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SR/DOB/62-164

7 June 1962

*File
OPS
Policy & Studies Review*

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SR/Plans

SUBJECT : Response to C/WPS memo for C/SR, dated 1 May 1962

REFERENCES : a. C/SR/COP/Plans memo dated 4 May 1962;
b. WPS memo 196.29 dated 1 May 1962

1. In responding to reference b. on the testing of Wartime Readiness, it is felt this is an appropriate time to reiterate certain DOB concepts which have been stressed in the past. Attention is drawn to paragraph 1 of reference b. which quotes the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities: "We urge that action be expedited to bring the planning for intelligence activities in time of war to the highest feasible state of readiness and that a realistic war gaming of them begin as soon as practicable." DOB has repeatedly contended that the ultimate profitable exercise and testing of the AEDEPOT Program's efficiency would be that of holding joint exercises with Special Forces in the European Theater. This plan does not envisage a haphazard or indiscriminate application of all AEDEPOT graduates into such an exercise. It has been approached on a very selective system, i.e., through the selection of the more outstanding cadre members, the potential team leaders, who then would not only enhance and enrich their own capabilities and confidence, but would demonstrate to the Special Forces the type of support they could expect from this Agency's clandestine personnel in time of hostilities. The resultant mutual benefit to be derived from this form of exercise should be evident to any professional intelligence officer. Unfortunately, whenever this subject was broached, it was derailed by the DDP ruling that "externally held assets should not be compromised.....". The security risks of such an operation, as it pertains to the AEDEPOT selected graduates, could be held to a minimum through the use of "black flights" and the personnel operating in alias. Should this again be denied, it is felt that as a minimum acceptable standard, selected AEDEPOT graduates should be permitted, in fact urged, to participate in Special Forces training exercises in the Z.I.

2. In direct response to the requirements in paragraph 3 of reference a., the following answers are provided as keyed to the questions appearing in attachment 2 of reference b.

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- (3) DOB not only maintains a current list of AEDEPOT assets at its location, but has supplemented this by duplicate files in VD. Furthermore, target activities and team selections are being formulated for inclusion in VD as well. DOB is also currently engaged in the development of an emergency pick-up and alert plan to supplement the regular plan. In addition, DOB periodically checks the SR file of REDSOX identity data cards to insure up-to-date correctness.
- (4) The lack of available qualified case officer personnel has slowed the preparation of target folders. These folders are being compiled and have the ultimate aim of providing each team with concise and comprehensive data about its own specific area of operations.
- (11) Insofar as the AEDEPOT cadre is concerned, the plans for conversion of personnel to wartime application are in the process stage, consistent with answers to questions (3) and (4) above. The same may be stated for materiel, but to a lesser degree of readiness.
- (12) Through its expansive recruitment efforts and general planning, DOB has a limited number of assets available for use in regions for which no military requirements have been received, and is continuously searching, within its operating capabilities, for additional assets of this nature.

[Chasr, SR/DOB]

ECBP/gc

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