

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

progress report

The following is an extract from CSOB Semi-Monthly Report No. 8, dated 28 January 1952, 830-CMGWU (TS 59661):

AEQUOR:

A. The presence of CAMBISTA 2 in Munch has afforded us an opportunity to take stock of this project and to re-affirm our adherence in the operational agreements entered into with CAMBISTA 1 last year. In terms of internal USSR operations, we infiltrated CAMPOSANTO 1 into USSR by air in September 1951. He was to communicate by letter drop and had instructions to attempt exfiltration via Poland prior to November 1951 with a situation report, but if this were not feasible, to remain until the spring, meanwhile communicating through the drops. To date we have had no word from CAMPOSANTO 1. His mission was to determine the extent, if any, of underground activity in Belorussia, and to advise us of the best method of continuing operations in the area if no organized did exist.

B. We have in training at present a team of three agents, which may be shortly augmented by one addition. One of the agents, the prospective team leader, CAMPOSANTO 2, has been in W/T training for approximately eight months and is an excellent operator. If CAMPOSANTO 1 exfiltrates this team will be ready to act on whatever operational instructions or advice he brings them. If he does not, it is planned to use the team to initiate a system of establishing a series of underground units similar to that mentioned above for the Ukraine. This combination of a "controlled black base" which resembles the post-war partisan bunker set-up, and a few agents trained to attempt to move and operate at least semi-legally, will be the pattern for future Belorussian operations. Under this scheme the team would require air infiltration, probably no later than April 1952. Air infiltration is necessary in order that the team, with a relatively large amount of supplies, can be dropped to the densely forested area from which it will operate.

C. Personnel are now undergoing assessment and some have been accepted for a second team which will be prepared to continue expansion of the individual underground bases or in line with any altered scheme which may be presented by information received from the team going in earlier. The two teams would be trained separately in order to minimize security compromise of individuals. (See CACETA.)

D. In terms of long range aims, it is probably accepted by EUCOM, and according to briefing by the Pentagon made available at the recent REDSOX Conference, also by the Defense Department, that the Belorussian area is the one spot where full time tactical coverage would be the best possible guaranty of adequate advance warning if the Soviets decide to launch an all-out attack on Western Europe. In addition, it is here that carefully planned retardation might be successful and particularly effective. Also, nationalist

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

J

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

AEQUOR (Cont'd)

fervor can be counted on to support rear area partisan action which will be simpler to organize if support points already exist. The only way to do all this is to get the "man on the ground" and the CAMBISTA 1 organization has the men and the desire to collaborate fully. We must find a way to make the thing work since to have the warning we desire could obviously alter considerably the expectations of success the Soviets might anticipate.

E. Due to the favorable terrain afforded by the BSSR, i.e. thickly wooded, swampy areas, sparsely populated, we feel that the establishment of "black bases" will present few difficulties. However, the flow of information needed must be passed by us by more effective means than radio, just as we cannot rely on air drops every time we desire to send in a few thousand rubles to a "black base" or a resident. Therefore, if the operation is to be a success we must have adequate lines through Poland and detailed information on the Polish USSR frontier. Probably no other groups, except perhaps the Galician Ukrainians, are so well equipped in terms of language and background to work well and effectively in a Polish based courier service. If we have this channel, the chances for the success of the operation would be immeasurably increased.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION