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987 CMGWU26 February 1952

SUBJECT: REDSOX/AEQUOR

Progress Report covering period 15 Oct. 1951 - 16 Feb. 1952

TO: Chief, ZACACTUS
Washington, D.C.INFO: Chief of Mission
Frankfurt, Germany

ATTN: []

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1. Attached herewith is [] latest progress report on the AEQUOR project. We believe it to be an excellent operational report which fully reveals the broad range of this project and the very real capabilities which it has for expansion in a variety of directions.

2. Our relationship with the BNR has thus far been relatively profitable in the number of well qualified agents that have been obtained for penetration operations. The difficulty thus far has been the high percentage of rejects. These percentage figures should not be regarded with too much discouragement, however, when it is balanced against the results of other projects, and in addition when one remembers the very high degree of qualifications which have been demanded from these candidates during their CAP assessment. In connection with the CAP assessment and the suggestions made re its improvement in Paragraph 7B of the attachment, it should be noted that these steps can now be expedited by CSOB since the responsibility for ELOPE REDSOX recruitment has come under our control.

3. Re the expansion of the AEQUOR project in Western Europe, referred to in the attachment as AEQUOR/WEST, the suggested utilization of CAMBISTA 2's organization covers a variety of purposes in which both the SR and EE Divisions should be interested. With Germany being rapidly exhausted as a recruiting ground, even for current operations, it is clear that our attention must be focused on Western Europe and/or the United States. In point of fact all of the current AEQUOR agent candidates have been recruited from Western Europe. The difficulty with the process thus far has been that we have been unable to screen the agent candidates at the source, and the suggestions made in the attachment are designed to improve this defect.

4. The potential of CAMBISTA 2's various national groups in Western Europe in the field of psychological and political warfare and propaganda appear to be reasonably obvious and the support of this potentiality would be regarded by CAMBISTA 2 as a satisfactory political "quid pro quo" for his continuing supply of agent candidates.

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5. In any case it is clear that to implement any part of AEQUOR/WEST it will initially be necessary to coordinate through the Western Europe Division [] in the various countries named in the attachment for the purpose of establishing [] contact. initially through [] but possibly later through [] with the local branch of CAMBISTA 1. Since such coordination will require aggressive Washington action, we are very anxious to have your reaction to the suggestions made in Paragraph 7C at the earliest possible time with some indication of when, if approved by you, such action can be taken.

[]

RSP/ayh

Distribution:

- ✓ 3 - ZACACTUS, Washington w/Encl.(in trip.)
- 3 - Chief of Mission, Frankfurt w/Encl.
- 2 - CSOB w/Encl.
- 1 - SGHOLDEN w/Encl.

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Enclosure to CAMBIU 98

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AEQUOR PROGRESS REPORT

16 FEB. 1952

COVERING PERIOD: 15 OCT. 1951 - 16 FEB. 1952

1. RESULTS OF CAMBISTA 2 SPOTTING:

CAMBISTA 2 has furnished us to date with a total of 64 names of Belorussians for assessment by CAP (Combined Assessment Program CSOB/ZRELOPE). Of this number, 50 are located in England, 10 in Belgium, 3 in France and 1 in Spain. Name traces have been initiated on all, with negative returns received on all except for 4 recent additions, about which results are not yet known.

2. RESULTS OF CAP ASSESSMENT:

a. Number of candidates assessed by CAP to date:

Since the initiation of CAP on 15 October 1951, a total of 29 candidates spotted through CAMBISTA 2 channels have been assessed by CAP.

b. Qualifications of assessed candidates:

Type A (qualified for immediate agent training):	3
Type B (qualified for PA training)	: 5
Type C (qualified for PM training)	: 4
Type D (rejects)	: 16

In addition to the above, one candidate (CAMBISTA 5) was assessed and found suitable for liaison/cutout functions, and another candidate (CAMPOSANTO 6) was assessed outside of CAP and recruited for immediate agent training.

c. Breakdown of rejects:

Physical unfitness	: 4
Questionable motivation/undesirable characteristics:	7
Below average intelligence	: 5

3. PRESENT AGENTS SITUATION:

a. Agents recruited between 15 November 1951 and 30 January 1952:

CAMBISTA 5, CAMPOSANTOS 4, 5, 6 and 7.

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b. CAMBISTA 5 Status:

Subject has performed satisfactorily as leg man and CAMBISTA 1 representative vis a vis candidates appearing in Munich for assessment. His other duties have been: translations of CAP test-administration material; transmittal in and out of England of candidates and agents travel documents for application therein of Combined Travel Board entry permits; transmittal of funds to the CAMBISTA 1 organization in England to cover the expenses of candidates traveling to Munich for assessment.

c. CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6 Status:

Subjects have begun training on 14 January.

d. CAMPOSANTO 7 Status:

Subject was assessed and recruited during the week of 11 January 1952. He was instructed to return to England to settle his personal affairs and was summoned back to Munich for training on 29 January 1952. Subject began training on 30 January 1952. On 7 February, [] was notified by MAT that subject had refused to jump off the parachute tower during the last three days. CAMBISTA 2, who was conferring with [] in Munich at the time, was informed of this fact, and urged [] to make a last effort to persuade CAMPOSANTO 7 to jump. In the event this failed, CAMBISTA 2 agreed to make every effort to dispose of CAMPOSANTO 7 in the most secure manner. Various disposal methods were discussed based on the necessity of sealing off CAMPOSANTO 7 from outside contacts, at least during the period prior to dispatch of AEQUOR Team One. In spite of the difficulties involved in conducting a full surveillance job on CAMPOSANTO 7 for about three months, CAMBISTA 2 felt that he could successfully seal CAMPOSANTO 7 off by throwing him in the midst of the CAMBISTA 3 elite in Louvain, assigning a team of men to take turns in keeping CAMPOSANTO 7 under 24 hours observation. On 8 February 1952 [] went to MAT and failed to talk CAMPOSANTO 7 into jumping. Inquiries with CAMPOS 2, 4 and 6 failed to reveal any clues either absolving or condemning CAMPOSANTO 7 as a possible penetration agent. The CAMPOSANTOS seem to think that he merely chickened out. This opinion is also held by CAMBISTA 5 who later handled the subject. Disposal methods were discussed with [] and [] It was decided that the rigorousness of 24 hours surveillance on CAMPOSANTO 7 could encourage him to blow information known to him in view of subsequent sourness and resentment. While abiding to the original concept of isolating CAMPOSANTO 7 within the CAMBISTA 3 complex in Belgium, it was recommended that he be handled on the

basis of his cooperation, willingness and loyalty to CAMBISTA 1 and 2. [] was instructed to take charge of CAMPOSANTO 7 on that same day and to arrange for his disposal. Subject was turned over to CAMBISTA 5 during the night of 8 February 1952 with instructions not to leave each other for a minute until further notice. On 9 February 1952, [] briefed both men on the security hazards involved in the situation, stressing extreme carefulness and the necessity of avoiding all outside contacts while CAMPOSANTO 7 was still in Germany. The unavoidability of temporarily restricting CAMPOSANTO 7's whereabouts was explained to him, and his proposed stay in Belgium was presented to him as an organizational haven for substitute activities, where he would be expected to prove himself a conscientious organizational worker under the patronage and guidance of experienced CAMBISTA 3 activists. CAMBISTA 5 was taken aside and briefed on the situation as seen by us and CAMBISTA 2, and was instructed to assume full responsibility for CAMPOSANTO 7's custody while en route to Belgium. Since CAMPOSANTO 7 holds a British travel document, it is impossible for him to obtain a Belgian entry visa outside of England. In view of this fact, CAMBISTA 5 was instructed to escort CAMPOSANTO 7 to London, obtain a Belgian visa for him, escort him to Belgium and deliver him along with our disposal recommendations to CAMBISTA 2. Both men left on the first leg of their trip on 11 February 1952.

e. CAMPOSANTO 5 Status:

Subject was assessed and recruited during the week of 10 December 1952, and was instructed to report to Munich for training on 2 January 1952. Subject failed to report on that date. CAMBISTA 2 was questioned on the matter on 4 January 1952 and stated having seen CAMPOSANTO 5 in England o/a 25 December 1951. According to CAMBISTA 2, CAMPOSANTO 5 had reconsidered his availability for immediate operations on the grounds that he considered himself better qualified for war time use due to his purely military background. In order to obtain first-hand information on the matter, a telegram was sent to CAMPOSANTO 5 requesting him to come to Munich for discussions. Subject appeared in Munich on 11 January 1952. During extensive conversations with [] subject accounted for his change of heart in a manner which seemed to indicate that he was genuinely eager to serve his fatherland in any capacity, providing he felt convinced that he was qualified to do the job at hand. Subject was repeatedly encouraged to admit the existence in his mind of such positive factors as fear, disinterest, organizational apathy or conflicts. Subject stolidly clung to his initial argument. After reaching, and waddling in, a stalemate of reiterations, it was decided to present subject with a direct, clear-cut and final proposition. Subject's present qualifications for immediate operations were firmly and clearly explained to him. He was told that we would make it our business to equip him with additional qualifications before we would consider sending him out on his mission. The importance of subject's contribution in enlisting in immediate operations, as well as the prevailing urgent need for his services, were stressed to him. Finally, decision was left to CAMPOSANTO 5 to reconsider the whole issue in the light of the above statement of facts, and to come up with whatever decision he saw fit, as long as it could be termed final by all concerned. Subject decided to accept our proposal

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and put himself at our disposal for immediate training after having settled his personal affairs in England. Subject arrived at this decision with what appeared to be absolute determination and unquestionable conviction. Subject left for England on 15 January 1952 with instructions to report to Munich immediately when summoned. No definite date was set due to the fluid state of AEQUOR operational planning which then prevailed. However, subject was informed that he was to consider himself alerted as of 25 February 1952. As a result of subsequent operational planning, it was decided to keep CAMPOSANTOS in reserve until the formation of AEQUOR Team Two, but due to the afore-mentioned CAMPOSANTO 7 situation, decision was made to summon CAMPOSANTO 5 immediately to replace CAMPOSANTO 7 in AEQUOR Team One. A telegram summoning CAMPOSANTO 5 was sent him on 9 February 1952, to which he answered that he will arrive in Munich to commence training on 18 February 1952.

f. Additional AEQUOR personnel:

A safe-house-keeper couple (CAMBISTA 6 and 7) have been assessed during the week of 14 January 1952 and began keeping house for the CAMPOSANTOS on 30 January 1952.

4. GENERAL SPOTTING SITUATION:

a. Situation in England:

The relatively large output of candidates for assessment emanating from England is apparently due to the strong organizational structure of Belorussians in that country. The Association of Belorussians in Great Britain and affiliated organizations are assisting candidates slated for assessment in Munich in matters of visas and finances under organizational cover. CAMBISTA 2 went to England in December 1951 and reported that spotting of agent candidates as well as PA and PM candidates will continue at an even pace.

b. Situation in France:

According to CAMBISTA 2, the poor results of spotting in France are due to the scattered and organizationally uncoordinated state of local Belorussians. As a matter of fact, CAMBISTA 2 has never come up with a satisfactory explanation regarding this situation. It is conceivable that his rapport with the leaders of Belorussian organizations in France is bad, or that the local leaders may disapprove of militant activities in general and spotting for assessment by a foreign power in particular. The fact remains that considerable progress should be achieved in this field in France with or without CAMBISTA 2's help.

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c. Situation in Belgium:

Aside from an undetermined number of Belorussian coal miners, this country is the center of Belorussia's promising young men with a political future. CAMBISTA 2's organizational entourage consists of about a dozen bright, active and politically devoted young students, whom CAMBISTA 1 plans to preserve as the leaders of a potentially CAMBISTA 1-ruled Belorussia. These young men are responsible for the bulk of AEQUOR spotting, and four out of five thus far assessed by CAP have qualified for PA spotting. Of the less brilliant element among Belorussians located in Belgium, two (CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6) have been recruited for agent training. Spotting is continuing among coal miners, and if pressure is applied on CAMBISTA 2 it is conceivable if not probable that he may throw in one or two of his prize young men for agent training.

5. RAPPORT WITH CAMBISTA 2:

Rappert with CAMBISTA 2 in the past two months has fluctuated between good and excellent. It is felt that CAMBISTA 2 has little if any reason to be dissatisfied with our mutual dealings. It appears to the undersigned that we have faithfully lived up to our commitments and that we have shown efficiency, diligence, promptness, basic honesty and consideration in all aspects of our work with CAMBISTA 2. Other than our disposal of CAMPOSANTO 3, which is and probably will remain a sore point, there can be no major wrong with which CAMBISTA 2 could charge us. The danger point of our relations with CAMBISTA 2 have always had to do with situations which in his estimation were a threat to his political grandeur vis a vis CAMBISTA 1. His fear of anything that may mar him in the eyes of the CAMBISTA 1 gallery has on several occasions led him to wield the now tiresome threat of immediate resignation. Per example, if he instructs six PM or PA candidates in London to report to Munich for assessment on 7 January, in spite of the fact that he had been clearly instructed to reserve that week for the assessment of agent candidates only, he will insist on having the group he chose go through assessment, in disregard of the difficulties and contre temps he is thus causing us. This type of situation arises from CAMBISTA 2's sloppiness in committing himself in order to appear grand in CAMBISTA 1 political circles. It is the estimation of the undersigned that repeated concessions on our part will only tend to encourage his tendency in this direction and will make future dealings increasingly difficult. This is why, whenever concessions on our part seemed unavoidable, they have been made to appear as major problems overcome with great difficulty and through considerable efforts from us on his behalf. As a result of this, it is felt that CAMBISTA 2 has confined his independent commitments and improvisations to a minimum, thus operating with a reasonable dependence upon our approval and general supervision.

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CAMBISTA 2 has been cooperative and sensible in matters regarding our handling and control of the CAMPOSANTOS. It is felt that he will effectively assist the case officers in charge of AEQUOR training to maintain order and discipline, and inject the CAMPOSANTOS with the necessary political and morale-building stimulation through monthly visitations.

6. ACTION PENDING:

a. Spotting for AEQUOR Team Two:

On 8 February 1952 CAMBISTA 2 was informed of the necessity to have a minimum of two agents in W/T training by 15 March 1952 at the latest, if AEQUOR Team Two was to become a reality. The additional complement of two or three men could be assessed and recruited in July or August. CAMBISTA 2 left for Belgium, France, England and Spain on 9 February 1952, in an effort to produce four or five agent-candidates for assessment on 3 March 1952. He will report the results of his trip on 21 February 1952.

b. Projected expansion of CAMBISTA 1 assets in Western Europe:

During conferences with CAMBISTA 2 in January 1952, the entire gamut of past and present AEQUOR activities were reviewed in an attempt to improve the results of our present efforts and expand beyond the current framework of our activities. Taking as a basis the present need for intensified anti-Soviet actions in Europe, the following project tentatively cryptonamed AEQUOR/WEST was conceived and exposed to CAMBISTA 2:

- (1) Spot, assess, recruit and train high level CAMBISTA 1 members in England, France, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Denmark and Italy, to initiate, develop and carry out the following activities in their countries of residence:
 - (a) Spotting, preliminarily assessing and routing to us of agents, PM and PA candidates.
 - (b) Gathering a network of letter-drops in current contact with the BSSR.
 - (c) Reporting on strength, location, political leanings, personalities, activities, affiliations and IS contacts of local emigre groups.
 - (d) Infiltration of CP dominated emigre groups.
 - (e) Observing, analyzing, tabulating and reporting on methods, channels and scope of Soviet propaganda for counter action.

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- (f) Writing, printing and distributing anti-Soviet leaflets.
- (g) Designing, printing and posting anti-Soviet posters.
- (h) Editing, printing and distributing anti-Soviet publications.
- (i) Activating, organizing and participating in anti-Soviet demonstrations.
- (j) Spotting, assessing and recruiting indigenes for penetration of local CP organizations.
- (k) Doubling of Soviet or CP agents within emigre groups.
- (l) Contacting, cultivating and defecting local Soviet personnel.
- (m) Spotting, assessing, recruiting and training additional CAMBISTA 1 personnel for local agent and leg work.
- (n) Establishing a network of safe houses and dead letter drops for use in the event of war.
- (o) Spotting, assessing, recruiting and briefing of stay behinds.
- (p) Writing and mailing poison pen letters.
- (q) Enlisting the services of the Belorussian clergy for overt anti-Soviet attacks.
- (r) Organizing anti-Soviet reading rooms.
- (s) Gathering and transmitting Soviet publications.

It is anticipated that if authorized by Headquarters, this project could be activated by summer 1952. The men spotted by CAMBISTA 2 to carry out the above activities will report to Munich for assessment and whatever training will have been devised for them by us. It is expected that we will pay them full salaries and provide them with operational funds, for which they will be accountable to us.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. For higher spotting selectivity:

Inasmuch as over fifty percent of candidates spotted by CAMBISTA 2 and sent to Munich for assessment are rejected, it seems imperative

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to work out a pre-assessment screening device, which would eliminate less of time, personnel and expenditure by disqualifying undesirable elements in their countries of residence and preventing their wasteful convergence on Munich. It is the opinion of the undersigned that covert interviews with candidates in their countries of residence could be laid on for an American case officer with fluent knowledge of Russian under the cover and with the assistance of CAMBISTA 1. The case officer could thus determine the potential of candidates locally and in one sweep rather than doing it in Munich by degrees and belatedly. On 3 December 1951, the undersigned conferred in Brussels with a representative [] in an effort to promote, organize and initiate the afore-mentioned screening device. On being advised of the difficulties involved in dealing with emigre groups in Belgium, the undersigned followed [] recommendation of delaying all matters pertaining to direct contact with CAMBISTA 1 and 3 members in Belgium, pending further conferences []. The undersigned was advised that a representative [] would appear in Munich in the future to resume talks on the matter. Since no immediate action to get pre-assessment screening underway became possible in Belgium, due, primarily, to the conferees' inability to determine the precedence of one priority as opposed to the other (REDSOX vs. [] current operations), it is felt that Headquarters decision and guidance should precede all attempts to embark on similar negotiations with []

b. For improvement of CAP:

(1) Security:

In view of the impracticality of effectively cutting off the CAP translating staff (composed of provisionally cleared, non-US personnel) from sensitive information, it is recommended that all personnel connected with CAP be in possession of full operational clearance. Attempts to isolate some members of CAP personnel from operational knowledge available to others has proved unsuccessful and is, in the estimation of the undersigned, a grave security risk.

(2) Availability of operational personnel:

In order to set up CAP as self-reliant assessing unit independent from project case officers acting as interrogators, and free-lancing Carriage operators upon whose availability CAP has had to depend, it is recommended that a permanent operational staff comprising interrogators and Carriage operators be assigned to CAP. In order to brief the staff-interrogators on the specific project requirements regarding

the group being assessed, the necessary comments and recommendations could be made to the interrogators by the project case officer on the initial day of assessment. Experience has proved that a minimum of three interrogators and one Carriage operator are required to cover the operational assessment of a group of six assessees in the five days CAP program now in effect.

(3)

Inasmuch as candidates assessed by CAP are told by CAMBISTA 2 spotters that they will be assessed by a US military commission for the purpose of determining their military qualifications for war time use, it is recommended that a portion of the personnel at CAP

on occasion caused embarrassing queries on the part of assessees.

c. For coordination of AEQUOR
projected AEQUOR/WEST activities:

in areas of

Authorization is requested from Headquarters to permit the AEQUOR case officer to make personal contact in England, France, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Spain and Italy, in order to:

- (1) Make arrangements enabling the AEQUOR case officer to personally contact leaders and prominent personalities of CAMBISTA 1 and affiliated organizations in all afore-mentioned countries, to:
 - (a) Fully exploit, better organize, and widen the present field of group contacts, in an effort to implement the existing anti-Soviet potential of AEQUOR.
 - (b) Locate a possible substitute for CAMBISTA 2, to be recruited in the event CAMBISTA 2 quits for political or other reasons.
 - (c) Locate, sound out and possibly cultivate Belorussian movements, groups or individuals opposed to CAMBISTA 1, or politically unattached.
- (2) Coordinate all projected AEQUOR/WEST activities.
- (3) Implement with our group contacts all similar activities carried out

- (4) Determine areas of respective non-intervention regarding [] AEQUOR/WEST operations.
- (5) Discuss the availability of the following support assets [] towards AEQUOR/WEST operations:
 - a. Information on local IS
 - b. Information on local emigres
 - c. Information on local IS-emigre contacts
 - d. Information on local IS facilities available []
 - e. [] personnel available in support of AEQUOR/WEST operations
 - f. [] and letter-drops available in support of AEQUOR/WEST operations.
- (6) Introduce the following AEQUOR/WEST assets in support [] operations:
 - a. Information on emigre groups and individuals
 - b. Spotting, assessing and recruiting emigres for [] operational use
 - c. Information on CP activities within emigre groups
 - d. Information on Soviet personnel in support of the REDCAP program through AEQUOR/WEST agents contacts
 - e. Information on local CP activities through indigenous informants recruited by AEQUOR/WEST agents
 - f. Additional [] and letter-drops.

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