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20 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : CINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCAL Requirements Compliance and Ready Status

- REFERENCES: a. 12 December 1958 Memo from SR/COP/Plans to CPP,  
subject as above
- b. 17 March Memo for the Record, subject: "Acceptance  
of U/W Requirements"

1. I met several times during the last two weeks with [ ] SPA/DDS, and [ ] Commo's point of contact for SR Division, to discuss SR's response with respect to last fall's requirements exercise involving the 63 U/W requirements received through the JCS channel. In a nutshell, the problem that has arisen is the belated discovery through [ ] coordination as SPA/DDS on the response over DCI's signature to the JCS that the consolidated capability statement for the various divisions, including SR, did not take into account Commo's capability to support the deployment phase of this exercise. With specific reference to SR's capability we indicated that 100% of the 63 U/W requirements could be accepted and that in 22 cases our capability was already in existence. (In the remaining 41 cases our acceptance was qualified by the indication that SR's capability was "in the developmental stage".)

2. After considerable discussion it was agreed that PPC should have made available to Commo, at the start of the requirements exercise in late 1958, the complete package of requirements (with overlays, maps, narrative discussion, etc.) so that Commo would be able to make their contribution from the point of view of Commo's ability to provide base support for agents who, in wartime, would be introduced into the target areas. In the absence of this step in the process, no accounting was taken of Commo's ability to provide the required communications support. This was not as much of a problem in the case of the other area divisions because Commo had prepared signal plans and done all their homework at the time of the development of the various stay-behind projects on the books. Additionally, it was not too much of a problem for SE's AEDEPOT-type capability because of the small size of the area involved and Commo's earlier planning based on the Agency's facilities in Cyprus. The problem in the case of SR's acceptances is obviously

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most difficult in the case of the nine requirements in Northeast Siberia accepted on the basis of AEDEPOT agents since these particular target areas are well out of the range of the Okinawa Commo base facility. In a subsequent meeting on 14 May with [ ] of PPC, [ ] Commo, [ ] and myself in attendance, we arrived at the following agreement:

- a. In those cases where SR indicated on their capabilities reports that we had an asset in existence this will be changed to "asset under development". In other words, even though we have the agent stockpiled in 22 cases, the change of readiness indicator has been made to give Commo a chance to work out something around the problem of base station support. It was agreed that this will be a cleaner solution than any effort to introduce qualifying language to the effect that the agents are available but Commo does not have available base station support, etc.
- b. On the next go-around [ ] agreed that PPC will feed copies of all requirements to Commo at the start of the exercise. Then SR and the other divisions will be called upon by their respective Commo liaison officer to work out details with respect to communications support. This will be done before anything is put on paper about capabilities.

3. After the meeting discussed above, [ ] and I met to discuss several points with respect to the latest renewal request on Project AEDEPOT. I suggested that several changes are in order in the text of the renewal request, largely to make it clear that AEDEPOT's existence is justified as a predominantly intelligence (not U/W) capability. More specifically, I pointed out that the renewal request as initially drafted suggests that the 63 U/W area requirements received this past year from the JCS represent the only foundation stone for the project. I indicated also that the "Tasks" section is slanted in its entirety to U/W activities with no mention of intelligence except in the context of "Operational Intelligence Support for U/W Activities". Mike agreed with me that it would be well to retool the renewal request to put over the idea that, while the only requirements against which we have measured the AEDEPOT assets so far have been the U/W requirements, we are expecting a whole batch of JCS intelligence requirements any day.

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We agreed also that it would be well to put over that the training to which the AEDEPOT agents are subjected is slanted predominantly toward the intelligence (largely through communications training) although some U/W training is given to round them out. It was agreed, in summary, that the above adjustments are in order because the project is being submitted through FI and not the PP project channels. Lastly, Mike agreed with me that it would be well to make an adjustment in the renewal request to show that the "3 agents per target" (not all of them accomplished communicators) will be an ultimate goal instead of an actuality since SR's indication of capability in the U/W exercises was based on one AEDEPOT agent per target.

[ ]  
SR/COP/Plans

Distribution:

- 1 - Chief, DOB
- 1 - SR/COP, SR/COP/FI, SR/DCOP/FI
- 1 - WP/Requirements
- 1 - Chrono

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