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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3022  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

DO/DOB/64-8

11 March 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, DODS**

**SUBJECT : Use of AEDEPOT agents beyond that for  
which recruited**

1. Following is a brief summary covering AEDEPOT agent performance per your oral request.

2. Background: As a general pattern, the average AEDEPOT agent candidate is largely motivated for the program because of ties to his respective country of ethnic origin. On completing their basic training and signing reserve contracts the agents frequently want assurance they will be called up only in event of a national emergency or hot war, and then for use only in their own ethnic areas. This assurance has always been given them.

3. During the period April - September 1960, WH representatives levied a number of requirements on DOB for agent personnel to perform a variety of work in support of JMARC. These requirements varied considerably in subject, i. e. maritime, demolitions and sabotage, WT communications, weapons, maps and compass and so forth. Files of graduate SR agents were screened and some 26 agents selected by Chief, DOB were approached for the assignments. All were advised this effort would not be for the U.S. Army (under which cover they were trained) but against communism in general and in support of an operation with which the U.S. Government was sympathetic. Of those pitched, a total of 21 volunteered. All signed initial 3-month contracts and many were extended to periods of eight months; one still remains, three years later. The agents served in Guatemala and Panama as instructors in the subjects listed above, as members of boat crews in the Caribbean, etc. Although several were later quite critical of what seems to have been poor handling on the part of WH staff personnel, none of the agents quit the AEDEPOT reserve.

4. During December 1961, Chief, EE anticipated a possible outbreak of hostilities as a result of Khrushchev's threats over Berlin. EE asked SR for a minimum of 12 Polish speaking agents to be on standby

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for infiltration into Poland to report on rail and military traffic through Poland into East Germany. SR agent files were screened for Polish speakers (not a prerequisite for SR agents) and 18 agents' records reflected knowledge of Polish. These agents were approached and 15 agents volunteered to perform this assignment. They were then brought to DOB's training site in January 1962 for a two-week reorientation and briefings. Although they were never committed, these 15 agents provided a standby task force for EE during 1962. At that time, EE began levying requirements on DOB for the recruitment and training of agents for EE's contingency and hot-war needs.

5. In addition to the two relatively large groups above, four SR agents have been individually used operationally by other components of the Agency:

- 1 By NE Division during 1958 in Jordan
- 1 By EE Division twice, during 1959 in Poland and again during 1960 in Poland
- 1 By SR and NE jointly since 1961 in Iran
- 1 By SR and NE jointly since 1962 in Iran.

☐ Chief, DO/DOB ☐

PEC/ccs

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