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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

12 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/2

SUBJECT : Review of Positive Intelligence Production from
Project AEMARSH for the Period 1 February 1958
to 1 February 1959

Statistics

1. Our review of the AEMARSH project reveals that positive intelligence production during the period 1 February 1958 to 1 February 1959 was as follows:

No. reports received/processed:	30
No. reports used in disseminations:	26
No. reports rejected:	3
No. reports awaiting dissemination:	1 ([] material - see para 17)
No. of disseminations:	23
No. of evaluations requested:	6

General Comments

2. The major portion of the production from the AEMARSH project during the period under review has been derived from AEMARSH/1 debriefings of ethnic Germans repatriated from the Baltic area. To illustrate, 74 percent of the total disseminations from the AEMARSH project were based on such debriefings. This figure would be increased to 87 percent if the product of the debriefings of a Soviet (Latvian) citizen visiting West Germany were included. The other 13 percent of production stemmed from elicitation or debriefings of Soviet visitors or escapees in the West and from one REDSKIN trip to the USSR ([]) which was financed through the AEMARSH project. Production from the latter is still being processed (see para 17).

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3. During the period under review, no requirements for positive intelligence collection were forwarded to the field from Headquarters (according to SR/RQ records). Although twenty of the twenty-three disseminations concerned topics on the IPC list, debriefings were rather shallow and therefore contributed less than they might have had good, detailed requirements or debriefing aids been used. Nevertheless, 87 percent (23) of the raw reports received were considered worth dissemination to customer agencies. This figure includes one report from [] (EGF-2577) which was handled by another division because its emphasis was not on the USSR. Approximately 50 percent (12) of the reports received were prepared by the field on mats which Headquarters found usable for dissemination. Customer evaluations were requested for six of the published reports.

4. Specific comment on the reporting of the various AEMARSH assets follows, with emphasis on AEMARSH/1 debriefings which have contributed the bulk of this project's production.

AEMARSH/1 Debriefings

5. Twenty-two of the twenty-four field reports resulting from AEMARSH/1 debriefings were disseminated to the intelligence community. The two rejects (EGFA-21942 and EGF-3493), on the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and military activities in the Dundaga area respectively, contributed no new information. Otherwise, AEMARSH/1 debriefings have, in general, contributed good information and have been timely. But, with the exception of about three reports, the total impression is that almost as much was left out of each report as could have conveniently been included. As a result, especially interesting topics have lacked the desirable authenticating detail of how the information was acquired by the source, precisely where it was obtained, since in most instances the information was based on the personal experience or observation of the source, and more exact estimates of numbers of individuals, installations, and objects. The comparing of previously collected intelligence information to source knowledgeability on similar topics, and in some instances the same topics, in order to supplement, to correct, and to bring up to date our holdings is likewise not reflected in the reports. Techniques and emphasis in reporting have varied. For example, in one instance, the utilization of an enormous amount of time in debriefing on a city plan resulted in a detailed well-balanced and well-prepared textual report, with an exhaustive effort to pinpoint points and installations of interest by employing suitable graphic support. This effort resulted in an excellent evaluation by ORR and by the British (see para 6). But the effort on another city plan report was directed solely to the preparation of a graphic study (see para 8).

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6. The most outstanding reports produced by AEMARSH/1 are the result of city plan debriefings. CS-3/355,722 (EGFA-15370 and 15584) entitled "City of Kaunas", was based on a debriefing of an ethnic German repatriate who resided in Kaunas. The report was 17 pages long and included 64 paragraphs of textual material and an annotated city map of 48 points. The debriefer obviously used the City Plan Debriefing Guide available to the Frankfurt Operations Base, which is generally used in city plan debriefings conducted under the AEROPLANE project and at CABEZONE. The textual material in the report covered such topics as reconstruction since World War II, population, military installations, and activities, controls, shortages and black market activity. The material presented was comprehensive, in breadth as well as in depth. An excellent job of translation from the original language appears to have been performed. According to ORR/D/GG/S, the report filled a priority need and was probably true. Considerable importance was attached by this office to receiving further reports on this subject. The British (JIB) gave this report their highest rating, calling it of considerable value and "well set-out".

7. However, the material for CS-3/355,722 (another city plan) was received from the field in two separate reports (EGFA-15370 and EGFA-15584), necessitating a complete Headquarters re-write, with emphasis on reorganization of subject matter and elimination of duplicating items. Also, the attachment to the finished report, an oversized map enclosure, had to be annotated at Headquarters from two separate overlays. Although the end product was exceptionally good, the tremendous effort expended at Headquarters might have been reduced had the field been in a position to employ a more logical approach to the task, which admittedly was enormous.

8. CS-3/379,972 (EGF-3741), entitled "Town Plan of the Old City of Riga", displayed on the part of the source, an ethnic German repatriate, an exceptional memory. Only 13 pages long, the report is composed solely of a legend, consisting of 258 points, with an attached oversized map enclosure. An evaluation from ORR has been requested, and although not yet received, it is not too presumptuous to suggest that this probably represents the most detailed installation report on that city. Nothing in SR/6/Maps is comparable. The report was processed on mats by the field and required little Headquarters' effort before publication. The existence of about 80 percent of the installations listed in the report was verified through the 1955 Riga Telephone Directory. It would seem that the same source could have provided textual support and background information on the city (c.f. para 8) which not only would have enhanced the legend, but also would have brought up to date (to 1958), no doubt in considerable detail, the military, industrial, political, economic and social conditions of the city. It appears from the layout of the report that it was initially prepared as "homework" by the repatriate. and that no debriefing for general information was done.

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9. Similar criticism applies to CS-3/358,911 (EGFA-21844), entitled "Town Plan of Dolgiy Most" (N 58-17, E 32-27, Novgorodskaya Oblast). This report was two pages long, with an attached memory sketch serving as a basis for the city plan. ORR/D/GG/S evaluated this report as of considerable value and probably true. They described it as "excellent", with none of the 63 points shown to be wrong based on "somewhat limited information presently available". This was SR/6/Maps' first acquisition on this town. Textual support for this report would have been especially appreciated, since the town described lies in an area suspected of guided missile activity and the date of information was fairly recent (to 1957). As an example of missing information which would have been useful, no mention was made of traffic on the nearby abandoned railroad line, which has recently been reported reactivated.

10. CS-3/366,748 (EGF-3361), CS-3/372,158 (EGF-3359), and CS-3/372,567 (EGF-3360) are based on information provided by a Latvian woman visiting West Germany. Considering the probable clandestine aspects of this collection effort, the acquisition may be considered very good. Topics of high interest were reported on in timely fashion. However, the use of generalities where particulars must have been known and the apparent subjectiveness of the source somewhat destroyed the effectiveness of the reporting. For example, CS-3/372,567, entitled "Conditions in Latvia", attributes to the Latvian girl who earns about 400 rubles a month as a typist "the resorting to prostitution, which has blossomed very quickly in recent times". "High officials, who are the biggest promoters of prostitution", come to Riga "on business trips from the USSR". Comment on how this information was acquired by the source and description of specific instances would have added authenticity. Specific details as to where in Latvia, and specifically where in Riga, what high officials, and through what devices, i.e., pick-ups, "motorized prostitution" would have been useful. Source's thorough knowledge of the city and its conditions as displayed in CS-3/372,158 suggests that she could have provided the information outlined above.

11. Of the four reports submitted on civilian air defense measures, one report, CS-3/378,156 (EGF-3738), is from a source identified as having participated in civilian defense training. It may be presumed that the source of another report, CS-3/372,130 (EGF-3492), likewise participated. Of principal interest in the latter report are the sketches of locations of bunkers; some of these locations were confirmed in CS-3/378,156. Since these reports were on a topic of high priority, with recent dates of information, thorough exploitation of the repatriates' knowledgeability would have been desirable. From the participant, no mention is made of who conducted the classes; how well they were attended; length of classes; specifically, what subject materials were discussed, i.e., capabilities of foreign aircraft, devastation statistics, and chain of command and

organization of local services during emergencies, since this is known to be given in similar classes; participation in actual drills; was source in the training group taken to see the bunker described in paragraph 2, and if so (besides the description already given), how and of what materials was the bunker constructed, i.e., thickness of walls and doors, ventilators, depth of bunker, etc.; and was the bunker supplied with non-perishable foods, water and emergency equipment? "Similar bunkers are supposed to be built in every house in Riga," coupled with the statement that another is known to exist, suggests that this source, who is described as a former resident of the city, could have provided much more information on this topic.

12. Again, very timely information on a topic of considerable interest was reported in CS-3/353,032 (EGF-2885), and CS-3/368,532 (EGF-3384), but both reports, on Lithuanian and Latvian partisan and resistance activity, suffered greatly for want of detail, detail which would not have spilled over into the area of operational intelligence. Other than the message that resistance exists in these areas, given much too cryptically, the reports contributed little. For example, CS-3/368,532, entitled "Lithuanian Resistance", was based on information provided by an ethnic German repatriate who is described as a former member of the resistance. The date of information is 1952-1958, and since the date acquired was July 1958, it is possible that the date of information actually extended to mid-1958. The total contribution was hardly one page long, lacking descriptions on modus operandi, acts of resistance, numbers of partisans and their age groups, weapons used, political sympathies, support from non-participating elements of the population, etc. One who was in the movement for at least six years should have been able to provide more information of interest.

13. Similar criticism may be made of CS-3/380,737 (EGF-3739) entitled "Military Installations in the Velna Ezers District of Riga", from an ethnic German repatriate who viewed the installations; CS-3/371,395 (EGF-3351), entitled "Prison Camps in the Karaganda Area", from an ethnic German repatriate described as a former prisoner; and CS-3/371,631 (EGF-3363), entitled "Establishments in the Solikamsk Area", from an ethnic German repatriate described as a former prisoner, which ORR evaluated as of considerable value and probably true. Neither of the last two reports included diagrams of the compounds, anything about internal administration, even deductively arrived at, life in the camps, or unusual events in their camp experiences which might be related to more significant occurrences elsewhere. In one report, description of the work performed was ^{dismissed with} the notation that "political prisoners in these camps were employed in construction work", while in the other report nothing was said about security.

] Reporting

14. During the period under review, only one positive intelligence message was received from [] It was considered too vague and known to be of intelligence value and was not disseminated.

] ([]) Reporting

15. Of the three [] reports received, only CS-3/351,995 ([]) can be considered a good acquisition. The information was obtained as a result of the agent's attendance at an international conference in which a Soviet delegate participated. Although part of the report dealing with conditions in Latvia and Estonia was somewhat vague and general in nature, the major portion of the report presented good biographic information on the Soviet participants, as well as similar information on certain popular Baltic literary figures. The other two reports based on debriefings of the four Latvian fisherman were too vague, brief, and dated to be of much value. One of these reports was published as part of CSLT-3/678,734 (); the other () as CS-3/350,732.

AEMARSH/15 Reporting

16. The one report from AEMARSH/15 (EGF-2990), entitled "Difficulties in Transiting the White Sea Canal", consisted of one short paragraph based on information obtained from a Soviet merchant marine officer. It was combined with other material on the same subject and disseminated in CS-3/353,173.

] Material

17. Material resulting from []'s trip to the USSR was transmitted in raw form under cover of [], dated 6 January 1959, and is still being processed by SR/Reports. The following disposition will probably be made of the material: The sketch of the main portion of the city of Riga will probably be disseminated as a CS report; the postcards and photographs will probably be deposited in Graphics Register; the maps will be sent to ORR Map Library; and the art programs, timetables, and other overt documents will be sent to SR/6 for possible use. Without knowing more about the circumstances of this trip, it is difficult to conjecture how much more valuable information might have been acquired had Headquarters guidance been given. However, there are specific targets of interest in the Riga area to which [] could conceivably have been steered, with perhaps more profitable results than the recoverage of known locations in the city. Also, if the trip was made by air, briefing on how and what to photograph from the plane might have proven valuable.

Suggestions for Improved Reporting

18. If renewal of this project includes continuation of AEMARSH/1's debriefing efforts and/or potential REDSKIN trips for acquisition of positive intelligence, it is suggested that the field be provided with appropriate requirements, briefing, and debriefing aids so that we can get "more for our money". Specifically, if the debriefing of repatriates is to continue on any scale at all, we suggest that the German situation be reviewed in the light of action being taken in other parts of the world with respect to exploitation of such sources for positive intelligence. For example, would it be worthwhile or feasible to base requirements on some sort of personal history statement? The following additional suggestions are based on the assumption that some debriefing of returnees or visitors will continue.

19. Debriefings could be in more depth. The most prominent deficiency in the AEMARSH collecting and reporting effort is lack of detail. Conditions of debriefing vary and therefore affect the latitude and depth of material covered. However, the nature of the reports examined, many on the same topics about the same areas covering the same period of time, reflect a disregard for the "digging" aspect of acquiring information. A certain amount, even minimal, of reviewing previously collected information to see that new information fills gaps, up-dates, and supplements, should be performed in the field with Headquarters' guidance.

20. Debriefings could be broadened to include more variety of subject matter. Not only is there lack of depth on a given topic, with exceptions amply described above, but there is also lack of a lateral approach to debriefing. Of some 16 independent sources of information, the most concentrated reporting came from a Soviet (Latvian) visiting West Germany who produced three reports; two sources produced two each; the remaining produced one each. It is difficult to believe that the reports from these repatriates represented their total worthwhile knowledgeability. In paragraph 9, we have already suggested that a more extensive approach to debriefing might have resulted in the acquisition of highly desirable information of a high priority nature. ORR, in its evaluation of the report on Solikamsk, stated that any information since 1956 was needed on this entire area. If these sources were available for additional debriefing, possibly much more intelligence information, although not necessarily of similar priority, could have been collected.

21. It would be desirable to have the field transmit where applicable the original language version of terms and phrases which appear unusual or new, as well as of installations and points of interest. This is essential for preserving the "local color" and for purposes of authentication. The AEMARSH reports only rarely carried original language items.

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22. We should like to recommend that a more generous use of the reference, graphic, and guide materials at the Frankfurt Operations Base and in the German Station Complex be used in debriefings. Much of such material is unclassified. As you know, one of the best collections of references and maps in Europe can be found at CABEZONE. These have frequently been made available to FOB personnel. An Air Force comment indicates the desirability of using standard references. CS-3/365,222 (EGF-3153 and EGF-2972), entitled (1) Military Information Concerning the Latvian SSR and the Lithuanian SSR; (2) Atomic Defense Bunkers in Riga; and (3) Possible Missile Base in the Dundaga Area, based on information from ethnic German repatriates, was called of value and probably true by the Department of the Air Force. Air Force also commented that the sketches would have been more useful if the information were keyed to "suitable graphic bases". We are sure that what is meant is use of the AF Target Complex Mosaic Series.

[]
Chief, SR/Reports

KC:PK:vt

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