

DETAILED BRIEFING ON AEDEPOT PROGRAM

The CIA global war plan for clandestine operations, TS 149,000 dated 2 August 1957, is intended to define the major missions of CIA war time clandestine operations and establish the general functions and concepts which will guide the detailed planning for war time organizations, operations, and support.

The assumption that little or no warning, prior to the actual overt acts of war, will be given by the Sino Soviet bloc is contrary to reasonable expectation and experience. The attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, has widely been acclaimed as having happened without warning nevertheless, much has been written since, showing evidence that the United States was vulnerable to attack at that time. It is doubtful that any nation's first overt act would be the sudden launching of a massive nuclear attack. Isn't it more reasonable to expect the Reds to continue their diversionary tactics at which they have been so successful? It should be assumed that we have sufficient warning of an impending all out war at the time that the Soviets have ceased being successful in expanding international Communism. At that time we should infiltrate our externally held agent assets where possible and hope that we have sufficient numbers in place to be effective when needed.

The assumption that the Soviet bloc is capable of overrunning the Urasian land mass is a sound one and it further emphasizes the desirability of having our agents in place prior to that time. In some instances it may be desirable to have some of our agents in the allied countries prior to their being overrun and then the agents may be able to make their way to their target areas easier and quicker than we could get them there after the fact.

One of the missions of CIA, stated in the Criteria for Determination Wartime Military Requirements for CIA clandestine operations, TS 109734, dated 29 October 1955, is UW operations.

Prior to war, CIA will establish action nuclei ready for exploitation by the DCI or appropriate military elements. Nuclei of this type, where possible, would be located within the area of potential operations, compartmented in accordance with the respective purposes to be served and should be equipped with communications and supporting facilities. When this degree of preparation by CIA is not possible, CIA will undertake the following, separately or in communication as possible: to establish a probable area of operational action at least one all purpose agent organizer with communications, who can gather operational intelligence and spot, but not necessarily recruit, personnel for the

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requirements in the area; to establish broader assets of a supporting character, not constituting independent action capability; to assist the primarily responsible elements of the Armed Services. Such assets will report operational intelligence, establish contact with local resistant potentials and provide reception, safe haven, and communications facilities, and services, where pre-war establishments of assets, residence, in the denied area is not possible to recruit and train, and hold externally select cadres of agent and action personnel for war-time infiltration.

CIA will not normally undertake such action as demolition and denials, as it is presumed that military forces are the more appropriate instrument for such activities. It is with the combination of the above objectives in mind that SR/DOB is conducting the AEDEPOT Program: that is to recruit, train, and hold externally, ready for infiltration at the direction of the DCI against assigned targets, select personnel who would then report operational intelligence, establish contact with the local resistance potential, and provide reception, safe haven, and communications facilities, and services until the arrival of the Special Forces.

Since D-day is indeterminable at this time, it cannot now be predicted when the DCI will call upon these assets. Therefore it behooves us to plan comprehensively how we can develop sufficient assets within a reasonable period and to execute such plans to the fullest extent of operational and administrative policies. Each target area could be satisfactorily covered by a team of three agents, that is, a leader to protect the United States Government interests, a former national of the target area who would establish contact with resistance potential and who would be less susceptible to be apprehended, and a WT radio operator, to provide communications.

In the area of SR/DOB interests, there are 63 targets presented by the military, which are current as of this date and require 198 agents. By the end of FY 60, the AEDEPOT Program has developed over 52 agents. Pending receipt of authorization to increase current facilities and capabilities, SR/DOB can continue to develop no more than forty agents per year. The following policies are established within SR/DOB in order to provide a clear understanding of how the AEDEPOT Program is to attain the foregoing objectives.

The AEDEPOT Program is a part of the CIA unconventional warfare activities being undertaken by SR/DOB specifically to prepare timely support to our military forces in anticipation of open hostilities against the Soviet Union. The support is not intended to duplicate guerrilla warfare activities of the Special Forces, but will primarily consist of subversion behind enemy lines in a secure and clandestine manner.

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Each CIA agent team will normally be assigned an area of about 25 miles in radius. Its mission will be: (a) to be prepared for an immediate commitment; (b) to refrain from overt and direct acts of sabotage and raids which may unduly expose its members to capture; (c) to report operational intelligence; (d) to organize support and advise indigenous friendlies in unconventional warfare through their leaders; (e) to initiate the organization of an escape and evasion net; (f) to provide reception and a smooth and thorough turnover of responsibilities to Special Forces upon order of proper authority; (g) to perform any other mission directed by proper authority.

Under Department of Defense Cover representing a highly classified unit, recruitment of agent candidates will be by any secure means available and will be based on all four of the following factors: (1) Potential ability to perform tasks involved; (2) Motivation; (3) Unquestionable loyalty; (4) Voluntary acceptance.

1. Potential ability. From the initial spotting of a candidate there must be a continuous evaluation of him by all concerned, whether the individual's past history and current assessment indicate any reason which would definitely prevent him from being mentally or physically able to perform a team member's duties, notwithstanding, our capability of rendering him proper guidance and adequate training. All members of a team must have a language ability of the target area. The leader of the team must possess proper temperament, stability, resourcefulness, maturity, and be able to complete the exercises of authority over his team members in order to perform his primary function of being the United States Government representative. The principal agent must be able to mingle among the native population of the target area without creating undue attention or suspicion. This requires native fluency in language, customs, habits, appearance, and area knowledge in order to perform his primary function of being the effective link between the team leader and the friendlies of the area. The WT radio operator must possess the aptitude to become a highly proficient communication member of the team.

2. Motivation. Each candidate must be evaluated to determine at least one good reason why he should want to participate in this program. Individuals whose families have been persecuted by communist rulers, or who have a particular desire for revenge, or immigrants who are particularly appreciative of the benefits that they have received in this country and the opportunities offered here, are generally adequately motivated to perform clandestine duties against the Soviet Union or for the United States. Individuals who appear to be soldiers of fortune or of a mercenary nature may still be acceptable candidates if it can be determined that they are genuinely sincere in being willing to perform their duties under the terms of the contract.

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3. Unquestionable loyalty. Due to the security aspects of this program any chance of disloyalty or susceptibleness to become disloyal to the United States Government and its properly appointed authorities must be determined as early as possible and by whatever means may be deemed appropriate. Only those candidates who are given an operational clearance by proper authorities should be allowed to read and sign the contract. In no case should a candidate be told the nature of the Program prior to his reading the contract.

4. Voluntary acceptance. Due to the hazardous nature of the duties involved, only volunteers will be acceptable as candidates for the Program. A continuous evaluation of the candidates will be made during the recruitment, in order to predict whether he will or will not volunteer when presented with the contract. Leading questions should be asked, such as; in the event of war would he rather be a junior officer in a parachutist unit of the U. S. Army, or would he rather remain in his present civilian occupation? How he answers, including the apparent sincerity of his answers, should help to estimate his future reaction in being asked to sign a contract. Whenever it is revealed that a candidate is not apt to volunteer, further processing will cease, pending a decision by the Chief, SR/DOB to proceed. In addition to the above criteria for recruiting, each candidate's acceptance will depend upon other factors that must be considered on an ad hoc basis for each individual case. For instance, if a candidate is about to be drafted into Military Service, it may be advisable to let him acquire such training and pick him up later or it may be advisable to request a delay in induction to permit him to take our training first. In any case, arrangements must be made with the military to tag the 201 files of our agents in order to insure that their services will not be denied us if and when we need them. In another instance, a candidate may be earning more than \$600/month in his civilian occupation. Consideration must then be given to determine whether his qualifications would justify a training salary so much higher than that received by other trainees. Candidates accepted for training will receive an amount equal to their average civilian gross earnings, plus 10%, and operational expenses with a minimum of \$100/week of gross salary. In most cases candidates will request our assistance in getting them a temporary leave of absence from their civilian employers to undergo the training periods and to insure their employment upon their return. Official requests to employers will be made under Materiel Testing Unit, U. S. Army cover but, in no case will we commit the U. S. Government in being responsible for the candidates resettlement problems after the training period.

Training

Upon acceptance of the candidates as trainees it must be realized that they are potential priceless assets. In order to justify the efforts and costs involved in this program and more specifically to accomplish

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our mission of providing this unique support to the military, we must gain the respect and confidence of these agent trainees. Our task of training and organizing them into respective teams for future employment will be greatly simplified if they want to learn what we have to teach them. The majority are, or will be, naturalized citizens and their initial orientation period, manifesting why they are here, should be candid, frank, sincere, and factual. Their loyalty was satisfactorily resolved before this, so now, lets use it. Their training will consist of tradecraft, fieldcraft, and technical subjects commensurate with their mission as outlined above. The training requirement is divided into three distinct phases with specific objectives for each phase. Basic phase consists of 16 calendar weeks in residence with about 950 hours or more of orientation and application in clandestine activities. Primary objective of the basic phase is to determine whether the candidate possesses the potential aptitude to learn and apply each of the related clandestine activities. The secondary objective is to instill within the candidate a sense of mutual respect, further desire, and to overcome the inherent allied fear of progressively advanced subjects of clandestine activity, plus study and practice of certain subjects while at home during the remainder of the year. Its primary objective is to enable the candidate to become proficient in the subjects for which he has shown an aptitude. Its secondary objective is to increase his motivation and his desire to further his knowledge while at home. Lastly, to determine the various possible ways of utilizing him. The final phase and indeterminable period of testing and refresher training as necessary between the date of mobilization and date of dispatch. Its primary objective is to determine the candidate's readiness for his mission. Its secondary objective is to provide further training if necessary and if time permits.

Holding

Upon successful completion of basic training, the candidates will be thoroughly briefed on pertinent aspects of their future status as reservists. The briefings will include: (1) which agency employees they know, by what name; (2) the security requirements; (3) the submission of names of likely candidates, but to refrain from any recruiting; (4) maintaining proficiency; (5) reporting every change in personal status; (6) being available for periodical refresher training, and (7) being available for commitment as necessary. Assistance will be provided in re-establishing the reservists in their former economic milieu but at no time will the United States Government be committed as being responsible for rehabilitation of reservists whose misconduct or misfortune is not directly attributable to his association with this program.

Major functions of the Program are as follows: Maintenance of liaison between the War Plans Officer of the SR Staff, CA and SWP Staff and SR/DOB staff in order to keep abreast of the current requirements

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and progress. Direction of recruiting, training and holding in reserve suitable agents will be provided by Chief, SR/DOB or DOB/COP. Planning for the assignment, mobilization and commitment of the assets to be provided by officers concerned in the AEDEPOT Project.

The SR War Plans Officer will keep SR/DOB abreast of current requirements and the Project Officer recommends ways and means, including presentation of the basic plan and annual renewals, of fulfilling the requirements to the DOB/COP for the approval of the Chief, SR/DOB and higher authority as may be necessary.

The DOB/Chief of Operations directs the chiefs of various staff sections within SR/DOB to perform their respective functions in support of the Program and requires monthly reports from each staff section chief by the second working day of the ensuing month.

DOB/Chief, SA&E Section supervises the acquisition of acceptable candidates. His monthly reports to DOB/Chief of Operations will include all contacts made, funds expended, and the progress being made on the recruiting end, assessing, recommendations, and an estimate on future progress.

The DOB/Chief of Training will submit schedules of instruction for approval and will subsequently supervise all the training as necessary. His monthly reports to DOB/Chief of Operations will include a training progress evaluation of each student, any appropriate recommendations, and an accounting of man hours and funds expended.

The Commanding Officer of the Military Cover Unit will be responsible for the welfare of the students while in residence and will maintain the necessary liaison with the military at the post in providing for the required housekeeping and training site facilities. His monthly report to DOB/Chief of Operations will include a character, health, and personality evaluation of each student, plus a record of supplies and funds expended. Recommendations and estimates of future requirements will be reported as necessary. A daily journal will be maintained at the site, with entries of each relevant incident, including arrivals and departures of all personnel.

The DOB/Supply Officer will requisition for, and issue supplies, maintain proper records in accordance with approved procedures. His monthly report to DOB/COP will include a single list of transactions for the AEDEPOT Program, the cost of each item and the method of accountability. Requisitions for planned purchases during the following month will be submitted with justification for approval.

The DOB Staff Support and Fiscal Officer will require written requests, on approved forms, for advancement of funds and will require receipts or

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certificates when appropriate in accounting for funds expended. He will be responsible for rendering advice on fiscal matters and maintaining accountability and records in accordance with Agency rules and regulations. His monthly report to DOB/COP will account for all funds expended in relation to the AEDEPOT Program.

The DOB/Security Officer will make such recommendations regarding security as he may deem appropriate. He will conduct such investigations and inspections as may be necessary to determine the degree of security discipline being exercised at the training site. He will maintain files indicating the various names of all personnel associated with the Program. His monthly report to DOB/COP will cover any investigations and inspections he may have conducted during the month with his recommendations.

There are many offices, branches, and divisions of CIA, plus other agencies and departments, who assist wittingly or unwittingly in Project AEDEPOT. In this case a name of a veteran is produced, giving his current home address, his place of birth, his age, and his language ability. With this information a covert interview is conducted during which time a member of the SA&E section, or one of our spotters, attempts to determine from the candidate, in a covert manner, whether he looks the type that would make a potential candidate. The information gathered at this covert interview is then incorporated in a request for a POA (Provisional Operational Approval). Upon receipt of the Provisional Operational Approval an official interview is conducted with the candidate. At this time a member of the SA&E section will contact the candidate under the auspices of the Department of the Army, simply showing that there is a government interest in the individual, and further information is elicited from the individual.

He is then asked if he would be willing to come to Washington for further testing and examinations. Should he consent to do so, his fare is paid to Washington and he is expected to get a leave of absence from his civilian employment for approximately one week. While he is in Washington he undergoes a physical examination, a polygraph examination, a biographical debriefing, a psychological examination, his photographs are taken, his fingerprints are taken and he makes several handwriting samples.

Upon conclusion of the assessment period here in Washington, if the reports indicate that the individual is acceptable, either the Project Officer or one of his assistants, interviews the candidate, at which time he makes the pitch explaining the Program to the individual. This is done after the individual has signed the Secrecy Agreement.

When the candidate agrees to participate in the Program, he is instructed to return home and await further instructions. During the ensuing period, all the paper work has been accomplished by the SA&E

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section, and the analysis of the assessment package is submitted by Chief, SA&E, through the Project Officer to Chief, SR/DOB. Upon acceptance of the individual into the Program the PRQ's I and II are completed and a request for an OA (Operational Approval) is then submitted. Meanwhile the Project Officer processes a request for a pseudo and alias for the individual and he submits contract information and check list. He then notifies the candidate by mail of acceptance into the Program.

When the candidate acknowledges the letter and agrees to participate arrangements are then made to get the candidate excused from his civilian employment. Most of the time it requires an official letter from the Pentagon to the employer under Materiel Testing Unit cover, denoting U. S. Government interest in the individual for a period of approximately four months, with a request to the employer that he release the man for the four month period to assist the Government, with the understanding that he will rehire the individual at the end of this period, without jeopardizing his re-employment rights. When the employer concurs, a letter is sent to the candidate to report for duty. Arrangements are made to meet the candidate upon his arrival in Washington. He is immediately assigned an alias and instructed not to use his true name again in the company of other students. He is then taken to the training site at Fort Meade, Md. at which time he is given a briefing and a synopsis of the entire course. Individually, the candidates are interviewed by the Project Officer again at which time they are given the contract to sign.

Then they embark on their sixteen weeks of intensive training. During the first three weeks they are confined to the immediate training area and are not allowed to go home or have free weekends for security indoctrination. A letter drop is given to each candidate in order to allow his immediate family to correspond with him without divulging the exact place or site of his training. The trainees are quartered in pleasant surroundings and are fed U. S. Army garrison type rations. They are clothed in U. S. Army field clothing. All this is given them without expense to themselves.

By the end of the third week they are quite well versed in their cover story and are able to answer leading questions from their friends or families at home. After this time they are allowed to go home or wherever they wish during the weekends when no training is scheduled. They are paid every two weeks and most of them send a greater portion of their pay home. They are not allowed to bring their automobile or any other identifying objects with them for security reasons.

During the sixteen weeks there are many hours of classroom training and field problems, either in town or at military installations, or at industrial sites. They also go on three extended field trips: one to Camp Drum, N. Y., where most of the air operations training and

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demolitions takes place. The jump training from the 34 ft. tower, although no jumps are made from aircraft by the students, they do see demonstration jumps by the staff members. Training at Isolation consists of border crossing and demolitions. They are flown back to and from the site. Toward the end of the course there is an extensive field problem at Camp Pickett, Virginia, where the final comprehensive exercises are conducted. Upon completion of 16 weeks of basic training, each candidate is interviewed individually by the Project Officer at which time he is asked if he desires to continue his participation in this program. It is at this time that the contract he signs initially is terminated. Should he agree to participate in the future, he is then requested to sign a new contract of two year duration which requires him to maintain contact by mail with the Project Officer. To increase his proficiency or maintain his proficiency, to be available each year for approximately two weeks of further advanced training. During this period he is reimbursed with an allowance of 50 dollars quarterly to take care of such incidental expenses that are involved in this nature of business, for instance he is required to take a post office box in his community where mail can be sent to him without being censored by members of his family. He is taught simple methods of Secret Writing, should he desire to write items of a sensitive nature, he can with this training write his subject matter on the back of ordinary letter paper without fear of censorship by unauthorized personnel. In the event that he knows a friend or someone whom he thinks would be interested in this type of Program he is instructed to elicit all pertinent information and send the information to us. He is directed not to do any recruiting himself. He is instructed to maintain or to stay abreast of current events in his former country and to report on items of intelligence interest. The processing of these agents is a continuous one.

The Project Officer accomplishes vital documents cards on each agent for the RI files.

[Chief, SR/DOB]

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