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4-1124

28 SEP 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT: Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance of JCS
Wartime UV Requirements

REFERENCES:

- a. SR Memo of 25 August 1964, on this subject
- b. EE comments on Ref. a., dated 10 September 1964
- c. WPS Comments on Ref. a., dated 17 September 1964


1. SOD concurs in the recommendations of SR Division contained in Ref. a., including the suggestions by both SR and EE that this be extended to include the Denied Areas of Eastern Europe. These recommendations essentially conform to the views expressed by SOD in the "Review of Projects Which Respond to JCS Requirements for Staybehind," which was submitted to ADDP on 17 February 1964.

2. SOD is also in general agreement with the comments of WPS contained in Ref. c., excepting that we believe a part of what WPS suggests is either already accomplished or otherwise unnecessary.

a. It is already established beyond such doubt that the current reliance on (WUDEPOT) external assets to meet JCS wartime UV requirements is basically unrealistic. SOD, SR, and EE are all in general agreement on this, and it would appear to be unnecessary therefore to convene a committee to re-examine this issue. The review of WUDEPOT which is now under way is to determine whether these external assets can profitably be put to any other use.

b. A National Intelligence Estimate on the degree of dissidence among the peoples of the USSR and the Satellites would contribute little to the problem. Such

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an estimate already is contained among the basic Assumptions in our Global War Plan; and in any event, regardless of the findings, this would not alter the inability of external agents to establish contact with the dissidents. It is this inability to establish contact, more than the degree of dissidence, which is the basic weakness in the whole WUENFOT concept.

3. SOD is not in agreement with the EE suggestion (Ref. b.) that responsibility for the clandestine development of wartime UW support be relegated to the military.

4. Primarily, what needs to be done now is for the Agency and the JCS jointly to re-examine the validity of the concepts on which military UW planning is based, with the intent of developing a more meaningful formula for the establishment of UW requirements which the Agency can accept.

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Major General, USA
Chief, Special Operations Division

SOD/GB/ []:ch (23 September 1964)

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FROM: C/SR

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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25 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

VIA : Chief, War Plans Staff
Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Reconsideration of CIA's
Acceptance of JCS Requirements for the USSR

REFERENCE : SOD Memorandum, dated 17 February 1964,
Subject: Review of Projects which Respond to
JCS Requirements for Staybehind

1. In Attachment D of reference, SR Division commented on the activity conducted by the Domestic Operations Base (DOB) under WUDEPOT (formerly AEDEPOT) in response to JCS requirements on the USSR. In this attachment we stated, "If SR Division's effort to solve the problem of initial internal contact is not successful, it will be necessary to reconsider CIA's acceptance of JCS requirements for this area." We have taken a long, hard look at the relationship between the WUDEPOT concept and the JCS requirements for the USSR in the light of current circumstances. It is our considered opinion that it is no longer realistic for CIA to look forward to the fulfillment of currently formulated JCS requirements in a hot war situation.

2. Project AEDEPOT was initiated in 1956 specifically to prepare for UW support for the military in anticipation of open hostilities against the USSR. Its original objective was to recruit and train selected agents, and hold them in reserve externally for dispatch to designated targets in the USSR in event of war. All of the JCS wartime UW requirements accepted by CIA in the USSR have been accepted under this project.

3. In essence, the rationale of the concept has been as follows: The JCS has designated targets in the USSR in terms of specified "UW Areas." In wartime the Army Special Forces teams are to drop into these areas to

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support local indigenous dissident forces. The Special Forces teams are recruited in the United States and highly trained for this mission. Their main requirements at the time of deployment are to have some fore-knowledge of the dissident elements in their target area, and to have some secure means of making contact with them. Originally CIA was asked to have agents pre-positioned in place in the target areas to serve these requirements. Since it was not feasible for CIA to do this, CIA agreed to develop and hold agents externally to meet the requirements when called upon (and the JCS accepted this). In the eight years since this was agreed to, there has developed a number of very practical reasons why SR Division now considers even this concept unsound. Under each of the three specific UW-type activities, the key to the success of any of the CIA missions is the ability of CIA assets to establish contact with indigenous anti-regime elements. We feel that, although their training is excellent and the program well conducted, the teams are not, if the situation is viewed realistically, capable of effecting contact with either latent or active anti-regime elements. The mechanism of externally held assets now in being thus lacks the one capability which is essential to its usefulness. This mechanism is maintained at an average annual cost exceeding \$200, 000 exclusive of staff officer salaries.

4. Since we are unable to come up with a satisfactory solution to the key problem, we feel it mandatory that CIA reconsider its acceptance of JCS requirements for the USSR. We recommend that steps be taken through appropriate channels to advise the JCS along the following lines: In 1956 we felt that the operational situation within the USSR made it infeasible to have "sleeper" agents for activation in a hot war. As a consequence we accepted in subsequent years certain JCS UW requirements for fulfillment by externally held assets. We now feel that this latter concept has since been overtaken by events and technological advances and, in effect, has no application today. Given this development, our present responsibilities for the conduct of clandestine operations against the USSR and the nature of our assets for this purpose, CIA is not able to accept the JCS requirements for providing a means of making contact with dissident elements within specified target areas of the USSR. We should add, however, that we are confident that our intelligence collection activities in the USSR (including internal assets in place) will provide some foreknowledge of dissident elements which may be useful to military forces when and if the occasion demands.

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5. In the foregoing recommendation we have addressed ourselves only to the acceptance of the JCS requirements in order not to mislead the JCS as to the nature of the Agency's actual UW capabilities for the target areas concerned. We feel, however, that there are broader issues connected with the concepts upon which the JCS wartime UW requirements are based. We realize that, under existing policy directives, the establishment of wartime requirements and of the concepts and assumptions on which they are based, is a military and not a CIA responsibility. However, as the Operating Division within the Clandestine Services responsible for the USSR, we have a number of reservations on the validity of JCS wartime UW planning which is based on concepts developed more than a decade ago and which have not since changed or been critically examined. We recommend, therefore, that CIA initiate a re-examination of the concept of firing requirements in terms of "UW areas" and of the basic assumption that there exists a high degree of dissidence among the populations of the USSR. This could be extended if EE Division desires to include the Satellite areas. Such a re-examination could be gone into jointly by CIA/WPS and its JCS counterpart or even more comprehensively through the mechanism of the USIB as a National Intelligence Estimate. Such an estimate or re-examination would provide CIA with more meaningful criteria upon which to base its acceptance or rejection of wartime UW requirements.

Chief, SR Division

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10 SEP 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

VIA: Chief, War Plans Staff
Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT: EE Division Comment on SR Memorandum dated 25 August 1964, Subject: Recommendation for Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance of JCS Requirements for the USSR

1. EE Division desires to extend the basic SR Division recommendations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Subject memorandum to include reconsideration of the acceptance of the JCS UW requirements for the Denied Areas of East Europe. While the nature of the requirements for East Europe vary in some points of detail from those for the USSR and CIA has accepted the requirements for East Europe on a somewhat more limited basis than the requirements for the USSR, the substance of the problem is materially the same in both areas.

2. Apart from the points mentioned in the SR memorandum, we believe the following deserves note: Given the utter impossibility of satisfying the Denied Area JCS UW requirements on a prepositioned in-place asset basis and the resultant current reliance placed on externally-held USA assets recruited and trained under Department of Defense cover, it would seem logical that the Department of Defense - should the JCS continue to maintain their current UW concepts - directly conduct this activity with CIA supplying such specialized technical support and training as may be required. The function foreseen for the WUDEPOT/OKWHIPPER assets, it would seem to us, could be best handled by the military creating regular T/O slots for this function within the Special Forces Teams and recruiting and enlisting personnel of the WUDEPOT/OKWHIPPER type as careerist Army specialists.

3. We desire to add the further recommendation that the situation as concerns the complete "debarment" of the Department of Defense from developing for wartime use its own staybehind UW support agents in Free World countries also be reviewed. In the case of West Germany, for example,



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CIA has accepted the JCS UW requirements on the basis of a unilateral in-place W/T-equipped multipurpose singleton support-agent per UW area. Since the conduct of this type of operational activity - until activation in wartime - does not differ in essence from the peacetime conduct of unilateral clandestine collection operations, we do not see any good substantive reason why the Department of Defense should not have permissive authority to develop its own unilateral wartime UW support assets in certain Free World areas, subject of course to the same coordination requirements that obtain for clandestine collection operations.

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Chief
Eastern Europe Division

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17 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

VIA: Chief, Operational Services
Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Reconsideration of CIA's
Acceptance of JCS Requirements for the USSR

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the ADD/P, dated 25 August 1964,
Subject Above


1. WPS agrees with SR Division on the desirability of jointly re-examining with the JCS the validity of the concepts upon which their wartime UW planning is based. We believe, however, that before this is done, we in CIA should establish a clear position with regard to distinctions which should be made, if any, in requirements and concepts for UW in the USSR, Satellites and other denied areas.

2. We are currently reviewing the WUDEPOT program, both in terms of the concepts upon which the program was established and its capabilities to provide trained assets for other than hot war use. Since WUDEPOT is an external assets development program, our conclusions with regard to it will have a bearing on our discussions with the JCS on external assets.

3. After we have established an Agency position on UW concepts for denied areas and on the value of external asset programs for such areas, we would be better prepared to discuss with the JCS their requirements for support of Special Forces Teams programmed for introduction into the USSR and Satellite areas. Inevitably, if we cannot accept their requirements, the JCS or the Department of Army will propose that the Military undertake the development of assets, either internally or externally, to support Special Forces operations. Our position with regard to such a proposal should be established prior to discussions with the JCS.

4. We agree that the JCS should be informed if we can no longer accept requirements for providing a means of making contact with dissident elements within specified target areas of the USSR. We recommend that

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this not be done, however, until after we have established a firm Agency position on the matters discussed above. A suggested schedule for accomplishing this is as follows:

- a. Establish the Agency position with regard to the validity of external asset programs and concepts. Representatives from SR Division, EE Division, FE Division, SOD and WPS would form the committee for this purpose.
- b. Draft terms of reference for a National Intelligence Estimate which would evaluate the degree of dissidence among the populations of the USSR and Satellite areas now, and probable active dissidence in the event of war.
- c. Based on a, above, inform the JCS to what extent we can or cannot accept UW requirements within the USSR and/or Satellite areas.
- d. Concurrently with c, recommend to the JCS that we jointly re-examine the validity of the concepts on which military wartime UW planning is based, with the intent of developing more meaningful criteria for the development of UW requirements which the Agency could accept.

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Chief, War Plans Staff

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