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DATE 2007

SR/DOB/60-2065

7 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Operational Security of Project AEDEPOT

REFERENCE: DDP/PG Memorandum dated 5 August 1960

1. Referenced memorandum indicates that CI has recommended an operational security review be made of Project AEDEPOT. The memorandum further points out that the memorandum on AEDEPOT/2, prepared by the CI Staff, "highlights some aspects of the /vulnerability/ problem." The CI memorandum notes that: (A) The AEDEPOT candidates should be considered sensitive and Targets for Soviet CE penetration, and (B) that some AEDEPOT trained assets have close relatives in the Soviet Bloc.

2. It is perhaps unfortunate that AEDEPOT/2 was selected as a "sounding board" inasmuch as his case is more of an isolated one and does not truly reflect the average AEDEPOT candidate. Whatever the results of his personal actions on the assignment with EE/P in separating AEDEPOT/2 from the AEDEPOT Program it can be reasonably expected that he will abide by the signed Secrecy Oath according to the briefings and debriefings on security matters pertaining to his connections with the U. S. Government. Furthermore, there are a number of factors involved in the AEDEPOT/2 case which are not inherent in AEDEPOT per se and are more the subject of individual review rather than of the Project itself. In reality, the only questions deemed necessary to dwell on are those mentioned as (A) and (B) in the preceding paragraph and the following assumptions can only be conjecture.

A. AEDEPOT candidates as targets of Soviet CE penetration. A basic assumption which must be made is that the Soviets are aware that the U.S. Government is concerned with the formation of units or elements to be used behind the Iron Curtain in time of war. This is felt to be a valid assumption as the U. S. Press, on more than one occasion, has devoted space and comments to Special Forces. It may also be assumed that Soviet Intelligence is either directly aware or has, at least, surmised that non-military cadres formed from USSR ethnic groups are being trained for infiltration in the event of open hostilities. Based on this, the RIS then, is certainly interested in ascertaining the identities of the AEDEPOT graduates. This, they may accomplish by (1) their "rezydentura" in the

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United States, which has penetrated local emigree circles and has been able to identify the candidates through (a) indiscretions on the part of the candidate himself through direct boasting or alluding to participation in hush-hush activities or (b) through the gossipiness of emigrees or others who have an affinity for attaching either a "Communist" or "intelligence/spy" label to individuals or activities they do not like or are unable to comprehend or explain. The Soviets may also become aware of the candidates through censorship in which the candidate, his family, friends, etc., refer directly or allude to such participation. (c) AEDEPOT trainees with close relatives behind the Iron Curtain. The definitions of close relative is generally considered as meaning one's parents, brothers, sisters, or offspring. To this we may add grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins to whom the individual was very strongly attached. Virtually all AEDEPOT trainees, have relatives behind the Iron Curtain:

7 with 1 or both parents:
9 with brothers or sisters.

3. Finally, the recommendation is made that (a) the true identities of other AEDEPOT personnel known to each trainee be made a matter of record, and (b) each trainee should agree not to travel into denied areas without the approval of this Agency. SR/DOB has done the following in this matter.

A. First, in the security briefing given to the students, it is stressed that they do not discuss their names, place of residence, or any personal data with each other. Secondly, at the conclusion of each training period, each student is debriefed as to which of the other students he knows by true name. It should be pointed out at this juncture that knowledge of one another's true name in certain cases is inescapable for a number of reasons. Paramount is (1) the submission of names of potential candidates solicited of the graduates, (2) the men tend to group themselves ethnically and when they are from the same town they cannot help but meet at church, social functions, etc., and thereby learn true names.

B. Although official papers to this effect are not signed, each graduate is told that any contemplated travel outside of the United States should be made known initially to the Project officer.

4. In summation, in view of the assessment procedure, the possibility of a Soviet penetration agent entering the Program is considered to be virtually nil. That the Soviets are aware of this Program per se or assume that such a project is in effect must be considered to be a highly likely possibility. In opposition to this we have the high security consciousness on the part of the graduates themselves. Furthermore, as an added precaution, though the graduates fully realize that their hot-war assignment will be into their "native" area, the exact or even general location is not

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known to them. Thus, even if the Soviets somehow knew that [] was slated for the Ukraine, one man (or even a dozen) living "black would be difficult to apprehend in an area of over 214,000 square miles and among more than 40,500,000 people, and even more so with chaos which will be rampant in time of war.

5. SR/DOB feels that the security aspects of the AEDEPOT Program are good, and efforts to maintain and improve it are a continuing factor.

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Chief, SR/DOB

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22 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AEDEPOT-2, aka. AEGRINDER-1, previously AELARDER-1
C-42212

1. Subject, an AEDEPOT trained "reservist", was involved in WW II Polish underground activities. He is the cousin of DS-575, a Polish tele-technical official who defected in 1953, and with whom he lived for a time in the United States. From 1951 Subject corresponded with his mother in Poland, where he has other relatives. He travelled to Poland in 1957 and 1959 to try to assist his mother in emigrating from Poland to the USA.

2. In November 1957 SR/DOB presented for approval the AELARDER Project, to dispatch into Poland and the western USSR the subject individual, AELARDER-1, who had recently completed a six months course of training in clandestine techniques and tradecraft under Project AEREADY. Para. 8b(2) of the project proposal stated that "He displayed a definite aptitude for the tasks envisioned for him under Project AELARDER. His psychological, psychiatric, and medical evaluations indicate his adaptability and fitness to engage in the operation."

3. The CI Staff questioned the wisdom of exposing a trained AEDEPOT asset as proposed and noted that psychological-psychiatric assessments in 1955 and February 1957 reported that he "has been unable to persevere and succeed in any vocational endeavor, is unstable and immature and that he may be unpredictable under sustained stress". On 3 December 1957 this discrepancy and other points concerning the AELARDER project proposal were discussed with representatives of EE/P, SR, FI/OPS, and CI Staff. SR representatives stated that SR assessment of Subject, during and after 6 months training, was very high. Some modifications were made in the project proposal and Subject was dispatched.

4. During his stay in Poland Subject reportedly was in touch with an old friend, AEGRINDER-2, a personal pilot to high officials of the Polish Government, with access to the USSR and satellite countries. Accordingly EE/P project AEGRINDER, to dispatch Subject to Poland to assess and debrief the target, was submitted in September 1959. Upon return Subject was debriefed

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and polygraph tested, during which test he deliberately attempted to influence the machine. There were indications that Subject bragged to his family in Poland of his "special connections with the U.S. Government". Because of Subject's dishonesty in financial dealings and operational reporting, and because of lack of discretion, and because he had contacts with UB personnel, EE/P requested termination of the AEGRINDER Project. CI Staff, on 24 March 1960, concurred and recommended that AEDEPOT assessment procedures be reviewed when that project comes up for renewal. Subsequent discussion with the AEDEPOT case officer has indicated that the AEDEPOT recruitment process has become more selective and assessment procedures have been revised and the standards raised.

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CI/OG/SovSat

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