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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference with WPS Representatives

1. A conference was held on Monday, 27 November 1961 at SR/DOB with representatives of the War Plans Staff, on problems of mutual interest. Representing WPS were [] while the SR/DOB members were [] The conference touched upon a number of pertinent points and appeared to be beneficial to both parties concerned.

2. The WPS visitors were provided a concise picture describing the origin of SR/DOB, its development and the expansion of the AEDEPOT Program from a strictly SR enterprise to one which now embraces both EE and NE type assets. In response to questions raised as to the ultimate utilization of the various agents trained, it was pointed out that SR and EE assets were recruited, trained and (tentatively) targeted against the J.C.S. target requirements, whereas the NE agent assets were limited in number and are considered as an across the board contingency force to be used in event of limited/localized situations in the Middle East. A brief discussion centered on the employment of AEDEPOT assets for other than their proposed missions, i. e., such as their use by WH Division in the "Cuban deal". WPS reviewed this with some concern, generated primarily by the potential "loss factor" which could conceivably occur. It was quickly brought to their attention that although a number of the graduates who participated in the WH action were quite disgruntled with the "other outfit" which handled their project, it was SR/DOB's very considered opinion that if anything, their loyalty and faith in "M. T. U." was strengthened. The matter of training was briefly covered touching upon the broad aspects of subject categories with relation to the various training sites: Fort Meade, Camp Pickett and Camp Drum.

3. At a previous meeting the question had been posed as to the possibility of effecting emergency contact and assembly of the AEDEPOT graduates in the event of a national emergency. The suggestion was advanced by SR/DOB that perhaps DPD would have aircraft available. [] reported at this meeting that DPD would probably not have any facilities available in the event of a national emergency to provide air-lifting the AEDEPOT agent assets to any assembly point. He suggested that perhaps the Office of Security representatives in the key cities could alert the men and

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provide them (from stockpiled sources) with documentation which would facilitate travel under priority conditions. As a last resort it was suggested that the men could proceed to nearby military installations in order to secure transportation. This discussion of course, inevitably led into the problem of where the men (AEDEPOT agent assets) should assemble in the event of imminent hostilities. It was explained to WPS that according to information made known to SR/DOB, the relocation (and final assembly, briefing, and equipping) point would be Isolation. This apparently did not appear too suitable to WPS and they intimated that a site other than Isolation would be a more feasible one.

4. A direct product of this final theme could readily be headed by the question, "Does SR/DOB have a responsibility to the agent assets beyond their training, holding and call-up in event of hostilities?" This involved a certain amount of conjecture on the responsibilities of various components. It was unanimously felt that once the men had boarded a flight for Europe, they would be under the authority of the (military) Theater Commander. An animated discussion revolved around this point and a conclusion reached that for purposes of retaining continuity, assuring maximum efficiency in briefing and equipping the assets, they should remain under SR/DOB jurisdiction until they are aboard a plane taking them to their final pre-target destination.

5. [] stated he felt that the surfacing of pertinent "wartime" questions, and assuring the proper assignment of responsibility to cover all contingencies, was a problem WPS should resolve. To this end, he and his staff will consult further with DC/SR with recommendations for written "DOB wartime responsibilities".

[]
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

Distribution:

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