

1. OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL OF CAMBISTA 1.

A. In view of the anticipated 40 to 50 Belorussian nationals forthcoming during the next few months for assessment under the AEQUOR project as a result of spotting carried out during August 1951 in France, Belgium, England and Germany by four members of CAMBISTA 3 under CAMBISTA 2's directives, (RE: MUNIFG-4915) it appears that the operational potential of CAMBISTA 1 and affiliated organizations is becoming a matter of concrete evidence.

B. Our present knowledge of CAMBISTA 1's internal political trends and activities is limited to the external media of their publications and to our brief association with CAMBISTAS 2 and 4. Thorough analysis of the available CAMBISTA 1 newspapers and pamphlets has not been possible due to language difficulties.

C. It is expected that a clearer understanding of CAMBISTA 1's organizational structure will be reached in the near future when translated publications and a detailed brief of CAMBISTA 1's affiliated Parties will be made available to us by CAMBISTA 2.

D. On the strength of our present knowledge of the situation, augmented by the productive results of our association with CAMBISTA 2, and in anticipation of forthcoming amplifications and clarifications, an essentially optimistic opinion on CAMBISTA 1's future operational potential can be formulated at present.

2. RAFFORT WITH CAMBISTA 2.

During meetings held between CAMBISTA 2, [ ] and [ ] on 29 and 30 August 1951 and on 12, 13 and 14 September 1951, it has again become apparent that CAMBISTA 2 earnestly desires and works towards complete mutual understanding and good will. Present problems and future dealings within the AEQUOR framework were discussed freely and in a spirit of cooperation. CAMBISTA 2's requests for financial support seemed tempered with moderation, as indeed is his general approach to American aid. One has the feeling that, unlike some of his emigre counterparts, his concept of collaboration with Americans is not merely a dollar-squeezing proposition, but a joint effort based on services rendered and returned. His attitude regarding American personnel with which he has dealt is courteous and considerate. He doesn't seem to hold American operational efficiency in contempt, which has on occasions been the case with other individuals, and has hastened the end of some beautiful operational friendships.

3. CAMBISTA 2 ACTIVITIES.

A. CAMBISTA 2's degree of control over CAMPOSANTO 1 withstood a test during his visit here on 29 August 1951. He managed to talk CAMPOSANTO 1 out of going to Paris to see CAMBISTA 4, which in view of possible exposure to RIS agents in Paris seemed extremely inadvisable. Since CAMPOSANTO 1, embittered by the postponement of his August dispatch, rigidly insisted on seeing

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GAMBISTA 4, a compromise was reached through GAMBISTA 2 and a meeting between GAMBISTA 4 and CAMPOSANTO 1 was arranged in Strasbourg on 6 September 1951 with [ ] present. Prior to seeing GAMBISTA 2, CAMPOSANTO 1 has also been most unwilling to attempt a September dispatch. GAMBISTA 2's intervention in this matter also brought satisfactory results.

On 10 September GAMBISTA 2 arrived in Munich to participate in CAMPOSANTO 1's final briefing. GAMBISTA 2 had previously requested permission to attend CAMPOSANTO 1's take-off in order to check his equipment. Upon being explained the impossibility of complying with his request, on the grounds of rigid regulations governing access to US military installations, GAMBISTA 2 agreed to merely go over each item verbally with CAMPOSANTO 1, and suggest changes, additions, or substitutions, as the case may be. The briefing was attended by [ ] and [ ]. A few minor changes relating to CAMPOSANTO 1's equipment were suggested and complied with, and all aspects of CAMPOSANTO 1's mission were reviewed. Following the meeting, GAMBISTA 2 and CAMPOSANTO 1 were allowed complete freedom to confer in private and at length on matters pertaining to GAMBISTA 1.

B. During conferences with [ ] and [ ] on 29-30 August 1951, GAMBISTA 2 stated that his summer spotting program (RE: MEMA-6244) had produced an estimated 40 to 50 candidates for assessment. GAMBISTA 2 handed us seven preliminary PRGs completed by candidates spotted in Germany.

On 12 September 1951, GAMBISTA 2 furnished us with a list of 28 names of individuals located in Great Britain, three in France and one in Belgium, bringing to 39 the total of candidates thus far spotted by GAMBISTA 2 available for assessment.

C. On 30 August 1951 GAMBISTA 2 was informed of the need to recruit Belorussian individuals eligible to perform the following functions:

- 1/ An individual available to us in Munich to act as principle agent, cut out, assistant in preliminary assessments, translator, liaison with GAMBISTA 2.
- 2/ An individual of Soviet background with operational and/or partisan experience, to assist in training agent-candidates.
- 3/ A W/T instructor.
- 4/ An elderly couple to act as house-keepers for agent-candidates in the training area.

GAMBISTA 2 promised to bring to Munich for assessment O/A 1 October 1951 an individual whom he feels will meet requirements to exercise the functions of principle agent (RE: item 1/). GAMBISTA 2 expressed confidence in the possibility of filling the remaining slots of the proposed Belorussian staff within a few months.

D. In regards to the poor results of CAMPOSANTO 3's assessment (RE: MEMA-6669) GAMBISTA 2 suggested that CAMPOSANTO 3 might have been withholding war-time SS connections, thus throwing the assessment machinery off.

During conferences on 30 August 1951 CAMBISTA 2 offered to look into the CAMPOSANTO 3 question on his next meeting with CAMBISTA 4.

On 14 September CAMBISTA 2 stated that both he and CAMBISTA 4 backed CAMPOSANTO 3's bona fide without reservations. CAMBISTA 2 showed marked disappointment when told that CAMPOSANTO 3 could under no condition be cleared on CAMBISTA 2 and CAMBISTA 4's recommendation alone.

It was explained to CAMBISTA 2 that putting the assessment machinery in motion again on someone whom we felt had been given an ample chance to prove his bona fide was an issue in itself which would have to be carefully weighed. It was suggested to CAMBISTA 2 that he procure us with a new life history by CAMPOSANTO 3, specifically disclosing and elaborating on lies and falsifications made during our assessment of the subject.

Upon analysis of this new history, a final decision could be reached by us as to the advisability of re-assessing CAMPOSANTO 3.

#### 4. POLITICAL DATA FURNISHED BY CAMBISTA 2.

A. CAMBISTA 2 considers Russian emigre organizations to be unsympathetic towards Belorussian problems in view of their predominantly Great Russian memberships. He feels that the question of self-determination paramount to Belorussians interests is being pushed in the background in favor of what CAMBISTA 2 terms "Russian imperialism". He favors cooperation among all Russian minority groups and the pooling of all resources, providing everyone concerned recognize the Belorussian state as a political entity which now exists within the USSR, albeit under a government which is unacceptable to the majority of its inhabitants.

B. CAMBISTA 2 stated that he would like to attend the meeting of the Council of the Belorussian National Rada, which will be held on and around 25 December 1951 in New York. If present, he intends to introduce and urge a resolution towards making the first step in the direction of collaboration and understanding between all Russian emigre groups.

C. CAMBISTA 2 urged the US to make concrete formulae and clear cut definitions and programs of future political policy and intentions regarding Belorussia, in order to draw the Belorussian masses to our side.

D. On 27 August 1951, CAMBISTA 2 was asked to furnish us with detailed information on the organizational structure of Belorussian political groups throughout the world. In answer to this request, CAMBISTA 2 sent ticklers to Belorussian groups in various countries requesting latest data on this subject. Answers began coming in on 15 September 1951, and CAMBISTA 2 hopes to furnish us with a complete report O/A 1 October 1951.

In the mean time CAMBISTA 2 volunteered the following approximations on the subject:

#### BELORUSSIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN BELGIUM:

A. SAJUZ BELORUSOV U BELGI (Union of Belorussians in Belgium).

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MEMA-7052

**President:** Jan ZYTKO

**Membership:** 800

**Headquarters:** 8 Place Hoover, Louvain

**Branches:** Liege, Charleroi, Monse, Waterschein.

**Character:** Cultural, educational. Lectures on current political topics re: national issues.

**Affiliated Organization:** SABS (SAIUZ ARGANIZATZIAU BELORUSKVAI EMIGRATZI)

**President:** Leon RYBLEWSKI

**Headquarters:** 65 rue du Granvilliers, Paris.

**B. ZHURTAVANIE BELORUSOU KAMBATANTOV (Society of Belorussian veterans)**

**President:** Theodor YIMOFIJCZYK

**Membership:** 120

**Headquarters:** (Same as item A)

**Branches:** (Same as item A)

**BELORUSSIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ENGLAND:**

**A. ZHURTAVANIE BELARUSAU U VIALIKAJ BRITANI. (Society of Belorussians in Great Britain)**

**President:** Alexis NADSON

**Membership:** 1200

**Headquarters:** Penn Road 52, London N7.

**Publication:** Nas Lachu.

**B. ZHURTAVANIE BELARUSAU GAMBATANTOV U VILIKI BRITANI (Society of Belorussian veterans in Great Britain)**

**President:** Piotr SYCZ

**Headquarters:** 20 Southampton Road, London SW 5. (President's address.)

**C. KRISTIANSKAE ABIEDNANIE BELORUSSAU RABOTNIKAU U VILIKI BRITANI.**

Split in two groups both located in London.

**President:** Group A: Nikola BULAK  
Group B: SURAVY (fnu)

**Membership:** Group A: 160

**Character:** Opposition group. Opposed to the ENR. Considers that the legal Government should comprise of members of the Central RADA

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(headed by ASTROBSKI, now in Argentina) put into power in 1944 by the SS General GOTTBERG.

BELORUSSIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE US:

A. BEIHRUSKAIE-AMERIKANSKAIE ZHURTAVANIE U US.

President: Nikola HOROSKO

Headquarters: 325 East 100th Street. NYC

Publication: Belarus.

B. CENTER OF BELORUSSIAN VETERANS

President: General KUSEL

Headquarters: NYC

C. BELORUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC ASSOCIATION

President: Dr. J. STANKLEVITCH

Headquarters: 6 Vanderveort Place, Brooklyn 6, NYC.

Publications: Veda.

BELORUSSIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CANADA.

A. ZHURTAVANIE BELORUSAU U KANADIE

President: K. Akula

Headquarters: 119 Bathrn St. Toronto, Ontario.

Publication: Belorusau emigrant

BELORUSSIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ARGENTINA.

ZHURTAVANIE BELORUSAU U ARHENTINIE.

President: Konstantin MERLAK

Headquarters: Calle Itapiru 2681 V. Alcina. Buenos Aires.

STUDENTS ORGANIZATIONS:

A. Belgium: President: Boris RUGHULA

Headquarters: 8 Place Noever, Louvain, Belgium.

B. France: President: Michel NAUMOVICZ

Headquarters: 13 Avenue de la Bourdonnais. Paris (7)

- C. Italy: President: Piotr TATARINOWICZ (priest)  
Headquarters: Via Carlo Santano 2, Rome
- D. England: President: Goslan SIFOVICH (priest)  
Headquarters: Marian House, Holdam Avenue, London N 12.
- E. US: President: Michel TULEJKA  
Headquarters: 325 East 100th St, NYC.

5. FINANCIAL AID REQUESTED BY GAMBISTA 2 FOR THE PUBLICATION OF "THE FATHERLAND"  
(RE: MURFUG-4915; MEMA-6214)

As far as can be ascertained by GAMBISTA 2's comments and verbal translations of leading articles in the last issue of "The Fatherland", the political line of this publication appears to be moderately nationalistic and generally consistent with the conciliatory tone of GAMBISTA 2's own political statements.

"The Fatherland" will be published on a trial basis with our covert financial support for the next three months (RE: WASHFC-07419) during which time copies of the newspaper will be pouched to Wash. for final analysis and disposition.

Since financial support for continued publication of the "Fatherland" appears to be GAMBISTA 2's most consistently pressing request, it is hoped that final approval will be granted following the three months trial period.

6. COMBINED CSOB/ZRELOPE ASSESSMENT PROJECT.

In view of the operational potential for both the CSOB and ZRELOPE programs of the forthcoming 40 to 50 Belorussians (RE: par. 1.), it was suggested that ZRELOPE and CSOB pool their assessment methods, resources and personnel.

The task of the assessment program will be to select:

- (1) Type A candidate (For partisan-warfare training under ZRELOPE).
- (2) Type B candidate (For agent training under CSOB).

A. Candidates will be assessed at the ZRELOPE assessment center by the available ZRELOPE staff augmented by a CSOB case-officer and a carriage-operator.

B. The assessment program governing each candidate will be geared to last approximately one week.

C. Name-checks will be initiated by CSOB and completed on all candidates prior to their convergence on the ZRELOPE assessment center.

D. Candidates residing in Germany will be contacted by ZRELOPE spotters and directed by them to the ZRELOPE assessment center.

E. Candidates residing outside of Germany will be contacted through GAMBISTA 2 channels, received by CSOB personnel and routed to the ZRELOPE assessment center.

F. Cover used by candidates to authenticate their movements to and from their places of residence will be:

- (1) Vacation trip; and if extensively questioned upon their return home;
- (2) Admitted involvement in the LODGE BILL program.

G. After termination of assessment, Type A candidates will be directed to return to their homes and await developments. Type B candidates will be turned over to CSOB for immediate training.

H. CE action will be initiated against candidates suspected of penetration designs.

The above assessment program has been tentatively scheduled to begin on 1 October 1951.

7. RECOMMENDATION

In view of the eminently satisfactory results of GAMBISTA 2's Summer spot-ting campaign at a cost of 50,000 Belgian Francs, it is recommended that approval be granted to finance his continued efforts in this direction.

