

10 June 1952

Chief, SR  
 Chief, KE  
 Chief, of Station, Frankfurt

REDSOX/Operational

SECURITY INFORMATION

Final Report on AEQUOR I

1. Submitted herewith is the final report on the AEQUOR I mission. The report covers the period from approximately 15 March to 1 May. An account of the events leading to the cancellation of the mission is submitted as an annex.

## PERSONNEL

2. Non-Staff. During the final period, the activists in training for the mission were CAMPOSANTOS 2, 4, 6 and 5. CAMPOSANTO 2 was to serve as principal W/T operator with CAMPOSANTO 4 as his assistant, while the other two men were to be scouts and eventual residents. CAMPOSANTO 5 was dismissed from the training group at his own request in mid-April. Essentially, his resignation was motivated by his reluctance to go on a dangerous mission with CAMPOSANTO 2, of whom he was personally not fond and whose leadership he distrusted. When the mission was cancelled shortly before dispatch-time as a result of CAMPOSANTO 2's outrageous behavior, the latter was also dismissed. In addition to the trainees, CAMBISTAS 6 and 7 were attached to the training group as house manager and cook respectively.

3. Staff. The case officers directly assigned to the training group were [ ] and [ ] as the senior officer, was responsible for the operational aspects of the project (plans, legends, area briefing, tradecraft etc.), [ ] who lived with the trainees in the safehouse — also handled certain operational matters as well as administration and coordination of the training programme, and [ ] because of his special knowledge, was in charge of para-military training and equipment. Of course, there was considerable overlapping of functions. All three officers took turns at the onerous job of escorting the trainees on recreational weekends.

## TRAINING

4. Physical. Until the last two weeks before the scheduled dispatch, an effort was made to give the trainees at least an hour of P/T daily. This consisted of standard military P/T exercises (with special emphasis, however, on

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those useful to parachute jumpers) followed by running for periods of up to twenty minutes. On days when regular P/T was not possible, the trainees played volley-ball instead. By dispatch-time all three of the trainees were in reasonably good physical condition; CAMPOSANTO 6, as a former physical culture student, was best & CAMPOSANTO 2 was adequate despite his heavy smoking and a chronic bronchial condition. CAMPOSANTO 4 caused some concern, however: although apparently strong, he was poorly coordinated, and had consequently suffered a series of sprained ankles, dislocated shoulders, and similar mishaps. He was also ill on several occasions -- although judging from the symptoms of his behavior, it is likely that these illnesses were psychogenetic. Even he, however, was considered fit to make a jump by dispatch-time. In the beginning, all the case officers stoutly participated in P/T, but after a week or so, [ ] [ ] [ ] dropped out alleging the press of other responsibilities.

5. Tradecraft. Because of the nature of the planned operation, considerable stress was put on clandestine communications and less on other aspects of T/C. In addition to theoretical lectures delivered by the case officers and consultants, the trainees were given extensive practice in selecting, reporting on, and servicing dead drops. Attention was also devoted to the use of safety, danger and recognition signals. Some time was spent in the study of eliciting information from unwitting persons, but very little on recruiting. This was deliberate, as the case officers--in accordance with the operational plan--wanted to discourage recruiting--at least until the final phases of the operation.

6. Although they all achieved a mechanical understanding of T/C, none of the trainees mastered its principles or fully accepted the necessity of its application in their proposed operation. This was, no doubt, due to the kind of motivation that impelled them to undertake such a mission in the first place: CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6, especially, appeared largely to be motivated by the simple emotions of hatred and revenge--emotions that are likely to demand an outlet in public violence rather than in the secret stratagems of clandestine operations.

7. Despatch and Reception. Since the trainees had already completed their basic airborne training, they did only brush-up work in this field during the final period. One new aspect of despatch training was, however, taken up. This concerned post-drop orientation. It was realized that inadequate map coverage and poor visibility would combine to make the location of a pin-point DZ by the air crew highly problematical. Instead of using a single DZ, the idea was advanced of using a 10-20 kilometre Dropping Strip along which there would be several possible DZ's. The aircraft would fly along this Strip and drop the activists over whichever DZ appeared most suitable.

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By timing the length of the flight from a recognizable IP to the actual DZ with a stopwatch and combining this figure with the aircraft's speed and azimuth, the activists could arrive at a fairly accurate determination of their ground location.

8. In view of the possibility of a Fall resupply drop, considerable attention was devoted to the various aspects of reception training. After studying the theory of DZ selection, reporting and servicing, the trainees participated in several live exercises, in which they set out flare-paths and fielded air-dropped bundles. In collaboration with the CSOB/K Airborne Section, [ ] developed a simplified DZ reporting form suitable for W/T broadcasting. Minimal training was also given in the use of the URC-4.

9. Fieldcraft and Survival. As the operational plan called for the group to establish a black base, maximal training in fieldcraft and survival techniques was clearly of highest importance. Unfortunately, none of the case officers was versed in these matters, and GACETA 1, the only man who was, was ill during most of the reporting period. The only English-language survival-training materials on hand were a Boy Scout manual and a small Air Force pamphlet. Fortunately, a study prepared by GARCAJGU in Russian and an extremely useful Soviet explorer's handbook, the Spravochnik puteshestvennika i kraevedy, permitted the trainees to do a certain amount of home study. The well-known Spravochnik partizana, however, was available only in an abridged German translation. But even had specialist personnel and adequate training materials been available, proper instruction in this field would still have been difficult, as CAMPOSANTOS 2 and 4 — who were to man the black base and thus needed it most — were fully occupied with their W/T and cipher training. As it was, they picked up bits and pieces of the necessary training in the evenings and during the combined field exercises.

10. W/T and Cipher. Under the direction of [ ] CAMPOSANTOS 2 and 4 satisfactorily rounded out their Commo preparation. CAMPOSANTO 4, who was slated to be an emergency operator, was given the minimal necessary training in condensed form. Even this, however, required his full-time application. He was easily discouraged, and complained that he would be only half-trained in Commo and half-trained in the other aspects of his preparation and would thus be neither fish nor fowl, and, in effect, good for nothing. There was, unfortunately, some truth in this, but under the circumstances, nothing could be done about it. He was, of course, assured that, as an emergency operator, he would play a role of vital importance. As it later turned out, another factor in this matter was CAMPOSANTO 4's secret hope that, as a fully-competent operator with his own signal plan, he and CAMPOSANTO 6 would be able to work independently of CAMPOSANTO 2.

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11. CAMPOSANTO 2, although careless and occasionally absent-minded (once or twice he left his crystals behind when he went on a field problem), had already become one of the most proficient operators trained at CSOR/K. So far as W/T was concerned, he spent the last month and a half in continued practice of his sending technique through on-the-air contacts with LIMBER. These were made either from the safehouse or from the field. [ ] also taught him the elements of set maintenance. Shortly before the group's departure from CSOR/K, a team from LIMBER briefed him and CAMPOSANTO 4 on their primary and alternate signal plans. The introduction by Commo during the last week of a new on-the-air procedure intended to simulate Soviet traffic more closely caused CAMPOSANTO 2 some difficulty as it was radically different from the one he had learned—but this too was satisfactorily mastered.

12. During the final period of his stay at CSOR/K, CAMPOSANTO 2 spent a great deal of time learning his danger and control indicators and in the encipherment and decipherment of practice traffic. The control indicators and case-officer challenges were quite elaborate, and required lengthy study on CAMPOSANTO 2's part — especially as his memory is not good. Since, other things being equal, the Soviets would be in an ideal position to mount a successful playback operation with CAMPOSANTO 2, it was felt that pains should be taken to devise a system of detection-proof indicators and challenges. It is to be feared that those worked out [ ] would not have proven entirely successful in this regard.

13. Shortly before the group's departure from CSOR/K, CAMBISTA 2 (largely at the instigation of CAMPOSANTO 2) requested permission to incorporate special CAMBISTA 1 indicators in the W/T traffic. These indicators, as CAMBISTA 2 candidly admitted, were intended to serve as a guarantee that the Americans were not withholding messages from him and that his messages to CAMPOSANTO 2 were being transmitted. CAMBISTA 2 stated that this guarantee was needed not so much for himself as for CAMPOSANTO 2 and the leadership of CAMBISTA 1, and, as evidence of his own trust of the Americans, he expressed his willingness to give us an advance supply of his indicators so that, in an emergency, messages could be sent in his absence. From the field's standpoint, it was felt that—since we honestly intended to show almost all the traffic to CAMBISTA 2 in any case—there would be no harm in permitting the use of independent indicators so long as they did not conflict with, or vitiate ours. CAMBISTA 2 was told, however, that certain kinds of operational information, e.g., DZ's and flight times, would naturally have to be withheld. To this he readily agreed. Actually, CAMBISTA 2 attached much less importance to this whole matter than did CAMPOSANTO 2, who even wanted to go so far as to include the special heading, "To the Government of the Belorussian People's Republic:" in each message so that no one could later accuse him of having been an American agent!

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14. Photographic. According to the operational plan, one of the primary tasks of the AEQUOR I was to have been the collection of operational data, with especial emphasis on document intelligence. Indeed, this was to have been their only intelligence task. While much of the needed document intelligence could be transmitted by W/T, photographs would, of course, be of even greater value. All of the CAMPOSANTO's were, consequently, trained in the photography of documents under natural light conditions. The camera that they trained with (and that they were to have taken with them) was the Minox, with measuring chain and lightmeter. Although, in some quarters, this camera is dismissed as a toy, tests have shown that there is none better for clandestine document photography under conditions where bulky and elaborate equipment cannot be used. The trainees had originally requested Leicas but, as these demands were clearly not based on the requirements of the mission but simply on the notion that the Leica was well-known, expensive, and hence desirable, they were turned down. It was, of course, painfully realized that document photographs—however excellent—would be of small value unless some means could be devised to exfiltrate them. Even so, document photography was considered worthwhile; some day, perhaps, it might be possible to exfiltrate the exposed (but undeveloped) film by leaving it in a dead drop in, say, BARANOVICHI, to be picked up by a courier operating under officer-on-leave cover from BERLIN.

15. Secret Writing. Under the guidance of specialists from TAD who visited CSOE/K from time to time, all three of the trainees were given adequate training in this subject. CAMPOSANTO 6 spent more time on S/W than the others, as it was to be his sole method of communication.

16. Miscellaneous. At their own request, the trainees were instructed in the driving of automobiles and trucks and motorcycles.

## MISSION PREPARATION

17. Operational Plan. Briefly summarized, the mission of the AEQUOR I team was to have been a) to gather operational data and, b) to begin laying the foundations of a viable, long-term operational support structure in the western part of the Belorussian SSR. The team was to concern itself neither with espionage nor with clandestine action operations. The accomplishment of such a mission requires both a secure base and contact with the local population. Other operations in the past have enjoyed one or the other, but AEQUOR I would have been the first in which both could have been achieved in a black base-cum-outside resident combination.

18. Ideally, such a mission would require at least four men—and preferably five (two base W/T operators, and two or three scouts, one or two of whom

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would eventually become outside residents). When the defection of CAMPOSANTO 5 left only three men there was some question as to the advisability of mounting the mission. But with the arrival at CSOR/K of CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9, a solution was found that would not require abandonment of the original operational plan: CAMPOSANTOS 2, 4, and 6 would be despatched in the spring to lay the groundwork during the summer months, and CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 (who, in the meantime, could complete their training) would be sent in as reinforcements in the fall.

19. According to the plan, the operation was to have progressed by phases. In the early phases, the first team was to set up the black base, reconnoitre the surrounding area, and likewise select and report back on a number of DZ's suitable for fall use by the second team. Later, CAMPOSANTO 6 was to attempt to legalize himself nearby while CAMPOSANTOS 2 and 4 remained in the forest to man the base. After the arrival of the reinforcements, one other man was to attempt legalization. Once established on the outside, CAMPOSANTO 6 and the other resident were to communicate with the base solely by dead drops through which they would send operational data and spotting reports on possible candidates. Recruitment itself was not to be attempted until much later, and then, not by the residents but by one of the base-men on a flying basis. Candidates were, furthermore, to be recruited solely to carry out support functions, e.g., accommodation addressee; and were, as far as possible, to be kept unwitting of the anti-Soviet nature of their work. "Go slowly and travel farther" was to be the guiding slogan.

20. Such, in brief, was the operational plan as it was worked out by the case officers and presented on numerous occasions to CAMBISTA 2 and the trainees. Although local conditions would, of course, dictate modifications, the case officers were convinced that basically it was a good and viable plan; CAMBISTA 2 found it unobjectionable, but as despatch-time drew close, it became increasingly clear that the trainees entertained intentions in respect of their operational activity that by no means accorded with it. CAMPOSANTO 6 was intent on returning to his home area in Eastern Belorussia--an idea that CAMPOSANTO 4 also favored--and CAMPOSANTO 2 seemed interested in settling down in one of the towns of Western Belorussia. None of them was keen on the idea of living in a black base. Here again, the reluctance of the trainees to accept the operational plan can probably be ascribed to a motivation that inclined them to prefer direct action to the dull and uncomfortable life of a forest base. The case officers tried to counter this tendency by pointing out the folly of singleton expeditions on the one hand, and expounding the black base-cum-resident theory on the other. It is likely that the trainees would eventually have been wholeheartedly won over had not CAMBISTA 2 seen fit to suggest during the final briefings that the team need stay in the forest no longer than would be necessary for them to get their bearings. A fear that CAMBISTA shared with the case officers was that CAMPOSANTO 2 would prove as unwilling to accept direction once he reached Belorussia as he had been while in training. CAMBISTA 2 finally expressed himself as satisfied on this

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score; the case officers, however, were not overly sanguine in respect of faithful adherence to the operational plan by the activists.

21. Legends and Documentation. For legend purposes, each trainee's life was divided into three periods: a) from birth to the German attack in 1941, b) from 1941 to demobilization, and c) from demobilization to the present. In general, the pre-war legends presented little difficulty; with suitable modifications, they followed the trainees' actual lives. The wartime and military legends were, however, a more complicated matter as they involved the juggling of several factors. First, to avoid the stigma of political unreliability attaching to those who had lived under German occupation, matters had to be arranged so that the activists were either in the interior when the attack started or were evacuated ahead of the enemy advance; and secondly, conformity with our sparse demobilization information and our even more limited choice of dates and places of issue for post-war civilian documentation forced a Procrustean chopping and stretching of the activists' lives. War-time service in the army was necessary as exemptions were extremely rare for men of the activists' age and would have drawn undesirable attention to them—and, in any case, exemplars of exemption documentation were not available. The military legends to have been used by the team members were all supplied by ZUPPER. Two of them were leftovers that had originally been intended for other agents. In general, the military legends were no more than skeletal, contained awkward gaps, and were occasionally contradictory. Thus, according to their legends, CAMPOSANTOS 2 and 4 had, at one time, served in different units of the same division, but in one legend it was stated that the division had been disbanded five months or so before the time given in the other legend. And, although this was not ZIPPER's fault, collated background material on the war-time organization of the Red Army (which would have been useful to CAMPOSANTOS 2 and 4, who had never served in it) was not available. This lack was, however, to a certain degree made up by several informative lectures given to the trainees by CAVAN.

22. The obligatory issue-dates of the activists' post-war civilian documentation required that they not be conscripted until 1943 or late 1942 at the earliest. This meant that employment legends had to be devised for this pre-mobilization period as well as for the post-demobilization period. In the interests of convenience and simplicity, the legends were arranged so that the activists, after demobilization, returned to the same city in which they had worked before their conscription. The employment legends were made up by the CSOB Support Section and HQ, and were generally satisfactory. The city briefs, however, (with exception of that on CHKALOV which was excellent) were far from adequate in that they consisted of a semi-collated hodgepodge of WRINGER reports, Air Force target briefs, and other, miscellaneous studies and materials. It is hard to understand why properly prepared briefs on Moscow and Leningrad, the two principal cities in the USSR are not yet available. It is felt that if the purpose of city briefs was kept in mind by those responsible for their production, viz., to provide REDSOX activists with the sort of information that a normal resident could be expected to know, much wasted effort could be prevented, and better briefs produced.

23. CAMPOSANTOS 2, 4 and 6 were to have been provided with 1948 pasporta and voennye bilyety from Leningrad, Chkalov, and Moscow respectively. Given the well-known limitations of REDSOX documentation they were excellent.

24. Area Briefing and Study. During the course of their training the trainees read Soviet periodicals and listened to the Moscow radio to brief themselves on current events in the USSR. They likewise studied CARCAJOU's translation of the Controls Handbook. CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6, as former Soviet citizens, had, of course, a basic knowledge of life in the Soviet Union and needed only to be brought up to date on the many changes that have taken place since the war. While CAMPOSANTO 2's knowledge of the USSR was adequate, it was primarily theoretical, and his incurably "Western" attitude made it difficult for him to enter into the spirit of Soviet actuality. Although they did what they could, the case officers, through their own lack of knowledge, were unable to give the trainees a thorough and well-organized course in Soviet actuality—and CALLEDO, the only one who could, was fully occupied with another training group. As mentioned earlier, CAVAN gave several valuable lectures on the post-war Soviet Army and, incidentally, on living conditions in general. It is particularly in the field of Soviet actuality that a Russian-manned press reading, collating and carding service would be of great value. A basic Soviet actuality loose-leaf handbook could be prepared in Russian, and the press service could supplement it with periodical bulletins. Such a service would, of course, also be of great value in the preparation of city briefs and documentation.

25. Aside from the folder Weissruthenien of the Militär-geographischen Anlagen zum Europäischen Russland, there was very little briefing material available on Belorussia. Map coverage of the team's operations area (the Minsk-Baranovichi-Oshmiana triangle) was provided by four sheets of the German 1:300,000 series which is more detailed than the AMS 501 1:250,000 series. The base area was covered by a number of sheets of the GSh RKKA 1:100,000 series. No larger scale maps of the base area were available, and the usefulness of these was impaired by the fact that they were basically fifty years old with corrections made no later than the early 'thirties. At the field's request, HQ performed the extremely valuable service of printing both sets of maps on nylon. HQ also provided aerial photo coverage (unfortunately meager and spotty) that proved valuable to the case officers and Air Section representatives in the final selection of a Dropping Strip. For security reasons the operations area and base area were not revealed to the trainees until the team left the CSOR/K area. Map study of the base area with CAMBISTA 2 (himself a native of it) was interrupted by the difficulties with CAMPOSANTO 2 that led to the cancellation of the mission.



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26. Equipment. The problem of equipment proved to be an extremely vexatious one. On the one hand, the case officers wanted the team to have everything it would need to accomplish its mission, but on the other, definite limitations of weight and bulk had to be considered. To complicate matters further, the trainees' ideas of what they should take with them often differed markedly from those of the case officers. Eventually, however, a more or less satisfactory compromise was reached.

27. Clearly, the most important item of equipment was CAMPOSANTO 2's W/T set. When fully packed for the drop, his RS-1 together with a spare transmitter and receiver, a generator, spare batteries and other parts weighed a formidable total of more than 100 lbs. By all accounts, the RS-1 is a sturdy and dependable set, but surely its weight is excessive. Because of this, the case officers had originally favored the RS-6, a much lighter and more compact set; but reports of its delicacy and unreliability caused them finally to choose the RS-1 as being more suitable despite its heaviness. Here, indeed, is a fruitful field for Commo Research: let them design a set with the lightness of the RS-6 and the dependability of the RS-1. But let them first devote themselves to the even more pressing problem of developing a lightweight generator to replace the Army GN-58, a 26-lb. monster that was never designed for clandestine use in the first place.

28. Once the W/T equipment was weighed in, an absolute maximum of 200 lbs. was left over for all other items; and this still meant approximately 100 lbs. per man—a heavy weight for inexperienced jumpers (even with the XT-10 parachute), and one that could hardly be carried for any appreciable distance on the ground. Ideally 50 or 60 lbs. per man would be a more appropriate load. Since the team was to have set up a black base in a forest-cum-swamp area, the Case Officers tried to include everything that would permit such a base to be built and self-sufficiently maintained on a minimal-survival basis until local sources of additional supplies could be found. Among the items included were cooking and camping gear, ponchos, a survival tent, a rubber boat, weapons and ammo, and numerous smaller articles such as mosquito netting, knives, compasses, flashlights, fishing kits, dog repellent, etc. Many useful items had to be left out to keep the weight down, and still it was high. In the matter of equipment selection, the case officers had to play by ear, so to speak, as none of them (with the partial exception of [ ] was in any sense an expert. The advice of HQ specialists would have been most welcome. The chief arguments with the trainees about equipment arose over the question of weapons and ammunition. The case officers felt that weapons should be used primarily for hunting (.22 pistol with silencer), and if the activists were to take any other weapons (e.g., a sub-machine gun with a purely nominal quantity of ammo), it was to be solely for psychological reasons, since if the team were ever subjected to an armed attack, the operation might as well be written off. The trainees, however, saw the problem in an entirely different light; they were obsessed with the thought that they would be ambushed, and consequently, wanted to take as many weapons and as much ammo as possible—even at the expense of food and other necessary items. CAMPOSANTO 4 was the most obdurate: he insisted on taking 3000 rounds of ammo (at 25 lbs. per 1000 rds.). It took the combined efforts of [ ] CAMBISTA 2 and the case officers to disabuse him of the notion that his principal job was to kill as many Soviets as possible before expiring

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gloriously beside his smoking Schmeisser. Finally, reason prevailed, and a compromise solution was reached—although neither the trainees nor the case officers were genuinely satisfied. According to the compromise, each man was to have taken a Schmeisser, a 9 m/m Browning pistol, and a small 6.35 m/m pistol. Between them they were to have 500 rounds of 9 m/m ammo and a small quantity of 6.35 m/m ammo. In addition, there was a single .22 pistol with silencer to be used for hunting and several boxes of ammo for it. In the opinion of the case officers all of this was still far too much, but in view of the prevailing pre-despatch tension, no further reduction was possible. Later, CAMPOSANTO 4 was discovered to have artfully concealed several hundred more rounds of 9 m/m ammo in his clothes.

29. The W/T apparatus, equipment, maps, ammo, weapons (with the exception of the Schmeissers, which were to have been carried in special Grimble holsters) and money were all packed in jump bags mounted on packboards. Extra Schmeisser clips were to have been worn in special vests and the code pads and signal plans as well as part of the money were to have been carried in Grimble money-belts. Over their shabby Soviet-type clothing, the activists were to have worn modified AF summer flying suits.

#### PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES

30. During the last month and a half of training, combined exercises incorporating an increasing number of the subjects taught were given to the trainees. These included post-drop assembly and parachute burial exercises, dead drop selection, DZ and reception problems, night compass marches and, of course, W/T contacts.

31. To cap off the team's preparation and give them a final dry run that would, as far as possible, simulate conditions in the immediate post-drop period, [ ] and [ ] worked out an elaborate six-day combined field exercise. Aside from its training value, this exercise was intended to test equipment and emergency rations under field conditions, to permit observation of the trainees in action, and finally, to settle the acute problem of the team leadership. The exercise was conducted in the Grafenwöhr military manoeuvre area, and was participated in by CAMBISTA 2 as well as [ ] and [ ]. He and the case officers served merely as observers; once the broad outlines of mission had been given to them, the details of all problems were worked out among themselves. The exercise included everything from post-drop assembly, parachute burial, forced night marches and river crossings to base selection, reception of air-dropped supplies, clandestine meetings, scouting, surprise raids, interrogation and the W/T exchange of enciphered W/T messages with [ ] through LIMBER. All in all, the Grafenwöhr exercise was felt to have been an unqualified success by everyone involved, and at least as far as the present case officers are concerned, it will serve as a model for future training. A detailed account of the exercise prepared by [ ] is included as an annex to the present report.

#### MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

32. It would not be an exaggeration to say that AEQUOR I was plagued by

morale and disciplinary problems almost from the start. As despatch-time approached, crises and flaps succeeded one another with increasing frequency. They took various forms, but all, in one way or another, involved efforts to subvert discipline or exploit the goodwill of the Americans. To some degree, these last-minute crises were brought on by the inevitable pre-despatch tension that affected case officers and trainees alike. In large measure, however, they were provoked by CAMPOSANTO 2, whose perverse and intractable personality would have tried the tempers of men far saintlier than the case officers. But he was not solely to blame; the other trainees were also at fault, and so, indirectly, were the case officers.

33. At the start of the training programme, the case officers—and particularly [ ]—had made the mistake of assuming that a reasonable and conciliatory attitude towards the trainees would evoke a similar response in them. But, in fact, what resulted from this policy was that CAMPOSANTO 2, like Stalin, exploited every concession and compromise and made of them springboards for fresh provocations. In the beginning, the compromises and concessions seemed trifling, but as one followed the other, the case officers eventually found that they had imperceptibly retreated into a position where each crisis admitted of only two solutions: either the mission was cancelled, or, for the sake of harmony and the preservation of the mission, a new compromise had to be made. And since no crisis seemed important enough in itself to justify cancellation of the mission, the case officers swallowed their pride and appeased. Finally, in the flap-ridden week that preceded the group's departure from CSOB/K, the case officers compounded the error of their original attitude by calling in a deus ex machina in the shape of [ ] Once CAMBISTA 2—and through him, the trainees—realized that a plenipotentiary chief was available to settle their problems directly, the already weakened position of the case officers became even more anomalous. Who, after all, wants to deal with subalterns when the general is at hand?

34. To what extent the disciplinary difficulties with the trainees were due to the case officers' soft policy and to what extent to the forwardness of CAMPOSANTO 2, is a question that cannot readily be answered. In any case, the case officers are now convinced that softness and appeasement lead only to disaster—in agent training as well as in politics. They have consequently subjected themselves to this somewhat painful sanokritika in the hope that other case officers may profit by their mistakes.

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Attachment to MEM-A.

Annex to AEQUOR I Final Report:  
Events Leading to the Cancellation of the Mission

1. On 24 April 1952 the training group was moved from the CSOB/K area to safehouse near Munich where they were to be given their final briefing prior to departure for the staging area. The next two days were spent in the study of their legends on the part of CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6, and in final Commo briefing on the part of CAMPOSANTO 2. CAMBISTA 2 arrived on the 25th, and on the night of the 26th, he and the case officers took the trainees into Munich for a last fling.

2. As some ambiguity still persisted concerning the financial arrangements for the team, the trainees requested that [ ] discuss the matter with them in person. He arrived at 1800 on 27 April. Two points were raised by CAMPOSANTO 2, who acted as spokesman: a) the number of rubles to be taken by the team, and b) the question of their insurance and other emoluments.

3. The team had been given a total of 142,000 rubles, or 40,000 rubles per man plus a reserve fund of 22,000 rubles. The trainees stated that according to the calculations that they and CAMBISTA 2 had made, this sum would not be sufficient, and asked that it be increased to at least 50,000 rubles per man. [ ] replied that, although their request might conceivably be justified, the fact of the matter was that there were simply no more rubles available. After some discussion the trainees accepted the situation.

4. The second point was not so easily disposed of. CAMPOSANTO 2 stated that, according to his understanding (and that of CAMBISTA 2 and the other trainees) the U.S. Government would pay \$10,000 to each activist's beneficiary if he did not return from the mission or \$10,000 to him personally if he did. CAMPOSANTO 2 wanted to know if this were likewise [ ] understanding. [ ] replied that it was not and that, evidently, there had been some misinterpretation of the position he had taken in earlier of this matter with CAMBISTA 2. He then once more outlined the provisions of the financial arrangement: an amount equal to the salary of an American lieutenant was to be placed monthly in an escrow account for each activist while on mission, and an insurance payment would be made to the beneficiary designated by him should he not return. He added that, although his Headquarters had not yet approved it, he was confident that they would agree to the sum of \$10,000. (It will be recalled that when [ ] had earlier informed CAMBISTA 2 that he was not authorized to pay more than 5,000 per man CAMBISTA 2 had offered to sign a note for an additional \$5,000. This was, of course, a noble but meaningless gesture as CAMBISTA 1 was the beneficiary of each trainee.) [ ] went on to state that the Americans did not wish to behave like the Germans but sincerely wanted to deal with the Belorussians on a basis of equality. CAMPOSANTO 2, however, was unmoved by [ ] arguments and insisted that the latter agree to the payment of \$10,000 to each activist upon return. [ ] then interjected that this would, in effect, be a bonus--the sort of thing that was paid to spies and hirelings of Wall Street--and that, clearly, the present case was different; he and the other activists were patriots, fighting to deliver their homeland from the Soviet yoke. [ ] still pursuing the theme of equality, added that Americans in Korea, who were fighting as much in the common cause as CAMPOSANTO 2 and the other activists would be in Belorussia, received no bonuses on return. CAMPOSANTO 2 said that he failed

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to see the analogy and still persisted in his demand. [ ] then went on to point out that he and CAMBISTA 2, thinking of the future, had been at pains to set forth the principle of equality in governing the relations between the Americans and CAMBISTA 1. If he were now to relay this bonus demand on to Washington, it might be interpreted in some quarters as an assertion on the part of the Belorussians that, in effect, "Belorussians and Americans are equal, but Belorussians are more equal". Such an interpretation, he concluded, might have far-reaching effects on the question of further collaboration. This statement had a visible effect on CAMBISTA 2 who, no doubt, saw all that he had worked for crumbling before his eyes. CAMPOSANTO 2, however, remained unmoved. The other trainees had, until then, taken no part in the discussion. CAMPOSANTO 4 now announced that he was going to bed. CAMPOSANTO 6 remained but said nothing. It was evident that neither of them sided with CAMPOSANTO 2. Finally, when further arguments failed to impress CAMPOSANTO 2, it was suggested that the three trainees talk the matter over separately. This was agreed to, and CAMPOSANTOS 2 and 6 followed their comrade upstairs.

5. While they were gone, [ ] CAMBISTA 2 and the case officers held a brief conference. It was decided that, for the sake of the mission, CAMPOSANTO 2's demand would be acceded to. CAMBISTA 2 pleaded that this be considered as an exception, and that it not be allowed to affect future relations. To this, [ ] replied that he could offer no guarantee whatsoever. It was agreed to call the trainees downstairs to hear the decision. [ ] warned, however, that he would tolerate no further demands on the part of CAMPOSANTO 2. When the trainees returned and the decision was announced, an effort was made to relieve the tenseness of the atmosphere by having a drink or two and discussing other matters. Shortly, however, to the dismay of CAMBISTA 2 and the disgust of everyone else, CAMPOSANTO 2 announced that there were still a few minor matters to clear up "so that everything would be in order"--a phrase that the case officers had come to recognize as invariably presaging some new unpleasantness. And indeed, the "minor matters" turned out to be a demand that CAMPOSANTO 2's bonus be paid to his bankers in London before the team's despatch! Showing what was (for him) remarkable self-control under intolerable provocation, [ ] patiently explained that for security and technical reasons this was entirely out of the question. CAMPOSANTO 2 then countered with the demand that the money be paid to him personally before his departure. This was absolutely the last straw; and [ ] consequently terminated the discussion at this point.

6. Although [ ] and CAMBISTA 2 continued to argue with CAMPOSANTO 2 until 0400, it was clear that the mission was lost. This was not because of the unacceptability of CAMPOSANTO 2's demands, but rather because of the insolence of his behavior and his egotistical disregard not only for the Americans but CAMBISTA 1 as well had so incensed the other two trainees that any future collaboration between them would have been impossible. Even had CAMPOSANTO 2 changed his mind, the case officers, under the circumstances, could not have permitted the team to be despatched.