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SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. MGMA- 10455

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE: 14 July 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/ Operational
SPECIFIC— AEQUOR II Progress Report 1 May - 1 July, 1952

Regulations	Check one!
By Action Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para. by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
By Comments Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Introduction:

1. Submitted herewith is a progress report covering the period 1 May - 1 July 1952. This report covers the events following the cancellation of the AEQUOR I mission, and the initiation of AEQUOR II with the concomitant preparation for a summer despatch.

2. After the collapse of AEQUOR I and while arrangements were being made for the disposal of Camposanto 2, [] took Camposantos 4 and 6 on a leave tour. (It was felt necessary to give the trainees a change of scene from the tension and frustration they had undergone the week before, as well as to afford the case officers an opportunity to reassess the usefulness of the above two trainees for a possible later mission.) There was no doubt that both Camposantos 4 and 6 were affected by the actions of Camposanto 2, i.e. they had tasted the fruits of success in winning compromise after compromise from the Americans merely because the case officers chose to yield rather than to cancel the mission over some petty issue. The case officers agreed unanimously that unless Camposantos 4 and 6 accepted without reservation to abide by and adhere to all instructions given them, then to continue to hold them would present an impossible handling problem. In addition to the handling problem, lack of any control or respect by the trainees while undergoing training would give the case officers no assurance they would follow the operational plan or adhere to any operational requests while on their mission.

3. In a series of post-mortem discussions with [] the case officers undertook the re-examination of our policies vis-a-vis Cambista 1 and the trainees it furnished. In reviewing many of the problems which arose it was agreed a stiffening of our attitude was in order. Cambista 2 was informed by [] that in view of the set-backs suffered as a result of the disposals of Camposantos 5 and 7; the abortion of the AEQUOR I mission and the pending disposal of Camposanto 2, the American headquarters were reviewing the advisability of continuing collaborating with Cambista 1. Cambista 2 was dismissed and told he would be summoned when headquarters had reached a decision as a result of its findings. In the interim the case officers drew up a

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CS Classification: 74-126-44/1 thru 4
JOB: 62-860/35
Box: 11-701: 2

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CLASSIFICATION

74-126-44/1
74-6-333/5

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general protocol entitled "The Conditions Governing the Training of Belorussian Activists for Missions Inside the BSSR" which was to be presented to Cambista 2 as the terms under which collaboration would continue. (Annex A). Cambista 2 reluctantly accepted the general terms and also the trainees' protocol (Annex B, outlining rules and regulations governing the trainees). The trainees when presented with their protocol were given two days within which to carefully digest its contents. Camposantos 4 and 6 both accepted the conditions even though many of the provisions were extremely distasteful to them. However, they felt deeply moved by the performance and subsequent disposals of Camposantos 2, 5, and 7 and felt that they would not fail to carry the banner of freedom to their oppressed compatriots in their homeland.

4. As a precautionary measure to be assured of the trainees' compliance with the protocol, Camposantos 4 and 6 were housed first in the old safe-house for a few weeks, then in a new safehouse in the CSOB area until 15 June. This move was made despite the fact that they were to join Camposantos 8 and 9 as a team for an August despatch.

5. In the meantime Camposantos 8 and 9 were continuing their W/T training which they began 1 April and were making better than average progress in their training. [] the resident case officer, together with [] had in this period initiated a program of outdoor training interrupting the monotonous commo training, with the former officer servicing the daily needs of the trainees. After Camposantos 4 and 6 agreed to the terms of the trainees protocol, [] presented Camposantos 8 and 9 with the protocol for their unconditional agreement, to which they also agreed. The conduct and attitude of both groups of trainees in the following period proved satisfactory and the two groups were joined together prior to their departure on the Grafenwohr joint field exercise.

Planning:

6. Of the various operational despatch possibilities, the case officers more seriously considered the following:

- a. A September drop with all four candidates (at that time we were not aware of the fact the Air Section would go in August)
- b. A September drop with Camposantos 4 and 6 to be followed by a team in Spring built around Camposantos 8 and 9.
- c. A Spring despatch of Camposantos 4, 6, 8 and 9.
- d. A Spring despatch of Camposantos 4 and 6 forming the nucleus of one group and Camposantos 8 and 9 forming the nucleus of another group.

7. While reviewing the various possibilities and despatch combinations -- September or Spring 1953 -- taking into consideration as many variants and factors as possible, we were informed that an early (2-13) August despatch was possible, so we decided to send in all four in August. Some of the factors influencing the decision for August despatch are as follows:

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- a. The agents would have approximately two and a half months or more prior to winter to establish themselves. This was felt to be sufficient time.
- b. There would be at least two qualified W/T operators in the group. This was not true of AEQUOR I.
- c. Camposanto 8 was a native of the operational area and knows it well. In the former team we did not have such a person.
- d. Failure to seize upon this opportunity to despatch the group this August would mean a delay of at least 8-9 months in beginning operations in a vitally strategic area.
- e. The almost certain disposal of present team members who psychologically would be unable to wait until Spring. A certainty in the case of Camposantos 4 and 6, a probability in the case of the other two.
- f. A deterioration of relations with Cambista 1 which would affect future recruitment.

A general outline of the AEQUOR II operational plan is contained in Annex C.

Training:

8. After the decision was reached to retain Camposantos 4 and 6 as part of an August team, they began a program of W/T training using the CSOB/K base training facilities. In the meantime a safe-house in the CSOB area was being furnished and equipped with W/T training equipment to provide an autonomous training site where Camposantos 4 and 6 would move first and begin training, to be joined later by Camposantos 8 and 9. When both groups of trainees were finally brought together, all four individuals seemed to blend well and showed signs from the very beginning of being a well-knit balanced group. The caliber of the trainees was by far the best seen at CSOB/K.

9. Since the time remaining prior to despatch was so short --May - August -- the primary concentration in training on all four team members was and continues to be W/T training. To date [] the communications instructor, and Cargo have been spending full time on the W/T training of all four trainees. In the meantime, [] and [] during the evenings and occasionally breaking into the tight W/T schedule have given the trainees fieldcraft and trade-craft exercises. The out-door training exercises were climaxed by a live parachute jump and a six-day field problem at the Grafenwohr military training area along similar lines to the problem conducted by the AEQUOR I group, with even more gratifying results (ref MGMA-09934, para 31). On the problem, Caceta 1, experienced in living black in wooded areas, participated in the training exercise and contributed greatly by his demonstration of survival techniques and construction of a permanent-type bunker.

10. The training status of the individual trainees is as follows:

Camposanto 4: Because of his late arrival at CSOB/K, Camposanto 4 was trained as an emergency W/T operator and as an assistant to the principal W/T operator during the AEQUOR I mission. However, with the demise of AEQUOR I, Camposanto 4 reentered W/T training where he has concentrated full attention and at present is second to Camposanto 9. Camposanto 4 although slow at times has shown progress in grasping the W/T training. At present he has reached a plateau in his training

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and was surpassed by Camposanto 9 who appears to have a greater aptitude for commo. As part of AEQUOR I, Camposanto 4 has received training in S/W, photography, document falsification, driving, scouting and patrolling and other field-craft subjects which will be reviewed and expanded upon in the present training cycle. In summary, Camposanto 4 on the whole has progressed satisfactorily in his training and is expected to be a qualified secondary operator by despatch time.

Camposanto 6: When Camposanto 6 first arrived at CSOB/K, he was given three weeks of W/T training; however, because it was felt the AEQUOR I team needed specialists in field-craft and survival techniques, he was taken out of W/T and concentrated primarily on the above topics. When training was initiated for AEQUOR II, Camposanto 6 was once again placed in W/T because of (a) the feeling the more W/T operators there would be, the better the chances of communications; and (b) the problem remained of subject's morale if he was not given a full productive program during his training. Once in W/T training Camposanto 6's progress was very slow and it soon became apparent he had the least aptitude. His slow progress may have been affected by a case of latent gonorrhoea he was clearing up, and psychological barriers he was building up in his mind due to the harshness of the protocol provisions not giving him any freedom, etc. [] and [] In a series of discussions with Camposanto 6 suggested the latter drop W/T (2 July). Camposanto 6 objected strongly to the suggestion and pleaded that he be permitted to continue with the W/T. Since the case officers did not want to stymy his interest or lower his morale, they agreed to permit Camposanto 6 to continue with W/T for another week pending notable progress. Camposanto 6 as a former member of AEQUOR I has received more extensive training than the other team members in the non-W/T topics. Nevertheless, as in the case of Camposanto 4, his former training will be reviewed and expanded upon prior to despatch. In summary, it is doubtful whether Camposanto 6 will qualify even as an emergency operator. However, since his primary function will be as scout and group contact man and since there will be at least two other qualified operators in the group, the above is not regarded as a serious deficit.

Camposanto 8: Ever since his arrival at CSOB/K 1 April, Camposanto 8 has been concentrating his full attention on W/T training. To date Camposanto 8 has made satisfactory progress and may qualify as a W/T operator prior to despatch time. In addition to his W/T training, Camposanto 8 participated in the Grafenwohr exercise as well as in a number of other field-craft exercises with Sempland and Brocklane. Callido had also given Camposantos 8 and 9 a series of three lectures on Soviet Actuality, and Caceta 1 had given a series of five lectures on survival to the group as a whole. Camposanto 8's principal asset to this mission is his excellent knowledge of the operational area.

Camposanto 9: Thus far, Camposanto 9 has shown the best aptitude in W/T training and is currently regarded as the principal operator by the commo instructors, even though Camposanto 4 has spent considerably more time in training. He has shown greater ability to grasp more quickly and to apply more proficiently what he has learned than any of the other trainees. On the whole, he has received the same training as Camposanto 8 above and has proven to be the most outstanding trainee in grasping not only W/T but the many other non-W/T aspects of his training.

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Morale:

11. The morale of the group as a whole is rather high. In the past few weeks, however, the trainees have raised the question a number of times of relaxing the discipline as outlined in the protocol. The question of relaxing the discipline has provoked a number of discussions by the trainees with the case officers who were charged with being inhuman and cruel and using the methods of the "MGB". Nevertheless, the feeling of the case officers was not to relax the discipline but to continue along the same line, since yielding on any one point would provide a wedge in the hands of the trainees to demand further concessions. The only problem with the present group arose during the period 10 May - 15 July when Camposanto 6 began suffering from a case of depression. Being a self-confident, independent type person, Camposanto 6 undoubtedly was bothered subconsciously, if not consciously, by his poor performance in W/T, finding himself the least competent operator of the team members. Other factors undermining his morale are his latent gonorrhoea and his objections to the restrictions imposed upon the trainees. After a number of discussions with Camposanto 6, he appeared to the case officers to have unburdened himself and marked improvement was observed in his morale. The arrival of Cambista 2 it was felt would further tend to bolster his morale.

12. In the final phases of preparation, the case officers plan to (a) increase outdoor training, (b) have Caceta 1 prepare a series of additional lectures which he will deliver combined with field demonstrations on survival techniques, (c) have Callido spend a week lecturing and drilling the trainees (see Annex D for a grading of trainees' proficiency in phases of training).

13. In order to expedite the final phases of preparation, the case officers have broken down their functions as follows:

[] Documents, legends, and control signals
Liaison and coordination
Equipment, supplies and training
- Administration, household, and training

Comments:

14. With four weeks remaining before despatch, the case officers are currently intensifying their efforts in the final aspects of training, procurement of clothing and equipment, and the preparation of documents and legends. All the above is progressing according to plan with no difficulties foreseen as yet. The case officers have found (despite the sporadic grumbling of the trainees) that the hardened American attitude as expressed in the protocol has elicited the respect of the trainees and has decreased the handling problem as compared to AEUOR I by a conservative 70%. All in all, the psychological effect of the protocol on the trainees has provided a solid working basis in dealing with the present group of agent-trainees and if it is indicative of the results obtained by a hardening of American attitude, can be suggested for trial in similar cases.

15. For headquarters information a breakdown financial summary is contained in Annex E.

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ANNEX A

Conditions Governing the Training of
Belorussian Activists for Missions inside the BSSR

1. The Government is willing to provide training, logistical, financial and other support to Belorussian anti-Soviet activists within the BSSR because, in struggling to achieve the liberation of Belorussia from the Soviet yoke, the Belorussians are, in effect, helping the Western cause.

2. In order to save lives, time and expense and to promote operational security and effectiveness, the Government, as a condition of its collaboration with the Belorussians in the carrying out of activist missions, must, however, insist on the decisive voice in the planning of all such missions and in the training, equipping and despatch of the activists who participate in them.

3. Knowing that the behavior of trainees while in training invariably has a direct bearing on their behavior while on mission (and consequently on the success or failure of their missions), the Government has set forth a training regimen that is calculated to protect security and to encourage in the trainees those habits, attitudes and disciplines that will help them during their eventual missions. Training officers will be held responsible for adherence to this training regimen by the trainees and are directed to issue such detailed regulations as will ensure full compliance with its conditions. The training regimen is mandatory, and any infraction of its provisions will result in the immediate cessation of training activities.

4. Training Regimen:

a. Discipline:

Trainees are in military status. This means, specifically, that they will

(1) Accept the direction of the training officers willingly and without question in all matters;

(2) Be available for duty at all times.

b. Security:

Trainees will never leave the training premises unaccompanied;

Trainees will in no manner communicate with unauthorized persons;

Inhabited points within the immediate area of the training site as well as such other localities as the training officers may designate are out of bounds, except when the trainees are on duty.

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ANNEX B

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REGULATIONS

I. General

1. Trainees (Kursanty) are in military status.
2. Trainees will be available for duty at all times.
3. Trainees will submit willingly and without question to the direction of the training officers.
4. Any infraction of regulations will be followed by the immediate cessation of training activities.

II. Security

1. Trainees will never leave the training premises unaccompanied by a training officer.
2. Trainees will, under no circumstances, communicate with unauthorized persons.
3. Inhabited points in the immediate vicinity of the training site as well as Munich, Stuttgart, Augsburg and such other localities as the training officers may designate are out of bounds to the trainees except when they are on duty.
4. No wine or hard liquor will be drunk by the trainees outside of the training premises.

III. Working Schedule

Although exceptions may be made by the training officers, the normal day will be as follows:

0700 - Reveille
0830 - 1200 - Work
1300 - 1700 - Work
1900 - 2100 - Work
2200 - ---- - Taps

IV. Finance

From the monies allocated by the U. S. Government for the support of certain BNI activities, trainees will receive a monthly salary equivalent to that of Officer Candidates in the U. S. Army. All personal expenses will be defrayed from this salary, and a part of it will be withheld to pay for cigarettes, liquor and toilet-article rations as well as for certain other miscellaneous expenses. The residue, viz., DM 400 will be paid to the trainees.

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V. Recreation

Subject to the exigencies of the training programme and security, adequate leisure and recreation time will be granted to the trainees-- although not necessarily on week-ends and holidays.

VI. Services Supplied by the U. S. Government

1. Housing
2. A daily subsistence allowance of DM 7
3. Transportation
4. Additional food items, e.g. coffee, tea, sugar, fats, etc., not readily available on the German market.
5. Training equipment, material and supplies--including special clothing.
6. MPC expenses incurred on duty and recreational trips.

Read and Understood:

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ANNEX C

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AEQUOR II OPERATIONAL PLAN

Note: The present Plan is essentially the same as that set forth in MGAA-243.

Personnel: Camposanto 4 (W/T Operator)
Camposanto 6 (Scout and eventual resident)
Camposanto 8 (Emergency W/T Operator, scout and eventual resident)
Camposanto 9 (W/T Operator)

Mission: To collect operational data and initiate the establishment of operational support facilities in the BSSR.

Operational Area: Minsk - Oshmiana - Baranovichi triangle

Implementation of Mission:

Phase I

The team is to be air-dropped during the August 1952 moon-period at the same place as that selected for AEQUOR I. Immediately after assembly and burial of their parachutes, the team will leave the DZ and move into the interior of the forest that is to be their Base Area. By D-Night plus 3 they will have established a temporary base in the heart of the forest.

The first W/T contact will be made as soon as possible and in no case later than D + 4.

The next week or so is to be spent in a systematic recce of the Base Area in order to get the feel of the local situation and select a first permanent base site.

Whenever any of the team members is out on recce, precautions (in the form of safety, danger and recognition signals) will be taken to ensure that his possible capture will not endanger the others.

By the end of the first three weeks construction of the first base and selection of W/T broadcasting sites and caches should have been completed. The RS-6 together with the back-up signal plan will have been cached previously.

Phase II

During the next month, while Camposantos 4 and 9 remain in the Base Area, the other two men will extend the range of their recce to include nearby towns in the Operational Area. Towns close to the periphery of the Base Area will, however, be avoided. Their principal task will be the passive collection of operational data.

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The first man to venture out on longer-range recce will be Camposanto 8, who is himself a native of the Novogradok region.

Initially, the scouts should not absent themselves for more than a day or two at a time.

Later, when they have gained assurance, and if the results of their earlier recce expeditions are auspicious, one of them will attempt to establish himself semi-legally in a nearby settlement and the other will commence the organization of local sources of logistical support for the Black Base. It will be especially important to store up food against the winter.

Once the two outside men have left the Base either permanently (in the case of the resident) or for long periods (in the case of the supply man), it will be moved to a new site unknown to them. Their sole communication with it will thenceforth be via dead-drop. The drops will be serviced by the Base men.

During this phase, in addition to building winter bunkers for living and storage, the Base men will select and report (by W/T) on several widely separated DZ's, suitable for both personnel and freight.

Phase III

With the onset of heavy snows, the Base men will hibernate in their winter bunker. W/T transmissions and dead-drop servicing will continue -- but on a severely reduced basis.

During the winter, the outside resident will concentrate on living himself into his cover. He will engage in no recruiting or political activity. From time to time, however, he will continue to submit (via dead-drop) reports on operational data (especially document intelligence) and on acquaintances and associates whom he considers to be potential candidates for recruitment.

The outside supply man will either attempt to establish himself in the same way as the resident (but in another area) or, failing that, will fall back on the winter Base.

Phase IV

By early Spring, a limited number of local dissidents will be selected for recruitment on the basis of the resident's spotting reports. Potential recruits will be selected in terms of their suitability to carry out operational support functions, viz. cut-out, courier, accommodation addressee, safehousekeeper.

The actual recruitment of any candidate is in no case to be effected by the resident who spotted him, but by one of the Base men -- on a flying basis.

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Through these new recruits a beginning can be made towards the setting up of a secure and viable operational support structure.

Phase V

During the Spring and Summer of 1953 the structure will be expanded through local recruitment and possible through the use of newly air-dropped personnel.

In general, an attempt is to be made to expand the structure westwards, towards the Polish border so that a part of it, at least, may be tied in with land lines crossing that country.

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ANNEX D

SUMMARY TRAINING STATUS AEQUOR II

1 May - 7 July

SUBJECT	<u>C 4</u>	<u>C 6</u>	<u>C 8</u>	<u>C 9</u>
1. Tradecraft	Good	Good	Fair	Good
2. Observation Rpting	Good	Good	Fair	Fair
3. Soviet Actuality	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair
4. Field-craft	Good	Good	Good	Good
5. Weapons and self-defense	Good	Good	Good	Good
6. Physical	Good	Good	Good	Good
7. W/T	Good	Poor	Fair	Good
8. Cryptography	Fair	Good	Fair	Good
9. S/W	Good	Good	-	-
10. Photo (document photography)	Good	Good	-	-
11. Document Falsification	Fair	Fair	-	-
12. Cover and legend	Good	Good	-	-

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ANNEX E

SUMMARY FINANCIAL MEMORANDUM

A. Salary: (Covering personal & recreational expenses Agents)

Camposanto 4	400. DM/ mo
6	400. DM/ mo
8	400. DM/ mo
9	400. DM/ mo

B. Subsistence: 7. DM or equivalent per day

Camposanto 4	210. DM/ mo
6	210. DM/ mo
8	210. DM/ mo
9	210. DM/ mo

C. Salary: (housekeepers)

Cambista 6	300. DM/ mo
7	300. DM/ mo

D. Subsistence:

Cambista 6 plus child	12. DM per day	360. DM/ mo
Cambista 7	7. DM per day	210. DM/ mo

E. In addition the trainees are furnished with:

1. Medical and dental expenses
2. Laundry services and non-food household expenses
3. Recreational equipment, e.g. volley balls, punching bag
4. Special clothing for training purposes
5. M.F.C. expenses incurred on recreational trips
6. Housing and overhead expenses
7. Transportation costs

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