At the request of Cambista 2, Pozniak (who had previously been negatively assessed) was reinterviewed by [redacted] and [redacted]. Results confirmed the previous negative assessment.
- (d) At our request, Cambista 2 tentatively questioned Camposanto 7 to determine if his previous failure had been truly caused by inability to face the tower test, or had actually been caused by his dislike of Camposanto 2. Camposanto 7's answer indicated that the former was the true reason, so the matter was not further pursued.

(3) Prospects

- (a) Cambista 2 reports that Camposanto 3 has finally made a full confession of all facts which previously caused his negative Carriage assessment, and that he still appears very eager for an operational assignment. He will be brought to Munich early in August for a full assessment, and it is anticipated that he will prove an acceptable candidate, if his Carriage run proves satisfactory.
- (b) Cambista 2 reports that he has two candidates for agent activity and one for P/A activity spotted in England. The two agent candidates will be brought to Munich for assessment early in August, and the P/A candidate late in August.
- (c) General: There appears to be little reason for optimism in the present European spotting and recruiting situation as now organized. Cambista 2 claims that he has no more present prospects in Belgium, and none in England beyond those mentioned above; he is sending three of his spotters to France early in August to make a determined canvass of the situation among both Cambista 1 and non-Cambista 1 members, but he does not appear particularly hopeful about the results. Cambista 2 further states that he has several names in Germany, which Cambista 5 will check, but doubts that there are any outstanding prospects among this group.

Cambista 2 appears to have made a sincere effort in the matter of spotting, although it has been impossible for the undersigned to get a detailed accounting from him of his actual movements, contacts, or the amount of time he spends on this work. Accordingly, it is impossible for the undersigned to state conclusively that Cambista 2 has done everything in his power to secure agent candidates. It is known that Cambista 2, together with other leaders of Cambista 1, subscribes to the principle that a nucleus of the very best young men in Cambista 1 must be preserved for the day of Byelo-Russian liberation, and hence must not be risked in hazardous

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immediate operations. The calibre of some of these young men presently being held back by Cambista 2 is indicated by a review of the extraordinarily favorable assessments given the three Cambista 1 candidates for the forthcoming P/A school -- Gwirka, Zaprudnik and Margovich. It is not known how many men of similar character are also being held back by the Cambistas.

A number of other reasons for the poor quality of present recruiting, and certain suggestions and recommendations arising therefrom, have been covered in previous despatches (see MGMA 10483, MGMA 10593, and MUNI 9438).

(d) Recruitment in North America: Recommendations on this subject have been separately covered (see MGMA 10593).

B. Political Developments

- (1) Plan "West": The development of this plan has been reported separately (See MGMA 10483). At the present time, Cambista 2 and Cambista 5 have recommended two names to fill the posts of Cambista 1 representatives in England and Belgium; respectively, Alexander MADSON (who will come to Munich in the near future for interviews), and Pawel URBAN (who has previously been favorably assessed for P/A work by MOB). Cambistas 2 and 5 will continue to look for a suitable candidate to fill the post in France. Cambista 5 will begin work with these men as soon as authorization is received from headquarters to move ahead with the plan.
- (2) Plan "Cadre": The development of this plan has been reported separately (see MGMA 10483, MUNI 9438, MUNI 9429, and MGMA 10708).
- (3) Cambista 1 skeleton division: During July Cambista 2 presented the undersigned with a tentative plan which he had developed for the organization of a skeleton (virtually a notional) Byelo-Russian military division. Basically, his plan envisaged setting up a divisional staff and an officers' T/O, and assigning all Byelo-Russian officers, who can be interested in the work, to positions within this T/O. Certain duties would be given to every officer so assigned looking toward the day when the division can become a military fact complete with men, equipment, and weapons. Meetings would be held at various intervals, and a house organ would be founded to keep all divisional officers informed of the progress of the division, and other matters of purely military interest. The division would probably be organized on a regimental basis, one "regiment" being located in each country which has a sizeable Byelo-Russian emigration (including the U.S.). Cambista 2 feels that the organization of such a division (however much a paper organization) would have considerable appeal and centralising effect on the Byelo-Russian corps of officers, and would do much to counteract the disruptive effects within the Byelo-Russian emigration of the Zarechniy/Astrowski (previously reported "Ostrowski") maneuvers.

The undersigned concurred in the soundness of Cambista 2's plan, encouraged him to go ahead with the formation of such a division, and indicated that it might be possible for us to offer financial support to such a project at a later date if such a project is later justified.

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(h) Zarechniy/Astrovski activities: A detailed report on this matter is being prepared, and will be forwarded to headquarters early in August.

G. Recent Developments concerning "The Fatherland"

This subject has been reported separately (see MGMA 10661, MGMA 10688, and MGMA 10754).

D. Recent Developments concerning the Cambista 1 satirical magazine, "The Hornet"

This subject has been reported separately (see MGMA 10495 and MGMA 10753).

E. AEQUOR Team II

All matters concerning the training of the team will be reported separately by []

F. Recent developments concerning the three Cambista 1 candidates for the forthcoming P/A school year

During July, all three candidates -- Cwirka, Zaprudnik, and Margevich -- came separately to Munich for a final assessment interview by [] The results of these interviews were extremely favorable, and have been reported elsewhere (see MUNI 9358). The only problem remaining outstanding in connection with these three is the matter of their final clearances. In view of the exceptional calibre of these candidates, and in order to prevent the deterioration of our relations with Cambista 1, it is hoped that every effort will be made to expedite these clearances so that the three candidates may travel to the U.S. in time to commence the school term.

G. Disposal of Camposanto 2 to WH

Camposanto 2's handling during the first two weeks of July, and final despatch to WH approximately July 13, was supervised by [] in Frankfurt. It is presumed that adequate reports have been prepared by Frankfurt. The sole question concerning Camposanto 2 with which MOB was concerned during July arose as follows: while Cambista 2 was in Munich in early July, he stated, in passing, that he had received a report from an unnamed friend that the friend had seen somebody he believed to be Camposanto 2 "in the streets of a town near Frankfurt". The undersigned intimated to Cambista 2 that this was impossible, but made no flat statements, now knowing the extent of Cambista 2's actual knowledge. The matter was never again discussed with Cambista 2. At the same time, the undersigned instigated inquiries in Frankfurt to determine whether such an occurrence had in fact been possible. Frankfurt's reply was that Camposanto 2 had only been out of ECIC on two occasions, and had been accompanied both times (once by [] and once by a WAC sergeant). Frankfurt's reply also indicated that it might have been possible for Camposanto 2 to have climbed the fence and escaped from ECIC for a short period of time without detection. As any of the above might explain the source of Cambista 2's information, it is impossible to ascertain the true facts without further question of Cambista 2, which appears undesirable. In any case, this incident offers a further demonstration of the unsuitability and inadequacy of ECIC as a secure holding area for cases requiring complete isolation.

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Cambista 5 reports that Camposanto 5 is apparently well settled in England, has a job, and has secured a place to live. The undersigned secured Camposanto 5's new address from Cambista 5, and instructed Cambista 5 to maintain a friendly correspondence with Camposanto 5 in order that we might keep track of him, and be able to locate him if desired.

I. Assessment Reports

During the month of July, 13 summaries of assessment reports of Cambista 1 candidates previously assessed at Munich were prepared and given to Cambista 2. It is hoped that these reports will enable him to increase the quality of his spotting and recruiting work in future. Cambista 2 appeared highly impressed by the reports, particularly the psychological assessments.

5. ACTION PENDING (Field):

- A. Complete re-evaluation of Project AEQUOR, and determination of future **EXCLAIM** relations with Cambista 1.

The three month trial period presented to Cambista 1 early in June comes to an end on August 31. At or prior to that time, Cambista 1 will be presented with our decisions regarding future fields of mutual endeavor and collaboration. (See Para 8 below.)

- B. Interviews and assessment of candidates produced by Cambista 2 for the purpose of fulfilling requirements as outlined in Para 4 (A) above.
- C. Preparation of the remaining summary assessment reports of Cambista 1 candidates previously assessed by **MOB** for submission to Cambista 2 (see Para 4, I above).
- D. Further implementation of plans "West" and "Cadre" (as outlined in appropriate references Para 4, B above), upon receipt of approval from headquarters.

6. ACTION PENDING (Headquarters):

- A. Approval of Project AEQUOR. The initial request for such approval was made more than one year ago.
- B. Forwarding to the field of a Project Outline and basic plan of AEQUOR. Action is requested on this matter as soon as possible in order that the field may determine what type of activity is authorized under this project, and what type requires further authority.
- C. Approval and forwarding to the field of specific authorizations for expenses under Project AEQUOR during fiscal year 1953 as projected and budgeted in the June Progress Report, the present document, and indicated references within the body of these reports.

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- D. Action on plans "West" and "Cadre" as requested in appropriate references (see Para 4, B above).
- E. Decision and action on the subject of spotting and recruiting in North America for Project AEQUOR as requested in a separate despatch (see MEMA 10593).

7. INDICATIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS:

Training of AEQUOR Team II proceeded so smoothly during the month of July that absolutely no problems of major moment have arisen, or appear likely to arise in the short time remaining before despatch. A full report will be submitted by the training case officers.

Recruiting for AEQUOR Team III, as indicated elsewhere in this report and appropriate references, is extremely unsatisfactory.

It is as yet too early to state what effect plans "West" and "Cadre" will have in achieving the over-all objectives of Project AEQUOR. However, it can already be stated that these plans appear to have the wholehearted support of Cambista 4, and to have stimulated the enthusiasm of Cambista 2.

"The Fatherland" continued in July to maintain a negative (although not an overtly opposition) attitude toward the work of the American Committee, and on at least one occasion was guilty of a quite violent Russophobic article. Cambista 4 has promised [] and [] to speak firmly to the editor of "The Fatherland" in order to rectify this situation; the results of his action will be closely watched during August by the AEQUOR and QKACTIVE case officers. If satisfactory results are not obtained, the advisability of more direct action by the AEQUOR case officer will be considered.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS:

- A. With the end of the three month trial period (about which Cambista 1 was notified through Cambistas 4 and 2 at the beginning of June) now rapidly approaching, it becomes incumbent upon the AEQUOR staff, both in the field and at headquarters, to consider the over-all direction of Project AEQUOR since its inception, and particularly since the beginning of the trial period.
- B. At the present time, the activities which are being carried on under Project AEQUOR are as follows:
 - (1) Training of agents for immediate use.
 - (2) Training of certain selected Cambista 1 members for future political work in the ZRELOPE P/A school.
 - (3) Spotting and recruiting in Europe of candidates for the above two programs.
 - (4) Subsidy of "The Fatherland" on a relatively permanent basis.
 - (5) Subsidy of "The Hornet" on a three month trial basis.
 - (6) Maintenance of Cambista 2 on salary as Cambista 1 chief of operations, with particular duties in the spotting and recruiting field in Europe.
 - (7) Maintenance of Cambista 5 on salary, with particular duties as cut-out and permanent Cambista 1 representative in Munich, and contemplated future duties as supervisor of the initial stages of plan "West".

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At the present time, the activities which are being developed under Project AEQUOR for implementation within the coming three months are as follows:

- (8) Plan "West"
 - (9) Plan "Cadre"
 - (10) Expansion of spotting activities of all categories to the U.S. and Canada, to be conducted by a representative of Cambista 1 appointed by Cambista 4.
- C. The question that must be answered by the end of August is, therefore, the following: which of the above activities do we wish to continue either in their present form (in the case of activities 1-7) or their presently planned form (in the case of activities 8-10); alternatively, if modifications of these activities are decided on, what will be the purpose, nature, and extent of the modifications. Although it is not intended to attempt a final answer to this question at the present time, we believe that a short summary of the direction of our present thinking will serve as a useful basis for future decision.

Obviously, the starting point for such a discussion must be a recapitulation of the basic objectives of project AEQUOR. As we see them, they are as follows:

- a. To provide intelligence assets within the USSR by means of penetration operations.
- b. To exploit maximally the Cambista 1 operational potential (i.e. providing bodies and technical information) in support of penetration operations into the USSR.
- c. To develop Cambista 1 as a strong anti-Communist organization that can unite the strength of the Byelo-Russian emigration behind any type of anti-Communist activity.
- d. To influence the policies of Cambista 1 so that they are in accord with U.S. Government policy.

It is clear that these objectives fall into two different categories. Point "a" is a basic DECLAIM objective that is only incidentally tied-in with our present association with Cambista 1, and would remain valid whether or not we continue to work with Cambista 1. Points "b" through "d", on the other hand, relate only to Cambista 1. The basic question to be answered, therefore, becomes in reality three questions, namely:

- i. How can objective "a" best be achieved?
- ii. Are objectives "b" through "d" all desirable?
- iii. In the case of those that are desirable, how can they best be achieved?

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- D. Project AEQUOR has always been almost entirely oriented toward internal operations and concerned with exploiting the Cambista 1 potential to assist in mounting penetration activities into the USSR. Although technically a joint project, the political objectives have never been clearly defined or vigorously pursued; political activity in the project, in fact, was limited, prior to June 1952, to subsidizing the Cambista 1 newspaper (without making any concerted effort to control or influence its editorial policy) as a sort of "quid pro quo" payment to Cambista 1 for supplying bodies for immediate operational use.

From the start, achievement of even the limited internal operational objectives of project AEQUOR has been hampered by two principal organizational weaknesses. The first is the fact that BYCLAIM is possessed of inadequate information concerning the Byelo-Russian emigration as a whole, particularly with regard to specific personalities, strength in various countries, political affiliations and their intensity, actual strength and potential of Cambista 1, and the strength and potential of rival political figures or groups to Cambista 1. This lack of accurate information, or the means of obtaining it, has caused numerous difficulties, paramount among which are the inability to plan accurately concerning the productivity of present activities or the desirability of future alternatives; our utter dependence on the recommendations and conclusions of the Cambista 1 leaders concerning personnel available for various activities (and, corollary to this, our inability to approach or utilize non-Cambista 1 members -- it being highly doubtful that such would be recommended to us by the Cambistas -- in spite of the fact that experience with other emigre groups indicates that the large majority of the emigration are unaffiliated with any particular emigre group); and our inability to mount and maintain adequate CE coverage of the persons and groups with which we are in operational contact.

The second organizational weakness is the narrowness of our contact with Cambista 1. For all practical purposes, we can deal only with Cambista 2, since our sole other contact --Cambista 4-- steadfastly refuses to become mixed up with "operational" matters. The unsoundness of this situation must be immediately apparent; among other points might be mentioned the fact that we have no control over or check on the effectiveness (or even the diligence) of Cambista 2's various efforts; the fact that we are automatically cut off from any possible contact with possible operational candidates who do not happen to respect Cambista 2 (or vice versa); and the fact that we have no place to turn if dissatisfied with Cambista 2 personally (which weakness is well known to Cambista 2) and hence no possible spur to keep him to the mark.

It is also clear that both these organizational weaknesses, difficult as they have been in the past, become enormously magnified at any time that an expansion of activities under project AEQUOR is considered.

- E. With the above explanation, and in order to provide a basis for answering the questions posed earlier, it is desirable to present, in the form of a list, the actions which we feel should presently be undertaken, together with a short resume of our thinking with regard to each. The actions are:

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1. That a determined effort be made to recruit persons other than Cambista 1 members for singleton or group penetration activities within the USSR. In this connection, the possibility and desirability of using persons of other than Byelo-Russian nationality (as, for example, Great Russians, and especially Poles or even Volksdeutsche who may be familiar with the area) should be particularly explored.
 2. That recruiting in Europe of Cambista 1 members for current operations, as it has been conducted in the past by Cambista 2, be virtually halted. In its place would be substituted an immediate recruiting effort in North America to provide agents within the next three months, and a long-range effort in Europe through the initiation of plan "Cadre" to provide agents by the Spring of 1953 and thereafter.
 3. That it become a primary objective of Project ANQUOR to build up the prestige and strength of Cambista 1 as the dynamic and dominant force within the Byelo-Russian emigration. This objective may be achieved by plan "Cadre", plan "West", the "Skeleton Division" plan, support of the Cambista 1 newspaper, support of the Cambista 1 satirical magazine, training of P/A candidates in the ZRELOPE P/A School, and similar activities as developed.
 4. That the Cambista 1 organization be induced to use its strength in support of political and psychological warfare objectives in general accord with United States policy. This objective may be achieved by clearly delineating the desired goals, and then exercising supervision, providing guidance, and maintaining control over all operations from a political as well as an operational standpoint.
 5. That all the above operations involving Cambista 1 be carried out in such a manner that BYGLAIM has direct contact with a diversity of people, each of whom will be responsible for the operation of his own function. As an example, control of the "Cadre" school would be exercised directly through contact with the Director of the school.
 6. That, concurrently with the primary objective of each of the above operations involving Cambista 1, a secondary objective be always kept in mind; namely, to utilize every operation to develop as much biographical, CR, and other miscellaneous information on the entire Byelo-Russian emigration as possible, with the eventual purpose of becoming as independent as may be desired from the Cambista 1 organization in the matter of future approaches to the Byelo-Russian emigration. Plan "West" should be particularly productive from this point of view.
- F. The following is a short exposition of the thinking that underlies the above six points; the numbering of the paragraphs is keyed to the numbers of the above six points:
1. The basic principle underlying this suggestion is, of course, nothing new; it is worth amplification at the present time only because the apparent failure of Cambista 1 to provide sufficient bodies for staffing future projected operational teams brings into sharper focus the problem of providing adequate intelligence coverage of the USSR.

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It should be borne in mind, when considering recruiting possibilities, that one result of the operational concept of the combined "black-base/legalisation" team (which most future AEQUOR teams are expected to be) is a relaxation of the language and "cover" requirements for those members of the team who will be permanently assigned to the black base. This means that a non-Russian, who could never attempt legalisation because of his accent, etc., but whose area knowledge or other attributes (such as W/T proficiency) was sufficiently high, could nevertheless become a valuable member of such a team. This fact assumes importance when one considers the vastly larger agent-recruitment pool that immediately becomes available when one is no longer limited by the factor of nationality.

Teams recruited from such diverse elements would, in all probability, not be suitable for joint work with teams recruited from among Cambista 1 members.

- 2,3,4. If one is dealing operationally with an emigre organization such as Cambista 1, it is not sufficient to deal with separate parts of the organization in an unrelated manner. It is thus not satisfactory to give Cambista 2 some money and tell him to produce bodies for operational use; unless Cambista 1 is strong enough politically to command the willing loyalty of a large membership, and unless it is sufficiently well organized to locate the most suitable of its membership for a particular job, Cambista 2 will have only indifferent success -- as he has. Equally clearly, the handing over of a monthly subsidy for publishing a newspaper is no substitute for a carefully planned and controlled program to maximize the Cambista 1 potential in the field of political and psychological warfare. No activity in which Cambista 1 indulges is without effect on all other Cambista 1 activities; therefore every activity which we wish to encourage should be undertaken as part of a master plan based on a thorough analysis of the total contribution which we wish Cambista 1 to make. Elemental though this statement is, it has apparently never been universally recognized, with the result that after nearly two years of Project AEQUOR, the results that have been obtained are far less than might reasonably have been expected.

We take as an axiom that Cambista 1 is worth working with from both an operational and a political standpoint. Our objective is, therefore, to maximize the operational and political aid which Cambista 1 can offer in support of DISCLAIM objectives.

We visualize plan "Cadre" as providing a central rallying point and intellectual locus for the entire Cambista 1 membership, as well as being a magnet to attract a few of the best of the young members of the emigration and train them for better service in the Cambista 1 cause. At the same time, it will provide a long range pool for recruitment for current operations.

We visualize plan "West" as providing the direction for the principal effort that Cambista 1 will make in the field of political and psychological warfare, as well as providing DISCLAIM with considerable

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information that should be of great value in developing independent contacts with members of the Byelo-Russian emigration outside of Cambista 1. We foresee using the three Cambista 1 members, who are presently about to commence the one-year course at the ZRELOPE P/A school, as regional representatives under plan "West" upon their completion of the P/A course; we expect, of course, that their orientation toward United States policy will be extremely favorable by that time.

We consider support of "The Fatherland" necessary to the cohesion of the Cambista 1 membership, but feel that its editorial policy must be made favorable to the aims of Project QKACTIVE; if possible to arrange, we favor Project QKACTIVE assuming control of "The Fatherland". We consider our support of "The Hornet" as a preliminary experiment in the type of work that will be accomplished under plan "West".

We recommend the cessation of Cambista 2's recruiting efforts in Europe because they are unproductive and not worth the expense. We further recommend the immediate extension of recruiting activities to North America because it is the only apparent source of immediately needed agent candidates.

5. It is our intention to avoid, in the future, the situation that presently obtains whereby one man is our sole operational contact possessing authority to negotiate on behalf of Cambista 1. This situation is unhealthy for us for reasons already stated earlier; it is equally unhealthy for Cambista 1, since it artificially increases that man's power, prestige, and patronage within the Cambista 1 organization to a very large extent, as well as makes him sole interpreter of United States policy and wishes to Cambista 1 -- and vice versa.
6. It is our further intention to avoid, in the future, our present position of complete dependence on the Cambista 1 organization for contact with and entry into the Byelo-Russian emigration as a whole, since we strongly suspect that there are many operational assets among the non-political emigration who would be of great use to us, but whom we shall never locate through Cambista 1 channels.
- G. It is requested that headquarters cable a general reaction to the above recommendations prior to August 31, and follow-up with a more detailed comment by pouch.

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