

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. MGAA-283

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR Division  
Chief, EE Division  
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *CBJ*

DATE: 1 March 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AEQUOR

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of AEQUOR/CAMPOSANTO Progress Report

1. Herewith transmitted is the AEQUOR/CAMPOSANTO Progress Report covering the period 3 January to 10 February 1952.

2. Copies of training schedules throughout this period are attached as Appendix A.

Att: (1 w/app)

Distribution:

- ✓ Chief, SR - 3 (2 w/att) (*APP. A - ORIG. ONLY*)
- COS, Frankfurt - 1 (w/att)
- CSOB - 2 (1 w/att)
- CSOB/K - 2 (w/att)

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SECRET

Ref. to MGAA-283

SUBJECT: AEQUOR/CAMPOSANTO Progress Report, 3 Jan. - 10 Feb. 1952

1. This AEQUOR/CAMPOSANTO progress report covers the period 3 Jan. to 10 Feb. 1952. During this period two staff members joined the project: [ on 7 January, ]  
on 29 January.

2. Training: In order to prepare the trainees for the forthcoming spring dispatch the AEQUOR case officers at CSOB/K formulated a Master Training Program, which will be forwarded under separate cover, within the framework of the training capabilities at CSOB/K. Because of the complexity of the mission (see Mission Plan, KAUFFG-569) specialization in certain fields needed by individual members for the mission, the arrival of trainees at successive dates and the time allotted for training prior to dispatch, the training had to be broken down into three levels of instruction.

Since CAMPOSANTO 2 will be the only W/T operator, his training is continuing along these lines. At the same time CAMPOSANTO 4 was selected to continue W/T instruction on a full time basis in an attempt to prepare him as an emergency W/T operator. The general feeling among the case officers was that at least two individuals should be familiar with W/T in the event anything happened to the principal W/T operator. The communications section agreed to train CAMPOSANTO 4 as an emergency operator capable of transmitting a signal or warning but declined to commit themselves further because of the short period of time remaining, before the estimated dispatch date.

The remaining two CAMPOSANTOs are to concentrate on the non-W/T aspects of training and specialize in fieldcraft and survival techniques. For a more specific breakdown, see the weekly training schedules (Appendix A).

On 28 January the CAMPOSANTO team (with the exclusion of the fourth team member, CAMPOSANTO 7, who was to arrive on the 29th of January) embarked upon the intensive training plan as laid down by the case officers. The first week of intensive training also marked the beginning of the airborne training which disclosed the unsuitability of CAMPOSANTO 7 for the mission and his ultimate disposal. The details of CAMPOSANTO 7's disposal are discussed below in Special Problems.

On the whole, the training of CAMPOSANTOs 2, 4, 6 and 7 (excluding the airborne training of CAMPOSANTO 7) indicated a satisfactory performance by the trainees in every aspect of the major fields of preparation. All trainees applied themselves energetically during the day and contributed to the evening discussions as outlined in the training schedule. CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 7 applied themselves particularly well in their field work.

3. Morale: On the whole, morale of the group was high during the reporting period. A transitional period passed during which the group members were a bit apprehensive about, but reserved judgment on, the new arrivals prior to and immediately after their arrival.

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However, all individuals rapidly adjusted themselves to their new surroundings and the task at hand. No doubt the meeting with CAMPOSANTOs 2, 4, 6 and CAMBISTA 2 bolstered the morale of the trainees considerably. At the request of the case officers, CAMBISTA 2 spoke with CAMPOSANTO 2 privately regarding his conduct and responsibilities toward the other trainees and Americans working with him.

4. Personnel:

a. CAMPOSANTO 2: During this reporting period CAMPOSANTO 2's rapport with the case officers had undergone a perceptible change resulting in a series of minor problems. As far as can be determined the present series of problems began with CAMPOSANTO 2's insistence to see his fiancée over the Christmas holidays. At the time the problem was overcome by the case officer, [redacted] with the subject's agreement not to see his fiancée, but the subject has been subsequently more difficult to handle, resulting in opposition on his part to suggestions of the case officers. To date all such minor problems have been thrashed out with CAMPOSANTO 2 to the satisfaction of both parties concerned. In this connection earlier morale problems connected with his fiancée have not been mentioned by CAMPOSANTO 2 (since the holiday incident) and likewise have not been mentioned by the case officers.

The case officers, after a careful review, came to the conclusion that the leadership of the group would have to be given to CAMPOSANTO 2. Some of the reasons prompting this decision are:

- (1) CAMPOSANTO 2's longevity at CSOB/K;
- (2) CAMPOSANTO 2's educational and middle class background;
- (3) an implied commitment made to the subject earlier by CAMBISTA 2;
- (4) the absence of any other trainee with outstanding leadership abilities; and
- (5) probably the biggest factor, i.e., he would not subordinate himself to any other selected leader with the possible exception of CAMBISTA 2 or someone of similar stature. (If CAMPOSANTO 2 would reject a subordinate role, and this the case officers unanimously agree upon, the spring dispatch would have to be cancelled since he is the only W/T operator.

Faced with the fact that CAMPOSANTO 2 will have to be the leader for the above-mentioned reasons, the case officers embarked upon an ambitious program of developing leadership traits in the subject. Discussions were held frequently pointing out the need for a revision of his conduct in places, developing a greater spirit of camaraderie among the other team members, closer cooperation with the case officers, etc. Actually, CAMPOSANTO 2 presented more problems to the case officer

in securing his individual cooperation and support than any of the other team members. After each discussion with the case officers CAMPOSANTO 2 pledges full cooperation and generally agrees with the case officers' reasoning. It is expected that through frank discussions with the subject a modus operandi will be reached to the satisfaction of both parties. On the whole, from the training viewpoint, CAMPOSANTO 2's conduct can be considered satisfactory.

b. CAMPOSANTO 4: Thusfar CAMPOSANTO 4 has proven the most cooperative and the most willing to accept the guidance and direction of the case officers. While skiing at Garmish on 27 January, CAMPOSANTO 4 sprained his shoulder which hindered his participation in physical activity. However, he continued with his W/T and other non-exerting aspects of training. CAMPOSANTO 4 has seriously applied himself to his training.

c. CAMPOSANTO 6: Subject arrived at CSOB/K on 3 January according to plan and began training the following day. Basically, subject is an intelligent, friendly, solid type of individual and, on the whole, receptive to guidance and direction by the case officers in his training. Subject, feeling confident at times, possesses the "know-it-all" attitude which the case officers are gradually bringing under control. Subject also has willingly accepted the guidance and direction of the case officers in training.

d. CAMPOSANTO 7: When CAMPOSANTO 5 failed to appear on 3 January as earlier agreed upon, efforts were made to replace the needed fourth man on the team resulting in the recruitment of CAMPOSANTO 7. A meek, shy, inoffensive looking individual possessed with an alert, inventive mind, subject probably possessed more of the characteristics desired in a candidate for dispatch than any other trainee in the AEQUOR group. In the two weeks during which he underwent training subject grasped quickly the fundamentals and successfully applied them in the field. However, because of his unacceptable performance in his airborne training he was recommended for disposal (see details below).

5. Administration: The administrative support given the project during the reporting period was satisfactory with a few exceptions. The trainees, no less the case officers responsible for their training, never did receive warm outer garments for winter outdoor training. These garments, however, were not immediately procurable. An earlier request made for a winterized jeep needed to drive under winter conditions is still pending.

6. Special Problems:

a. One of the most significant developments in this reporting period was the disposal of CAMPOSANTO 7. As mentioned earlier, CAMPOSANTO 7 arrived on the 29th of January and began training on the following day. As outlined in the Operational Plan (MGAA-243) CAMPOSANTOs 6 and 7 were to act as contact men for the team on their mission. The case officers were in agreement that CAMPOSANTO 7 had the needed qualifications for his assigned duty, and the brief period he spent in training substantiated this feeling of his suitability. Because of

CAMPOSANTO 4's ski injury (27 January) the airborne training officer, [redacted] recommended that the airborne training be postponed during the week 28 Jan. - 2 Feb. in order to keep the trainees together in one group. The following week on 4 February [redacted] felt after preliminary preparation that the trainees were physically and psychologically prepared for the jump tower. On 6 February after prior familiarization, the trainees were led to the jump tower. No difficulty was encountered with CAMPOSANTOs 2, 4, and 6, all of whom jumped. However, CAMPOSANTO 7 balked and refused to jump despite the reassurance and examples of the other trainees and case officers who jumped before him. Efforts were made that evening to restore subject's confidence. The following day (7 Feb.) [redacted] chief of the airborne section attempted to induce the subject to jump, but the latter, visibly frightened and totally beaten, refused once again to jump. Another attempt was made on 8 February but subject refused to even ascend to the jump tower. In view of the unsatisfactory performance in his airborne training, [redacted] and [redacted] recommended subject's disposal for the following reasons:

- (1) Although the man may be induced to jump, he may balk on the plane, bringing about serious consequences on the successful dispatch of the others and the mission plan.
- (2) If he would leave the plane, he would be in such a state of terror he would be apt to injure himself on hitting the ground.
- (3) Continuing to keep him with the others aware of his not having jumped would have repercussions on the morale of the other team members.

In view of the above facts the case officers felt it prudent to dispose of the subject rather than jeopardize the forthcoming mission. On 9 February [redacted] after consultation with CAMBISTA 2, turned CAMPOSANTO 7 over to the custody of CAMBISTA 2 and other members of CAMBISTA 3 who would secure employment for the subject in Belgium and keep him under CAMBISTA 3 control there. Immediate steps were taken to have CAMPOSANTO 5 replace CAMPOSANTO 7. (CAMPOSANTO 5 arrived 18 February to replace subject.)

b. On 1 February CAMBISTAs 6 and 7 together with their 5-yr. old son arrived at the CAMPOSANTO quarters to assume their new duties as housekeepers for the CAMPOSANTOs. During the period under observation by the case officers CAMBISTAs 6 and 7 performed their duties satisfactorily and expressed a willingness to cooperate in every detail. They have expressed a desire to emigrate to the United States and hope that satisfactory performance of their work will prompt some assistance from the case officers in this regard.

c. As mentioned above, on 7 January a meeting was held with CAMBISTA 2, [redacted] and [redacted] reaffirming earlier agreements and the scope of U.S.-BNR cooperation. Specifically, CAMBISTA 2 was requested to:

- (1) be more selective in spotting candidates;
- (2) continue efforts to furnish a native instructor;

(3) accept responsibility for the ideological training of the trainees;

(4) consider appointing a plenipotentiary to represent himself if he were not available;

(5) lecture to the trainees on their duties and responsibilities vis-a-vis the case officers; and

(6) try to see the trainees about once a month. CAMBISTA 2 was given a general idea of the operational plan and the projected phases of training as outlined in the MTP (Master Training Program). CAMBISTA 2 later that afternoon visited the trainees at the trainees' living quarters where he conducted the above-mentioned meeting.

[

] *JK*