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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

UW Reps. in Denied Areas

FROM

DDCI

NO.

DATE

30 Aug 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

NO.	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1	<i>DDCI</i>	<i>30 Aug 62</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Redacted]</i>
2	<i>DDCI</i>			<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Redacted]</i>
3	<i>DDCI</i>			<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Redacted]</i>
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FORM 610

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4-22-62
62-5175

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**SUBJECT: Unconventional Warfare Requirements
in Denied Areas**

**REFERENCE: 5M-1079-58, dated 27 October 1958, Subject:
Unconventional Warfare Requirements**

1. By Reference, JCS indicated that agent assets externally held in CONUS do not meet the requirements for Priority I/Category I areas within USCMCENUR's area of responsibility. The memorandum requested that CIA initiate new programs, where applicable, to assure that assets developed for such areas be located, if possible, within the area of potential operations or, as a minimum, within the geographical area of responsibility of the commander concerned.


2. From a careful review of all references regarding the subject, I believe that our mutual interests will be served if we reach a common understanding concerning CIA's capabilities and limitations to develop in-place agent assets in the denied areas of Europe. In addition, I believe we can both profit from a frank discussion as to why CIA cannot accomplish as much as we would like on UW requirements which are to be undertaken in wartime.

3. Attached at Tab A is a CIA concept which discusses our capabilities and limitations and contains a proposal which we feel offers a reasonable chance of success in support of theater commanders' wartime UW operations. The concept has been informally discussed with members of the Joint Staff. Not mentioned in the paper, but which I think is pertinent, is the fact that our past capabilities to accept UW requirements in denied areas do not reflect the amount of effort we have expended but rather the practical limitations

under which we must operate. We will, of course, continue our efforts to develop assets in denied areas in response to our peacetime requirements, and plans will be maintained to permit their conversion to wartime intelligence collection or UW missions. Whenever such assets are located within or reasonably close to an area selected for deployment of Special Forces Teams, the possibility exists that the agent may act as a contact man for the Team. Since this possibility is very remote, however, we do not feel justified in accepting UW requirements against the potential survivability and such wartime use of the assets. It is for these reasons that we have undertaken the development of externally held assets.

4. Although our proposal places great reliance on assets externally held within CONUS, we believe that, given a period of progressive alerts during a worsening international situation, they can be prepositioned in overseas holding areas prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities (GAO). In order to more speedily deploy the agent assets into the military commanders' preplanned UW target areas, we are finalizing plans for: alerting and assembling the agents; issuance of required documentation, clothing and equipment, and special material; overseas reception and location of secure areas for the agents; communications; final briefings on target areas and missions; case officers to handle the agents; and transportation into the target areas. If the situation allows implementation of our prepositioning plans, the theater commander will then have under his control a CIA Force which could respond to UW requirements on D-day. On the other hand, if the situation precludes pre-D-day overseas positioning of the assets, our plans are still valid except that our CONUS held assets can, for the greater part, only meet military requirements for Priority II operations (D/30 to D/90 days).

5. Your views on the attached proposal will be welcomed.


Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Director

1 Attachment:
Tab A, as stated

Signature Recommended:

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

WPS/GLO: ph (17 July 1962)

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**Proposal of CIA Concept in Regard to
UW Assets in Denied Areas**

1. NSC 5412/2 gives the CIA responsibility for covert operations and lists the types of actions to be accomplished. In part, this Directive states: "In accordance with established policies and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces in time of war for staybehind assets and evasion and escape facilities." In military terminology, UW consists of Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, and Subversion (Resistance).

2. With the advent of the Special Forces (SF) program in the Army, and the development of an Evasion and Escape (E&E) program by the Air Force, military requirements for CIA covert action support increased. The Army and the Air Force have indicated that their respective programs would be greatly facilitated if the CIA could provide assets within denied areas which, upon the outbreak of hostilities, would be prepared to undertake UW tasks in support of military operations.

3. In responding to military UW requirements in the past, CIA has listed four types of assets which it could reasonably be expected to provide.

These are:

a. Action nuclei located where possible within the area of potential operations, equipped with communications and supporting facilities, and trained to perform a specific type of UW task, i. e., Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, or Subversion.

b. One all-purpose agent organizer within each probable area of operations with communications and the capability to gather operational intelligence and spot (but not necessarily recruit) personnel for the requirements in the area.

c. Assets of a supporting character who will be able to provide limited support to responsible elements of the Armed Services within the operational area. Such assets are not capable of undertaking specific UW tasks, but can provide local information, establish contact with the local resistance potential, or provide safehaven or communications facilities and services.

d. Where prewar establishment of assets resident in the denied area is not possible, to recruit and train and hold externally selected cadres of agent and action personnel for wartime infiltration into the operational area.

The JCS, after making an assessment of these four kinds of assets, stated their preference for a, b, and d assets in that order. With regard to external assets, the JCS consider that for these to be considered effective for Priority I operations (D-day), they should be held within the theater where they would be readily available.

4. In 1959, the number of UW requirements submitted to the CIA by USCINCEUR totaled 198, of which 90 were for assets in denied areas. Of the denied area requirements, CIA accepted 66, 3 against assets in being and 63 against programmed assets. In 1960, total requirements dropped to 116, of which 68 were in denied areas. Of the latter, CIA accepted 26 against current assets and 10 against programmed assets. Of the 36 accepted, 35 were accepted against externally held assets. Only 1 requirement was accepted against an asset in place in a denied area. Acceptances based on programmed assets are of little value for current operational planning, unless their programmed readiness date falls within the effective date of the Military Plan (1 July - 30 June). CIA experience in the past has been that in more than 50 percent of the cases, the programmed readiness date was not met. As a result, changes have been made in asset development programs and requirement evaluation procedures which will make it possible to forecast readiness dates with greater certainty.

5. a. The types of assets which we have informed the Military could be developed fall into two broad categories:

(1) Those developed and held within the area of projected operations; and

(2) Those held externally.

Assets to be developed within the area of operations are recognized to be the most desirable types, but the many problems in developing such assets in denied areas are of an order and scope that make their development infeasible. Among the problems are: internal security within the area, maintaining the motivation of the agents, periodic training, the risk of having the asset come under enemy control, and the time, effort and cost which must go into such an effort when there is little likelihood of success and when there are high priority tasks for current operations.

b. The security risks involved in exfiltrating individuals for training are such that this can only be done in very special cases and cannot be counted on as a standard procedure. CIA has not yet found a way to maintain the motivation of individuals in denied areas without frequent contact between the case officer and the asset. Travel restrictions make this almost impossible. Moreover, if an asset is not allowed to "practice" occasionally, he soon goes stale; and, on the other hand, if he is allowed to "practice," he risks discovery. Perhaps

the most unfavorable factor, and one which we have no sure safeguard against, is the danger of the asset coming under enemy control. The validity of such assets would be unsure. In summary, it does not appear feasible for CIA or any other agency to establish UW assets in any meaningful number in denied areas to be held for wartime use.

6. It is therefore proposed that:

a. It is unlikely in the present circumstances that there will be any improvement over past performance in regard to establishment of covert UW assets in denied areas; and, recognizing the record of slippage, it is improbable that past performance will be equalled.

b. Priority of effort will be given to the establishing of assets having a current capability; however, plans will be maintained to permit their conversion to wartime missions, including UW missions when appropriate.

It has been CIA experience, however, that the life span of current assets is uncertain, and it is not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy which will still be available on the outbreak of hostilities.

c. The development of external assets to be held outside the projected area of operations, either within the U.S. or overseas, will be continued and augmented as required. Major reliance for the fulfillment of UW tasks will be placed on such assets.

Although it is a costly procedure in terms of personnel and money, this solution is practical and has advantages over assets developed and held internally. These are: They are less subject to compromise; they can be trained for the specialty they are to perform; they can, with proper attention to security factors, undertake joint training with military units if such is indicated; and they will be available at the time needed.

With regard to the development of externally held assets, CIA proposes to develop singleton assets or small teams of two or more men who could be infiltrated into the operational area prior to the Special Forces Teams. These assets would be complementary to the Special Forces and would be able to serve as guides and interpreters, since they would have fluency in the language and a knowledge of the area. CIA has undertaken to create a reserve pool of capable and suitable personnel for operations in the denied areas, and at the present time has a small reserve of such individuals in the U. S. These will be available for use with Special Forces, or if such use did not appear imminent, CIA would propose to use them on CIA unilateral missions. CIA is currently expanding its pool of agent assets and reviewing and improving the readiness of

existing assets. In addition, plans are being worked out to enable CIA with military support to transport U. S. held agents quickly to the overseas staging areas.

d. CIA will continue to review all current internal assets to determine their wartime U^S potential. The broad U^S requirement will be considered in connection with recruitment of new agents for current use.